VZCZCXRO6138
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #4245/01 2611417
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181417Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2610
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2831
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2976
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6301
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1650

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004245 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: AUXILIARY POLICE ASSESSMENT TEAM BEGINS WORK 
 
REF: KABUL 4001 
 
KABUL 00004245  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) After the recent Policy Action Group (PAG) 
decision to move ahead with recruiting auxiliary 
police (AXP) under MoI command and control, with 
Zabol as the pilot province (reftel), MoI with CSTC- 
A support immediately began to organize an 
assessment team.  An advance group of MoI, CSTC-A, 
and U.S. Embassy experts under the leadership of an 
MoI Colonel arrived in Kandahar on Sept 15 to carry 
out the logistical planning needed to begin the 
Zabol pilot project, moving on to Zabol the next 
day.  The full team, which will include additional 
MoI personnel, ISAF, and UNAMA representatives, 
should be complete and on the ground o/a Sept 19. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The team is eager to move ahead with 
recruitment and training, although details remain to 
be worked out.  Support from Zabol Governor Arman 
will be critical - Zabol was chosen in part because 
Arman is seen as supportive of central government 
efforts - and it is not yet clear whether that will 
be forthcoming.  If recruits do sign up for the 
program, the team will have to swing into full gear 
quickly to set up training schedules, equipment 
distribution, and deployment planning.   (Note: Late 
reports indicate an initial tranche of 30 recruits 
has been identified to begin training soon.  End 
note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Both MoI and the international community 
are concerned about who will pay salaries.  Central 
to the plan is shifting salaries from the governor 
to the MoI to ensure MoI control.  So long as the 
AXP are fully under the command and control of the 
MoI, we have taken the position that they should be 
treated like ordinary police.  Under that 
circumstance they would be eligible to come under 
the LOTFA payment structure.  There is enough money 
allocated to police payments in present ASFF funding 
streams to increase the U.S. LOTFA contribution 
enough to cover at least some of the AXP, or else to 
pay directly out of a parallel mechanism.  The 
Ambassador has made it clear to the IC that any 
additional U.S. contribution should not be used to 
pay the LOTFA shortfall, but rather would be 
earmarked for AXP.  He also said that the U.S. 
donation would be limited for now to the recruitment 
of approximately 800 AXP for Zabol province, and we 
would make no further commitment until we had 
assurance that the program would work and the new 
auxiliary patrolmen would be completely under MoI 
control.  If the governors refuse to relinquish 
control over their militias, U.S. funds would not 
be used to defray their expenses. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) This is very much a work in progress.  We 
are receiving daily reports from the assessment team 
in the field, which includes INL police experts and 
an Embassy reporting officer.  We will in a position 
to report more fully on the substance of their 
efforts in a week or two, when the results begin to 
be seen.  The U.S. members of the assessment team 
are under instructions to keep the team in the field 
until the program is implemented.   Meanwhile, the 
security situation in Kandahar and Ghazni after the 
 
KABUL 00004245  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
recent military activity there will compel a rapid 
extension of effort to those provinces as soon as we 
have confirmation that the experiment is on the 
right track. 
NEUMANN