VZCZCXRO2786
OO RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2420/01 2491755
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061755Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2331
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0419
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0380
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002420 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO AND AF/SPG 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO AU SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: AU MINISTERIAL MUST DECIDE FUTURE OF AMIS 
 
REF: BANJUL 411 (NOTAL) 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  African Union Peace and Security 
Commissioner Said Djinnit reported to international partners 
that in September 4 discussions with the AU, Sudan disavowed 
press reports that say it seeks the immediate expulsion of 
the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), but confirmed its rejection 
of a UN peacekeeping operation and the recently adopted UNSCR 
¶1706.  The AU faces a dilemma: announcing it will remain 
indefinitely in Darfur lessens the pressure for the GOS to 
accept a UN transition, but announcing a withdrawal in the 
absence of any alternative peace support operation could 
spell a humanitarian disaster for thousands in Darfur.  While 
urging AU planners and technical experts to make contingency 
plans for withdrawal, Commissioner Djinnit urged further 
engagement with China, Russia, and the League of Arab States 
to exert additional pressure on Sudan.  No decision on the 
future of AMIS will be made prior to a September 18 
ministerial-level AU Peace and Security Council meeting, to 
be held on the margins of the UNGA in New York. 
Acknowledging a deterioration in the political, security, and 
humanitarian situation in Darfur, Commissioner Djinnit also 
noted that the AU lacks the capacity to conduct a sustained 
peacekeeping operation, and reaffirmed the AU's belief that 
the "best way forward" remains transition to a UN operation. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
DESPITE SUDAN, AU STILL SEEKS TRANSITION TO UN 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (SBU) On September 6, African Union Peace and Security 
Commissioner Ambassador Said Djinnit briefed AU partners on 
the AU's response to September 4 statements attributed to the 
Government of Sudan seeking the immediate expulsion of the AU 
Mission in Sudan.  Djinnit noted that in an earlier meeting 
with AU Commission Chairperson Konare, Sudan's President 
Bashir voiced strong opposition to AMIS transition to an UN 
operation.  The GOS also "reacted quite strongly" to the UN 
and AMIS during the previous week's UNSC consultations in New 
York, Djinnit said.  To discuss Sudan's position, the AU 
convened a meeting of its Peace and Security Council (PSC) on 
September 4.  Acting foreign minister Mohamed Karti also 
summoned AU Special Representative for Sudan Ambassador Baba 
Gana Kingibe on September 4, to reiterate that the GOS wanted 
the AU to continue its mission in Darfur, that one should 
discard media reports suggesting otherwise, but that the GOS 
rejected both a transition to the UN as well as UNSCR 1706. 
The GOS had given the AU one week to clarify the future 
mandate of AMIS, Djinnit said. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The AU faced a Catch-22, Djinnit said, as the more 
it was inclined to remain in Darfur, the less pressure it 
could exert on the GOS.  The AU could not declare that it 
would remain indefinitely in Sudan, as that would provide the 
GOS with no incentive for UN transition. A core issue for the 
African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) would be to 
determine what options existed, Djinnit said.  Citing 
concerns by some unnamed PSC members and troop contributing 
countries, and the UN's 1994 withdrawal of peacekeepers in 
Somalia, Djinnit said one could not exclude the possibility 
of withdrawal.  Noting that safe and orderly withdrawal not 
only of AMIS peacekeepers but also of jointly owned (i.e., by 
the AU and by partners) equipment would require days if not 
weeks or months, Djinnit said military planners from the AU 
Darfur Integrated Task Force would meet with technical 
experts from partners and troop contributing countries to 
discuss contingency planning in the event that AMIS must 
withdraw by September 30.  In addition to withdrawal, Djinnit 
said other options included remaining for a short period 
beyond September 30 (from 15 days to 2 months) to provide 
additional time for consultations with the GOS, or to leave a 
substantially weaker peace support mission in place.  The AU 
could, for example, announce that it would remain in Darfur 
until October; if no progress were made by then, the AU could 
begin measures to dismantle and withdraw. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Djinnit reiterated the AU's commitment to peace in 
Darfur and its continued desire to seek a transition to a UN 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002420  002 OF 003 
 
