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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM2185, DARFUR Q SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF USAIDQS DARFUR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM2185 2006-09-11 12:31 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6774
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2185/01 2541231
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111231Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4481
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002185 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR Q SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF USAIDQS DARFUR 
FIELD OFFICES AND OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00002185  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  From August 4 to 17, the USAID Office of U.S. 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) Safety and 
Security Coordinator conducted a safety and security 
review of USAIDQs Darfur Field Office (USAID/DFO) 
operations in El Fasher, North Darfur and Nyala, South 
Darfur.  U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, UN agencies, 
international organizations, and non-governmental 
organization (NGO) security professionals consulted 
during the assessment agree that Nyala and El Fasher are 
sufficiently secure to allow USAID to operate at the 
moment.  The assessment found that the current USAID 
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian 
Assistance (USAID/DCHA) safety and security plan, which 
was approved in March 2006 and updated in August 2006, 
meets the safety and security needs of the USAID/DFO. 
The assessment also identified several potential 
security concerns that should be closely monitored.  End 
summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
Locations Visited and Contacts 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  From August 4 to 17, a USAID/OFDA Safety and 
Security Coordinator conducted a safety and security 
review of USAID/DFO operations, traveling to Khartoum, 
Nyala, and El Fasher.  The review included interviews 
with security professionals and senior representatives 
from the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, UN agencies, and 
NGOs.  Additionally, the USAID/OFDA Safety and Security 
Coordinator met with nearly all USAID/DFO staff to 
discuss the security situation.  The USAID/OFDA Safety 
and Security Coordinator also attended UN and NGO 
security briefings during the assessment trip. 
 
---------------------------- 
Security Situation in Darfur 
---------------------------- 
 
3.  The USAID/OFDA Safety and Security Coordinator 
reported that economically motivated crime is the most 
significant security concern for humanitarian agencies 
in Darfur.  In addition to thefts committed by 
opposition forces, there are regular reports of 
organized crime taking root in Darfur, with stolen 
assets being sold to opposition forces and exported to 
Chad. 
 
4.  The UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) 
reported the following statistics for February through 
July 2006 as compared to the same period in 2005. 
UNDSS reported that carjacking and banditry are up 230 
percent and 40 percent, respectively; overall security 
incidents have increased by 123 percent; security 
incidents involving the UN have decreased by 10 percent; 
security incidents involving NGOs have increased by 76 
percent; security incidents against the African Union 
have increased by 913 percent; and armed clashes have 
increased by 100 percent. 
 
5.  The assessment found that the security environment 
outside the state capitals of Darfur remains fluid and 
volatile.  With the continued presence of the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) troops and the deployment 
of UN forces contested, security outside the capitals of 
Darfur should be expected to decline. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
USAID/DFO Staff Living Conditions Darfur 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6.  The USAID/OFDA Safety and Security Coordinator 
visited USAID/DFO facilities in both Nyala and El 
Fasher.  USAID/DFO staff in El Fasher and Nyala reside 
in residences owned and operated by Development 
Alternatives, Inc.  After a site assessment of the area 
by the USAID/OFDA Safety and Security Coordinator the El 
 
KHARTOUM 00002185  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Fasher facilities were rated acceptable.  However, the 
USAID/OFDA Safety and Security Coordinator reported 
serious concerns about the Nyala facilities, which 
include the inability to control public access to the 
compound outside of normal business hours and the lack 
of separation between living space and office space. 
 
7.  The USAID/OFDA Safety and Security Coordinator 
recommended the establishment of a separate 
office/residence for USAID/DFO staff in Nyala.  The 
USAID/DFO and USAID/OFDA Safety and Security Coordinator 
are working with the Regional Security Office (RSO) at 
the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum on the review and clearance 
of a new facility. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Local Perceptions of USAID/DFO Staff 
------------------------------------- 
 
8.  USAID/DFO staff in both Nyala and El Fasher enjoy a 
positive reputation with the humanitarian community and 
within the local communities in which they operate and 
reside.  The USAID/DFO owes much of this positive 
reputation to USAIDQs ongoing support to humanitarian 
efforts in Darfur. 
 
------------- 
NGO Security 
------------- 
 
9.  The capacity of NGOs to undertake security analysis 
is limited, and many NGOs are not fully utilizing 
available UNDSS services.  In El Fasher, NGOs meet every 
two weeks to discuss security concerns.  NGOs are 
finding it increasingly difficult to maintain contact 
with commanders of the armed militias and to identify 
areas of control due to changing personnel and 
alliances. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Camps 
----------------------------------------- 
 
10.  Tensions in IDP camps in North Darfur continue to 
increase.  The reported prevalence of weapons at the 
household level in camps such as Abu Shouk and Zam Zam 
is an issue.  In addition, reports from AMIS and the UN 
Mission in Sudan documented the presence of weapons and 
heavily armed Sudan Liberation Army forces in Zam Zam 
camp.  Skepticism of vaccinations and water chlorination 
conducted by Water and Environmental Sanitation staff 
has led to violent confrontations in IDP camps in North 
and West Darfur. 
 
11.  Representatives from UN agencies and NGOs reported 
that IDP camps are increasingly being used as political 
tools by the various opposition groups to spread 
propaganda in support of or in opposition to the Darfur 
Peace Agreement process.  Additionally, QYouth patrols, 
originally created by IDPs to address security concerns 
within the camps, are becoming increasingly politicized 
and are challenging the official leadership within the 
camps. 
 
--------------- 
Recommendations 
--------------- 
 
12.  The USAID/OFDA Safety and Security Coordinator 
noted that USAID/DFO staff are very conscientious about 
their personal safety and security and follow 
established protocols.  However, care should be taken to 
ensure that staff members do not become complacent 
situational awareness should be maintained at all times. 
The current security climate in both Nyala and El Fasher 
are acceptable for continued USAID/DFO operations under 
current security protocols developed by UNDSS and vetted 
through the RSO.  Overland travel by USAID/DFO staff 
outside the city limits of Nyala and El Fasher should 
continue to be considered as exceptional and requires 
the explicit consent of the USAID/DFO Team Leader and 
 
KHARTOUM 00002185  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
RSO.  Only travel requests determined to be Qmission 
criticalQ should be considered for approval.  City 
limits should be defined as within the official 
Government of National Unity and Humanitarian Aid 
Commission checkpoints. 
 
13.  USAID/DFO staff should remind our implementing 
partners and contractors that they are required to 
follow the USAID branding regulations for use of USAID 
logos.  Implementing partners should also be advised 
that they may apply for a logo waiver if security 
situations warrant. 
 
14.  Given the dynamic nature of the political and 
humanitarian situation in the three Darfur states, the 
USAID/DFO Team Leader and the USAID/OFDA Safety and 
Security Coordinator recommend that safety and security 
situation in Khartoum, South Darfur, West Darfur, and 
North Darfur be re-evaluated at least every three 
months, more often if the situation further 
deteriorates. 
 
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