VZCZCXRO5591
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHHM #1074/01 2640917
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 210917Z SEP 06
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1487
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 1049
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0005
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 1563

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HO CHI MINH CITY 001074 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DRL/IRF FOR AMBASSADOR HANFORD 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTORS WILDER AND ABRAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM SOCI PREL PGOV KIRF PREF VM
SUBJECT: THE UNIFIED BUDDHIST CHURCH OF VIETNAM 
 
REF: DRL/IRF 9/19 EMAIL; B) 05 HCMC 1277; C) HCMC 732; D) HCMC 551; E) 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001074  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Ref A reported questions on the status of the Unified 
Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) and on allegations of serious 
harassment of UBCV members in provinces in the HCMC Consular 
district.  This message provides our analysis of the status of 
the UBCV and the causes for government repression, which run 
contrary to the overall improvement in conditions in religious 
freedom in Vietnam.  In our view, the repression of the UBCV is 
triggered by its insistence on complete organizational freedom 
and its political opposition to single-party, Communist rule in 
Vietnam.  The rights of the UBCV leaders to assemble, organize 
and peacefully express their views should be guaranteed, but are 
not a question of religious freedom. 
 
What is the UBCV? 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The UBCV was formed in 1964 to voice the political and 
social concerns of the Buddhist community in the Republic of 
Vietnam (South Vietnam).  Up to 20 different Buddhist sects 
merged to form the UBCV.  Many within the UBCV were anti-war, a 
position that benefited the North, although the direct influence 
of the Viet Cong and the "National Liberation Front" on the UBCV 
is unclear.  The UBCV was an outgrowth of the massive protests 
that triggered the coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem's 
government.  These protests included the dramatic 
self-immolation of Thich Quang Duc in HCMC in 1963. 
¶3. (SBU) Following the fall of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975, 
the Communist Party moved to consolidate all mass and civil 
society organizations under its control.  The UBCV was a natural 
target because of its history of pre-1975 political activism. 
In 1981, after UBCV Patriarch Thich Huyen Quang, General 
Secretary Thich Quang Do and other leaders refused to submit to 
 
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Communist Party control, the UBCV was banned and the 
GVN-recognized Vietnam Buddhist Sangha (VBS) established.  Some 
prominent monks and nuns affiliated with the UBCV joined the 
VBS. 
Current Level of Strength of the UBCV 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Even in its heyday, the UBCV did not command the 
adherence of all Buddhist schools in southern Vietnam.  UBCV 
General Secretary Thich Quang Do told us that he estimated that 
75 percent of the Republic of Vietnam's Buddhists were 
affiliated with the UBCV.  Buddhists in what was North Vietnam 
had no affiliation with the UBCV. 
 
¶5. (SBU) GVN controls make it impossible to determine the 
current level of popularity of the UBCV in southern Vietnam. 
Our discussions with a number of VBS monks, some of whom are 
contemporaries of Thich Quang Do, indicate that some VBS leaders 
chafe under GVN control and wish for more organizational 
independence.  They view their participation in the VBS as the 
best available option to heal the nation following the war and 
to focus on administering to the religious and social needs of 
the Vietnamese (Ref B).  VBS officials say there is no 
day-to-day interference in their ability to perform religious 
duties.  It is unclear how many VBS leaders would return to the 
UBCV if the ban were lifted. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The UBCV has been able to maintain a relatively robust 
organization, despite GVN repression.  Its monks are energetic 
and charismatic.  They command respect from the local community. 
 For example, Thich Thien Hanh, the senior-most UBCV monk in 
Thua Thien Hue province in central Vietnam, told us that he has 
formed what is in effect a breakaway group of 200 VBS monks 
operating in 40 pagodas and three training schools in Hue and 
Quang Tri provinces. 
 
