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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 004994 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/31/06 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) LDP presidential election 2006: Tanigaki distinct from Abe, Aso 
on use of collective self-defense right 
 
(2) Study of Shinzo Abe (Part 3): Efforts underway to revise Koizumi 
policy course pursuing competitive principles 
 
(3) Personal network of Shinzo Abe (Part 3): Persons who have gone 
through a lot support the "prince" 
 
(4) Security policy a top priority for the next administration 
 
(5) New security era (Section 11)-Striking enemy bases (Part 1): 
Notion within the bounds of self-defense rights; Enemy base strike 
differing from US preemptive strike 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) LDP presidential election 2006: Tanigaki distinct from Abe, Aso 
on use of collective self-defense right 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Abridged) 
August 30, 2006 
 
Whether or not to change the government's interpretation of the 
Constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective 
self-defense has emerged as a campaign issue in the ongoing Liberal 
Democratic Party presidential race. Finance Minister Sadakazu 
Tanigaki, an advocate of constitutional amendment, criticized Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, who simply wants to alter the 
government's interpretation. Foreign Minister Taro Aso has also 
begun siding with Abe, reversing his previous call for 
constitutional revision. Abe's standpoint has drawn a backlash from 
the New Komeito, the LDP's cautious coalition partner. 
 
The right of collective self-defense is the right of any state to 
jointly prevent by force an attack on a foreign state with which it 
has close relations, even in the event that the former state has not 
itself been subjected to such an attack. 
 
According to the government's interpretation of Article 9 of the 
Constitution, Japan has the inherent right of collective 
self-defense but is not allowed to exercise it under the current 
provisions of the Constitution. 
 
Abe has posed a question about the government's interpretation. His 
recent book Toward a Beautiful Country reads: 
 
"Even if US troops who are mobilized to deal with a contingency in 
areas surrounding Japan were attacked on high seas by an enemy, the 
Self-Defense Force would have to leave the scene. How long would the 
international community tolerate Japan's logic that it has the right 
to collective self-defense but cannot exercise it?" 
 
On Aug. 22, Abe announced a plan to consider altering the 
government's interpretation of the Constitution regarding the 
defense of Japan. 
 
Aso used to repeatedly underscore the need to amend the Constitution 
instead of modifying its interpretation of it. But he now sides with 
Abe. He said on an NHK program on Aug. 27: "Changing the 
government's interpretation (to allow the country to exercise the 
 
TOKYO 00004994  002 OF 009 
 
 
right) is more pragmatic." Aso's about-face may be interpreted as 
revealing his intention to become prime minister after Abe. 
 
In contrast, Tanigaki is sticking to constitutional revision. He 
apparently intends to make a clear distinction with Abe and Aso over 
this issue. 
 
A New Komeito executive predicted: "If Mr. Abe tries to steamroller 
his view, the coalition arrangement with the LDP will collapse." 
 
(2) Study of Shinzo Abe (Part 3): Efforts underway to revise Koizumi 
policy course pursuing competitive principles 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Abridged) 
April 31, 2006 
 
On the night of July 26, dozens of business leaders, including 
Central Japan Railway Company Chairman Kasai and Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries Chairman Nishioka, dined with Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Shinzo Abe at a Japanese restaurant in Tokyo. State Minister in 
Charge of Economic and Fiscal Policy also attended the meeting. 
 
The business leaders in the meeting were members of the Shiki no Kai 
(Four Seasons Association) composed of executives from more than 20 
leading firms mainly in heavy industries, like Tokyo Electric Power, 
Japan Air Lines, Toyota Motor, and Fuji Photo Film. Most members 
were in their 60s, far older than Abe. Abe naturally took the role 
of the listener. He has given priority particularly to its 
meetings. 
 
Just before the meeting, former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda 
had revealed his intention not to run in the Liberal Democratic 
Party presidential election. Yosano said in the meeting: "Mr. Abe 
surfaced as the leading candidate in a moment. I would like to 
support him." The participants took the remarks as expressing his 
support for Abe. 
 
