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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM2225, DARFUR - SOUTH DARFUR SITUATION REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM2225 2006-09-14 13:05 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3137
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2225/01 2571305
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141305Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4544
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002225 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT:  DARFUR - SOUTH DARFUR SITUATION REPORT 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1625 
 
KHARTOUM 00002225  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Though security in South Darfur remains relatively stable, 
humanitarian organizations are anxious about the potential for 
increased insecurity as the dry season approaches.  Decreasing 
security and increased fighting in North Darfur may already be 
affecting South Darfur.  Additionally, problems in the health sector 
and with camp coordination concern USAID field staff.  End Summary. 
 
-------- 
Security 
-------- 
 
2.  (SBU) South Darfur is currently experiencing a period of 
relative calm that creates a generally permissive atmosphere for the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance.  For example, the UN World Food 
Program (WFP) reached 99 percent of targeted beneficiaries in South 
Darfur during the month of August.  The feeling on the ground, 
however, is that this may only be a temporary window of opportunity. 
 The arrival of the dry season in early October could trigger the 
resumption of military operations, which are currently inhibited by 
the high water levels in wadis (seasonal rivers) and washed-out dirt 
roads.  WFP is preparing for such events by instructing cooperating 
partners to distribute double or even triple rations during the 
month of September in potentially insecure areas of South Darfur. 
By doing so, WFP aims to allocate food to beneficiaries who may not 
be accessible in October/November if conflict renews and decrease 
warehouse stocks that are vulnerable to looting. 
 
3.  (SBU) As early as August 3, the UN security officials and the 
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) announced unconfirmed reports 
of a National Redemption Front (NRF) presence in Adula village, 
located east of Shaeria.  On August 24, UN sources reported an 
attack by armed men in the village of Songo, located 160 km 
southwest of Buram in the extreme south of the state.  Finally, 
reports indicate that a clash occurred in Muhajariya, South Darfur, 
on August 26. 
 
4.  (SBU) The most notable recent conflict in South Darfur is that 
between the two Arab ethnic groups of Habanya and the Reizegat, 
though this dispute is not believed to be related to the larger 
conflict.  Fighting that took place in the localities of Ferdus and 
Buram started at the beginning of 2006 and reignited in early July. 
The fighting in July caused the displacement of an unknown number of 
Reizegat to Ed Daein and the relocation of more than 32,000 Habanya 
into Buram town for safety.  By July 31, more than 20,000 of the 
Habanya internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Buram returned to 
their villages of origin.  On August 9, the South Darfur State Wali 
presided over a ceremony in which the Habanya and Reizegat signed a 
peace agreement.  According to the International Organization for 
Migration, the Wali gave the groups SD 150 million (approximately 
USD 700,000) to be used to pay compensation for losses incurred 
during the fighting.  Recently, UN sources have reported attacks on 
Al Amoud Al Akdar village and other surrounding villages, located 
south of Buram on September 9 and August 29.  As of September 12, 
humanitarians have been unable to reach the village to confirm 
reports of civilian casualties, burned villages, and other damage. 
The UN plans to travel to the village within the coming days. 
USAID's Darfur Field Office (USAID/DFO) staff will continue to 
closely monitor this situation and report on the outcomes of the 
assessment mission. 
 
------ 
Health 
------ 
 
5.  (SBU) Cholera continues to be the focus of the health sector in 
South Darfur.  USAID reports that State Ministry of Health (SMOH) 
officials insist on referring to it as "acute watery diarrhea" 
despite national level officials' utilization of the term "cholera." 
 The UN World Health Organization (WHO) began reporting cases in 
Nyala town on May 24, which spread initially to other areas of the 
state including Ed Daein, Kass, and Gereida.  However, since 
mid-June, the cases have been concentrated primarily in Nyala town 
and Kalma camp.  The official SMOH/WHO surveillance system shows 
that the epidemic peaked in week 30 at 143 cases and that the 
current number of new cases has declined to 68 in week 35.  Although 
 
KHARTOUM 00002225  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
this surveillance system has considerable flaws including limited 
geographic coverage and low reporting rates, this general downward 
trend is also supported anecdotally by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).  By the end of August, the two cholera 
treatment centers in Nyala town and Kalma camp had a daily average 
of only 10 patients each. 
 
6.  (SBU) USAID/DFO has noticed that the lack of coordinated 
leadership in the South Darfur cholera response is a matter of 
concern.  Three months after the first reported cases of cholera WHO 
and SMOH have yet to present a comprehensive or actionable response 
plan.  Health promotion, hygiene education, water chlorination 
campaigns, and oral rehydration therapy programs have proceeded in 
fits and starts with little effective coverage or coordination with 
NGOs providing volunteers and supplies.  The lack of overall 
leadership from WHO and SMOH has led NGOs to create a parallel 
coordination structure for exchange of information.  USAID/DFO staff 
noted that the UN Children's Fund resumed coordination of the Nyala 
town water chlorination campaign in late August, which is being 
implemented relatively well by USAID partner CARE and the Sudanese 
government Office of Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES). 
 
----------------- 
Camp Coordination 
----------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Camp coordinators work to identify gaps within the 
response, facilitate dialogue between the camp residents and the 
NGOs working there, register new arrivals, and respond to crises. 
The absence of designated camp coordinating agencies had created 
noticeable humanitarian gaps leaving community grievances 
unaddressed in some of the IDP camps surrounding Nyala including 
Otash, Dereig, and Al Salaam.  To solve this problem, the UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) took the lead in 
working with the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) to encourage the 
naming of camp coordinators for these locations.  In June, the 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) mobilized staff in anticipation of 
filling these roles. 
 
8.  (SBU) On July 20, HAC designated the German NGO Humedicas to 
coordinate Al Salaam camp.  In mid-August, after long delays, HAC 
named two local NGOs, Sudanese Red Crescent Society and Rehad al 
Fursan, as the coordinators for Otash and Dereig camps, 
respectively.  OCHA has expressed reservation as to whether the two 
local NGOs have the capacity and resources effectively to fulfill 
the camp coordination role and plans to conduct a capacity building 
workshop for the organizations on September 16. 
 
9.  (SBU) On July 27, OCHA named NRC as the camp coordinator for 
Gereida, where an estimated 128,000 IDPs now live, making it the 
largest camp in all of Darfur.  OCHA was able to make this 
determination without the involvement of HAC because Gereida is in 
SLA-controlled territory.  NRC is expected to help address immediate 
needs, such as the replacement of more than 600 latrines that 
recently collapsed due to sandy soil and heavy rains, identifying 
community priorities, and filling the gap in the information flow of 
events in Gereida back to the humanitarian community in Nyala. 
 
10.  (SBU) On September 3, Kalma camp coordinator NRC was stopped at 
the HAC checkpoint outside of Kalma camp and not allowed to enter 
the camp.  Upon conferring with HAC in Nyala town, NRC was told that 
there was a HAC investigation underway and that they would not be 
allowed into the camp until a three-day investigation was completed. 
 However, as of September 13, NRC has still not been allowed to 
return to Kalma camp.  The lack of camp coordination in Kalma is 
preventing USAID/OFDA partner CARE from returning to the camp to 
resume water and sanitation activities.  CARE was relying on NRC to 
facilitate a meeting with sheiks in Kalma camp to negotiate 
guarantees for the security of their staff; without NRC present, the 
meeting has not taken place. 
 
POWERS