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UNCLAS NAIROBI 003500 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM KCOR KE
SUBJECT: KENYA: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL OBAMA 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Welcome to Kenya, a country that stands 
out among its East African neighbors as a stable, open 
democracy and as a key regional partner for the United 
States.  The country is making a dramatic break from its past 
by greatly improving respect for human rights and by 
expanding democratic space in wich a variety of media and 
civil society organizations thrive.  With substantial 
existing infrastructure, a well-educated work force and a 
diverse economy, Kenya could become East Africa's engine for 
economic growth.  Mission advocacy and assistance programs 
actively support and promote Kenya's development.  As but one 
example, impressive results under the President's Emergency 
Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) include the dramatic 
increase in the numbers of U.S.-supported anti-retroviral 
(ART) treatment sites, contributing to a greater than 
100-fold increase in the number of Kenyans on anti-retroviral 
treatment since the PEPFAR scale-up began. 
 
¶2.  (U) These positive elements, however, are tempered by 
ongoing high and low-level corruption and internal political 
rivalries that have unfortunately slowed some areas of our 
bilateral cooperation and Kenya's own economic development. 
Kenya has yet to meet its international obligation to enact 
counter-terrorism legislation, which is not considered a 
priority.  Years of ecological mismanagement have put Kenya 
on the brink of an ecological catastrophe that will 
reverberate through the economy and will impact issues as 
diverse as health care and regional stability.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Terrorism: Aligning Priorities 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The bombing of our Embassy on August 7, 1998 and 
the subsequent November 2002 terrorist attacks on an 
Israeli-owned hotel and Israeli chartered aircraft within 
Kenya have been linked to Al-Qaeda, which retains the ability 
to operate in and around Kenya.  Working with Kenya against 
the threat from terrorism remains the first priority on our 
bilateral agenda, and we have had some modest successes.  We 
have provided training to the Department of Public 
Prosecutions and the Kenya Airports Authority.  The U.S. Navy 
Maritime Operations and Training Coastal Security Program 
with the Kenyan Navy, Police, and Kenyan Wildlife Service is 
the only inter-ministerial counter-terrorism effort in Kenya. 
 Our Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) office has established a 
robust police training program, and a coastal security 
program that promises to improve Kenya's capacity to secure 
its extensive coastline, through the combined efforts of ATA, 
the Kenya-U.S. Liaison Office (KUSLO), the Defense Attache's 
Office (DAO), and the Economic and Political sections. 
Cooperation with the Kenyan Government on this program is 
 
excellent and should serve as a model for such multi-sectoral 
projects.  As a top priority, our counter-terrorism efforts 
benefit from the cooperation of all Mission agencies, 
including DOJ's Resident Legal Advisor, USAID, FAA, and DHS. 
CJTF-HOA Civil Affairs teams have been active in Kenya since 
2003, providing humanitarian assistance and supporting 
development projects throughout North Eastern and Coast 
Provinces. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Unfortunately, on the whole, Kenya's posture in the 
war on terrorism is less productive than we would like.  For 
most Kenyans, crime is a greater security concern than 
terrorism.  As a result, very few Kenyan politicians or 
citizens see counter-terrorism legislation as a top priority. 
 Kenya has an international obligation to enact 
counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering legislation in 
accordance with UN conventions.  The issue of 
counter-terrorism legislation has become controversial in 
Kenya, with elements of the press, the political class, the 
human rights community, and Muslim leadership berating such 
legislation as anti-Muslim.  The Government of Kenya still 
has not established the necessary legal tools nor organized a 
joint task force of police and prosecutors, despite 
significant U.S. financial support and advocacy.  Military 
aspects of our counter-terrorism activities, particularly 
training, suffered a loss of funds due to Kenya's failure to 
conclude an Article 98 agreement.  Without an overarching 
Kenyan counter-terrorism strategy and legal framework, our 
efforts will carry on in a piecemeal fashion and will lack 
the impact of a fully integrated program. 
 