After Yosano was defeated in the House of Representatives election 
in 2000, the Shiki no Kai was inaugurated to encourage him. Yosano 
brought Abe to a meeting of the Shiki no Kai with him, introducing 
Abe as "a young capable lawmaker." Abe was just appointed as deputy 
chief cabinet secretary. 
 
Kasai, a key member of the association, is an advocate of 
constitutional revision. Nishioka played a central role when the 
Japan Business Federation (Nihon Keidanren) proposed a review of the 
nation's three principles on arms exports in 2004. Their arguments 
are close to Abe's. 
 
On economic policy, many aides to Abe suggest that he should 
"entrust economic policy into the hands of reliable experts." In his 
book titled: Toward A Beautiful Country, Abe used most pages for 
foreign, defense, and education policies, with only less than one 
fifth devoted to the economic area, including social security. 
 
Yosano is one of the "reliable experts" for Abe. The government's 
annual economic and fiscal policy guidelines adopted at a cabinet 
meeting this July contained this expression: "a 21st century-type 
mild, affluent Japanese society with a combination of economic 
growth and safety/stability." 
 
A medium-ranking official of the Ministry of Health, Labor and 
Welfare who engaged in drawing up the policy guidelines gave this 
 
TOKYO 00004994  003 OF 009 
 
 
explanation: "In an effort to present Mr. Abe's policy identity, he 
and Mr. Yosano decided to use the word 'mild'." He added: "The 
inclusion of the word was intended to underscore that only 
competitive policy and economic principles are not enough in 
society." 
 
LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Hidenao Nakagawa also supported 
Abe in working out measures to cut spending to be included in the 
policy guidelines. Yosano and Nakagawa launched the Conference on 
Fiscal and Economic Reforms, a council of the government and the 
ruling parties, appointing Abe as moderator. The stage is gradually 
being set for "the Abe administration." 
 
Assistant Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Atsuo Saka instructed 
director generals from relevant government agencies in early March 
to map out specific second-chance measures in response to a proposal 
by Abe. 
 
On March 23, Abe officially announced in a press briefing that the 
government would set up the Second Chance Promotion Council. One 
week after that, the council held its first meeting with the 
participation of the bureau directors to whom Saka had given 
instructions. 
 
Saka used to be a Finance Ministry official. From just after the 
inauguration of the Koizumi administration, he undertook the task of 
drawing up the government's annual economic and fiscal policy 
guidelines. But he was at odds with then State Minister in Charge of 
Economic and Fiscal Policy Takenaka, who hated the influence of the 
Finance Ministry. In 2005 he became vice president at the 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation. This 
January, however, he assumed the present post designed to help Abe, 
in response to a request from the Kantei. 
 
Abe has never assumed a portfolio in any influential government 
agency, so he has no extensive personnel ties in Kasumigaseki 
government office area. The personnel networks held by Saka are 
valuable assets for Abe. In mid-May, Abe invited Saka and members of 
the Second Chance Promotion Council for dinner. A senior official of 
the Cabinet Secretariat categorically said: "Abe's new brain trust 
advisors are not from the private sector but are Kasumigaseki 
officials." 
 
In the private sector, there is puzzlement at Abe, who is trying to 
play up his own policy identity while deepening his cooperation with 
bureaucrats. 
 
At the main conference hall in the Kantei on Aug. 25, Abe asked 
eight representatives from the banking industry, including Japanese 
Bankers Association Chairman Nobuo Kuroyanagi, to offer financial 
aid for a second-chance program. 
 
One participant said: "Financing it will involve risk, so government 
subsidies will be necessary." Many senior executives at leading 
banks severely evaluate the second-challenge project, one remarking: 
"This kind of project should have come several years ago, when 
credit crunch was a serious problem. Abe intends to play this card 
to the gallery." 
 
