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Viewing cable 06WELLINGTON655, VISIT OF EAP DAS DAVIES TO NEW ZEALAND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06WELLINGTON655 2006-08-22 01:02 2011-04-28 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Wellington
VZCZCXRO6796
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0655/01 2340102
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220102Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3174
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 4514
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY PRIORITY 0596
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA PRIORITY 0500
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WELLINGTON 000655 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D (FRITZ), EAP/FO, EAP/RSP, EAP/PD, AND EAP/ANP 
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA LIZ PHU 
PACOM FOR JO1E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NZ US
SUBJECT: VISIT OF EAP DAS DAVIES TO NEW ZEALAND 
 
REF: A. WELLINGTON 627 
     B. WELLINGTON 536 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William McCormick, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  New Zealand is eager to continue to 
identify areas of future US-NZ cooperation, GNZ officials 
told EAP DAS Glyn Davies during his August 17-19 visit. But 
PM Clark and other senior officials are wary of riling the 
Labour party's left, and prefer that we gradually signal our 
dialogue through individual actions and a series of senior 
level public meetings rather than unveil a sweeping new 
initiative.  DAS Davies and GNZ counterparts reviewed Pacific 
Island, regional security and counter-terrorism issues, and 
existing US-New Zealand defense and intelligence cooperation. 
 All meetings were very cordial.  Embassy Wellington and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) staff will in 
the coming days draw up a list of the items flagged at the 
meetings for possible cooperation.  The New Zealand side 
endorsed DAS Davies' suggestion for a second bilateral 
interagency meeting early next year. 
 
2.  (C) The nuclear issue was barely raised by any GNZ 
official during the visit.  DAS Davies' off the record 
discussions with local journalists and his August 20 TV 
interview were similarly forward looking.  A brief article in 
the August 21 New Zealand Herald focused almost entirely on 
Davies' observation that the US had much to learn from New 
Zealand's experience in the Pacific Islands and shares NZ's 
concerns over the influence of checkbook diplomacy in the 
region.  End Summary. 
 
------------ 
GNZ Meetings 
------------ 
 
3.  (C) MFAT CEO Simon Murdoch told DAS Davies that PM Clark, 
FM Peters and Def Min Goff are all "broadly comfortable" with 
the Bangkok process and want it to succeed.  But in order not 
to raise opposition from Labour's left they would rather have 
actions precede rhetoric and avoid presenting the initiative 
to the public as a package.  Murdoch said the GNZ hopes for a 
series of senior-level encounters to show we are cooperating, 
for example a brief meeting between PM Clark and POTUS or S 
on the margins of the UNGA or November's APEC leaders' 
meeting in Hanoi. Davies welcomed the low-key approach 
towards increasing cooperation, but noted that at some point 
New Zealand's political leadership will need to make a public 
expression of support for the relationship.  He also 
cautioned that high-level meetings at the UNGA and APEC could 
prove difficult due to pressing commitments on the U.S. side. 
 
 
4.  (C) Murdoch said GNZ officials have gone over the Aide 
Memoire from the Bangkok meeting and have identified areas of 
"low-hanging fruit" for possible cooperation, as well as some 
more difficult options for them and/or us.  He said the 
officials had also identified some initiatives as having the 
most benefit for the GNZ, recognizing some would be difficult 
to achieve.  Among these would be for GNZ's terrorism threat 
assessment group (CTAG) to participate in assessments with 
the "4 eyes" and US-NZ consultations on the implications of 
the Pacific Island Countries' (PICs) improving 
peacekeeping/military capability.  Murdoch also acknowledged 
that Secretary Rumsfeld's meeting with DefMin Goff  was "not 
great" but said GNZ hopes we can still look for a process 
that will afford NZDF greater predictability of what it can 
and cannot do with US counterparts.  He stressed this again 
during the working lunch held later in the day. 
 
----------------------- 
The PICs and the Region 
----------------------- 
 
5.  (C) At an inter-ministerial roundtable on Pacific Island 
issues and regional architecture, MFAT Deputy Secretary Alan 
Williams said that GNZ remains very concerned about the 
potential for international crime and instability in the 
PICs.  In addition to stepping up aid to the region (now 50% 
of all assistance), NZ now has 20 government agencies working 
on outreach to the PICs.  It is also increasing its 
 
WELLINGTON 00000655  002 OF 002 
 
 
engagement with partners such as Australia, the European 
Union, and Japan and welcomes the chance to do the same with 
us.  NZAID officials said that competition between China and 
Taiwan is increasingly undermining good governance.  However, 
GNZ has begun dedicated talks with China on PIC issues, for 
example during the recent visit to Wellington by Chinese 
Assistant FonMin He Yafei (ref B).  GNZ has also visited 
Taipei to voice concerns on Taiwan's checkbook diplomacy in 
the region. 
 
6. (C) Williams said GNZ expects to be in the Solomons for 10 
years or more.  Although GNZ agrees that Melanesia is an "arc 
of instability," there are bright spots, with economic growth 
continuing in Tonga and Tuvalu, and Vanuatu reasonably 
stable.  GNZ officials are not as gloomy as their Australian 
counterparts about PNG, but worry that corruption there will 
undermine economic growth.  GNZ is focusing on sector support 
and donor harmonization for the PICs, which they think will 
be more effective than traditional development assistance and 
will create a "demand side" for good governance currently 
lacking in the region.  NZ officials are also trying to 
identify the next generation of PIC leaders.  They and Davies 
agreed there is a need to improve the interaction of external 
partners with PIC leaders around the Pacific Islands Forum. 
 
7.  (C) On E. Timor, GNZ believes a new police force must be 
formed from scratch. The judiciary must be reconnected with 
the people as 90% of its business is conducted Portuguese, 
which most Timorese don't speak.  GNZ and Australia are in 
broad agreement on most E.Timor issues, but GNZ does not 
believe an Australian-led force would be insulated from 
domestic political machinations in the way a UN-led force 
would be.  On East Asian architecture, Williams said that GNZ 
regards WTO as its most important economic and trade forum, 
with APEC as the best regional vehicle.  GNZ has expended 
considerable diplomatic effort to enter the East Asian Summit 
and remain "in the tent," but is asking questions about what 
the organization will do and whether any trade aspects will 
reflect NZ values. 
 
8.  (C) At a roundtable on Security issues, MFAT Acting 
Deputy Secretary Dell Higgie said GNZ is funding security 
capacity building in SE Asia, and is also helping to fund 
"soft end" CT efforts in the region such as a regional 
interfaith dialogue among clerics from ASEAN, E. Timor, PNG, 
Fiji, Australia, and New Zealand, to meet in NZ next year. 
Higgie reviewed New Zealand's efforts to help the PICs meet 
their Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other 
global counter-terrorism (CT) obligations.  GNZ is for 
example working with Australia to develop a PIC CT response 
plan.  Higgie noted that the PICs are nervous about CT 
resource commitments and it would be helpful for USG 
officials to help reassure them.  New Zealand has also helped 
the Cooks and Niue develop financial intelligence units and 
continues to monitor their effectiveness.  GNZ will host a 
PSI Operational Experts Group in March or April 2007.  It 
would like to host a full exercise in 2008 and sees this as a 
possible Bangkok process discussion for Washington early next 
year. 
 
 
 
 
 
McCormick