VZCZCXRO9162
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2610/01 2681545
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251545Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2618
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 002610 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/RSA 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: SEPTEMBER 21 AU DITF BRIEFING CONFIRMS 
AMIS EXTENSION, HIGHLIGHTS FUEL PROBLEMS 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2524 
 
     ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 2523 AND PREVIOUS 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  While the AU PSC extended the mandate of 
AMIS to December 31, and Sudan has allowed the rotation of 
AMIS troops to resume, AU officials expressed concern that 
transition to a UN peacekeeping operation remains an 
unresolved issue.  The AMIS Force Commander remained in Addis 
Ababa, but reportedly received a visa for Sudan on September 
24a.  AU officials reported that security in Darfur continues 
to deteriorate, citing aerial bombing by the GOS and threats 
to IDPs.  Inability to pay its aviation fuel contractor 
compelled AMIS to ground its air operations and underscores 
the need for funding and logistics support for AMIS to 
establish a strategic reserve, AU military planners said.  AU 
officials also acknowledged that the Sudanese Air Force 
forcibly refueled its aircraft using an AMIS-marked tanker. 
The European Commission reported that it owes nearly 39 
million Euros in unpaid pledges to the AU, but cannot provide 
nearly USD 7 million sought by contractor PAE by September 
30, as prepayment for the extension of food services.  AU 
officials requested partner assistance in conducting a 
"lessons learned" exercise, and welcomed the appointment of a 
USG Special Envoy for Sudan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) On September 21, the African Union Darfur Integrated 
Task Force (DITF) briefed selected AU partners (US, UK, 
Canada, EC, NATO, and UN) on political, logistical, and 
security developments of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). 
 
--------------------------------------- 
AMIS EXTENDED; 2 BATTALIONS TO BE ADDED 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) AU DITF POLAD Dr. Solomon Gomes confirmed that on 
September 20, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), 
meeting at the head of state level in New York, had decided 
(1) to extend the mandate of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
for three months to December 31; and (2) to enhance AMIS with 
the addition of two battalions, as suggested in a new concept 
of operations (CONOPS).  (NOTE: Communique was subsequently 
forwarded to AF/SPG on September 22.  END NOTE.)  While 
Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore had told the press 
that Sudan was willing to talk to the UN, "the issue is still 
there, and that is transition." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Gomes reiterated concern that the August 30 addendum 
to the July 28 UNSYG's report on Darfur called for UN 
military personnel to "infiltrate" AMIS:  USD 50 million in 
proposed UN DPKO assistance to AMIS was specified for 105 
MILOBs, CIVPOL, and civilian staff from the UN.  As Sudanese 
military personnel were stationed in every sector, the 
deployment of such UN staff could complicate the situation in 
Darfur further, even leading to AMIS being asked to leave. 
The area of operations for UNMIS was not the same as that of 
AMIS, Gomes added.  Operative paragraphs 7-8 of UNSRC 1706 
discussed tangible support that the UN could provide to the 
AU, he noted. 
 
---------------------- 
ROTATION SHOULD RESUME 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Referring to the GOS note verbale of the previous 
week that requested the suspension of AMIS rotation pending 
the outcome of the PSC, Gomes said there was now "no reason 
to block the rotation process."  If the GOS wanted the AU to 
stay, then "it needs to cooperate with us," he said.  NATO 
Senior Military Liaison Officer (SMLO) noted the need for a 
formal note verbale from the AU to both NATO and the EU, in 
order to resume rotation; Gomes said that the AMIS Deputy 
Head of Mission would raise the issue with the GOS and with 
AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ambassador Said Djinnit. 
The GOS had agreed to issue visas to incoming AMIS Force 
Commander Major General Luke Aprezi and to 6 MILOBs, but had 
not commented recently on rotation, Gomes said.  (NOTE: AU 
subsequently acknowledged receiving a GOS note verbale dated 
September 18 granting overflight and landing clearance to 
specific aircraft conducting rotation.  END NOTE.) 
 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002610  002 OF 005 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Poloffs underscored the urgency of clarification 
from the GOS to resume rotation, especially of Rwandan forces 
who would utilize airlift from Botswana, and who would have 
to wait to October if not airlifted within the next few days. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
AERIAL BOMBARDMENT CONTINUES 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) AU DITF Military Component representative Colonel 
Masumba said information on actual activities on the ground 
was "hard to come by," as AMIS was not given open access; it 
was therefore difficult to provide a military assessment of 
the military offensive by the GOS in northern Darfur.  The 
GOS continued to use aircraft to bomb areas held by 
non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), Masumba 
said.  SITREPs received on September 21 reported Janjaweed 
moving north to support the GOS offensive there.  "The 
assault by GOS is being done hand-in-hand with SLA Minni 
(Minawi).  There is a clear case here of the two working 
together to try to deal with the non-signatories, SLA Wahid 
and the NRF (National Redemption Front)," Masumba said.  As 
SLA Minni forces had captured one village from SLA Wahid, but 
had been repulsed from another, the offensive was not so 
successful, he added. 
 
