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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002002 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016 
TAGS: PREL SNAR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: MISSION RECOMMENDATION FOR RENEWAL OF 
BRAZIL'S ABD PROGRAM 
 
REF: A. STATE 139897 
 
     ¶B. STATE 102423 
     ¶C. BRASILIA 1450 
     ¶D. 05 BRASILIA 2683 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D). 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Mission Brazil herewith recommends annual 
recertification by the President of Brazil's Air Bridge 
Denial Program (ABD), based on the information below, which 
is formatted in paras 2-9 in accordance with Department's 
instructions in ref A.  End summary. 
 
PART A: GOB ADHERENCE TO AGREED SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL 
PROCEDURES: 
 
¶2. (C) Per ref B instructions, PolCouns, Air Attache and 
Assistant Air Attache met on 13 July at the Defense Ministry 
with Major Brigadeiro do Ar (three star equivalent) Ricardo 
Machado Viera, who commands Brazil's integrated air defense 
and air traffic control system (COMDABRA), to consult on the 
status of Brazil's air bridge denial ("shootdown") program. 
Machado, who was accompanied by two other officers from the 
ministry, has senior operational command authority over all 
aspects of air defense and air traffic control in Brazil, and 
has been involved in all discussions with the USG on the 
shootdown issue for several years.  Machado understands the 
USG's process for renewal of the Presidential Determination 
covering U.S. cooperation with Brazil in its ABD program, and 
he provided (or undertook to provide) answers regarding 
issues raised in reftel.  On key points, he affirmed: (1) 
that there have been no/no lethal force events in the program 
over the past year, and (2) there have been no/no changes in 
the operational and safety procedures referenced in the 
September 2004 exchange of diplomatic notes between the GOB 
and USG.  Moreover, he offered a review of the program's 
functioning in practice, reiterated that Brazil's program is 
focused on dissuasion, and offered (in confidence) his 
assurance that Brazil's air force would only use lethal force 
in the context of a carefully pre-planned operation 
coordinated with police authorities, in which there is 
certainty about the criminal identity and intent of any 
suspect, non-cooperative aircraft. 
 
¶3. (C) With regard to ref B issues, Machado affirmed to 
PolCouns and DAO officers that: 
 
-- There have been no/no incidents of use of lethal force 
since the advent of Brazil's ABD program until the present 
date -- neither warning shots nor rounds fired with the 
intent of disabling/destroying a suspect aircraft; 
 
-- There have been no/no changes of any kind in the Brazilian 
program's operational and safety procedures from those 
referenced in the September 2004 exchange of notes between 
the GOB and USG regarding Brazil's ABD program; 
 
-- Brazil's ability to "see" and track unusual and suspect 
air activity has improved dramatically with the full 
implementation of the SIVAM Amazon surveillance system (which 
uses both ground radar and Embraer R-99 AWACs-type aircraft), 
introduction of the A-29 ALX "Super Tucano" fighter aircraft 
and secure data links.  As a result, there is an increase in 
the number of "air tracks of interest" recorded by COMDABRA 
over the past year.  Machado undertook to provide asap his 
command's statistics on ATOIs, interceptions, and force downs 
from October 2005 to 30 July 2006. 
 
¶4. (SBU) While the operational and safety procedures of 
Brazil's program are unchanged from those referenced in the 
September 2004 exchange of notes, the increased capacity and 
sophistication of BRAF equipment and methods are enhancing 
the program's efficiency and safety, Machado said.  The R-99 
airborne radar aircraft acquired for Brazil's SIVAM program 
are providing vastly improved coverage, especially when 
deployed for intensive patrols to areas where there is a 
 
BRASILIA 00002002  002 OF 003 
 
 
perceived spike in irregular air activity.  The R-99 aircraft 
can interact seamlessly via data links with ground bases and 
with the A-29 interceptors now coming on line with the BRAF, 
which are faster, have longer range, and possess 
sophisticated avionics and surveillance equipment.  For 
example, Machado said an R-99 can locate and track a suspect 
aircraft beyond visual range, then "stand off" on station as 
an A-29 moves into position to trail the suspect craft.  The 
A-29 can transmit video images of the suspect plane in real 
time to both the R-99  and COMDABRA ground stations, and all 
radio communications between the BRAF interceptor and the 
suspect plane are also transmitted. Hence the type, tail 
number and physical aspect of the plane can be seen, 
facilitating identification by BRAF and the police.  The 
video and audio records are available for after-action 
assessment or investigation. 
 