Abe's true colors are reflected in recent moves to grope for ways to 
revise the Koizumi policy course. When a senior member of the 
Cabinet Office suggested in late June that the office would discuss 
details about a new body to replace the Regulatory Reform and 
 
TOKYO 00004994  004 OF 009 
 
 
Privatization Promotion Council before it expires at the end of this 
fiscal year, Abe reportedly grumbled: "Is it still willing to 
continue the task?" 
 
Whenever he delivers speeches, Abe always cites the importance of 
public works projects. Abe was quoted as saying to his brain trust 
advisor who used to be a bureaucrat: "Constructing a San'in 
expressway is necessary;" and "Extending Shinkansen bullet train 
lines will turn to be Investment for the future and will contribute 
to remarkably developing local districts." 
 
Abe also told the brain trust: "Should a large supermarket be 
opened, local shopping districts will dry up, and festivals will 
also fade out. That is the current state of local areas." 
 
He implied that if priority were given only to efficiency and 
competition principles, local communities would be destroyed. 
 
In the Aug. 29 edition, the US newspaper Wall Street Journal noted: 
"Mr. Abe will not be the second coming of Mr. Koizumi," defining him 
as "a politician giving priority to agreement." The newspaper also 
pointed out: "He has indicated a plan to redistribute income to 
local governments again," adding: "Closed-door politics might begin 
to be carried out, and the economy might become stalled in Japan 
again." 
 
(3) Personal network of Shinzo Abe (Part 3): Persons who have gone 
through a lot support the "prince" 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Slightly abridged) 
August 31, 2006 
 
Around 1985 when Japan was in the throes of its bubble economy, 
Yoshiyuki Inoue, 43, incumbent policy secretary to Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Shinzo Abe, worked at the now defunct Japan National 
 
SIPDIS 
Railways (JNR) as an engine driver for express trains with sleeping 
berths -- "Asakaze" and "Hayabusa" -- between Tokyo and Kyushu. 
 
Inoue was born into a poor family in Odawara City, Kanagawa 
Prefecture. He lived with his parents and an older sister in 
city-provided housing. He entered JNR at the age of 18. While 
working night shifts, he graduated from the correspondence course of 
a university. 
 
With the privatization of JNR in 1987, Inoue found a job in the 
former Prime Minister's Office in 1988. In January 2000 he became an 
administrative secretary to then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Fukushiro Nukaga in the cabinet of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. He 
them met then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe in the government 
of Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, which was launched following the 
death of Obuchi. He worked on the issue of abductions of Japanese 
nationals by North Koreans, in which the public had little interest 
at that time. He gained Abe's confidence because of his hard work. 
He said that he learned that protecting the lives and properties of 
the people was his political responsibility. 
 
After Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Pyongyang in 
September 2002, Inoue led the work of drafting a bill to support 
victims kidnapped by North Korea for repatriated abductees. He then 
worked at the office of communication coordination on abduction 
issue in the Cabinet Secretariat. He returned to the Prime 
Minister's Official Residence and became a policy secretary at the 
request of Abe who became chief cabinet secretary in late October 
 
TOKYO 00004994  005 OF 009 
 
 
last year. 
 
Inoue is regarded as one of the most likely candidates to become the 
prime ministerial secretary (for political affairs) when Abe becomes 
prime minister. In the past, a pattern of veteran secretaries like 
Isao Iijima, who has served for nearly 30 years as a secretary to 
Koizumi, assumed the prime ministerial secretary post. If Inoue is 
picked, it will be an unprecedented case. 
 
Abe, who has a grandfather and granduncle who each served as prime 
minister, has the tendency of trusting and treating preferentially 
persons like Inoue who have gone through a lot of hardship. 
Yoshihide Suga, 57, senior vice minister for internal affairs and 
communications, is one of them. He formed the Nonpartisan 
Parliamentary League to Support a Second Chance, and made efforts to 
have junior and mid-level LDP lawmakers support Abe (in the upcoming 
party leadership race). 
 
Suga, born into a farm family in Akita Prefecture, came to Tokyo in 
1966 and worked in a small factory. After working at another 
company, he became a secretary to former trade minister Hikosaburo 
Okonogi. He was then elected to the House of Representatives in 
¶1996. 
 