--------------------------------- 
SECURITY: CONTINUED DETERIORATION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Displacement of the civilian population was ongoing, 
reflected in the number of new IDPs appearing at IDP camps, 
especially at Abushouk and Tawila, Masumba said.  He reported 
a "deteriorating situation":  villagers reported harassment 
and raids by Arab militias, who prevented villages from 
working on their own farms.  In addition, demonstrations 
against transition to the UN occurred throughout Darfur, "not 
without some prompting".  Two pro-UN demonstrations had also 
occurred: one student had been killed in suppression of a 
protest at the University of El Fasher; elsewhere, a local 
sheikh had been arrested after condemning the GOS policy of 
opposing the UN, but was later released following protest by 
local residents and the intervention of the Wali (governor). 
AMIS was also concerned about the threat of cholera, 
particularly due to the situation of camps. 
 
¶9. (SBU) SITREPs received September 21 showed threats to IDPs 
from the GOS, and that the deteriorating security situation 
was not improving, Masumba said.  AMIS was trying to "hang 
on" to do whatever it could, with limited resources; AMIS 
could not abandon the people of Darfur, he said.  Incidents 
reported by AMIS MILOB group sites included the following: 
-- Zam Zam:  a 28-vehicle GOS "battle pick-up" convoy with 
mounted weapons was reported threatening IDPs at Abushouk IDP 
camp for supporting UNSCR 1706; local sheikh threatened that 
if the UN came, the first shots fired would be against those 
at the camp. 
-- Various MILOB group sites reported cattle thefts (e.g., 
250 in Sector 8; also in Sector 6). 
 
¶10. (SBU) Masumba cited apparently coordinated attempts seize 
AMIS vehicles from unarmed CIVPOL: 
-- A gunman fired at a PAE vehicle at a PAE camp, then fled, 
after demanding its keys. 
-- Tawila (September 20, 11:45 a.m.):  CIVPOL monitor on the 
way to pick up teachers at a primary school was stopped at 
gunpoint in front of the school; driver continued to drive 
toward the school, despite being threatened and struck; 
gunman seized Thuraya satellite phone and charger. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Masumba could not confirmed reports of GOS troops 
being executed for cowardice, but said he would not be 
surprised.  That Janjaweed were being brought in to assist 
the GOS suggested weakness among GOS troops, he said; GOS 
troops had a long history of such weakness.  Dr. Gomes noted 
that if true, AMIS would likely have little to say about the 
executions. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Gomes noted that the ceasefire agreement had called 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002610  003 OF 005 
 
