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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001966 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016 
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL ON 
INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY CHIEF 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D). 
 
 ¶1.  (S/NF) Summary.  On 14 September, Ambassador 
(accompanied by PolCouns and DATT) made a courtesy call on 
General Jorge Armando Felix, Minister for Institutional 
Security in the Brazilian Presidency. Felix's office oversees 
both national intelligence and narcotics prevention efforts 
nationwide, and is also an interagency crisis management 
center for the Brazilian Government (GOB).  Felix was 
accompanied by his deputy, General Wellington; Marcio 
Buzanelli, Director of Brazil's National Intelligence Agency 
(ABIN); and General Paulo Uchoa, Director of Brazil's 
Counter-Drug Secretariat (SENAD).  The frank and broad 
discussion covered bilateral cooperation against terrorism 
and narcotrafficking, and USG concerns about delays in 
security preparations for the 2007 Pan American Games in Rio. 
 Ambassador also raised the issue of bilateral cooperation in 
intelligence sharing on regional issues.  End summary. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY CABINET 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) Felix shared with Ambassador a slide presentation 
outling the responsibilities of the Presidency's 
Institutional Security Office (Portuguese acronym GSI), 
stressing that the GSI has primarily "coordination" vice 
"executive" authorities.  Felix explained that his office -- 
in addition to providing direct security support to the 
President, serving on the National Defense Council, and 
coordinating interagency crisis management in the GOB -- is 
responsible for overseeing the work of the Brazilian 
Intelligence Agency (ABIN) and is the seat of the President's 
National Anti-Drug Secretariat (SENAD).  Felix praised the 
cooperation of Embassy agencies, including the Narcotics 
Affairs Section (NAS), with his office and emphasized a 
desire to intensify cooperation whenever possible.  In 
response to questions by Ambassador, Felix further clarified 
that ABIN is primarily focused on intelligence issues and 
security within Brazil, and SENAD is focused on prevention 
and treatment of drug usage, vice repression and enforcement, 
which are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Police. 
 
CT ISSUES 
--------- 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador reviewed USG concerns about possible 
terrorist financing activities in the tri-border area, and 
solicited Felix's views on potential threats.  He also asked 
Felix about the structure of decision-making and executive 
responsibility on CT issues within the GOB, and raised the 
possibility of high-level visits by senior U.S. intelligence 
officials for meetings with Brazilian counterparts.  On 
operational issues, Ambassador praised the relationship 
between Brazilian intelligence and security officials and the 
Embassy, but expressed concern about the state of security 
preparations for the Pan-American games in Brazil in 2007. 
He also asked whether the GSI and ABIN have monitored persons 
coming to Brazil in evacuations from the recent fighting in 
southern Lebanon. 
 
¶4. (C) On the tri-border question, Felix said that the area 
is a focus of concern for Brazil in several respects, 
including narcotrafficking, arms smuggling, piracy and 
falisfication of myriad products, as well as money laundering 
and terrorist financing.  The GOB's police and intelligence 
services have an extensive presence in the region, and also 
have liaison relations with Argentine, Paraguayan and other 
national intelligence services, including U.S. agencies.  The 
GOB pursues CT investigations in the TBA and elsewhere 
rigorously, he said, but is mindful of not "stigmatizing" the 
Muslim community in the region, or prejudicing the area's 
 
BRASILIA 00001966  002 OF 003 
 
 
image as a tourist destination.  Brazil also has to be 
"sensitive" to the differences -- in economic development 
levels, in police capacity -- that exist among the three TBA 
"neighbors" and work in a "gradual" fashion to build 
confidence and lay groundwork for enhanced security 
cooperation between the three nations. 
 
¶5. (C) With regard to the GOB's bureaucratic architecture for 
managing CT issues, Felix told Ambassador that the GSI had 
recently sent to President Lula da Silva a proposal for new 
legislation that would organize the GOB's CT efforts into a 
more centralized structure under the supervision of Felix. 
If Lula approves the proposal, it will be forwarded to 
Brazil's congress as a "projeto de lei" (legislative 
proposal) for debate.  Felix, who traveled to the U.S. last 
year for consultations with USG agencies on development of 
interagency CT coordination, welcomed the Ambassador's 
proposal for high-level visits, and said he and the ABIN 
director would be the GOB interlocutors for such meetings. 
He directed his staff to prepare a draft agenda of potential 
issues of mutual concern to be addressed in the meetings, and 
undertook to provide the agenda to the Embassy. 
 
6.(C) Noting the Ambassador's concern that security 
preparations for the Pan Am Games appear to be moving slowly, 
Felix nonetheless demurred on a substantive reply, saying 
only that the National Secrariat for Public Security has the 
lead within the GOB for security for the games.  Felix 
further implied he would not welcome taking on the task. 
(Comment:  Notwithstanding Felix's comments, there is 
widespread frustration within the GOB and among international 
missions and service providers with the work being done by 
the Public Security Secretariat, and Mission elements are 
working informally on the issue with working-level 
counterparts in the GSI, who indicate they expect the 
security coordination mission for the games will be 
transferred formally to GSI in the near future. End comment.) 
 
