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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM2239, UN SECURITY UPDATE FOR NORTH DARFUR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM2239 2006-09-14 15:40 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3455
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2239/01 2571540
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141540Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4556
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002239 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU
SUBJECT:  UN SECURITY UPDATE FOR NORTH DARFUR 
 
REF:  KHARTOUM 2133 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  UNDSS highlighted ongoing SAF operations in areas 
to the north and southwest of El Fasher.  It estimated the overall 
security environment in those areas as unpredictable, and advised 
humanitarian agencies to exercise caution when operating in those 
particular locales.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) In its regular weekly security briefing on September 14, UN 
Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) highlighted several recent 
clashes between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and rebel troops in 
areas to the north and southwest of El Fasher.  The incidents 
include: 
 
-- September 11:  National Redemption Front (NRF) forces defeat SAF 
in Um Sidir and retake the village.  SAF elements were witnessed 
retreating south to safehavens in Mellit, Kutum, and Kafod.  UNDSS 
did not provide comment on the amount of equipment captured by the 
NRF or the number of victims, though it noted rumors of "possibly 
hundreds" of SAF casualties.  (Note:  In press reporting, NRF field 
commander Malik Adam Tyrab claimed that they seized sixteen vehicles 
mounted with anti-aircraft guns, DShK heavy machine guns, and other 
light armaments. Tyrab held that fighting resulted in only a small 
number of NRF wounded, while there were a number of SAF troops 
killed.  End Note.) 
 
-- September 11-13:  Following its defeat at Um Sidir, the SAF began 
a bombing campaign focused on Um Sidir, Hashaba North, and other 
surrounding villages. (Note:  ARC officer and other observers have 
noted steady re-supply and military flight activity at the El Fasher 
airport, with most Antonov bombers heading north.  It remains 
unclear if bombing continued into the morning of September 14.  End 
Note.) 
 
-- September 13:  UNDSS reported an unconfirmed SAF attack on the 
villages of Dobi-al-Umda and Dobi-al-Madrasa, both located southwest 
of El Fasher and east of Jebel Mara.  UNDSS remarked on reports of 
new NRF bases in the area, which would be the likely reason for the 
military action.  (Note:  ARC officer notes that in conversations 
with AMIS and UN officials, and in press reporting, a common 
assessment is that the SAF is seeking to cut off the north-south 
avenue of approach west of El Fasher.  SAF efforts may be aimed at 
hampering NRF attempts to organize a new front by linking up with 
SLA-Abdel Wahid Deputy Senior Commander Mohammed Adam Abdul el-Salam 
(also known as "Terada") south and southwest of Tawila.  End Note.) 
 
-- September 13:  UNDSS reported that additional troop 
reinforcements were sighted in El Fasher, including 40 vehicles - 
both technicals and troop transport trucks - and up to 1,000 
soldiers.  (Note: It is unclear whether these are additional troops 
providing reinforcement or if these forces have already been in 
theatre and are only being repositioned.  Sightings of substantial, 
heavily-armed military convoys and aerial activity have been common 
since late August.  On the margins, UNDSS further reported receiving 
news of battalion-sized elements deploying from Khartoum airport to 
Darfur on September 13.  End note.) 
 
-- September 13:  An unconfirmed attack was carried out by Janjaweed 
on the "Rwanda" internally displaced persons (IDP) camp near Tawila, 
UNDSS reported.  No further details were available, though UNDSS 
assessed that this was a relatively small and isolated incident. 
(Note:  In its September 13 situation report, AMIS stated: "MGS 
Tawilla reported that at about 122240C Sep 06, ten (10) armed men 
suspected to be Janjaweed entered the Tawilla IDP Camp and at gun 
point forcefully took animals belonging to the IDPs. Some of the 
IDPs managed to sneak out and inform the MGS. The protection force 
personnel were tasked to intervene and stop the act.  On arrival at 
the scene of the incident the gunmen had already left and the 
protection force followed the tracks of the gun men in the direction 
of Um Jalbalkh.  On sighting the PF personnel the armed men opened 
fire and the PF returned fire killing one of the gunmen and wounding 
another." End note.) 
 
3. (SBU) In a sidebar with ARC officer, UNDSS mentioned that the 
precise situation in the eastern Jebel Mara remains unclear.  There 
have been unsubstantiated reports of a parallel SAF offensive aimed 
at dislodging SLA-Abdel Wahid fighters and other "anti-DPA forces" 
in the region.  (Note:  A UNDSS security update reported severe 
clashes on September 10 "when SAF ground forces, including 
artillery, entered the Turba area, which is under control of 
SLA/Abdel Wahid.  The next day fighting declined but intensified 
again on September 12 when SAF reportedly bombed the area.  It is 
alleged that one Abdel Wahid rebel was killed and six others 
injured.  Fighting has also been reported in the area of Katur 
village, 15 kilometers southwest of Sabun.  National Security 
Director in Nyala confirmed the fighting in the above mentioned 
areas, involving SAF and NRF forces." UNDSS opined that "SAF 
casualties are not available but believed to be high since the GoS 
has requested additional staff in order to increase the capacity of 
 
KHARTOUM 00002239  002 OF 002 
 
 
the medical personnel at the military hospital at Nyala.  On 
September 12, more than 20 persons were evacuated to the military 
hospital at Nyala.  The fighting might be the beginning of the 
recently reported new (5-prong) SAF offensive operation south of 
Tawila."  End Note.) 
 
4. (SBU) COMMENT:  Some UNDSS and AMIS officials speculate that the 
SAF is seeking to exploit rifts in the rebel movements by further 
dividing them and taking advantage of their military weakness.  The 
NRF's capture of Um Sidir indicates that it still has sufficient 
capability and organization to mount effective counter-attacks. 
Continued SAF troop and materiel reinforcements flowing into El 
Fasher suggest that the Government will continue offensive 
operations in North Darfur and the Jebel Mara for the near future, 
with negative repercussions for humanitarian access and ordinary 
Darfurians.  El Fasher and the 30 - 40 kilometer zone surrounding 
the town remain calm. 
 
5. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED:  Gaining a clearer picture of SAF 
operations and intentions will remain difficult with virtually no 
active AMIS patrolling in areas of contention and with continued GNU 
obstruction of Ceasefire Commission efforts to carry out 
investigations.  (Comment:  A CFC participant informed ARC officer 
on September 13 that the SAF CFC representative rejected a CFC 
proposal to investigate fighting near Tawila.  End Comment.)  Fuel 
shortages in El Fasher - exacerbated by the GNU's withholding of 
petrol reserves - is further degrading AMIS' ability to operate 
(Reftel Khartoum 2113.)  Additionally, several AMIS personnel have 
alleged to ARC officer that the SAF continues to surreptitiously 
confiscate fuel from AMIS tankers at the El Fasher airfield, which 
closes after 1800 and is under the complete control of Sudanese 
authorities impeding the African Union force's ability to maneuver 
and carry out its mission.  END COMMENT. 
 
POWERS 
 
 
 
 
Saved: K://POL/2006 files/Cables - Chron/Drafts/Cbl 14Sept06 UN 
security update for North DarfurV2