 
for the GOS police to address crime, such as rape and 
banditry.  He expressed concern that AMIS SITREPs used 
"Janjaweed" and "Arab militia" interchangeably.  In fact, he 
said, when the GOS conducted attacks, it summoned members of 
the security forces (police, militia, etc.).  SITREPs were 
therefore inconsistent: speculative as to which rebel forces 
the GOS was engaging, which underscored the AMIS Force 
Commander's need for enhanced intelligence.  Reporting from 
AMIS was "less than satisfactory," and investigations were 
often promised but their reports were never received. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
AVIATION FUEL PROBLEMS GROUND AMIS AIRCRAFT 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Asked the impact of the grounding of AMIS 
helicopters, Masumba acknowledged that "lack of jet fuel 
means no flying," but said payment had been the issue.  As a 
check had been processed the previous day to authorize a USD 
1.5 million payment to fuel provider Matthews Petroleum 
Company (MPC), he said he hoped the situation was temporary 
and that MPC would resume delivery.  While there were no 
problems with ground fuel, the aviation fuel situation was a 
"serious problem and challenge."  Payment was only a 
short-term solution; "there is no reserve" of aviation fuel 
in theatre, which threatens operations, Masumba said.  Lack 
of aviation fuel threatened rotation: how could aircraft 
enter Darfur, if they could not depart?  It was critical to 
build a minimum reserve stock of 45 days.  As MPC was paid 
for the fuel that went into aircraft, partners needed to 
assist in determining how to pay for and build a reserve 
stock.  AMIS stock was not paid for until it was consumed; 
fuel being stored had therefore not yet been paid for.  A 
single supply flight brings only 50,000 liters: less than 
what AMIS consumes in one day, so regular weekly convoys of 
28-30 vehicles were needed.  As the stock carried by such a 
convoy would cost USD 2.8 million, AMIS could not create a 
reserve stock without financial and logistical support (i.e., 
current storage bladders have insufficient capacity) from 
partners. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Dr. Gomes observed that this issue had been raised 
earlier in 2004.  AMIS had storage facilities for aviation 
fuel in three locations among its 8 sectors; it was unclear, 
however, whether they were functioning.  Gomes recommended 
that AMIS adopt the practice used by the UN Mission in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).  UN Assistance Cell to AMIS 
representative (formerly chief of fuel for UNMEE), said AMIS 
needed its own stock, under its own management, not under a 
contractor; he also noted that fuel could not be stockpiled 
beyond 3-4 months.  Gomes said AMIS did "not have a choice" 
of whether to get fuel from another supplier.  The issue 
needed to be discussed with AU DITF Administration Control 
and Management Center Chief Commodore Binega Mesfin and AMIS 
HQ in El Fasher; payment was an internal problem, he added. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
SUDANESE AIR FORCE REFUELS WITH AMIS TANKER 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Masumba acknowledged that MPC used a vehicle with 
white "AMIS" markings to fuel GOS aircraft, but noted that 
contractually the fuel in the tanker, until consumed, was not 
owned by AMIS but by MPC.  (NOTE:  On September 22, 
Ambassador John Kayode Shinkaiye, Chief of Staff to AU 
Commission President Konare, formally informed Canadian 
Embassy that the Sudanese Air Force forcibly seized an AMIS 
tanker on September 11-12 and used it to refuel GOS aircraft, 
which AMIS protested as a violation of bothe the Status of 
Mission Agreement (SOMA) and the Darfur Peace Agreement. 
AMIS reports that MPC has now repaired its wholly-owned 
tanker, and will use it, rather than AMIS vehicles, to refuel 
other customers.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶16. (SBU) EC representative expressed concern about the GOS 
escorting fuel truck convoys from the Darfur border to El 
Fasher.  Gomes responded that following an earlier attack in 
which fuel tankers were lost, the GOS had instructed MPC not 
to provide fuel to AMIS.  Noting the difficulty of dealing 
with a sovereign government that was not sympathetic, such 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002610  004 OF 005 
 
 
arrangements depended on "exigencies on the ground."  DPA 
non-signatories already had the false perception of collusion 
between AMIS and the GOS, but in reality this was not the 
case, and should not be an issue.  Masumba said whether the 
conduct of a contractor could imperil the mission was a valid 
concern; it was possible "to starve AMIS of fuel," if there 
were no reserve in the mission area.  Even now, fuel convoys 
were being broken up, with only a few vehicles being allowed 
to pass.  (NOTE: On September 22, a convoy of only 11 fuel 
tankers was allowed to travel to Nyala.  END NOTE.) 
 
---------------------------- 
WITHDRAWAL CONTINGENCY PLANS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Gomes said that withdrawal contingency plans were 
in progress.  Asked about the disposition of joint assets 
such as vehicles and ammunition, Gomes said that Commissioner 
Djinnit was seized with the issue.  The AU felt that for 
assets given to the AU, the AU, not partners, should 
determine their disposition; distribution of such assets to 
either troop contributing countries or the African Standby 
Force (ASF) was being considered.  More information was 
needed from Commodore Mesfin.  On preparations for handover 
to the UN, Gomes said the AU and UN had met on September 14 
and that meetings with the UN were ongoing:  "when the time 
comes, it will not be difficult to happen." 
 
