VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1893/01 2411253
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291253Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6659
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001893 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
WEEK ENDING AUGUST 25 
 
 
This is CWC-72-06. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
EXTENSION REQUEST -- DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIA 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (U) Del reps delivered on August 23 the U.S. responses to 
Russian questions regarding the U.S. CW destruction program 
(formally received during the 46th Executive Council 
session), as well as a series of questions for Moscow related 
to Russia's CW destruction program and coordination with 
international donors.  Reps met with Konstantin Gavrilov, the 
Russian head of delegation, who reiterated many of his points 
from a similar discussion earlier in the summer.  He made it 
quite clear that while Moscow is not opposed to the concept 
of visits by an EC delegation to their destruction sites (or 
to Moscow), Russia will not reference such visits in its 
draft decision. Gavrilov suggested that modalities could be 
worked out independently of an EC decision, and that Moscow 
might accept a reference to the visits in EC-47 report 
language. 
 
¶2.  (U) Gavrilov also believes Moscow is opposed to any 
impact visits might have on the OPCW budget, and also to 
establishing a set frequency for the visits (i.e. annual) and 
would prefer to see visits triggered by "EC concern" or 
other, as yet undefined, criteria.  Del reps expressed some 
concern over the potential this created for political 
mischief making, and pointed out that delegations would 
likely require a very clear definition of criteria.  Finally, 
Gavrilov reaffirmed the Russian position that an extension 
request has already been granted, and that this is more a 
gesture of political goodwill than a necessity, indicating 
that Moscow is not overly concerned with approval of its 
decision.  Based on further discussion, del read is that, 
despite current differences in approach, drafting a set of 
parameters acceptable to both the U.S. and Russia is 
certainly possible; the difficulty at EC-47 and CSP-11 will 
be in reaching agreement on an acceptable way of assuring 
delegations the visits will actually occur (i.e. report 
language versus decision text). 
 
--------------------------------------- 
EXTENSION REQUEST - DISCUSSIONS WITH UK 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) Del reps also met with the UK rep Mark Matthews on 
August 24 to provide a copy of U.S. questions on Russia's CW 
destruction, and discuss possible strategies for reaching 
consensus on extension requests in the fall.  The UK del is 
exhibiting more flexibility than in the run-up to, and 
during, EC-46.  To achieve the ultimate goal of visits to 
U.S. and Russian destruction facilities, London is likely to 
be flexible on parameters, and possibly decision text, 
provided a satisfactory arrangement can be worked out through 
the EC Chair. 
 
¶4.  (U) Matthews is still reluctant to support consultations 
or discussions on the draft decisions, but recommends that, 
if necessary, any such efforts be headed by South Africa in 
its role as EC Chair.  Del reps also discussed which States 
Parties, in the end, might actually be willing to block the 
U.S. extension request.  Although Russia and Iran are both 
potential candidates, discussions centered on Iran; U.S. and 
UK reps agreed that the timing/nature of any IAEA actions 
could impact Iran's inclination to use the political leverage 
of "U.S. non-compliance" in the CWC context. 
 
------------------------------------ 
CW POSSESSORS (OTHER STATES PARTIES) 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (U) Del rep met with the Technical Secretariat Chemical 
Demilitarization Branch staff to discuss the status of CW 
destruction in the other possessor states.  Of note was the 
fact that Maradykovsky is now operational.  Although Russia 
is still working to complete its main operations building, 
August 17 evidently marked the movement of the first 
munitions into the ad hoc processing building, where 
 
munitions that do not require draining of agent prior to 
neutralization can be processed.  The TS estimates 80-90 
munitions are being processed each day.  The TS noted that, 
given the timing of Russia's 20% intermediate deadline and 
the fact that the incinerator at Maradykovsky is unlikely to 
be constructed in the next several months, a discussion on 
the end point of destruction is increasingly likely in the 
near future.  Facility documents are unlikely to be available 
before October. 
 
¶6. (U) The TS also stated that India has still not concluded 
its Facility Agreement.  (Del comment:  TS reps seemed unsure 
as to whether the delay was due to summer holidays, or 
lingering concerns in New Delhi.)  Del will follow up with 
the Indian del and TS in the coming weeks.  Del continues to 
work with the Albanian delegation and the TS to ensure next 
steps taken prior to beginning of destruction at Qaf Molla 
are successful.  The TS is prepared for a Final Engineering 
Review in early October, and agrees with the U.S. suggestion 
to compress the normal schedule, due to the relative 
simplicity of the facility.  Del will also work with 
Washington and the Albanian delegation on submission of an 
extension request for Albania's intermediate destruction 
deadlines. 
 
----------- 
ARTICLE VII 
----------- 
 
¶7.  (U) Facilitator Maarten Lak (Netherlands) held an August 
24 consultation on Article VII, to discuss his proposed 
program of work as well as potential elements for EC-47 
report language.  (Note: the consultation was lightly 
attended, due to the vacation schedules of a number of 
delegates.)  The UK -- supported by Austria, China, Croatia, 
France, Germany, Iran, Japan, New Zealand, and Spain -- 
requested that first delegations be briefed by the TS on the 
current status of implementation (Note: a status report dated 
August 15, 2006 was faxed back to ISN/CB).  Delegations noted 
their opinions that September 7 is too early to disseminate 
the progress report for the November EC: a detailed briefing 
would be preferable at this juncture.  After much discussion, 
Lak agreed to contact Legal Advisor Onate, shortly after 
Onate's return from his leave on September 1.  Lak noted that 
the progress report would be distributed the first week of 
September, but that it would be updated regularly between 
then and EC-47. 
 
