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Carol X Weakley  08/21/2006 04:42:58 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Carol X Weakley

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003272 
 
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SUBJECT:  ISRAEL: POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS IN POST-CEASEFIRE POLLS 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. Precisely 48 hours after implementation of the Lebanon ceasefire 
prime-time Israel Radio was offering a hotline to traumatized 
victims of the month-long Hizballah bombardment of northern Israel, 
but poll results from the center of the country, show that those 
outside the bombardment zone are also stressed, and are ready to 
take out their anger on Israel's political leaders, rather than its 
military leaders.   According to these polls, the public perception 
of the political leadership's failed performance will translate into 
a shift to the right in the next elections, primarily, but not 
exclusively, at the expense of Kadima's coalition partner, the Labor 
party.  Pending those elections, whether early or on schedule in 
2010, the current polls suggest individual politicians may pay a 
personal price.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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MARKED FOR FAILURE? 
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¶2.  Earlier this year, Israeli PM Ehud Olmert surprised the pundits 
by handing the defense portfolio to his principal coalition partner 
and Labor Party chief, Amir Peretz.  Political observers broadly 
concluded that the Israeli prime minister was motivated by a desire 
to neutralize Peretz on economic and domestic policy -- areas in 
which he is a known militant of some expertise. The general 
perception was that the new DefMin's greatest test would come over 
the issue of Olmert's promised "realignment" within the West Bank. 
The working assumption was that whether he succeeded or failed, 
Peretz would be kept busy, and that major policy decisions 
concerning defense would be left to Olmert and his close advisors. 
No experts were heard theorizing that in the event of a military 
fiasco or even a minor setback, Peretz would usefully -- from 
Olmert's perspective -- take the fall.  But the first post-ceasefire 
polls suggest just that. 
 
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LET THE IDF DO THE JOB 
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¶3.  When Yediot's post-ceasefire Dachaf poll asked an unspecified 
number of adult Jewish Israelis how they rated Peretz's performance 
throughout the fighting, only 36 percent said it had been good, as 
compared with 63 percent who said it had not been good.  Yediot's 
poll yielded less dramatic but nonetheless unflattering results for 
PM Olmert's, with a majority 51 percent of those polled labeling his 
performance "not good," as compared with 47 percent, who rated it 
"good". 
 
¶4.  Ma'ariv's Teleseker poll was more informative on both counts, 
showing a curve in Peretz's public fortunes with an initial 28 
percent of those polled prior to the hostilities expressing 
satisfaction with his performance as DefMin, rising to 61 percent at 
the end of the first week of the Israel-Hizballah conflict, and 
slamming back to 28 percent the day after the ceasefire.  The same 
poll showed different figures but a similar curve for PM Olmert -- 
whose public standing stood at only 43 percent approval among those 
polled prior to the hostilities, rising to 78 percent at the close 
of the first week of the conflict, and falling back below its 
starting point to 40 percent the day after the ceasefire. 
 
¶5.  Both the Ma'ariv and Yediot polls suggest that A) public ratings 
of both PM Olmert and DefMin Peretz were uniformly low prior to the 
crisis in Lebanon, and B) the perceived progress of hostilities had 
considerable impact on the evolution of public attitudes.  While 
there were few successes at any time during the conflict to justify 
the polled surge of public support after the first week of 
hostilities, it now appears that both ministers were temporary 
beneficiaries of a degree of "credit" extended by the Israeli public 
to facilitate completion of what it saw as the task of the military. 
 It was this "credit" that was decimated by the political 
leadership's acceptance of the ceasefire under terms that the public 
sees as failing to have achieved most, perhaps any, of Israel's 
originally stated objectives. 
 