-------------------------------- 
AMIS FORCE COMMANDER AWAITS VISA 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) Incoming AMIS Force Commander Major General Luke 
Aprezi (introduced the previous week) said he hoped to be in 
El Fasher by September 25, and expected to pick up his visa 
for Sudan.  (NOTE: As of September 25, Aprezi remained in 
Addis Ababa, but had reportedly received his visa the 
previous day.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶19. (SBU) Colonel Masumba noted that the new FC's arrival 
should support the AMIS Forward Joint Mission Headquarters 
(FJMHQ).  Officers from El Fasher had briefed DITF on 
resistance to the FJMHQ and lack of support from the outgoing 
FC, who thought the FJMHQ an unnecessary structure.  The 
agreement to hire a retired Zambian brigadier general as head 
of the Joint Operations Center (JOC) was "still in the 
pipeline." 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
AU AWAITS EC CONTRIBUTIONS OF 40 MILLION EUROS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶20. (SBU) EC POLAD discussed the status of European 
Commission financial contributions to the African Union.  AU 
note verbale 2778 of September 13 requested that the EC:  (1) 
expedite transfer of 50 million Euros under the current 
contribution agreement, to address current bills presented by 
contractor PAE; and (2) address the prepayment requested by 
PAE (for the extension of food services from October-December 
2006).  According to Brussels: 
--under the second contribution agreement, 4 million Euros 
for AMIS II remained outstanding and not yet paid by the EC; 
-- two weeks earlier, the EC paid 15.6 million Euros to the 
AU; 
-- the EC still had to make payment of 20 million Euros for 
October 2004-October 2006; 
-- the sixth contribution agreement, covering August 7 to 
mid-October, remained to be worked on; 
-- the EC could not engage in direct payments to contractors 
(i.e., and therefore cannot pay PAE directly, as the UK does 
for fuel); 
-- as noted at the July 18 AMIS pledging conference in 
Brussels, the EC made additional pledges for AMIS for October 
2006; the Netherlands and the UK had indicated that they 
would cover AMIS beyond October 2006. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
DARFUR-DARFUR DIALOGUE AND CONSULTATION 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002610  005 OF 005 
 
 
¶21. (SBU) Dr. Gomes had no announcements regarding the DDDC. 
DPA non-signatories still sought to make contact with the AU, 
and were awaiting the return of AU Commission Chairperson 
Konare.  Konare would also decide between two possible 
candidates to replace Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe as AU 
Special Representative for Sudan.  (NOTE: Post has learned 
that Ethiopian national Abdul Mohammed, a consultant to the 
AU on Sudan who is also an employee of UNICEF as well as a 
director of the Addis-based NGO, InterAfrica Group, has been 
selected to chair the DDDC preparatory committee.  Official 
announcement of his appointment has been delayed pending his 
release from UNICEF.  END NOTE.) 
 
------------------------------------- 
REQUEST FOR "LESSONS LEARNED" EXPERTS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) LG sought clarification of a September 19 AU note 
verbale to partners requesting a "comprehensive 'Lesson 
Learned' exercise as soon as possible," and noted that the 
request for 2-3 people was not realistic given the scope of 
the task.  Gomes replied that a team of 10 had worked on 
UNMEE lessons learned, and that partners could decide how 
many experts they could provide.  "You decide what you can 
do."  He said Commissioner Djinnit had been pleased with the 
earlier lessons learned report from Canada.  LG noted that 
NATO had previously submitted a note verbale with an 
outstanding offer to embed one lessons learned expert with 
the AU. 
 
--------------------------------- 
APPOINTMENT OF USG ENVOY WELCOMED 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶23.  (SBU) Upon being informed of the USG's appointment of a 
Special Envoy for Sudan, Dr. Gomes said Commissioner Djinnit 
had earlier received a proposal to appoint two special envoys 
for Sudan: one from the AU, and the other from partners. 
Another special envoy would be useful, to bring greater 
pressure on the GOS, especially given President Compaore's 
remarks that the GOS was willing to engage the UN.  Gomes 
expressed optimism that transition to the UN could occur; 
President Bashir needed to be briefed on the enhancement of 
AMIS, and on the replacement of "green berets with blue" who 
were there to help Sudan, not to overthrow him.  Some 10,000 
foreign troops were already in Sudan.  Sustained, collective 
pressure was needed, particularly as December was not far 
away. 
HUDDLESTON