¶8. (U) With respect to the substance, Lak summarized his 
suggestion that objective indicators be established for 
legislation, e.g., when the TS receives a draft for review, 
when a draft goes to Parliament, and when a draft is enacted 
and published.  New Zealand cautioned Lak, noting that the 
Convention does not require a State Party to submit its 
legislation for review, and in some instances submission is 
unnecessary, citing the drafts developed by Pacific Island 
Forum states in conjunction with former Secretariat lawyer 
Keith Wilson. 
¶9.  (U) Lak also suggested defining three groups of states: 
those that have done nothing, those that are drafting but 
will not finish the process before CSP-11, and those that are 
drafting but will finish after CSP-11.  Japan noted that it 
found this idea interesting.  Japan, supported by China, also 
noted its concern with the facilitator's proposal to have the 
Director General and the EC Chair reach out to implementing 
states, wondering how it would work and whether it would be 
cost effective.  South Africa noted the interrelation of 
Article VII outreach activities and the budget, wondering how 
outreach efforts would be funded.  China emphasized that 
there should be no "naming and shaming." 
 
¶10.  (U) Iran questioned whether the facilitator's paper 
should be the basis for our discussion.  If so, delegations 
need another round of discussion, to ensure that all 
interested delegations are able to participate.  Furthermore, 
Iran asked delegations to bring their views early in the 
process, in order to avoid waiting until the last minute, as 
has been the recent practice.  Spain suggested that the 
facilitator should be holding continual bilateral discussions 
 
and only having an informal consultation to allow delegations 
to bring broad views on the ongoing discussions. 
 
¶11. (U) The U.S. delegation noted that it would be too early 
to refer the implementation issue to the Second Review 
Conference at this point; we have another year to effect 
progress.  All other delegations supported this view, 
although China noted that perhaps it might be best to simply 
refer to the fact that this may be an item for the RevCon, 
adding that referring Article VII to the RevCon might imply 
that there is no expectation of any further progress on this 
matter. 
 
----------------------------- 
UPCOMING BUDGET CONSULTATIONS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (U) Del rep meet with Rick Martin, the Head of the 
Budget and Finance Branch, to discuss the upcoming budget 
consultations.  In response to U.S. concerns regarding the 
restrictive language in the budget concerning Technical 
Assistance Visits (TAVs), Martin said he believed the 
Implementation Support Branch (IPB) had intentionally slipped 
the language into the budget authorizing "up to 10 TAVs" in 
¶2007.  Martin said that in his view the best way to address 
the problem was quietly through the budgetary process. 
Martin said that he would discuss the issue with the Legal 
Advisor and then would probably be inclined to issue an 
information paper calling for, among other changes, replacing 
the "up to 10 TAVs" language in the budget with language 
allowing for more TAVs. 
 
¶13.  (U) Martin cautioned that it would probably be better to 
have the TS propose the change than have the U.S. raise the 
issue in open consultations, as this could potentially lead 
to horse trading on other unrelated issues such as OCPF 
inspections.  Martin also strongly suggested that it would be 
counterproductive to raise this issue directly with 
individuals in IPB, as they had drafted the problematic 
language.  He promised to quietly work with del to resolve 
the issue and to report back after his meeting with the Legal 
Advisor. 
 
¶14.  (U) Martin said that program managers would have a fair 
amount of discretion on how to use the funding proposed for 
the two temporary P-2 positions intended to support TAVs. 
The money could be used to hire two P-2s, to fund trips by 
other external experts, or to hire one P-4.  This essentially 
would be an issue to be sorted out by the Legal Advisor's 
office and IPB, and possibly the director of ICA.  He said 
that there was limited enthusiasm in the Legal Advisors 
Office for using the external network of legal experts, as 
the TS has had limited success with using the network in the 
past. 
 
¶15.  (U) On the question of increased funding for childcare 
at the OPCW, Martin said this was not a new entitlement but 
simply an increase of 30,000 Euros in the existing budget to 
reflect increased costs. 
 
¶16.   (U) Martin took the point that the language in table 9 
of the budget concerning Article VII implementation should 
probably read, "Active engagement during the year between the 
OPCW and 100% of Member States that have yet to designate or 
establish a National Authority." IPB had proposed that 75% be 
used instead of 100%.  Martin's view was this could probably 
be best addressed in the budget consultations. 
 
¶17.  (U) On the 2004 cash surplus, Martin said that this 
would likely be returned to SPs on or about December 10, 
¶2006.  The money would first be credited towards any 
outstanding 2006 assessment payments and then could be 
applied towards Article IV and V payments, and finally the 
2007 assessment.  This will likely mean that most of the 
surplus refunded to the U.S. will go towards our outstanding 
2006 assessed contribution. 
 
¶18.  (U) Ito sends. 
BLAKEMAN