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WHEN THE MUSIC STOPPED 
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¶6.  Both polls found similar results on the issue of the ceasefire. 
Yediot asked whether Israel should have agreed to it without the 
return of the kidnapped IDF soldiers, and an overwhelming 70 percent 
of those polled responded in the negative, with only 27 percent 
dissenting from this view.   When Ma'ariv asked the same question -- 
while eliminating any mention of the kidnapped soldiers -- the 
response was less dramatic but still decisive:  53 percent said 
Israel should have continued to fight, while 42 percent favored 
agreement.  Asked to evaluate the outcome of the fighting, those 
polled by Yediot and Ma'ariv produced a consensus that there were no 
clear victors.  Of those polled, 36 percent told Yediot that neither 
side won, while 30 percent gave victory to Israel and a matching 30 
percent said Hizballah.  Ma'ariv found 18 percent of those polled 
giving the edge to Israel, while 15 percent saw Hizballah in the 
lead -- all of which was mitigated by the overwhelming 66 percent 
that offered the conclusion that nobody won. 
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SOMEONE MUST PAY 
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¶7.  Amid much talk -- so far indecisive in its conclusions as to the 
need and usefulness of a commission of inquiry into the conduct of 
the hostilities and their outcome -- the focus is sharpening in 
regard to individual members of the political and military 
leaderships.  Ma'ariv's poll questions stopped short of the issue of 
resignations, but asked who is responsible for the perceived 
failures in the conduct of the fighting.  Of those polled, 49 
percent responded by naming PM Olmert.  DefMin Peretz was held 
responsible by 41 percent of those polled, as compared with the IDF 
Chief of Staff, LTG Halutz -- named by 40 percent.  This could 
change, however, in light of subsequent revelations that LTG Halutz 
sold his investment portfolio three hours after the kidnapping of 
the IDF soldiers and simultaneously with the initial incursion of 
the IDF into Lebanese territory.  Yediot tackled the resignation 
issue only to find greater public leniency toward PM Olmert -- whom 
only 41 percent thought should resign.  The IDF Chief of Staff was 
marginally more vulnerable with 42 percent demanding his 
resignation.   Way ahead of them, DefMin Peretz was clearly 
identified as expendable by a majority of 57 percent who thought he 
should forfeit his ministerial office. 
 
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TOO EARLY FOR EARLY ELECTIONS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  Could a commission of inquiry avert early elections? Many, not 
least in PM Olmert's Kadima party, may devoutly wish this to be so. 
According to both Ma'ariv and Yediot's pollsters, a majority of the 
public -- 67 percent and 69 percent respectively -- are in favor of 
the appointment of a commission of inquiry.  Only the government is 
empowered to appoint a commission of inquiry -- in this case of 
itself -- and a commission's work would be of long duration and 
therefore liable to be overtaken by events -- so establishing such a 
commission is not likely to satisfy a public anxious to know why its 
sons had to fight and die to reach an outcome that most voters say 
achieved little or nothing for Israel.  That leaves the prospect of 
elections, which polling indicates would take the country to the 
political right, primarily at the expense of Kadima's major 
coalition partner, the Labor Party of Amir Peretz. 
 
¶9.  Ma'ariv's poll question on how its respondents would vote in a 
new election found with surprising results:  Kadima maintains its 29 
seats in the legislature, Labor drops to 15 from its present 19, and 
Likud picks up seats from Labor, from Shas (which goes down to 10 
from 12) and from the Pensioners (who forfeit two of their seven 
seats).  Likud's hypothetical 20 seats may not spell an outright 
leadership challenge but are just sufficient, according to Ma'ariv's 
results, for the formation of a slim majority coalition by current 
opposition parties and with the participation of Shas.  While this 
scenario may be premature, it is sufficiently realistic to give new 
impetus to the efforts of Likud and its leader, Binyamin Netanyahu, 
who this week replaced Amir Peretz in the public perception as PM 
Ehud Olmert's major political rival. 
 
¶10.  At the same time, in addition to the Halutz classic act of bad 
judgment, there are mini-storms brewing over Olmert and his wife's 
financial transactions in buying a luxury apartment, sexual assault 
accusations against President Katzav and Justice Minister Ramon, and 
a job-appointment scandal involving Kadima MK Tzachi Hanegbi. Where 
these individually or collectively will impact the stability of the 
current government remains to be seen. 
 
#Cretz