VZCZCXRO3832
OO RUEHAST
DE RUCNDT #1570/01 2300157
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 180157Z AUG 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9891
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/UNMA// IMMEDIATE
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001570 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPKO UNSC IS LE
SUBJECT: UNIFIL FORCE GENERATION UPDATE: MEMBER STATES 
PROMISE SHIPS, BUT FEW CAPABLE TROOPS 
 
REF: USUN 1560 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001570  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. (U) Summary. During a meeting with current and potential 
troop contributing countries (TCCs) to an expanded UNIFIL 
force in south Lebanon on August 17, UN Deputy 
Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown made an impassioned 
 
SIPDIS 
appeal to member states to help secure a lasting peace by 
committing forces to the mission now.  He outlined the 
mission's concept of operations (CONOPS) and rules of 
engagement (ROE) -- and promised to distribute the draft 
documents on August 18 -- and urged member states to review 
the guidelines and make firm commitments within the next few 
days.  (Note: The CONOPS and ROE briefings were almost 
identical to those described in reftel.  End Note.)  At the 
end of the meeting, concrete offers for ground assets totaled 
five mechanized infantry battalions (2 from Bangladesh, 1 
each from Indonesia, Malaysia and Nepal), one engineer 
company (Indonesia), an additional engineer company-plus 
sized unit from France, and some border patrol units from 
Germany.  Several countries -- including Germany, UK, Greece, 
Norway, Denmark -- offered naval assets as well. 
 
¶2. (U) Summary cont'd.  In response to pointed and repeated 
questioning from the Egyptian and Indian PermReps on the 
conditions under which UNIFIL would use force, Malloch Brown 
observed that the Secretariat had crafted ROEs that are 
designed to be "prudent and non-offensive, but robust." But 
Malloch Brown emphasized that UNIFIL would not undertake a 
large-scale disarmament of Hizballah.  UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General 
Annabi added that the UN expects "no arms in sight" in its 
Area of Responsibility (AOR).  USUN Ambassador Wolff praised 
UNIFIL, GOL, and GOI efforts to implement UNSCR 1701 and 
noted the USG would provide logistics, planning, and 
intelligence support to the expanded force. 
 
¶3. (U) Summary cont,d.  During a bilateral meeting on August 
17 with PM A/S Hillen and Ambassador Wolff before the TCC 
meeting, Malloch Brown and DPA Director Michael Williams 
noted that Israel's stated unwillingness to accept 
contributions from countries with which they do not have 
diplomatic relations was a serious problem.  Malloch Brown 
acknowledged that controversial Malaysian statements had 
probably ruled out their participation in an expanded UNIFIL, 
but argued that "we need to hold the line" with Indonesia. 
In a separate meeting August 17 with an Israeli delegation, 
Annabi also urged the GOI to reconsider Indonesia,s 
participation, promising that Indonesian troops would be 
under firm blue helmet command and control and assuring 
Israel that the UN would take swift action in the event a 
problem arises.  End Summary. 
 
Malloch Brown Appeals for Troops 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Malloch Brown began the meeting with an impassioned 
appeal to potential troop contributors to help secure a 
lasting cease-fire by committing forces to an expanded 
UNIFIL.  The UN officials then outlined the force's concept 
of operations (CONOPS) and rules of engagement (ROE), and 
promised to provide drafts of the actual documents to TCCs on 
August 18.  (Note: USUN will forward these documents to the 
Department when received.  End Note.)  He asked member states 
to review these guidelines and provide firm commitments of 
forces to the UN in the next few days.  Describing the 
expanded UNIFIL as a truly multilateral force, Malloch Brown 
also noted it should be comprised of personnel from a "core 
group" of countries with supplementary contributions by other 
TCCs as appropriate. 
 
¶5. (U) Malloch Brown also made clear that UNIFIL should only 
be expected to "keep the peace while longer-term solutions 
are put in place."  These solutions would have to be 
political in nature, he emphasized, which is why SYG Annan 
had dispatched a team to Lebanon and Israel and would soon 
travel to the region himself.  Malloch Brown argued that the 
parties to the conflict "owe it to the member states" who 
will contribute troops to reach a political solution. 
 