 
¶7. (S/NF) ABIN Director Buzanelli, responding to Ambassador's 
question about movements of persons into Brazil from Lebanon 
in the wake of recent fighting there, said his agency has 
been carefully checking the names and backgrounds of 
Brazilian passport holders (and relatives) evacuated from 
Lebanon, and is coordinating this effort with other 
intelligence services, including those of the USG. But the 
work has been difficult and time-consuming, he said, as 
almost 3,000 Brazilians were evacuated from Lebanon, though 
some are now returning there with the ceasefire in place. 
Felix added that the GOB has been highly concerned about the 
possibility of terrorist elements or combatants slipping into 
Brazil with other evacuees, and remains attentive.  Felix 
noted that Brazil's population of over 7 million persons of 
Lebanese descent is, by far, made up mostly of Maronite and 
Orthodox Christians, who immigrated before the Lebanese civil 
war in the 1970s.  During and following the war, Muslims 
immigrated to Brazil, settling mainly in the tri-border area 
and Sao Paulo.  The predominent population of settled, 
prosperous non-Muslim Lebanese has "helped to maintain 
balance" and limit radicalization of the Lebanese population 
in Brazil, despite the deep emotional resonance events in 
Lebanon and the Middle East have in Brazil's middle eastern 
community, according to Felix. 
 
CRIME AND BORDER CONTROL 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassador recalled his recent meeting with Justice 
Minister Thomas Bastos, in which a possible visit by the U.S. 
Attorney General, DEA Administrator, and INL A/S were 
discussed, and in which Ambassador offered USG assistance in 
 
BRASILIA 00001966  003 OF 003 
 
 
addressing the recent violent attacks in Sao Paulo by the PCC 
organized crime group.  He noted conversations with Sao Paulo 
Governor Claudio Lembo and Rio Mayor Cesar Maia in which both 
had expressed high concern about cocaine inundating their 
cities.  He further recounted his meeting with Federal Police 
Director Paulo Lacerda, noting Lacerda's concern about the 
illicit flow of both narcotics and heavy-caliber weapons 
across Brazil's immense frontiers.  Lacerda had observed that 
he had only 7,000 Federal Police agents, and that the 
Brazilian Army has constitutional authority to purse public 
order/law enforcement missions within 150 kilometers of 
national borders.  Ambassador asked for Felix's perspectives 
on these concerns. 
 
¶9. (C) Felix said his office would welcome visits by the U.S. 
Attorney General, DEA Administrator, and INL A/S and 
expressed gratitude for offers of assistance to deal with the 
PCC.  Observing that Brazilian authorities are becoming 
progressively better at "following the money trail," Felix 
said Brazilian police are now increasingly using financial 
investigation tactics against organized crime, including the 
PCC and other narcotics and gun smugglers.  He said there is 
proposed legislation to expand the Federal Police to more 
than 14,000 agents, but that the Brazilian military continues 
to be reluctant to engage in border operations against 
narcotics smuggling, fearing the potential for corruption 
among the troops -- a troubling trend seen in neighboring 
countries, Felix added. 
 
¶10. (C) Brazil's battle against narcotrafficking has been "a 
cycle of success-failure," and he said the classic example of 
this is seen with Bolivia.  Brazilian law enforcement has 
enjoyed considerable success in controlling precursor 
chemcials and materials flowing from Brazil into Bolivia for 
the processing of coca into refined cocaine products.  As a 
result, Bolivia's cocaine has degraded to a point that it 
attracts little interest in the U.S. and European markets. 
But an unintended consquence is now evident as low-quality 
Bolivian cocaine floods Brazilian cities: Brazil is now 
Bolivia's main drug market. 
 
REGIONAL ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶11. (S/NF) Ambassador inquired whether the GSI and ABIN would 
be interested in colloborating with U.S. counterparts in 
sharing intelligence on developments in the region, including 
in Venezuela.  Felix was careful in his reply, but said such 
cooperation could be "useful," and said, with no elaboration, 
that "Paraguay could be of special interest."  Ambassador 
pressed further on the question of Venezuela, to which Felix 
quietly replied, "Why not?" 
 
¶12. (C) Comment. Felix appears willing to cooperate with USG 
authorities, and is clearly concerned with improving and 
streamling the GOB's capacity for dealing with 
counter-terrorism priorities.  We believe it would be 
worthwhile to involve his office more extensively in 
collobrative efforts on CT, counter-narcotics and organized 
crime, and foresee, in particular, the possible necessity of 
making the GSI a focal point for our efforts to work with 
Brazil on security preparation for the Pan Am Games. 
 
 
Sobel