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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 003202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR/PCOLEMAN 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD ECON USTR SF VE
SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA: SEMINAR ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HUGO CHAVEZ 
AND THE FTAA 
 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  The University of South Africa (Unisa) and the 
Embassy of Venezuela sponsored a July 28 presentation by Jos 
Briceo Ruiz of the Universidad de los Andes on the foreign policy 
of Hugo Chavez as it pertains to the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA).  The main points brought up in Ruiz's speech were: 1) 
Venezuela's perception that it was the target of a Washington-backed 
coup in 2002 plays a key role in its foreign policy, inducing a 
distrust of the U.S. beyond mere pragmatism; 2)Venezuela's three 
pillars of foreign policy are the promotion of a multipolar world, 
South-South cooperation, and collaboration within Latin America; 3) 
Venezuela has sought to ally itself with a variety of regional 
powers, including Russia, China, South Africa, India, and Brazil; 4) 
Venezuela's proposed alternative to the FTAA, the Bolivarian 
Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), is a political and social 
initiative with some economic elements that seeks to unify Latin 
America an alternative to the United States; and 5) the future of 
ALBA depends upon participation by MERCOSUR states, which is not 
immediately likely.  End Summary. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. (U) Unisa's Centre for Latin American Studies hosted the 
presentation in Pretoria, drawing an audience of about 25 people 
from the South African government, diplomatic missions, and the 
university's faculty.  The Charge d'Affaires of the Venezuelan 
Embassy opened the seminar with a brief speech thanking Unisa and 
Dr. Ruiz, who is a faculty member at the Universidad de los Andes, 
Mrida, Venezuela.  The following is a summary of his presentation. 
 
------------------------------- 
Three Pillars of Foreign Policy 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) According to Ruiz, the Hugo Chavez administration bases its 
foreign policy upon three pillars: the promotion of a "multipolar 
world," South-South cooperation, and Bolivarian cooperation in South 
America.  The three are closely related.  Venezuela will align 
itself against the United States to create alternate poles of power, 
preferably establishing those poles in the underdeveloped world and 
ideally in Latin America.  Especially after 2002, Venezuela has 
vocally opposed the dominant place of the United States in global 
politics.  Whenever possible, Chavez seeks to build relationships 
with regional powers, particularly in the third world.  Its 
"independent foreign policy" stresses the importance of restoring 
the sort of balance "present during the Cold War" by aligning with 
Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa, China, and others against 
perceived U.S. dominance and reviving organizations of third-world 
states to encourage developing states to look to each other for 
progress rather than to the West.  Above all else, Chavez stresses 
that Latin America shares a culture and economic interests -- a 
Bolivarian vision -- and should band together to face the United 
States and European from a position of strength. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
1999-2001: General Criticism of the FTAA 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Ruiz identified three stages in Venezuela's move away from 
the FTAA during the Chavez administration: general criticism, 
forthright skepticism, and radical opposition. 
 
¶5. (U) Ruiz noted that Venezuela entered into FTAA negotiations in 
1994, under the rule of Rafael Caldera's center-left administration. 
 Although the subsequent Chavez regime was at ideological odds with 
the United States' vision for the FTAA from its first days in 
office, Ruiz sees little continuity or clarity of purpose in that 
opposition from 1999 through 2001.  Government documents reveal a 
great deal of interest in trade deals with various partners -- 
MERCOSUR, the Andean Community of Nations, and the European Union, 
among others - but Venezuela continued to participate in the FTAA 
process, albeit with ever-increasing reluctance.  This indecision 
can be attributed to the Chavez government's focus on domestic 
change within Venezuela.  It was forging an entirely new political 
infrastructure while battling a determined opposition. 
 
---------------- 
2002: Skepticism 
---------------- 
 
¶6. (U) Domestic matters came to a head in April 2002, when a coup 
briefly toppled Chavez.  This episode is a defining point in the 
Chavez presidency, marking a sharp deterioration in relations with 
the U.S. and a growing sense of persecution in Caracas.  Regardless 
of the veracity of the Chavistas' claims that Washington encouraged 
 
PRETORIA 00003202  002 OF 002 
 
 
the coup, Ruiz stated that there is a widespread belief in 
government circles that Washington is out to get Chavez.  By 2002, 
Venezuela was an unenthusiastic participant in FTAA negotiations. 
While Chavez did not reject the FTAA outright -- he maintained that 
an agreement could be mutually beneficial depending on the treaty 
content -- his government began to search for an alternative Latin 
American trade federation.  Chavez eventually proposed the 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) in place of the FTAA. 
 ALBA was to be a strictly Latin American organization, resisting 
the hegemonic power of the United States and focusing on 
"cooperation" between states instead of the "competitive" focus of 
the FTAA, which Chavez perceived as inherently hazardous to the 
Americas' developing economies.  However, ALBA had little substance 
at first.  Ruiz relates that when the Cuban government asked Chavez 
for further details of the proposal in 2002, he had none to give. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
2003-Present: Radical Opposition to the FTAA 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) After 2003, ALBA gained substance, stressing "economic 
complementarity."  Instead of a lower general tariff promoting 
head-on competition between economic sectors, an ALBA deal would see 
assistance or importation in a weak sector in exchange for providing 
a good or service that the trading partner needs.  In December, 2004 
Cuba and Venezuela signed an agreement within the ALBA framework, in 
which Cuba sent 20,000 medical personnel and teachers to Venezuela 
in exchange for 96,000 barrels-per-day of inexpensive oil.  Bolivia 
joined ALBA in 2006. 
According to Ruiz, ALBA is only partly an economic vehicle; it is 
also concerned with promoting certain political and social goals of 
the Chavez administration and, as such, is a concept often 
indistinguishable from Venezuelan foreign policy.  The name is 
attached to a variety of projects designed to oppose United States 
hegemony, including energy cooperation projects with Caribbean 
states and Argentina and a proposed Latin American network to 
compete with CNN and American TV. 
 
¶8. (U) Ruiz told his audience that effectively the future of ALBA 
lies with the MERCOSUR states.  Venezuela has long desired to be a 
full member of MERCOSUR, and any realistic alternative to the FTAA 
must include Argentina and Brazil, with Chile preferably included. 
MERCOSUR has rejected the FTAA on practical grounds, demanding an 
open agricultural market from the U.S. and greater freedom for 
regional development planning, but the organization is founded on 
neoliberal economic principles and is not a natural partner for the 
Chavez regime, despite the recent liberal revival in South America 
and the close relationship between Chavez and Brazilian President 
Lula.  Although MERCOSUR flirts with ALBA, Ruiz acknowledges that 
none of its major powers are likely to reject the FTAA outright; 
they are far too committed to trade with the developed nations. 
 
BOST