VZCZCXRO2008
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1654/01 2490816
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060816Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8504
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1808
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1806
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1751
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1803
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1762
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1692
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1788
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1508
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1527
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1321
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1722
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1774
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1078
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0011
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9909

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001654 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TI
SUBJECT: NINE WEEKS OUT: OSCE UNDECIDED ON ELECTION OBSERVERS IN 
TAJIKISTAN 
 
 
DUSHANBE 00001654  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (U)  After a weeklong visit, the OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment 
Mission (NAM) remains undecided on whether or not it will send a 
full-scale observation mission for the November 6 presidential 
election.  The NAM, comprised of three OSCE/ODIHR officials, 
debriefed international missions August 31 on its findings which 
will be formally published mid-September.  During its visit to 
Tajikistan, the NAM met with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
parliament, local government administrations in Qurgon-Teppa and 
Kulob, and political party leaders. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Government officials assured the NAM that Tajikistan 
will officially invite OSCE observers.  They also told the NAM 
that election regulations will ensure equal treatment for all 
candidates.  The NAM reported it believes the present 
administration has people with knowledge and experience 
necessary to conduct a fair election if they actually obey 
President Rahmonov's call for a fair election.  (COMMENT: At 
this point, many people at the debriefing looked up and 
snickered.  Although the top of the administration gives public 
lip-service to a free and fair election, the consensus among the 
audience was that the administration is not willing to expend 
much energy to substantially improve the democratic election 
process and curb corrupt election practices, especially at the 
local level.  END COMMENT) 
 
¶3.  (U)  Despite the NAM's positive meetings with the 
government, the mission's indecision lies in the legislative and 
election rules that restrict competition.  The OSCE expects to 
send observers five weeks before the election, but the scope of 
the mission remains unclear, with the following three possible 
scenarios: 
 
-- An Election Support Team with less than five election experts 
could be sent to the local OSCE office to assist with monitoring 
and reporting.  This is the most likely scenario if no candidate 
emerges to run against Rahmonov or the OSCE deems that the rules 
set by the Central Committee on Elections and Referenda do not 
permit a level playing field. 
 
-- A Limited Election Observation Mission would allow long-term 
observers for internal OSCE reporting, but no short-term 
observers for election day. 
 
-- A Full-Scale Observation Mission would include long-term 
observers as well as up to two hundred short-term observers 
stationed throughout the country on the actual day of the 
election.   OSCE/ODHIR would publish a report on the election as 
it did for the 2005 Parliamentary Elections. 
 
¶4.  (U)  At any time the OSCE could alter its decision to adapt 
to changing circumstances.  For instance, if OSCE sent a limited 
mission but the election suddenly became credibly competitive, 
the OSCE would be prepared to train internationals already based 
in Tajikistan as short-term observers.  Similarly, if it sent in 
a full-scale mission, but the government cracked down on media 
freedom or eliminated a candidate, the OSCE could respond 
critically by withdrawing its observers. 
 
¶5.  (U)   United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding head 
Ambassador Sotirov advocated strongly for a full-scale 
observation mission with short-term observers.  A full mission 
would signal to the people of Tajikistan that the international 
community still maintains a watchful eye on the future of 
democracy in Tajikistan and might encourage them to continue 
election reform in the future. 
 
¶6.  (U)  Without a full-scale mission including short-term 
 
DUSHANBE 00001654  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
observers, the OSCE will not publish its election observation 
findings, leaving the field open to other observers, such as 
those sent by the CIS, no matter how inaccurate or biased.  With 
a full-scale mission, the OSCE would provide a legitimate and 
thorough analysis to counter those reports.  Its constructive 
criticism would send a clear message that Tajikistan needs to 
strengthen its democratic processes and may help lay the 
groundwork for future election reform. 
 
¶7.  (U)  During the August 31 briefing the OSCE declared they 
would send a mission, but appeared genuinely uncertain about the 
type of mission.  Over the next several days the OSCE will 
analyze the CCER decree and wait to see if anyone will run 
against Rahmonov.  Political parties will announce potential 
candidates fifty days prior to the election. 
 
¶8.  (U)  COMMENT:  The Tajiks were clearly not pleased with the 
OSCE's findings after the parliamentary elections in February 
¶2005.  If the OSCE refrains from fielding a mission in order to 
send a message that the presidential election is not free or 
fair, that message will have little resonance inside Tajikistan. 
 Tajik media, predominantly state-run and Russian-biased, would 
be critical of the OSCE's inaction and could look to other CIS 
observers more willing to bless a flawed process.  A full OSCE 
mission will provide the best avenue for critique of 
Tajikistan's unfair election and set the tone for future 
elections.  END COMMENT. 
JACOBSON