Suga first belonged to the Obuchi faction (present Tsushima 
faction). He supported then Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku 
Kajiyama, who ran in the 1998 LDP presidency in revelation against 
then Foreign Minister Obuchi. He bolted the Obuchi faction along 
with Kajiyama and former international trade and industry minister 
Shinji Sato. He chaired the LDP simulation team on sanctions against 
North Korea. He obtained Abe's confidence by coming up with a 
sanction plan on his own. 
 
Suga and Inoue got together at a Tokyo hotel on the night of Aug. 8. 
The two discussed the right timing for Abe to announce his candidacy 
for the presidency, campaign pledges, and arrangements for an Abe 
government. The two are putting together the shape of a new 
government while supporting the "prince." 
 
(4) Security policy a top priority for the next administration 
 
SANKEI (Page 9) (Abridged) 
August 31, 2006 
 
By Satoshi Morimoto, Professor and Director, Institute of World 
Studies, Takushoku University 
 
Collecting external intelligence vital 
 
Security is a major challenge for Japan. The next administration 
should give top priority to security policy. The Koizumi 
administration has enacted many laws and agreements on security. 
Their implementation requires improvements in the system. 
 
The next administration is urged to establish a national interest 
committee in the Diet and a national security council in the cabinet 
to let them plan and deliberate on security policy from a 
perspective of national interests. 
 
It is also essential to establish an external intelligence agency 
and a state secrets protection law. An existing Diet resolution must 
also be revised in order to improve the resolution of the sensors of 
information gathering satellites. 
 
TOKYO 00004994  006 OF 009 
 
 
 
The Antiterrorism Special Measures Law must be extended during the 
next extraordinary Diet session in order to keep the Maritime 
Self-Defense Force's Indian Ocean mission alive, adding to its 
mission such duties as warning, monitoring, and providing 
intelligence. The next administration is also advised to enact US 
military assistance promotion legislation to allow Japan to 
financially assist in the planned Guam relocation and building a 
facility to take over Futenma Air Station functions. 
 
Japan is urged to consider building an SDF base in Guam, as well. 
Maintaining the Japan-US alliance is the top priority for Japan's 
security, and US force regalement must be realized at all costs. 
This may entail a review of the National Defense Program Guideline, 
another challenge. 
 
The approach of enacting special laws on SDF overseas missions has 
reached its limit. Japan cannot send the SDF on overseas missions 
swiftly without a permanent law. 
 
Japan should also conclude an agreement with the United States to 
extend cooperation effectively, as was demonstrated in the wake of 
the 2004 Indonesian tsunami disaster. That should be followed by 
guidelines on Japan-US cooperation to respond to natural disasters 
in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
Japan must also be prepared for Pyongyang's possible retaliation 
against Tokyo's diplomatic initiative behind the UN Security 
Council's adoption of a resolution condemning North Korea's missile 
launches and financial sanctions. 
 
Japan, US must re-discuss role sharing 
 
Defending US bases in Japan used to be Japan's responsibility. The 
United States has been pushing ahead with its plan to deploy Aegis 
vessels and Patriot missiles in Japan to ensure security of its 
bases here. Japan and the United States must re-discuss role sharing 
regarding security in Japanese territories. 
 
The Japan Coast Guard is responsible for maritime territorial 
security, police forces for ground security, and the Ground 
Self-Defense Force for the security of areas surrounding US bases in 
Japan. The law needs to be improved to allow the GSDF to guard 
coastlines and seaside nuclear power plants. 
 
The government has taken steps to give additional duties and roles 
to the SDF to let them conduct wide-ranging international 
cooperation activities on one hand and to reduce the number of 
personnel and equipment on the other. Such steps are unreasonable. 
They may take a toll on disaster relief, as well. 
 
Japan and the US have also been frontloading missile defense since 
the test-launches of ballistic missiles by North Korean on July 5. 
It is important to operate the Japan-US missile defense system under 
a consistent chain of command. 
 