Doctrine, Organizational Independence, and Politics 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) In separate meetings over the last two years, Thich 
Quang Do, Thich Huyen Quang and Thich Thien Hanh have told us 
that there are no doctrinal religious differences between the 
VBS and UBCV.  The basic fault line is UBCV opposition to 
Communist Party control over the internal organizational affairs 
of the Buddhist Church.  In April 2003, Thich Huyen Quang 
rejected an apparent overture from then-Prime Minister Phan Van 
Khai to take over the leadership of the VBS.  The UBCV's 
response was to convene an organizational conclave in October 
¶2003.  UBCV leaders are aware of new GVN suggestions that it 
register under a different name and with new leadership, or that 
the UBCV and the VBS might merge.  Thich Quang Do told us in 
July that the UBCV was willing to support a merger if the new 
entity were independent, but the GVN would never permit this 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001074  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
(Ref C). 
 
¶8. (SBU) It is unclear when the UBCV's struggle for 
organizational independence morphed into opposition to a 
single-party State.  The Internet carries a speech by UBCV 
Patriarch Thich Huyen Quang from 1993 in which he called for 
free elections and multi-party reforms.  The UBCV's struggle for 
organizational independence and its political opposition to 
single party rule have become intrinsically linked.  For 
example, in one meeting with us, Thich Quang Do said that 
Communist Party leaders recognize that a unified, independent 
Buddhist organization would grow "beyond their control" and 
would be dangerous to the regime.  Thich Quang Do repeatedly has 
made it clear to us that he is a political rather than a 
religious opponent of the Party.  He will not compromise with 
Hanoi, so long as the Communist Party maintains a monopoly on 
power. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In this regard, both Thich Quang Do and the UBCV 
Patriarch also refer to the dramatic role the UBCV and Buddhist 
monks played in toppling the Diem regime in 1963.  They have 
indicated that they ould use organizational independence to 
oppose the Communists were they given the chance.  UBCV 
Patriarch Thich Huyen Quang has a picture of Thich Quang Duc's 
self-immolation in the entryway to his office as a symbol of the 
strength and determination of Buddhist resistance (Ref D). 
 
¶10. (SBU) There appears to be some difference of opinion within 
the UBCV over Thich Quang Do's strong anti-communist stance. 
Thich Thien Hanh, the UBCV leader in Hue, told us last year that 
he would be willing to merge with the VBS and operate under 
current Vietnamese law, were the new organization independent 
from the GVN.  In contrast to Thich Quang Do, Thich Thien Hanh 
met with international Buddhist leader Thich Nhat Hanh during 
the latter's groundbreaking return to Vietnam in 2005 (Ref E). 
(Thich Quang Do refused to meet Thich Nhat Hanh as Hanh would 
not meet with him in his capacity as the General Secretary of 
the UBCV.  Hanh, who had painstaking negotiations with the GVN 
over his visit, would not or could not meet Thich Quang Do under 
those conditions.) 
 
Repression Waxes and Wanes 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Thich Quang Do and other senior UBCV leaders were 
placed under "pagoda arrest" after their October 2003 
organizational meeting.  However, the level of repression and 
restrictions on movement appears to be carefully calibrated. 
The GVN will not allow Thich Quang Do to meet with the UBCV 
Patriarch, who is based in Binh Dinh Province in Central 
Vietnam, because of fears that this might strengthen the 
movement.  However Thich Quang Do is able to communicate with 
colleagues and associates inside and outside Vietnam.  The 
UBCV's Paris-based mouthpiece, the International Buddhist 
Information Bureau (and its website queme.com), is able to issue 
press releases on our visits with Thich Quang Do within hours. 
Moreover, in our meetings, Thich Quang Do has been remarkably 
well informed about Communist Party and dissident community 
developments inside and outside Vietnam.  He also is able to 
receive visitors including other UBCV monks and political 
dissidents (Ref F). 
 
¶12. (SBU) In our judgment, GVN-directed repression against the 
UBCV is a response to ongoing efforts by Thich Quang Do to 
reestablish a formal organizational structure through the 
creation of provincial "representative boards."  To date, the 
UBCV has established 18 such boards in HCMC and in provinces in 
central and southern Vietnam.  Members of these representative 
boards have been the focus of official harassment.  For example, 
our contacts in the UBCV have been able to confirm the expulsion 
of UBCV nun Thich Nu Thong Man from her pagoda in central 
coastal Khanh Hoa province.  (Incidents involving the UBCV nun 
first reported Ref G). 
 
