VZCZCXRO9549
RR RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1037/01 2261036
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141036Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4202
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1246
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0175
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0729
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1225
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0305
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1517
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2785
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1926
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0290
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1316
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0867
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0806

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001037 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, D, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR 
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: FOREIGN MINISTER ON SUDAN, DARFUR, AND 
POLITICS 
 
REF: STATE 1244 
 
NDJAMENA 00001037  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: The long-term success of the recent 
rapprochement between Khartoum and N'Djamena  will hinge on 
the good will of the countries' respective leaders, according 
to Chad's Foreign Minister.  He not only denied accusations 
of Chad's support for Sudanese rebel movements, but accused 
the international community of ignoring the positive role 
that Chad had played in past mediation efforts between the 
Sudanese government and the Darfur rebels.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On August 12, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmad 
Allam-mi met with Ambassador Wall to discuss Chad's recent 
diplomatic maneuverings.  Allam-mi's comments on Chad's 
opening of diplomatic relations with Chad are reported in 
septel. 
 
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CHAD-SUDAN RELATIONS POSITIVE, FOR THE MOMENT 
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¶3.  (SBU) Allam-mi told the Ambassador that the recent 
rapprochement with Sudan was based on the premise that 
strained relations with Khartoum would only further 
destabilize Chad.  Both parties had "poured oil into the 
fire," as Allam-mi put it, and the rupture in diplomatic ties 
was only bringing greater insecurity to the region.  In order 
to ensure that relations between both sides would continue to 
improve, President Deby and President El-Bashir needed to 
demonstrate the good will to commit to positive relations. 
Chad, according to Allam-mi, was prepared to make this 
commitment.  The question was now whether Sudan, which 
continued to harbor a Chadian rebel movement in Sudan, would 
cease its support for opponents of the Deby regime. 
 
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WE DO NOT SUPPORT SUDANESE REBELS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Ambassador turned to Darfur, and discussed 
reftel points with Allam-mi.  He pointed out that any 
Chadians who supported Sudanese rebel movement in Darfur and 
undermined the Darfur Peace Accords would become the 
potential target of U.S.-supported United Nations sanctions. 
The Foreign Minister was quick to deny any accusations of 
explicit Chadian support of Sudanese rebels who opposed the 
Darfur peace accords.  He admitted that the Chadian 
authorities were in contact with the G-19 Sudanese rebels 
operating in Darfur, but the communications was merely to 
gather information on the situation on the ground.  He also 
admitted that certain members of the GOC had reservations 
about the DPA, and had argued that support for Sudanese 
rebels might act as a counterweight against Sudan.  But the 
GOC was currently unified in its belief that peace in Darfur, 
not the destabilization of Sudan, was in Chad's interests. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Foreign Minister identified the Justice and 
Equality Movement and its leader, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, as a 
major reason for the perceptions of Chadian support for 
Sudanese rebel movements.  According to Allam-mi, Khalil and 
the JEM were purchasing equipment and support from defecting 
Chadian soldiers for their cause.  He cited an example of a 
recent Chadian military vehicle purchase (later transported 
to Darfur) by JEM loyalists from a Chadian military officer. 
While the GOC did not tolerate such actions by its military 
officers, it was very difficult to control such behavior. 
After all, the tribal and ethnic connections among the 
Sudanese rebels and elements in the Chadian military meant 
that military officers might independently supply weapons to 
the rebel movements, but these actions were not part of a 
government policy. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Allam-mi was highly critical of the international 
 
NDJAMENA 00001037  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
community's treatment of Chad.  He stated that the 
international community, which was now considering sanctions 
on members of the GOC, was supporting Minni Minawi, who 
himself was undermining the N'Djamena cease-fire agreement 
and the DPA by initiating attacks on other members of the 
Sudanese rebel movement and committing atrocities against 
civilians.  He said that the international community had 
forgotten the positive role that Chad had played in mediation 
efforts between the GOS and the Sudanese rebel movement, both 
trying to bring the parties to the negotiating table and 
assisting in unifying the rebel movement in preparation for 
the Abuja talks.  These mediation efforts, according to 
Allam-mi, were ignored by the rest of the world; and as a 
result of Chad's diplomatic intervention in the Darfur 
crisis, its relations with Sudan began to deteriorate.  Chad, 
in Allam-mi words, would not "play the game of the 
international community" when it came to Darfur. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) When the Ambassador asked if Chad's recent 
rapprochement with Sudan would mean that Chad would continue 
to support the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping 
force in Darfur and Eastern Chad, Allam-mi said while Chad 
continued to support the formation of such a force, it would 
have to assess how its support of a U.N. force impacted its 
relations with the GOS. 
 
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POLITICAL DIALOGUE CANNOT INVOLVE CHADIAN REBELS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (SBU) While noting that his area was foreign affairs, not 
domestic politics, Allam-mi addressed the issue of a national 
dialogue in Chad.  He asserted that a political dialogue 
cannot include members of the armed opposition.  The Chadian 
rebels did not represent the national interests, but rather 
tribal interests and rivalries, and therefore would not be 
accepted into any national forum for reconciliation until 
they agreed to disarm and join the political process.  When 
the Ambassador asked about Allam-mi's contacts with 
representatives of the armed opposition in Paris, the foreign 
minister said that he had had no significant contacts with 
Chadian rebels when in the French capital. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Recent diplomatic efforts at reconciliation between 
N'Djamena and Khartoum is a positive development for both 
countries and the region.  However, any future attacks by 
Chadian rebels into Chad could easily restart the blame game 
between the two governments.  We will continue to discuss 
reftel points with other members of the Chadian government. 
 
¶10.  (U) Tripoli minimized considered. 
WALL