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RR RUEHAT
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ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160836Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 004663 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO ERIN TREACY (CA/P/IP) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS PTER PINR PGOV PREL JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN STATUS UPDATE ON HSPD-6 INITIATIVE 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 109771 
     ¶B. PHILL-MPILZ E-MAIL ON 12JUNE2006: "RE: UPDATED 
        HSPD-6 MOU" 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Post has seen progress on several fronts in 
advancing the HSPD-6 Terrorist Screening Information 
Initiative. Post's inter-agency working group on HSPD-6 has 
been working closely to identify and educate key GOJ 
contacts, and to find solutions to potential obstacles. On 
June 6, 2006, Post delivered to the Foreign Ministry a draft 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for HSPD-6 to jump-start 
substantive discussions on the exchange of terrorist 
screening information. Post awaits a formal response on the 
proposal.  While an agreement to allow one point of contact 
for terrorist screening data exchange and information 
feedback seems unlikely, individual GOJ agencies appear 
motivated to find a solution and begin information exchange. 
Post's newly arrived Consular Visa Chief will take over as 
the main point of contact for this initiative as of August 
14, 2006. END SUMMARY. 
 
PROGRESS 
-------- 
¶2. (SBU) The HSPD-6 process in Japan continues to advance in 
a positive direction, albeit at a slow and deliberate pace. 
The multiple Mission agencies involved formed a working group 
in 2005 and invited key Japanese contacts to the Embassy for 
presentations on the HSPD-6 process and to discuss issues 
involved with information sharing.  Each Mission agency has 
also deliberated formally and informally on key issues with 
respective Japanese agency contacts. 
 
¶3. (U) Post has identified Rokuichiro Michii, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Foreign Policy Bureau, International 
Counter-terrorism Cooperation Division Director, as the point 
of contact for discussions regarding advancement of HSPD-6 
objectives.  In hopes of jump-starting substantive dialogue, 
on June 6, 2006, Post presented Michii with a draft 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for consideration (ref B). 
He stated that he would initiate coordination among the 
relevant ministries and agencies, noting that the discussions 
would likely include MOFA lawyers who will also want to study 
the issue. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Post is trying to pursue a single comprehensive 
agreement that will allow exchange of terrorist screening 
data between the United States and Japan and provide one 
point of contact for information requests and feedback 
between the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and the 
Government of Japan (GOJ).  While the GOJ agrees, in 
principal, that this information exchange will be a valuable 
tool in the fight against terrorism, it has expressed 
concerns that regulatory and institutional limitations will 
necessitate several points on contact.  However, given the 
enthusiastic support of individual Japanese agencies, we are 
exploring alternative solutions, including engaging in 
separate agreements with the various Japanese agencies are 
being explored.  Post awaits formal feedback from Michii on 
the MOU in order to pursue these alternatives, as appropriate. 
 
OBSTACLES 
--------- 
¶5. (SBU) Reciprocity and Process of information exchange:  In 
 
TOKYO 00004663  002 OF 002 
 
 
June 2006, Director Michii informally raised concern over the 
amount and redundancy of information that may be given in 
exchange for U.S. data.  While we encouraged Japan to share 
as much data with us as possible, we assured Michii that we 
do not expect to receive the same amount of data from Japan 
that we will provide to it.  He also noted that the GOJ 
interpretation of information sharing provisions restricts 
the Japanese Immigration Bureau (JIB) from sharing 
immigration information with non-immigration services.  This 
poses a problem because JIB, the most likely end-user 
organization, would be unable to share information with 
anyone other than immigration officials in the Department of 
Homeland Security.  One possible solution would be for a JIB 
official to serve as Japan's POC (thereby offering JIB a 
direct channel of communication to the TSC) but 
inter-ministerial rivalries (explained below) would likely 
hamper JIB's ability to manage the flow of information. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Limits of Information Sharing: Sensitivities and 
institutional limitations within GOJ for sharing information 
across GOJ agencies will make designating any one agency as 
POC unlikely.  This would require an institutional shift 
within the GOJ to expand the inherent limits of inter-agency 
cooperation and such a shift would take time.  While the hope 
is that HSPD-6 will encourage Japanese agencies to improve 
cooperation to allow information sharing and designation of a 
singular point of contact in the long term, an interim 
solution may be needed to achieve the immediate goals of 
HSPD-6 information sharing. 
 
POC CHANGE 
---------- 
¶7. (U) The Consular contact for HSPD-6 has changed.  Michael 
Garrote, the new Consular Visa Chief, will take over HSPD-6 
issues as of August 14, 2006. 
SCHIEFFER