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UNCLAS QUITO 002151 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS MOPS SNAR PTER EC CO
SUBJECT: NEW DEFENSE POLICY ADDRESSES NARCOTICS THREAT 
 
REF: QUITO 02078 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary: Since taking office in August 2005, Defense 
Minister Oswaldo Jarrin has attempted to shift the focus of 
Ecuador's defense posture away from its traditional rivalry 
with Peru towards more current national security threats, 
including that of narco-terror on Ecuador's northern border 
with Colombia.  On August 10 he released a 144-page "white 
paper" updating the ministry's 2002 defense policy (which 
Jarrin also spearheaded in an earlier capacity).  In a 
significant departure, the new paper emphasizes the need to 
beef up security along the Ecuador-Colombia border.  Without 
offering operational detail, the paper is being interpreted 
here as favoring a more robust military fight against 
narcotrafficking and illegal armed group activity in Ecuador. 
 
¶2.  (U) Civil society leaders have publicly criticized the 
paper, saying that the Ministry failed to sufficiently 
consult them before finalizing the document.  Others contend 
that Jarrin is trying to expand the military's mandate to 
include domestic policing.  Jarrin has rebuffed such critics, 
claiming consultations were conducted in numerous cities and 
that the military is trying to combat external threats which 
have violated Ecuadorian territory.  Our view is that 
Jarrin's efforts to refocus policy towards real security 
threats is positive and supports USG objectives to combat 
narco-terrorist activity in the region.  An important focus 
left out of the white paper, however, is the crying need to 
circumscribe the role of the military as arbiter of irregular 
changes of government.  We are hearing some rumblings that 
Jarrin's paper lacks buy-in from the military rank and file, 
which does not augur well for implementation after his 
departure.  End Summary. 
 
Jarrin's Defense Policy Released 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) Defense Minister Oswaldo Jarrin on August 10 unveiled 
the Ministry's "National Defense Policy 2006" to a 
distinguished gathering of high-level GOE officials, foreign 
military attaches, civil society leaders, and diplomats. 
President Alfredo Palacio, Foreign Minister Francisco 
Carrion, and Jarrin addressed the group, all stressing the 
need for a well defined defense policy to combat growing 
transnational crime and to protect national sovereignty.  In 
the event's only departure from script, Palacio was heckled 
by indigenous women from the Amazon region, who denounced the 
government's protection of oil installations from the forced 
entry of human rights demonstrators. 
 
¶4.  (U) The U.S. Military Group provided financial assistance 
for the policy update process, allowing the MOD to fly in 
defense dignitaries from Argentina and Chile.  U.S. funding 
also helped to pay for printing of the text and for the 
August 10 unveiling. 
 
Background on Jarrin and His Paper 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) Jarrin, a retired general and former undersecretary 
of defense and chairman of the Joint Staff, is the 
acknowledged mastermind behind the white paper.  Immediately 
after assuming the MOD position in August 2005, Jarrin began 
efforts to update the 2002 defense strategy, which he had 
overseen as undersecretary for national defense under former 
president Gustavo Noboa.  To do so, Jarrin convoked security 
strategists, foreign policy buffs, academics, and civil 
society leaders to discuss the nation's current security 
context for inclusion in the revised policy.  Nevertheless, 
unlike the Foreign Ministry's PLANEX (reftel) efforts, the 
2006 National Defense Policy is not viewed here as the 
outcome of an open consultative process, and insiders suggest 
internal military support for the document is questionable. 
At least during his tenure, however, the document will 
constitute the current national defense agenda. 
 
¶6.  (U) Like Carrion, Jarrin is considered one of Palacio's 
strongest ministers.  Jarrin's realistic estimation of the 
regional narco-terrorist threat has made him more in sync 
with regional USG objectives.  Some of our contacts speculate 
that if Leon Roldos (ID-RED candidate) is successful in his 
presidential bid, Jarrin could remain as Defense Minister, at 
least at the outset of the new government.  As a former 
general officer, Jarrin exerts effective control over the 
military ranks, but the civilian Ministry of Defense 
structure supporting him is weak. 
 
Defense Strategy Explained 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) Jarrin's white paper states that the primary security 
objective of the Ecuadorian military is to preserve peace and 
stability of the state, giving priority to political, 
diplomatic, economic, and other non-military solutions over 
armed conflict.  The paper claims the GOE is open to 
international cooperation to confront security threats. 
Through active participation in the United Nations and the 
Organization of American States, Ecuador seeks to combat 
transnational effects of the narcotics trade, illegal 
trafficking in arms, organized crime, and terrorism. 
Ecuador's response to such threats is shared among the 
Ecuadorian National Police, Customs, National Council for the 
Control of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, and the 
Armed Forces, the paper affirms. 
 
Strategic Objectives Outlined 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) The white paper outlines actions aimed at protecting 
Ecuadorian territory, population, resources, cultural 
patrimony, and interests, while contributing to regional 
stability.  The document sets out the following strategies to 
achieve the mission: 
 
-- Neutralize threats against territorial integrity in the 
border regions, at sea, or air. 
--Defend national territory and sovereignty against real and 
potential threats of external aggression. 
--Cooperate with institutions and governmental bodies in the 
case of emergencies. 
--Protect strategic areas. 
--Contribute to democratic institutions to guarantee judicial 
order. 
--Contribute to the preservation of the natural environment. 
--Protect the population, resources, and public services in 
the event of grave internal unrest. 
--Participate in international peacekeeping and humanitarian 
operations. 
--Comply with international conventions and treaties for 
which Ecuador is a signatory. 
 
