VZCZCXRO7381
OO RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3505 2621230
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191230Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6979
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 003505 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS MCAP PGOV PINR PTER PINS IZ
SUBJECT: PRT BAGHDAD: IRAQI POLICE PERCEPTION OF 
CAPABILITIES 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In furtherance of Baghdad Security Plan 
(BSP) operations, PRT officers visited seven police stations 
in BSP focus areas in September.  Our conversations with 
senior police officials revealed that police officers believe 
or want us to believe that BSP focus area residents lack 
confidence in local Iraqi Police (IP) units and that area IP 
leaders think violence will return to pre-BSP levels when the 
Coalition Forces (CF) disengage.  Local IP leaders have also 
apparently concluded that their officers lack training and 
experience, especially with weapons.  Bureaucratic blockages 
between the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and local police 
stations have reportedly resulted in inadequate equipment, 
operations and maintenance, and detainee tracking.  In 
addition, militia infiltration of local police stations is 
believed to be widespread.  Such a situation, if true, would 
be cause for concern.  END SUMMARY. 
 
IPs: Residents' Lack of Confidence, Violence to Return 
without CF-IA Presence 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
¶2. (SBU) IP officials from most BSP focus areas disclosed to 
us during our September visits that area residents have 
little confidence in the abilities of local IP forces. 
Investigative police, for example, complained that residents 
will not speak to them about security incidents and will not 
let them enter their homes without CF present.  A police 
station commander in Al Rasheed District confirmed that 
residents "refuse" to speak with his officers because the 
police "are not trusted by the residents." 
 
¶3. (SBU) While pleased with the recent decline in violence 
due to BSP security operations, many senior IP officials 
asserted that the improved security will be impossible to 
sustain without the continued presence of the CF.  These 
officials said they expect violence to rise after the CF 
disengage.  A police station commander in Al Mansour District 
said the calm will only "last as long as the CF and Iraqi 
Army are present." 
 
IP Leaders: Officers Lack Training 
---------------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) Police leaders also complained that most of their 
officers, particularly the recent recruits, lack training and 
experience, especially with weapons.  Some of our sources 
complained that they themselves had received little formal 
and on-the-job training.  A police station commander in Al 
Rasheed District surmised that "approximately seventy percent 
of his officers" were inadequately trained, especially for 
work in such a difficult security environment. 
 
Bureaucratic Blockages Between MoI and Local IPs 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶5. (SBU) IP officials also stated that lack of MoI support 
for equipment, operations and maintenance, and detainee 
tracking prevent them from patrolling areas and conducting 
proper investigations.  Most of the facilities we saw need 
general maintenance and additional supplies, and their 
equipment and vehicles require repair.  Few have adequate 
facilities for detainees. 
 
IPs on Militia Infiltration 
--------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) According to several recent police station monthly 
reports from the stations visited, many IP officials consider 
their ranks to be infiltrated by sectarian militias in spite 
of CF presence at the stations.  Investigative IPs from Al 
Rasheed claimed that militia members among the police ranks 
are responsible for many of the killings in the area.  The 
officials feel powerless to investigate because of lack of 
internal police and national MoI support. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶7. (SBU) The observations above are not official IP 
assessments.  We will try to obtain information confirming or 
refuting the claims that the IP local station officials in 
BSP focus areas have been inadequately trained and are 
without sufficient resources to perform regular area patrols 
and to conduct proper investigations.  Such a situation would 
be cause for concern.  END COMMENT. 
SPECKHARD