 
peacekeeping operation, as expressed earlier in numerous PSC 
communiques.  He said the AU's position remained that AMIS 
would terminate on September 30 and that "the best way 
forward" was a UN transition, particularly as the AU was 
still developing its capacity and resources to conduct 
peacekeeping operations.  The AU faced a significant dilemma, 
he added, as the June 27 ministerial-level PSC on Darfur 
(reftel) at the AU Summit had deferred consideration of a 
draft revised concept of operations for AMIS that called for 
increasing AMIS's capacities and logistics, and had decided 
to approve new tasks for AMIS but not additional resources 
for their implementation.  As the AU had briefed the UNSC, 
the AU recognized Sudan's opposition to UN transition, but 
had assumed that efforts would be made to later Sudan's 
decision.  Unfortunately, Djinnit said, such efforts had 
failed. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
RUSSIA, CHINA, ARAB LEAGUE -- ALL URGED TO PRESSURE SUDAN 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) Noting that AU Commission Chairperson had done his 
utmost to push Bashir, Djinnit urged partners to engage 
Russia, China, the Arab League, and possibly France to have 
them place greater pressure on the GOS.  He noted that the AU 
Commission had recently met with the visiting Russian foreign 
minister, who had agreed to engage the GOS; the AU would soon 
approach China.  The AU would consult with UNMIS and others 
in Khartoum later in the day, Djinnit said.  Another tactic 
may be for world leaders to approach President Bashir 
collectively, he said; there was also room for African 
leaders to act, he added. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
AU MINISTERIAL TO DECIDE WHETHER AMIS WILL WITHDRAW 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Media reports suggesting that the AU had failed and 
would immediately withdraw AMIS were misleading, Djinnit 
said.  Withdrawal was an option, he said, but the future of 
AMIS would not be determined until a ministerial-level 
meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) was 
convened September 18 in New York.  Such a meeting on the 
margins of UNGA would facilitate further consultations with 
key African leaders, if needed, he said.  While input from 
troop-contributing countries was important, the key 
decision-makers would be PSC ministers, Djinnit said.  An 
earlier ministerial-level PSC was not possible, he added, as 
the AU needed to prepare the necessary report to the PSC but 
faced the Ethiopian New Year holiday (September 11), and many 
African ministers would be traveling to Havana for the 
September 10-11 Non-Aligned Movement meeting hosted by Cuba. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Djinnit acknowledged that security and the 
humanitarian situation were deteriorating in some areas of 
Darfur, and that implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA) had "started on a weak note" with participation of only 
two of four parties.  Fulfilling additional tasks required 
5-6 additional battalions, but none had been approved, 
Djinnit said, compelling the AU to do more with less.  Noting 
that the DPA was ambiguous on the matter, he said that at the 
request of the GOS and SLM/A Minni Minawi, DPA 
non-signatories had been notified that they could no longer 
participate in the Ceasefire Commission.  The GOS was not 
willing to entertain any discussion on allowing 
non-signatories to the DPA to participate, he said.  As a 
result, AMIS was falsely perceived to be taking sides against 
non-signatories, and had been subject to several attacks.  On 
the other hand, examples of progress included: the 
establishment in Khartoum of a DPA Implementation Team, 
development of a public information strategy, and ongoing 
efforts to identify a chairman and preparatory committee 
members for a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
AU CANNOT SUSTAIN MISSION USING AD HOC FINANCING 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Djinnit took issue with the EC permrep's assertion 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002420  003 OF 003 
 
 
that AU now had sufficient funding to extend AMIS.  While 
recent cash contributions (30 mn Euros from the EC, 13.5 mn 
pounds from the UK, and 20 mn Euros from the Netherlands) 
could enable AMIS to continue beyond October, such ad hoc 
funding was precarious, Djinnit said, and could not serve as 
the basis for the AU sustaining a peace support operation. 
For the same reason, Djinnit added, staying in place with 
funding from the League of Arab States was not viable:  while 
the League's secretary-general had informed the AU of the 
League's decision to support AMIS, no contributions had been 
received from Arab states other than a single pledge from 
Qatar.  On the other hand, he said, the system of assessed 
contributions allowed by the UN was more sustainable. 
 
------------- 
PARTNER VIEWS 
------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Canadian ambassador noted that Sudan's continued 
opposition to UN deployment meant the situation in Darfur had 
reverted to 2003, and that withdrawal from Darfur, in the 
absence of any alternative peace support operation, would 
harm the AU's credibility.  He also expressed concern about 
the disposition of 105 Canadian armored personnel carriers 
(APCs), fearing their seizure by the GOS.  EC permrep 
underscored the need for a peaceful, non-military solution, 
as well as the need for concerted pressure on the GOS prior 
to September 18. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Charge questioned how the AU's oft-cited principle 
of "non-indifference," vice the OAU's principle of 
non-interference, would influence the decision on whether to 
withdraw AMIS.  In response, Djinnit said the AU had not 
developed sufficient capacity to implement the principle 
fully; the AU continued to build its institutions.  He hailed 
the successful role being played by the 15-member AU Peace 
and Security Council, noting that in contrast, under the OAU, 
no decision were made without the consent of the government 
concerned. 
 
¶11. (SBU) US, Canada, and EU heads of mission also 
underscored the necessity of the AU Commission taking a more 
aggressive public diplomacy stance to counter media reports 
that suggested that the AU had given up and would withdraw. 
Ambassador Djinnit agreed to convene a press conference, 
noting that the AU had been at the forefront of attempting to 
seek a solution for Darfur. 
 
¶12. (SBU) COMMENT:  Chinese and Russian representatives did 
not attend Ambassador Djinnit's briefing, which had been 
requested by the AU partners' group on Darfur, chaired by the 
European Commission and comprising the US, Canada, NATO, the 
UN, and Western European donors.  Separately, the AU 
Commission announced that the Darfur Peace Agreement Joint 
Commission meeting originally scheduled for September 7 in 
Addis Ababa has been postponed indefinitely.  Scant reference 
was made to UNSCR 1706 and its provision of a Chapter VII 
peace enforcement mandate.  Further engagement with China, 
Russia, and the League of Arab States, appear to be the only 
remaining options outlined by AU leadership.  END COMMENT. 
WILGUS