¶13. (SBU) We spoke on September 20 with Thich Vinh Phuoc, 
Secretary of the UBCV provincial board in Ba Ria Vung Tau 
 
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Province, who told us that he and other board members have come 
under increasing pressure from local authorities and the VBS. 
For example, in July police verbally threatened the provincial 
board after monks held a ceremony to consecrate 120 new monks 
into Buddhist service.  Thich Vinh Phuoc also claimed that there 
had been two separate firebombing attempts against him and 
another board member -- Thich Thanh Tinh -- in August, and 
pointed to the police as the culprits. 
 
¶14. (SBU) We subsequently spoke with Thich Vien Dinh, a senior 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001074  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
member of the national executive of the UBCV, about the Ba Ria 
Vung Tau firebombing allegations.  While stating that the 
overall intensity of police harassment had increased over the 
past few months, he said it was "uncharacteristic" for the GVN 
to make any physical assault against a monk, let alone attempt 
to kill him.  He said he had no further information on the 
incidents and did not offer any additional explanation.  We also 
spoke with a representative of the Ba Ria Vung Tau provincial 
Committee for Religious Affairs (CRA).  The CRA official told us 
that the creation of a UBCV representative board in the province 
was "illegal" and that the province was planning to replace the 
UBCV officials with "civil managers" to run the pagoda in 
question.  The CRA firmly rejected allegations that officials 
attempted to firebomb the UBCV pagoda or to attack the two 
monks.  The official said that perhaps the two monks staged the 
attacks to attract attention to the UBCV and to embarrass the 
government. 
 
¶15. (SBU) UBCV contacts also report that police are encouraging 
local believers not to associate with pagodas linked to UBCV 
provincial board members.  In some localities officials also are 
stepping up propaganda against the UBCV, accusing it of 
"reactionary" (political) activities.  Other representative 
board members routinely are summoned for "working sessions" with 
the police. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) The recent GVN decision to register a small Buddhist 
sect -- Tu An Hieu Nghia (the Four Gratitudes) -- and the 
pending registration of a second -- Tinh Do Cu Si Phat Hoi 
(Buddhist Mercy) -- indicate that there are other independent 
streams of Buddhist practice in Vietnam.  They also suggest that 
the GVN now is prepared to recognize and tolerate a greater 
level of diversity within the Buddhist community.  This is 
consistent with a more nuanced GVN approach to religion writ 
large in which the GVN has been willing to legalize Protestant 
and other religious groups so long as these organizations are 
strictly apolitical (Ref H). 
 
¶17. (SBU) The Communist Party's monopoly on the political 
process in Vietnam is enshrined in law and in practice.  Despite 
international human rights standards, Vietnam does not permit 
the UBCV -- or any other opposition group -- to organize, 
assemble peacefully or express political views in opposition to 
the GVN.   The UBCV leadership's position against single Party 
rule in Vietnam is influenced by its unshakeable belief about 
the role of Buddhism in Vietnamese society and its members' 
strong views on social justice.  That said, even Thich Quang Do 
acknowledges that the UBCV's objections to the current situation 
in Vietnam are political in nature, not religious. 
 
¶18. (SBU) In Thich Quang Do's mind, there is no single bigger 
threat to single-Party rule than a free Thich Quang Do and an 
independent UBCV.  Energetic, magnetic, determined, principled, 
Thich Quang Do without a doubt could be one of Vietnam's best 
opposition politicians.  And the UBCV is well within its rights 
to reject GVN overtures that might compromise its independence. 
For its part, the Communist Party, which exploited the agitation 
of the UBCV and other religious groups to further its goals 
pre-1975, also knows its history and its adversaries well.  So 
long as both sides maintain their current positions, we see no 
possible room for compromise, even as the GVN moves to legalize 
other religious groups in Vietnam.  End Comment. 
WINNICK