Outline of CONOPS and ROE 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) Malloch Brown, Annabi, and DPKO military advisor Mehta 
continually referred to the need to create a "strong and 
robust" force that could help ensure LAF control over the 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001570  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
south, address the humanitarian situation, prevent a 
resumption of hostilities, and create a zone between the Blue 
Line and the Litani River free of unauthorized armed 
elements.  Malloch Brown also noted that OP 14 of UNSCR 1701 
calls on UNIFIL to assist the GOL, at its request, in 
securing Lebanon's borders and prevent arms smuggling. 
Annabi and Mehta then offered an outline of the CONOPS and 
ROE of the force that was virtually identical to the 
briefings they gave A/S Hillen on August 16 (reftel). 
Although Mehta said he expects more comments on the draft ROE 
and CONOPS from the UNIFIL Force Commander as well as from 
certain departments within the Secretariat, Malloch Brown 
suggested the drafts would not change considerably unless 
member states demand changes. 
 
¶7. (U) In response to pointed and repeated questioning from 
the Egyptian and Indian PRs on the interpretation of OP12 and 
the conditions under which UNIFIL would use force (whether it 
would have to "enforce" the provisions of UNSCR 1701), 
Malloch Brown observed that the Secretariat had crafted ROEs 
that are designed to be "prudent and non-offensive, but 
robust."  He said the UN assumes that the political agreement 
to which the GOL had committed itself -- that no arms would 
be carried south of the Litani River -- would be respected. 
Predicting that UNIFIL would not be confronted by "major 
challenges" to this commitment, Malloch Brown suggested it 
might have to deal with small groups that would attempt to 
carry arms or smuggle them into the AOR.  In this case, 
UNIFIL would ask these groups to hand over their arms, and if 
they refuse, would be authorized to use force to disarm them. 
 But Malloch Brown emphasized that UNIFIL would not undertake 
a large-scale disarmament of Hizballah.  Further clarifying 
that the UN expects "no arms in sight" in the AOR, Annabi 
also said the UN does not plan to actively search for arms 
caches. 
 
USG Offers General Support 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) During his intervention, USUN Ambassador Wolff 
commended UNIFIL, the Secretariat, as well as the GOL and GOI 
for their efforts to support the cessation of hostilities and 
begin the LAF deployment to the south.  Noting that the 
situation remains fragile, he underscored that member states 
should seize this historic opportunity for long-term peace by 
ensuring that UNIFIL is able to fulfill its enhanced mandate 
quickly and capably.  Ambassador Wolff said the USG is 
prepared to provide logistics, planning, and intelligence 
support to the expanded UNIFIL mission. 
 
TCCs Offer Many Ships But Few Capable Troops 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Several delegates expressed interest in supporting an 
expanded UNIFIL force, although only a few offered specific 
commitments.  Most said they wanted the opportunity to sift 
through the CONOPs and the ROE before committing to 
particular forms of support, particularly with regard ground 
troops.  Specific commitments are listed below: 
 
Germany: 
 
-- a maritime &task force8 (NFI) for surveillance and 
possibly a larger naval force big enough to patrol the entire 
coast of Lebanon (pending Parliamentary approval).  Also they 
may provide some border patrol units, apparently to be 
provided on a bilateral basis. 
 
France: 
 
-- air and maritime support and an additional 200 troops, 
possibly engineers. Also offered to provide another general 
officer to assist with command and control. 
 
Italy: 
 
-- will join the effort but offered nothing specific during 
this meeting.  The Israeli Mission in New York told USUN that 
the Italian mission in New York had privately committed to 
providing a brigade during an August 17 meeting. 
 
Bangladesh: 
 
-- up to two mechanized infantry battalions. 
 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001570  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Indonesia: 
 
-- one mechanized infantry battalion and one Engineer Company. 
 
Denmark: 
 
-- two coastal patrol vessels and one corvette (pending 
Parliamentary approval). 
 
Belgium: 
 
-- will likely join the effort but the need to study the 
CONOPS and ROE first. 
 
Morocco: 
 
-- assistance currently being considered in Rabat, also need 
to study the CONOPs and ROE. 
 
Malaysia: 
 
-- one mechanized infantry battalion. 
 
United Kingdom: 
 
-- air reconnaissance support and one frigate for coastal 
patrol.  Also, the UK base in Cyprus will be made available 
for UN use. 
 
Poland: 
 
-- will maintain current UNIFIL level of up to 250 troops and 
may do more after looking at CONOPs and ROE. 
 
Nepal: 
 
-- one mechanized infantry battalion. 
 
Spain: 
 
-- will likely participate, need to study the CONOPS and ROE 
first. 
 
Norway: 
 
-- maritime support no earlier than late Sep or Oct. 
 
New Zealand: 
 
-- not decided yet but may provide some &modest niche 
capability.8 
 
India: 
 
-- undecided.  Need to look at the CONOPs and ROE. 
 
Turkey: 
 
-- use of an airport and a seaport.  May do more but need to 
look at the CONOPs and ROE.  The Turks also told the Israeli 
Mission in New York August 17 that they would provide troops 
to focus on humanitarian, reconstruction, medical, 
communications, and logistics needs. 
 
Greece: 
 
-- not certain but will likely offer one frigate and one 
naval helicopter. 
 
Portugal: 
 
-- undecided. Need to look at the CONOPs and ROE. 
 
Cyprus: 
 
-- port and basing facilities. 
 
Malloch Brown Previews Force 
Generation Effort in Prior Bilateral Meeting 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) During a bilateral meeting with A/S Hillen and 
Ambassador Wolff before the session with TCCs, Malloch Brown 
previewed his statement for the TCCs, noting that he was 
determined to counter the growing press reports that the UN 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001570  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
had only a "fuzzy" idea of UNIFIL's new mandate and concept 
of operations.  He said that Annan wanted to move quickly to 
establish "three or four" pillars to replace the French at 
the core of an expanded UNIFIL.  Malloch Brown suggested that 
Italy, Turkey and India were key to maintaining positive 
momentum in the force generation process and noted that he 
had spoken to all of them - and the Germans - to "warm them 
up" for the TCC meeting.  He asked USUN to reach out to New 
York delegations to encourage forward-leaning statements. 
(USUN Ambassador Wolff subsequently made a series of calls 
prior to the afternoon meeting to these key country 
delegations.  All stated they needed to review the CONOPS and 
ROEs prior to making a commitment.) 
 
¶11. (SBU) DPA Director Michael Williams noted that Israel's 
stated unwillingness to accept contributions from countries 
with which they do not have diplomatic relations (i.e., 
Muslim countries) is a serious problem.  Malloch Brown said 
that the Israeli statements had probably eliminated the 
possibility of contributions from Malaysia (following the 
statement by the Malaysian Foreign Minister suggesting 
Hizballah needed to be re-armed), but Malloch Brown continued 
"we need to hold the line" with Indonesia.  "Beggars can't be 
choosers."  In a separate meeting August 17 between Annabi 
and an Israeli delegation, Annabi also urged the Israelis to 
reconsider the Indonesian offer, promising close UN 
supervision of the Indonesian contingent. 
 
¶12. (SBU) In his discussion with Malloch Brown, A/S Hillen 
stressed that the expanded UNIFIL needed to be deployed 
quickly, and represent a robust, capable force, in order to 
effectively bolster the LAF.   Hillen emphasized the 
importance of a quick deployment, a comprehensive approach to 
the mission, and a muscular interpretation of the mandate in 
Resolution 1701.  In response, Malloch Brown urged the U.S. 
to play a lead role in providing assistance to the LAF, and 
he repeated the plea for a "price break" on U.S. military 
lift to potential troop contributors.  "I've waived a number 
of procurement rules to speed up the deployment," he said, 
"but I can't pay you three-and-a-half times the commercial 
rate for lift." 
BOLTON