VZCZCXRO8187
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1032/01 2231427
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111427Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4196
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1243
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0172
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0726
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0302
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0908
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1514
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2782
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1923
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0287
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1313
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0864
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0803

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 001032 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, 
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR 
DARFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR 
CAMPBELL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: DAOUSSA DEBY DENIES CHADIAN SUPPORT FOR 
DARFUR MILITIAS 
 
REF: STATE 1422 
 
NDJAMENA 00001032  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Daoussa Deby, special advisor and 
half-brother of President Idriss Deby Itno, denied 
accusations by Sudanese Liberation Movement leader Minni 
Minawi and others that the Chadians are supporting Sudanese 
rebels who refused to sign the Darfur Peace Accords.  He 
asserted that while the signing of the July 26 agreement 
between the Chadian and Sudanese governments is a positive 
step in bilateral relations, the international community 
should pressure the GOS to cease harboring and supporting 
Chadian rebels movements in Sudan.  Deby also believes that 
international partners should examine whether the 
implementation of an agreement opposed by a majority of 
Darfurians is truly a viable option for peace in the region. 
In a separate conversation, the Chadian Ambassador to the 
United States rejected the notion that Chad sought to 
undermine the DPA.  Assistance to the Darfur non-signatories 
(from whatever quarter) was simply an expedient tool to use 
against Khartoum. END SUMMARY. 
 
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CHAD DOES NOT MILITARILY SUPPORT SUDANESE REBELS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (U) On August 10, the Ambassador met with Daoussa Deby, 
presidential advisor and half-brother to President Deby, to 
discuss reftel points.  The Ambassador noted that the U.S. 
was extremely concerned by reports of Chadian support for 
non-signatories of the Darfur Peace Accords, and pointed out 
that the U.S. would support targeted United Nations sanctions 
against Chadian officials who were supporting Sudanese rebel 
activity.  The Ambassador also said that continued violence 
would endanger the DPA, which the United States viewed as the 
best way to achieve peace in Darfur. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Deby thanked the Ambassador for his comments, and 
categorically denied any Chadian military support for 
Sudanese rebel groups in Darfur.  Any Chadian military assets 
in the region were located on the Chadian side of the border, 
trying to defend the border towns of Adre, Tissi, and Tine. 
He said that the only assistance that the GOC had provided 
for Sudanese rebel groups was the right of transit and the 
right to reside in the country, assistance that was actually 
requested by the African Union in 2004.  The GOC, according 
to Daoussa, would soon cease this support in accordance with 
the commitments the Chadian government made in signing the 
July 26 agreement with the GOS. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
CHAD WANTS PEACE IN DARFUR 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Deby also said that support for Sudanese rebel 
activity in Darfur was contrary to Chad's wish to see peace 
and stability in the region.  After all, Chad was as much of 
a victim as the Darfurians from the conflict.  To that end, 
noted Daoussa, Chadian authorities were hosting over 200,000 
Sudanese refugees, and had acted as a mediator in the Darfur 
peace talks.  Beyond that, President Deby had publicly 
supported the Darfur Peace Accords following its signing in 
Abuja. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Daoussa pointed out that the President invited 
DPA-signatory Minni Minawi to N'Djamena following the 
conclusion of the Abuja talks, and told him that while Deby 
supported the DPA, he was fearful that the GOS would arm 
Sudan Liberation Movement forces loyal to Minni to destroy 
all Sudanese rebel groups opposed to the signing of the DPA. 
According to Daoussa, three days following the meeting, 
 
NDJAMENA 00001032  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Minni's forces, backed by GOS forces and equipment, attacked 
the non-signatory umbrella group G-19.  Daoussa said that 
Minni, who was accusing the Chadians of arming the dissident 
Sudanese rebel groups, was no better than the Djanjaweed in 
the level of brutality he and his supporters inflicted on the 
Darfurians during their attacks.  He, as Daoussa stated, was 
a "bad horse" who could not be trusted by the international 
community.  Daoussa added that Minni was blaming the Chadians 
for being responsible for his defeats in Darfur, because he 
did not want to admit to his supporters that other Sudanese 
rebel movements had defeated him and marginalized his 
influence in the region. 
 
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MAKE SURE THAT SUDAN IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Deby turned to the subject of Sudan, and said that 
the GOC was pleased with the recent agreement with the 
Sudanese, and hopeful of improved relations.  He noted that 
following the swearing-in ceremony of President Deby on 
August 8, the Head of State met with President Bashir of 
Sudan, President Qadhafi of Libya, President Bongo of Gabon, 
and President Sassou-Nguesso of Congo to discuss 
possibilities for improved border security and a 
re-establishment of respective embassies.  According to 
Daoussa, these discussions reaped some positive results, and 
established a basis for further dialogue. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Nevertheless, Daoussa stated that the GOC was 
concerned about the GOS's commitment to improve diplomatic 
relations with Chad.  After all, past agreements in Tripoli 
and Banjul had not been successfully implemented, and the GOS 
continued to harbor a Chadian rebel movement within its 
borders.  According to Deby, if the GOS wishes to demonstrate 
its commitment to stability in the region, it should stop its 
support for Chadian rebels who were able to directly attack 
Chad in the heart of its capital on April 13.  "The ball is 
in Sudan's court," noted Daoussa.  To that end, the 
international community could play an extremely important 
role in pressuring Khartoum to promote stability and cease 
its support of Chadian rebel groups.  An international 
presence along the border, Daoussa believed, would assist in 
keeping the Sudanese in check. 
 
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IS THE DPA REALLY THE BEST SOLUTION FOR PEACE? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (SBU) On the DPA, Daoussa argued that while the U.S. and 
others thought the agreement was the best chance for peace in 
Darfur, they should consider the feasibility of implementing 
an agreement that is not accepted by the majority of Sudanese 
rebel groups.  He stated that the rebels concerns for greater 
compensation for Darfurian victims and a concrete time-frame 
for the disarmament of the Djanjaweed militia were genuine 
concerns that should be considered by the international 
community.  After all, not developing a final agreement that 
is acceptable to most Darfurians would only exacerbate the 
level of violence and instability in the region, and hinder 
the repatriation of the Sudanese refugees back to their 
homeland. 
 
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AMBASSADOR BASHIR ON SUPPORT TO DARFUR REBELS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9. (SBU) In a private lunch with the Ambassador, Chad's 
Ambassador to the United States disavowed any Chadian 
interest in undermining the DPA.  He acknowledged however, 
 
NDJAMENA 00001032  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
that it was "possible" that Darfur non-signatories were 
receiving assistance from Chadian sources.  According to him, 
assistance to the non-signatories was simply an expedient 
tool to use against Khartoum. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Daoussa's denial of Chadian military support to 
Sudanese rebels is not surprising, despite the proliferation 
of assertions that such support is continuing.  We will 
continue to share the concerns in reftel with other members 
of the Chadian government. 
 
¶10.  (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL