VZCZCXRO4510
OO RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2524/01 2581335
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151335Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2478
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002524 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/RSA 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: SEPTEMBER 7 AU DITF BRIEFING REPORTS 
FUNDING SUFFICIENT TO EXTEND AMIS 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2420 
 
     ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 2523 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  On September 7, African Union officials 
reported to AU partners that recent cash contributions would 
allow the AU Mission in Sudan to continue operations beyond 
September 30, but that any decision on either extending or 
strengthening AMIS by two additional battalions would have to 
made at a September 18 meeting of the AU Peace and Security 
Council.  AU planners said they were making contingency plans 
for withdrawal, while acknowledging that withdrawal would be 
"a political tragedy for Africa."  AMIS military observers 
reported significant troop movements by GOS forces into 
Darfur, but could not estimate their number.  Among the 
security incidents highlighted were an August 31 attack by 
uniformed GOS forces on women and children in Graida; AMIS 
forces did not react, angering local IDPs who then had to be 
repelled with APCs.  AU officials said that a September 5 
incident, in which GOS troops entered an IDP camp at Kutum, 
represents a violation of both the Darfur Peace Agreement and 
the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement.  AU officials said 
Sudan's proposed security stabilization plan is unacceptable. 
 On the political front, AU officials said there are no legal 
grounds for excluding DPA non-signatories from participating 
in Ceasefire Commission meetings.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) On September 7, the African Union Darfur Integrated 
Task Force (DITF) briefed selected AU partners (US, UK, 
Canada, EC, NATO, and UN) on political, logistical, and 
security developments of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). 
(NOTE: AU DITF's subsequent September 14 briefing has been 
reported SEPTEL (ref B).) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
FUNDING SUFFICIENT TO CONTINUE, BUT WITHDRAWAL NOT RULED OUT 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) AU DITF POLAD Dr. Solomon Gomes reiterated 
observations made September 6 by AU Peace and Security 
Commissioner Ambassador Said Djinnit (ref A) that the 
possibility of AMIS withdrawal after September 30 could not 
be ruled out, but that any decision on the future of AMIS 
would have to await the outcome of a September 18 AU Peace 
and Security Council (PSC) meeting.  Partners who highlighted 
the AU's "moral responsibility" to remain in Darfur, had the 
equal responsibility of funding AMIS's continued presence, 
Gomes said.  AU DITF Head Ambassador Ki Doulaye Corentin said 
the September 18 PSC would ask whether sufficient funds 
existed to allow AMIS to continue to December; if not, it 
would likely push for AMIS's withdrawal.  The PSC would also 
consider whether AMIS had sufficient logistics on the ground 
to sustain its forces.  Ki Doulaye said funds were sufficient 
to take AMIS beyond September and suggested that the UNGA's 
Fifth Committee could request additional funding.  EC 
representative clarified that current funding would cover 
AMIS to October 22; cash contributions from the Netherlands 
and the UK would cover AMIS to December.  Ki Doulaye 
acknowledged that the AU had been informed that USG support 
for AMIS would continue beyond September 30. 
 
¶4. (SBU) A September 14-15 meeting with the UN would discuss 
how to strengthen AMIS on the ground, Ki Doulaye added. 
Commenting on a new concept of operations (CONOPs) for AMIS, 
AU DITF Military Component Chief Colonel Mayell Mbaye said 
the AU needed to await the PSC decision before adding two 
battalions and asking partners to airlift them.  An UNMIS 
representative had informed AU Commissioner Djinnit on 
September 6 that the UN strongly needed these two additional 
battalions.  Ki Doulaye said the UN should fund these 
battalions, if the UN wanted the AU to continue to December. 
Gomes observed that UNSCR 1706 "has the potential to create a 
problem between the AU and the UN," as it limited AMIS's 
support to the DPA to only the transition.  According to 
UNSCR 1706, once transition occurred, the AU no longer had a 
role to play; this was "troubling," Gomes said.  He said that 
the UNSCR was "far-reaching," but that a draft addendum to 
the UN SYG report, prepared by UN DPKO and issued on the eve 
of the adoption of UNSCR 1706, envisaged "incremental 
infiltration" of UN staff into Darfur, which created a 
problem for the AU.  Gomes said the AU would send a 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002524  002 OF 004 
 
 
delegation to the UN in New York.  Mbaye commented that the 
addendum was "opposite" to the agreement the AU had with the 
UN. 
 
¶5. (SBU) DITF's military component was discussing the 
contingency of withdrawal with troop contributing countries 
(TCCs), but the AU was "aware withdrawal from Darfur would be 
a political tragedy for Africa," Ki Doulaye said.  He noted, 
however, that withdrawal "would not be the first," citing the 
UN's withdrawal from Somalia in 1994.  "It will be very 
painful for all of us to pull out of Darfur," he said.  Mbaye 
confirmed that rotation of Nigerian troops, and of 152 
CIVPOL, had started.  DITF Head of Civilian Police Karl Mario 
Nobin reported that 260 CIVPOL staff awaited rotation (down 
from 498):  those from Mali would rotate September 8, and 
those from Cameroon would rotate September 10.  Ki Doulaye 
said that signing a contract for the construction of CIVPOL 
stations should continue, despite uncertainty about AMIS's 
future.  (NOTE: On September 14, DITF announced that the 
Nigerian rotation was complete, but that the rotation of 
Rwandan troops had been put on hold pending the September 18 
PSC.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Dr. Gomes noted that in discussions held the 
previous day on options besides withdrawal, the concept of 
"co-deployment" (implemented in Liberia) had not been raised. 
 He explained that if GOS continued to withhold consent to 
transition, one could have UN CIVPOL, humanitarian, and other 
staff arrive to reinforce AMIS; they would be AMIS forces but 
would adopt the mandate outlined in UNSCR 1706. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
AMIS STANDS BY AS WOMEN AND CHILDREN ATTACKED 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) DITF Military Component Chief Mbaye reported that 
the situation in Darfur over the last two weeks was 
"generally calm" except for Sectors 1 and 6 (where National 
Redemption Front and SLM Abdel Wahid forces had conducted 
attacks) and Sector 2 (where Arab militia had conducted 
attacks near Nyala).  Heavy rainfall continued to limit AMIS 
activities by road; banditry and rapes continued.  There had 
been significant GOS troop movements, although AMIS could not 
estimate their number.  Perhaps 6,000 GOS forces were in 
Darfur; AMIS could confirm that they were being reinforced 
but could not confirm that such reinforcements were coming 
from the south.  Canada noted that the GOS security plan had 
called for 10,000 more troops in Darfur by August 31; Mbaye 
said he could not confirm whether this was being implemented. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Mbaye said MILOB group sites had reported the 
following incidents: 
 
August 31 
-- Graida, Sector 2:  50 suspected Arab militia on horseback 
but in GOS uniform attacked women and children gathering 
grass.  "Non-reaction" by AMIS MILOB group angered IDPs, who 
were then "scared away" by AMIS using armored personnel 
carriers (APCs).  DITF does not know what AMIS did not 
intervene, and has asked AMIS for an explanation.  (EC said 
non-action in Graida was "regrettable" and "shameful", and 
welcomed the outcome of any investigation.) 
-- Kutum, Sector 6:  GOS representative reported seeing NRF 
vehicles. 
-- Sector 1:  Intelligence report received of NRF preparing 
an ambush (where attack of August 19 occurred). 
-- CIVPOL vehicle hijacked; AMIS weapons, 140 rounds, and 1 
CIVPOL radio seized. 
 
September 1 
-- Graida, Sector 2: 3 killed in clash with (pro-SLM/A Minni 
Minawi) Zagawa fighters. 
-- Tawilla, Sector 1: SLA Abdel Wahid sympathizers were 
recruiting in IDP camp for his movement; led to approximately 
100 IDPs departing the camp. 
-- Sector 6: movement northwest (destination unknown) of 28 
trucks with heavily armed GOS troops. 
 
September 2 
-- Sector 2: GOS army convoy sighted near Nyala/El Fasher 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002524  003 OF 004 
 
 
road. 
-- Sector 1: demonstration against international intervention 
by 5,000 protestors who presented petitions and bore signs 
reading, "No way, USA." 
-- Sector 5: similar demonstration against UNSC resolution 
1706 by 300 protestors, including women and children. 
 
September 3 
-- El Geneina, Sector 3: demonstration against UNSCR 1706 by 
5,000 demonstrators (including students, GOS workers, police, 
and National Congress Party members) led by the Wali 
(governor) of West Darfur, with signs reading, "No to foreign 
forces" and "No to non-believers." 
-- Sector 3: 400 SLA Wahid soldiers conducted attack with 
mortars and machine guns; 1 GOS police and 8 attackers killed. 
-- El Fasher, Sector 1:  GOS "show of force" as 50 vehicles 
pointed their weapons at AMIS HQ while passing. 
 
September 5 
-- Nyala, Sector 2:  Damage to UN property, some injured, as 
result of demonstration against UN deployment in Darfur. 
-- Kutum, Sector 6:  10 LandCruisers with mounted guns and 
GOS soldiers moved to an IDP camp, where they were reportedly 
conducting a "security patrol." 
(NOTE: Col. Mbaye underscored that this was a violation of 
the Darfur Peace Agreement and of the Humanitarian Ceasefire 
Agreement.  END NOTE.) 
-- 20 trucks with GOS soldiers were sighted moving to an 
unknown destination. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In response to LG's request for additional 
information on reports that the local sheikh in Sector 7 had 
asked to participate in AMIS patrols, due to alleged abuses, 
Mbaye said one could not impose conditions on AMIS.  DITF 
Head of Civilian Police Nobin explained that Zalengei, Sector 
7, had been a "no-go area" for several months; DITF was 
seeking information from the field on the resumption of AMIS 
activities there, he said.  Gomes said that the internal 
report on alleged abuses had been completed and given to the 
AU Chairperson but would not be publicized or given to the AU 
PSC.  Canada suggested that the AU strengthen its "lessons 
learned" process:  one could not afford to wait for the 
completion of work of formal boards of inquiry; given NRF 
threats to AMIS convoys, it was necessary to make preliminary 
recommendations for implementation as soon as possible. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Commissioner Djinnit had approved the appointment 
of a retired Zambian general to serve as chief of staff of 
the AMIS Forward Joint Mission Headquarters (FJMHQ), Colonel 
Mbaye said.  A note verbale had been sent, and he was 
expected to arrive before the end of September.  Mbaye 
expressed concern about serious problems in AU 
administration, noting a one-month delay in the hiring of an 
official from Gambia. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
AU AGREES WITH UNSYG THAT GOS SECURITY PLAN UNACCEPTABLE 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Asked to provide an assessment of GOS military 
movement, Ki Doulaye said that the GOS intended to solve the 
problems of Darfur by itself, as it had in 2003.  He 
reaffirmed that the AU's mandate in Darfur ended September 
30; it was unknown whether the PSC would extend AMIS's 
mandate to the end of December.  The GOS wanted to implement 
its own plan, "which would be catastrophic," Ki Doulaye said. 
 The GOS said it would fight the National Redemption Front 
(NRF) and Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM), and the Janjaweed were "all over the place with 
impunity," Ki Doulaye added.  He said that the UNSYG had 
already said the GOS security plan (sent to the UN but not to 
the AU) was unacceptable,  a position that all should 
endorse, Ki Doulaye said.  If the GOS were to implement its 
plan, the number of IDPs would dramatically increase, he 
said.  He noted fighting between GOS and Minni parties to 
control areas, and said that the AU had "no visibility on the 
future of this mission." 
 
¶12. (SBU) Canada reported that a Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation team had been attacked September 6 outside their 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002524  004 OF 004 
 
 
hotel in Khartoum, likely by official security forces in 
plain clothes; the CBC's visit to Khartoum had been 
facilitated by AU DITF. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
NO LEGAL GROUNDS TO EXCLUDE DPA NON-SIGNATORIES FROM CFC 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) One could not rule out the possibility of the 
breakup of Sudan, Gomes said; if the slow pace of the 
implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) continued, 
and the south sought independence, other states could follow. 
 Gomes reported that the DPA Implementation Team remained 
understaffed, and that no replacement had been named  for AU 
Special Representative for Sudan Ambassador Baba Gana 
Kingibe, who had recently announced his resignation.  Ki 
Doulaye said that appointments to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue 
and Consultation (chair and preparatory committee) were "in 
the pipeline." 
 
¶14. (SBU) Commenting on the recent expulsion of Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) non-signatores from the Ceasefire Commission 
(CFC), Ki Doulaye underscored that Minni Minawi, not just the 
GOS, strongly opposed the participation of non-signatories. 
If a meeting were convened, an "incomplete picture" would 
result.  The AU therefore proposed holding two meetings (one 
for signatories, one for non-signatories), as an earlier 
proposal for a single meeting in two phases had been 
rejected.  Having non-signatories no longer participate in 
the CFC had created problems for AMIS troops, who were now 
being targeted.  Nevertheless, he said, the AU still hoped to 
engage non-signatories, especially Abdel Wahid.  Gomes added 
that AU Commission Chairperson Konare had indicated his 
willingness to engage non-signatories.  Gomes noted that AU 
partners had said they were not part of the decision to 
exclude non-signatories; Commissioner Djinnit had received a 
note from the USG asking for reconsideration of the decision. 
 The GOS had taken a political decision, not a legal 
decision, Gomes said, as the DPA did not specify "those who 
did not sign should not sit."  "They have no grounds, 
legally," Gomes said, noting that discussions in Abuja had 
proposed a two-track mechanism.  Ki Doulaye highlighted the 
need to find ways to engage non-signatories, not exclude 
them; a high-level meeting to engage non-signatories, 
especially Abdel Wahid, was possible, he said. 
 
¶15. (SBU) COMMENT: The August 31 incident in which AMIS 
peacekeepers failed to intervene to protect women and 
children under attack in Graida by uniformed GOS forces was 
still under investigation as of September 14, and appears to 
have prompted AMIS to respond more robustly to subsequent 
attacks (ref B).  Lack of progress on the political front 
(i.e., slow implementation of the DPA, dysfunctional 
Ceasefire and Joint Commissions, and delays in launching the 
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation) highlights that the 
AU faces significant challenges in fulfilling not only its 
peacekeeping role but also its political role in Darfur.  END 
COMMENT. 
WILGUS