Ecuador-Colombia Border: New Focus 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U) In a significant departure from the 2002 defense 
policy, Jarrin's 2006 update specifically addresses relations 
with Colombia and the security threat along the common 
border.  The paper notes that Ecuador-Colombia relations have 
historically been good, but that differences over Colombia's 
ongoing internal conflict, transnational threats now 
affecting Ecuador, and the Colombian government's posture 
have harmed bilateral relations.  The paper affirms that 
Ecuador's proximity to troubled Colombian territory has 
generated strong pressure to develop a combined military 
strategy, which would depart from Ecuador's policy of 
non-intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. 
 
¶10.  (U) The white paper expresses GOE concern that 
narcotrafficking, illegal drug cultivation, environmental 
damage caused by coca eradication, refugee flows, precursor 
chemical trading, money laundering, and further involvement 
of border residents in illicit activities could threaten 
national security, and have serious domestic social, 
political, and economic implications.  Asserting that the GOE 
can not afford to ignore such activity, Jarrin's white paper 
outlines the following priority measures: 
 
--Demand that the Colombian government exercise better 
control of its border by activating National Centers for 
Border Attention (CENAF), preventing the transfer of illicit 
Activities, and increasing Colombian military presence in the 
vulnerable zones to the north and northeast of Ecuador. 
--Maintain Ecuadorian territory free of cultivation and 
processing of coca. 
--Neutralize illegal armed groups active in Ecuador. 
--Prevent a potential humanitarian disaster for refugees or 
displaced persons in Ecuador. 
--Preserve the natural environment and natural resources from 
the impact of eradication of illicit cultivations (in the 
proximity to national parks - diversity). 
--Initiate development programs for the protection of 
vulnerable populations and the generation of social and 
economic stability. 
 
¶11.  (U) The paper cites the Colombian government's decision 
to install a CENAF(which house immigration, customs, and 
other law enforcement agencies) in San Miguel-Putumayo and to 
activate Brigades 27 and 29 and Mobile Brigade 13 in Putumayo 
and Narino as positive.  The paper explicitly acknowledged 
USAID assistance in helping UDENOR to invest $78 m. in social 
and economic development in the troubled region.  The 
Ecuador-Colombia Binational Border Commission (COMBIFRON), 
establish in 1996, remains an instrument of mutual confidence 
preventing government-to-government conflict, the paper noted. 
 
Reform Discussed without Much Detail 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (U) Jarrin's white paper briefly addresses military 
Reforms in its final chapter.  The paper affirms the 
importance of restructuring the military to better fulfill 
constitutional mandates and new military responsibilities, 
but gives little supporting detail.  Among several vague 
bullet points outlining organizational changes needed, the 
paper notes that the proposed reform to the military's 
authorization law will address unspecified legal and 
structural issues. 
 
Reaction Mixed 
-------------- 
¶13.  (SBU) MFA Director for Border Relations with Colombia 
Amb. Claudio Cevallos told PolOff on August 22 that he 
considered Jarrin's paper a step towards redefining Ecuador's 
national security threats.  Despite internal anti-Plan 
Colombia sentiments, opportunistic politics, and nationalist 
journalism, Carrion, Jarrin, and others in the GOE are 
pushing a greater security and development focus in the 
border region, he said.  Cevallos praised Jarrin's leadership 
and stressed the need for greater investment in the region to 
keep Ecuador from transforming into a narco-state. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Bertha Garcia, Ecuador's foremost civil-military 
relations analyst and Director for the Democracy and Security 
Foundation at Quito's Catholic University, told PolOff that 
Jarrin's initiatives were "cosmetic" and off the mark. 
Garcia said that the white paper would do little to 
professionalize the military or foster greater respect for 
democratic norms, and warned that the U.S. should not help 
strengthen the military further. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Garcia also criticized the military's involvement 
in the economy, the lack of transparency, and claimed that 
high-level corruption is rampant.  None of these issues is 
addressed in the white paper, she noted.  Garcia agreed that 
the GOE should focus greater attention towards the 
Ecuador-Colombia border, but suggested that the Ecuadorian 
National Police (ENP) should take the lead on internal 
security matters, not Jarrin's military. Garcia admitted that 
she and Jarrin are at odds over her public criticism of the 
armed forces.  She lamented her exclusion from the Ministry's 
security strategy sessions, and said that she had even been 
prevented form participating in some of the MFA's PLANEX 
sessions on security. 
 
¶16.  (U) Countering criticism, Jarrin in an August 20 
interview said that his new defense paper seeks to help the 
GOE comply with obligations under the International 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances and the Inter-American Convention 
Against Terrorism.  Jarrin said that new external threats 
require a "multidimensional" approach in which multiple 
security elements work collectively to ensure national 
security.  He refuted allegations that he seeks to 
inappropriately involve the military in internal policing. 
 
USG Interests 
------------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) We view the white paper as generally positive in 
shifting the GOE's attention towards real security threats 
posed by transnational criminal and terror groups along the 
northern border with Colombia.  It remains to be seen whether 
the new policy paper will outlive Jarrin's tenure (or whether 
Jarrin's tenure might be extended under a new government). 
Though generally supportive of USG security interests, the 
new policy paper falls flat on another key USG 
interest--limiting the role of the Ecuadorian military in 
irregular changes of government. 
JEWELL