VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWL #0665/01 2360507
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 240507Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3188
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0216
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 4516
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0065

S E C R E T WELLINGTON 000665 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR EAP/FO, EAP/K, AND EAP/ANP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016 
TAGS: KNNP KPAO PARM PREL MNUC PTER
SUBJECT: KIWIS OFFER HELP ON NORTH KOREA 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 136495 
 
     ¶B. WELLINGTON 507 
     ¶C. WELLINGTON 176 
     ¶D. WELLINGTON 655 
 
Classified By: DCM David J. Keegan, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C/NF) Summary:  New Zealand officials say there is no 
direct trade between New Zealand and DPRK but they will 
advise GNZ entities to be on the lookout for trade and 
financial activities related to North Korea's ballistic 
missile programs.  New Zealand does not have the means to 
identify suspect DPRK entities on its own, so would 
appreciate any available U.S. information.  The GNZ is also 
willing to use NZ diplomats' trips to Pyongyang to help the 
U.S. gather information on DPRK companies.  NZ officials say 
two groups of DPRK officials may visit Wellington over the 
coming months. Embassy Wellington recommends Washington add 
regular consultations on North Korea to our list of possible 
areas for US-NZ bilateral cooperation.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C/NF) On August 23, Pol-Econ Couns discussed UNSC 
Resolution 1695 per ref A instructions with David Taylor, 
Director for North Asia at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (MFAT) and Taylor's  Deputy, Wendy Hinton.  Taylor 
said GNZ would comply fully with UNSC 1695, and said he would 
inform NZ Customs and other entities of the resolution's 
export requirements.  He said he has also requested an MFAT 
review to ensure that New Zealand export controls are 
adequate for the job.  In practice, however, New Zealand has 
not had direct trade with North Korea for at least six years. 
 Said Taylor, "The DPRK sells nothing we want and our 
exporters suspect the North Koreans can't pay for New Zealand 
products."  Some New Zealand consumer products do find their 
way into the N. Korean market, but via Chinese trading 
companies rather than direct imports.  Taylor, who was New 
Zealand's Ambassador to North Korea (resident in Seoul) 
before taking on his current role, suspects DPRK officials 
prefer the PRC trading houses because they offer bribes. 
 
¶3.  (C/NF) Taylor said NZ law is sufficient to deal with 
N.Korean financial transactions but GNZ does not have the 
means to identify which DPRK companies are involved in 
missile-related trade.  It would be very helpful if USG 
agencies could provide an unclassified list of entities which 
GNZ could provide to NZ financial institutions.  MFAT would 
also appreciate USG background information about the 
companies, as NZ diplomats typically meet with North Korean 
"showcase" companies when in Pyongyang but have no way to 
tell whether the companies are fronts for other activities. 
Taylor said MFAT would in turn be glad to report back to us. 
He promised to provide Pol-Econ Couns with a memo concerning 
a meeting he had with a DPRK company with 70 employees in 
China that exports Mercedes to Iran and Iraq. 
 
¶4.  (C/NF) The NZ Embassy is the only Seoul-based western 
embassy accredited to Pyongyang that has an officer fluent in 
Korean.  The officer, an ethnic Korean Kiwi, is a big hit 
with her DPRK counterparts when she travels there from Seoul, 
according to Taylor. By contrast, embassies based in 
Pyongyang are not allowed to employ ethnic Koreans, and only 
the UK mission has an officer who speaks very rudimentary 
Korean.  As a result, all other missions use DPRK-provided 
interpreters, who tend to avoid translating anything they 
regard as sensitive.  Taylor said that use of their own 
interpreter allows New Zealand diplomats to deliver stronger 
messages to Pyongyang, as new NZ Ambassador Jane Coombs did 
when she presented her credentials in June (ref B).  Taylor 
also said that while other Seoul-based embassies (notably the 
Canadians and Scandinavians) visit N. Korea more often than 
Kiwi diplomats do, the others tend to see the same people all 
the time and never get out of the official circuit. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) According to Taylor and Hinton, two groups of DPRK 
officials may be visiting Wellington over the coming months. 
Massey University has been asked by German national Karl 
Fell, of German Agro Action, to organize a 10-day tour of the 
North Island for five DPRK agriculture officials this 
November.  Professor Robert McCaa of U. of Minnesota has 
asked Statistics New Zealand to invite the Director of the 
Population and Health Department of the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS-DPRK) to a conference in Christ Church next 
year.  MFAT has asked Massey and Statistics New Zealand to 
keep them informed about these visits. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) Comment: GNZ officials are under no illusion that 
New Zealand has more influence over N. Korea than we do.  But 
they see themselves as a good conduit for delivering messages 
to Pyongyang and share our concerns about N. Korea's nuclear 
ambitions and other issues.  GNZ was very responsive to our 
efforts to shut down insurance for DPRK flags of convenience 
(ref C). Embassy recommends Washington add regular 
consultations on North Korea to its list of possible areas 
for increased US-NZ cooperation (ref D). 
McCormick