Japan must possess a sufficient enemy-base strike capability. There 
is every reason for Japan to equip support fighters with 
air-to-surface missiles and vessels with ship-to-surface missiles. 
Japan also must consider developing cruise missiles. 
 
Japan must be allowed to exercise the right of collective 
self-defense 
 
TOKYO 00004994  007 OF 009 
 
 
 
For maintaining maritime security, Japan must patrol and conduct 
warning and surveillance activities in cooperation with other Asian 
nations. Japan must also resolve the issue of the right of 
collective self-defense and actively join multinational efforts in 
the region. A transfer of the command of US Forces South Korea may 
prompt the US to give up defending that country. For Japan's 
security, it is essential to realize defense cooperation among 
Japan, the United States, and South Korea. 
 
Constitutional revision is essential for the country's security 
policy. It is desirable to enact national referendum legislation 
first, then revise paragraphs one and two of Article 9 to stipulate 
the possession of the national defense military that can exercise 
the self-defense right to defend the nation and its people, and to 
establish a basic security law and a basic international cooperation 
law to ensure effectiveness. 
 
(5) New security era (Section 11)-Striking enemy bases (Part 1): 
Notion within the bounds of self-defense rights; Enemy base strike 
differing from US preemptive strike 
 
SANKEI (Pages 1&5) (Full) 
August 29, 2006 
 
North Korea's firing of ballistic missiles (on July 5, 2006) has 
reignited controversy in Japan over the option of striking enemy 
bases or tekikichi kogeki in Japanese-a wording peculiar to Japan 
for its exclusively defense-oriented policy or defense-only posture. 
In terms of international commonsense, the notion of this enemy base 
strike, as a matter of fact, is tantamount to a "preemptive attack," 
which constitutes the right of self-defense vested in sovereign 
states under international law. It is quite different from the US 
Bush administration's preemptive attack that can be called a 
"preventive attack," which is not allowed under international law. 
China and South Korea are decrying Japan for its arguments over this 
enemy base strike. For one thing, it is mixed up in its terms. The 
Sankei Shimbun verifies the enemy base strike arguments. 
 
In March 2003, the United States made a 'preemptive attack' on Iraq. 
This was later regarded as a preventive attack, giving rise to 
controversy not only in the United States but also in the 
international community. How did the Bush administration build its 
logic of preemptive attack while being unable to come up with any 
hard evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the hands of 
Iraq? 
 
In the spring of 2002, US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld-one of those 
who were adamant on the necessity of attacking Iraq-told Bob 
Woodward, a well-known reporter for the Washington Post, that 
terrorist attacks cannot be prevented. The Pentagon chief was quoted 
in Woodward's book, Plan of Attack, as saying terrorists do not 
hesitate to do anything at any time. "That's why," Rumsfeld says in 
the book, "we must strike first." It was several months before the 
United States announced the so-called Bush doctrine with the option 
of striking first in its war on terror. 
 
There was a friend standing behind Rumsfeld. This friend told 
Rumsfeld, "Thomas Moore-who was a British philosopher in the 16th 
century-also argued about preemptive attack in his book, Utopia." 
Preemptive attack studied by Rumsfeld and others is not a 
far-fetched notion but is an old and new idea. 
 
 
TOKYO 00004994  008 OF 009 
 
 
Meanwhile, US Vice President Cheney stressed that the danger of 
doing nothing without making an attack is greater than the danger of 
what the United States would sustain from its preemptive attack. On 
Sept. 18, 2002, Rumsfeld stated before the US House of 
Representatives Armed Services Committee that the United States does 
not need perfect evidence. As is well known, Rumsfeld distanced 
himself from US Secretary of State Powell, who was cautious about 
attacking Iraq. The two were wide apart from each other, with the 
White House and the Pentagon inclining to carry out a preemptive 
attack on Iraq. Woodward depicts how Powell was in those days, as 
follows: "He was growing irritated at discussing the use of armed 
force based on a mere theory, although there's no imminent threat to 
the United States." 
 
