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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM2223, DARFUR - WEST DARFUR SITUATION REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM2223 2006-09-14 12:23 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3076
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2223/01 2571223
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141223Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4541
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002223 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT:  DARFUR - WEST DARFUR SITUATION REPORT 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1110 
 
KHARTOUM 00002223  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (U) USAID Darfur Field Office (USAID/DFO) staff traveled to El 
Geneina, West Darfur, from August 19 - 21, 2006.  The field officers 
re-established contacts with partner agencies, assessed humanitarian 
needs for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and discussed 
anticipated funding with implementing organizations.  Constraints 
identified include the inability to access project sites by road, 
high levels of IDP frustration with camp conditions, IDPs' lack of 
access to agricultural land, and harassment of Sudanese humanitarian 
workers.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Shrinking Humanitarian Space in West Darfur 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) According to UN World Food Program (WFP), West Darfur has not 
experienced any significant attacks against humanitarian workers 
since early July.  However, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
reported to USAID staff that sporadic fighting in the Kulbus area 
limited humanitarian access in August.  The organizations also 
reported that in West Darfur, humanitarian indicators remained 
stable, although the UN World Health Organization (WHO) reported 
five cases of cholera in Mornei camp, which were immediately treated 
and which did not result in any deaths.  Overall, USAID staff 
reported that camps continue to be served, while it is difficult to 
assess the needs of rural communities. 
 
3. (U) Since September 2005, all major roads have been ranked as 
Category D by the UN Department of Safety and Security, prohibiting 
ground transportation without armed African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) escort.  Even with armed escorts, humanitarians are reluctant 
to travel by road.  In August, UN sources reported a more than 900 
percent increase in attacks against AMIS since 2005.  Increasing 
attacks against AMIS have deterred humanitarian agencies from 
utilizing these escorts, resulting in an increased reliance on air 
transport for staff and supply movement between El Geneina, remote 
IDP camps, and other difficult to reach communities. 
 
4. (U) All six USAID partners in West Darfur have reported that 
insecurity has forced them to reduce humanitarian services.  USAID 
estimates that this reduction has affected nearly 500,000 
beneficiaries in West Darfur alone.  However, Save the Children 
(SC/US), Concern, Tearfund, Catholic Relief Services, MedAir, and 
International Medical Corps, continue to administer life-saving 
humanitarian services to over 600,000 people in West Darfur with 
funding from USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(USAID/OFDA).  USAID partner NGOs reported that access has been 
completely cut off in Um Kher, Beja, Waro, Katool, Ordi, Tirej, 
Orukum, Karty, Tandulti, Seraf Jidad, Noor el Salaam, Kondobei, and 
Bir Dagig. 
 
5. (U) A USAID-funded NGO stated that Chadians arriving in West 
Darfur near Beida have settled on land that previously belonged to 
local residents, who are currently not occupying the land because 
they are living in IDP camps.  The NGO fears that land rights will 
be a major issue when IDPs begin to return home. 
 
6. (U) Livelihood activities of IDPs have been limited as movement 
outside of camps is restricted by insecurity.  According to 
implementing partners operating in camps, IDPs have expressed 
concern about their limited access to agricultural land, family, and 
social networks.  Additionally, NGOs reported to USAID staff that 25 
percent of men in Mornei IDP camp are suspected to have arms stored 
in their households. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
UNHAS Flights are Humanitarian Lifeline 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7. (U) The UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) has allocated one 
helicopter to El Geneina to serve the transportation needs of the 
humanitarian community in West Darfur.  This helicopter provides the 
only reliable transportation for aid workers to project sites. 
 
8. (U) All six USAID implementing partners have had to curtail 
activities and now rely on UNHAS to carry out their programs.  From 
 
KHARTOUM 00002223  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
April 2004 to October 2005, USAID partners relied on ground 
transport to move supplies and staff to remote locations.  From 
November 2005 to September 2006, UNHAS flights have been the only 
option for transporting staff, humanitarian supplies, and salaries. 
 
 
9. (U) In 2005, West Darfur had access to two helicopters that could 
service each location twice a week.  In late July, the UNHAS 
helicopter transport was reduced to servicing each location only 
once a week due to insufficient supply of fuel, availability of 
additional crew, and number of helicopters. 
 
10. (SBU) In meetings with USAID staff, NGOs expressed concern that 
the reduced schedule placed their staff at an increased security 
risk.  In addition, they stated that in the event of mechanical 
problems, transport services would shut down completely until 
repairs could be made.  (Comment:  USAID/DFO staff note that the 
breakdown of the remaining helicopter could strand USAID partner's 
staff for over a week in remote locations.  End Comment.) 
 
11. (U) The UN has revised the West Darfur evacuation plan to 
compensate for the temporary fuel shortage.  The revised plan states 
that agencies in the northern part of West Darfur would evacuate by 
an El Fasher-based helicopter; agencies in southwestern West Darfur 
would evacuate by a Nyala-based helicopter; and organizations in El 
Geneina evacuate by airplane. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Humanitarian Agencies Face Harassment 
-------------------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) Several partners indicated increasing harassment of staff 
by the Sudanese government National Intelligence and Security 
Service (NISS) since May 2006.  NGOs stated that the Sudanese 
government may be attempting to cut off IDP populations from the 
international community. 
 
13. (SBU) USAID partners reported receiving threats from NISS staff. 
 One organization reported attempts to recruit informants from its 
staff by the NISS.  In Habila town, located south of El Geneina, 
NISS officials informed humanitarian agencies that the safety of 
their Sudanese staff could not be guaranteed. 
 
14. (SBU) Three organizations reported receiving letters from local 
communities indicating displeasure with certain humanitarian 
activities being implemented.  In all three cases, the letters were 
signed at the top of the paper with the text following beneath the 
signatures.  The organizations believe that the individuals were 
coerced into signing and have followed up with the local 
Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) office. 
 
15. (SBU) Several organizations stated that the Sudanese government 
is determined to wear down the international community, and that 
currently the strategy to do so includes separating IDPs from 
humanitarian agencies through a policy of misinformation.  USAID 
staff noted that this strategy was attempted in 2005, but the level 
of frustration and violence is higher this year and partners are 
anxious.  These incidents could indicate the beginning of a 
troubling trend of harassment and coercion for aid workers. 
 
---------- 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
16. (SBU) The humanitarian community has explored ways to mitigate 
the effects of harassment and declining access. Some mitigation 
strategies include pre-positioning supplies, transferring 
responsibility for programs to local community members, and 
encouraging the deployment of NGO staff to remote locations outside 
of El Geneina for three to six weeks. 
 
17. (SBU) The El Fasher-based USAID staff will continue to monitor 
the developments and give recommendations for West Darfur.  The 
Khartoum-based USAID staff will hold a contingency planning workshop 
for USAID's West Darfur implementing partners in late September. 
 
POWERS