¶5. (C) Machado said that the BRAF and COMDABRA now also have 
superior data bases and modalities in operation for checking 
suspect aircraft.  COMDABRA center commanders are linked 
directly by secure phones to senior Brazilian Federal Police 
(DPF) officials in Brasilia and can instantly check tail 
numbers or other data against police records.  All 
coordination with the DPF is centralized at DPF headquarters 
in Brasilia, and the BRAF will not act on information or 
requests for air force support coming from DPF field offices, 
or from state police agencies.  The BRAF also has its own 
data base of tail numbers of civil aircraft that have 
irregular or suspect flight histories in Brazilian air space. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Emphasizing that the GOB's approach to its ABD 
program has always been focused on its use as a tool of 
dissuasion, Machado noted that, before implementation of the 
shootdown legislation, narcotrafficking pilots would brazenly 
ignore BRAF fighters' orders, and even non-criminal pilots 
would sometimes take a nonchalant attitude toward responding 
to air force hails.  Now, aircraft intercepted, hailed and 
interrogated by COMDABRA aircraft have a "100 percent" rate 
of responding and obeying, he added. 
 
PART B: SITE VISITS TO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS: 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ref A requested site visits by Embassy officers to 
at least two air traffic control facilities in Brazil, to 
confirm the level of awareness among ATC personnel of 
Brazil's ABD  program and its procedures.  Mission reiterates 
ref C information that all/repeat/all air traffic control in 
Brazil, including civil aviation, is handled by uniformed 
Brazilian Air Force personnel.  The ATC centers are 
co-located with air defense centers at four BRAF facilities 
which conduct ATC/air defense for the entire country.  These 
four regional BRAF Centers for Air Defense and Air Traffic 
Control (CINDACTA's) are in addition to air traffic "towers" 
at larger airfields which control only local take-offs and 
landings.  Hence unlike the U.S., civil air traffic control 
in Brazil is not dispersed to various regional, state, and 
municipal airports, but is concentrated exclusively in the 
four air force centers.  Embassy has received BRAF 
authorization to visit two of the centers on 26-27 September: 
CINDACTA II in Recife (covering northeastern Brazil) and 
CINDACTA I in Brasilia (covering central Brazil).  Embassy 
DAO personnel will make the site visits and we will report 
findings immediately thereafter via septel. 
 
PART C: GOB EFFORTS TO PUBLICIZE ABD PROGRAM: 
 
¶8. (U) On 16 September, PolCouns, Air Attache and Assistant 
Air Attache again met with Brigadeiro Machado, COMBADRA 
commander, at his headquarters in Brasilia.  Per ref A 
questions, Machado provided the following information on GOB 
and BRAF measures to publicize the existence and procedures 
of Brazil's ABD program since it entered into force in 
October 2004: 
 
-- Machado confirmed that the GOB had issued Notice to Airmen 
(NOTAM) bulletins, per international procedures, when 
 
BRASILIA 00002002  003 OF 003 
 
 
Brazil's program was publicly announced by then-Defense 
Minister Viegas in October 2004.  Per standard NOTAM 
procedures, the NOTAM remained published for 56 days, until 
such time as information about the ABD program was 
permanently incorporated into Brazil's Aeronautic Information 
Package (AIP).  The information is now contained in the AIP, 
and is available on the BRAF's website, Machado said, adding 
that Brazil's civil aviation law has also been amended to 
reflect the ABD program's existence and scope. 
 
-- The GOB and BRAF also undertook a 30-day media campaign in 
October 2004, with both the Defense Minister and Machado 
conducting extensive interviews with national TV, radio and 
print media, Machado said.  In addition, posters outlining 
the ABD program and its procedures have been posted in public 
spaces and pilot ready rooms (where flight plans are logged) 
at airports throughout Brazil, Machado said. 
 
PART D:  STATISTICS: 
 
¶9. (SBU) In response to Mission request, the BRAF provided in 
an official communique to the Mission the following 
statistics for the Brazil ABD program, for the period from 1 
September 2005 through 31 July 2006: 
 
¶I.   Unknown air tracks:  4,567 
 
II.  Suspect air tracks (i.e., considered suspect owing to 
routes utilized, but not necessarily illegal); OBS: This 
number is included in I:  108 
 
III. Interceptions realized:  254 
 
IV:  Enforcement measures applied: 
a.   Change of route: 1 
b.   Obligatory landing: 1 
c.   Warning fire: 0 
d.   Destructive fire:  0 
 
¶V.   Quantity of drugs aprehended by police authorities as 
consquence of realized interceptions:  564 kg. 
 
VI.  Statistic for daily average of unknown air tracks:  21.7 
 
(Embassy Note:  Machado confirmed that IV a and b, and V 
refer to the joint BRAF-Federal Police operation described by 
Machado in ref C.  End Embassy note.) 
 
MISSION RECOMMENDATION: 
 
¶10. (SBU) It is this Mission's assessment that Brazilian Air 
Force and GOB procedures for the Brazilian Air Bridge Denial 
program continue to fully comply with the mutually agreed 
terms referenced in the September 2004 USG-GOB exchange of 
diplomatic notes constituting our bilateral understanding of 
Brazil's program.  On that basis, and subject to septel 
provision of information deemed satisfactory by Department 
for Part B above, this Mission recommends Presidential 
recertification of the Brazil ABD program in October 2006. 
 
 
CHICOLA