Japan, faced with North Korea's threat, needs to discuss enemy base 
strike 
 
In an international military sense, a preemptive attack is defined 
as an attack to be waged against an enemy because there is 
smoking-gun evidence that tells that enemy's imminent offensive. In 
the meantime, a preventive attack is defined as an attack to be made 
against someone who is not posing an imminent threat but could bring 
about an unacceptable threat in the future before that threat 
becomes apparent. 
 
The Bush administration's attack on Iraq was regarded as a 
preventive attack as the Iraq attack was carried out with the Bush 
administration remaining unable to prove the existence of WMDs in 
Iraq and an imminent threat along with it. 
 
This point decisively differs from the notion of a preemptive attack 
and also from Japan's enemy base strike argument. Furthermore, an 
enemy base strike is to be carried out "at a time when the enemy has 
set about an impending incursion on Japan," according to former 
Defense Agency Director General Shigeru Ishiba's account in his 
parliamentary reply. This enemy base strike is even more strictly 
defined than a preemptive attack in an international military sense. 
However, there are arguments about which stage should be deemed to 
be the point of time the enemy set about such an impending incursion 
on Japan. 
 
For instance, if you fire a gun at someone who only has a gun, that 
is a preventive attack. If you fire first at someone who is training 
his gun on you, that is a preemptive attack. In the case of striking 
an enemy base, that would be firing someone who is pointing his gun 
at you with his trigger finger on. 
 
Way back in the middle of the 18th century, the Seven-Year War broke 
out to involve countries in Europe. We can trace the template of 
preemptive attacks back to that war. Prussian King Friedrich first 
waged an attack on Sachsen. However, the Pact of Paris, a 
non-belligerency convention concluded after World War I, prohibited 
preemptive attacks. In those days, however, no one must have 
imagined what we see today with the advent of WMDs, the spread of 
international terrorism, and the development of missile 
technologies. 
 
"In the case of wars in those pastoral days, they could absorb the 
first strike and they could fight back," says Akira Kato, who was a 
researcher at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), a 
think-tank of the Defense Agency, and is now a professor of 
international political science at the international faculty of 
Obirin University. "But," Kato added, "it's too late (to 
 
TOKYO 00004994  009 OF 009 
 
 
counterattack) after sustaining the first strike in the nuclear 
age." 
 
The Bush administration launched a preemptive attack that can be 
called a preventive attack. That is also because the Bush 
administration-touched off by the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
in the United States on its nerve centers-was seriously concerned 
about the case where America comes under the first attack from 
international terrorists with WMDs in their hands. 
 
In April 1996, Japan and the United States issued a bilateral joint 
security declaration, which was based on a report written by Harvard 
University Professor Joseph Nye when he was a Pentagon official. In 
his article carried in the Washington Post dated March 14, 2003, Nye 
noted the world's entry into the age of "war privatization" with 
WMDs in the hands of terrorist groups, foreboding that its potential 
threat would drastically change civilized societies. Nye also 
defended the Bush administration for its raising of problems, 
including not only a preemptive attack against an imminent threat 
but also a preventive attack. 
 
On Oct. 2, 2003, Russia unveiled its new military doctrine for the 
option of striking first with the use of nuclear arms. In March this 
year, US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense McCormick reported to the 
US Congress that China has raised the accuracy of its ballistic 
missiles in an aim to improve its preemptive strike capability. Both 
China and Russia do not rule out the possibility of carrying out 
preventive attacks in the name of preemptive attacks on the grounds 
of an imminent threat. 
 
"It's up to the country concerned to judge whether its attack on 
another country is preventive or preemptive," Kato says. "That's an 
extremely subjective question," he added. In point of fact, it is 
hard to tell a preemptive attack from a preventive attack in the age 
of state-of-the-art military technologies and international 
terrorism. 
 
Meanwhile, North Korea is reportedly preparing an underground 
nuclear test. Faced with the threat of North Korea's potential 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles delivering nuclear warheads, 
Japan will now need to deepen discussions on the advisability of 
striking enemy bases. 
 
DONOVAN