Military Cooperation Strong 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Despite Kenya's ratification of the Rome Treaty and 
not concluding an Article 98 Agreement with the U.S. (which 
caused a freeze of IMET and FMF), the military-military 
relationship remains strong.  Our cooperation includes 
training, combined exercises, some provision of equipment, an 
intelligence exchange program, and senior DOD visits.  Our 
strong support of the Kenyan military also includes the 
African Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program 
(ACOTA) which prepares Kenyan battalions for United Nations 
or African Union mandated peace-keeping deployments with 
training and equipment. 
 
Political Overview: Democracy Prevails, But Room for More 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) With a general election just over a year away, 
Kenya is at a critical juncture as voters decide whether to 
persevere with "reform" government, even if the government's 
results to date have not lived up to the electorate's high 
expectations.  Following the election in 2002 of President 
Mwai Kibaki's opposition NARC coalition government, 
democratic and political space for Kenyans has increased 
dramatically, a far cry from the torture chambers and 
political imprisonments of previous administrations.  With 
greatly improved respect for human rights, a variety of media 
and civil society organizations thrive, measuring the 
performance of the government by higher standards than in the 
past.  Kenyans themselves demand and expect democratic 
behavior from their government.  This was vividly 
demonstrated during the constitutional referendum of late 
2005 during which voters demonstrated their ability to 
(mostly peacefully) oppose a largely government-supported 
initiative.  It was also seen in the public outcry against 
the government's attack on free media during the March 2006 
raids on the Standard Media House.  Other good governance 
success stories are the effectiveness and independence of the 
Electoral Commission of Kenya, which the Mission has assisted 
through appropriate information technology, and the Kenyan 
National Commission on Human Rights.  Coverage of the 
referendum and high-level corruption, and professional 
organization of broadcast debates, have demonstrated the 
growing maturity and professionalism of the media sector. 
Particularly in light of public exposure of two massive 
corruption scandals in early 2006, Parliament has more fully 
assumed its role of checking the power of the executive 
through oversight committees.  The executive, however, 
continues to wield considerable power over the legislature. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Despite these achievements, the Kibaki 
administration has come under tough scrutiny and criticism 
for not having realized many of the President's campaign 
promises.  While notably the government has been able to 
deliver free primary education, a new constitution and an 
effective crackdown on corruption are pledges unfulfilled. 
2005's campaigns for and against the draft constitution were 
characterized more by ethnic animosities than policy debate, 
and the Government used substantial incentives in its 
(unsuccessful) attempts to lure voters to support the draft. 
Individuals at the highest levels of government turned a deaf 
ear to most accusations of corruption, closing their ranks in 
an effort to protect themselves from legal action or 
political fall-out.  Even after public outrage at the 
Standard Media raids, some government officials continue to 
voice their unease with free Kenyan media (which would 
benefit from improved professionalism) chastising some 
outlets' irresponsibility.  Similarly, some voices from State 
House are calling for the independent commissions, especially 
the Electoral Commission of Kenya, to come under the direct 
control of the government.  This would be a serious setback 
to Kenya's democratization.  When the constitutional debate 
is revived, a key issue to be resolved will be whether the 
Executive accepts a check on its powers and allows for a 
prime minister with real powers. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) There are several long-awaited pieces of 
legislation pending before Parliament of particular interest 
to the United States.  One, the draft Anti-Money Laundering 
Bill, is required for Kenya to meet its international 
obligations and to strengthen efforts against corruption, 
drug trafficking, and terrorism.  Also awaiting discussion in 
Parliament are a bill providing for the public declaration of 
assets of government officials, viewed as an anti-corruption 
mechanism; a bill which will enhance the capacity of the 
judiciary through increasing the number of judicial officers; 
and a bill which would permit the funding of political 
parties from government coffers to level the playing field 
and reduce pressures to raise campaign funds through 
corruption.  With general elections looming in late 2007, and 
much energy wasted on political wrangling, it is unlikely 
that Parliament will make much progress on any of these bills. 
 
The Economy: Corruption Holding Back Development 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶9.  (U) The Kenyan economy grew by 5.8 percent in 2005.  This 
modest expansion is fairly broad-based, and is built on the 
resilience, resourcefulness, and improved confidence of the 
private sector.  Growth at this rate, however, will never 
pull the vast majority of Kenyans out of poverty.  Over 50 
percent of Kenyans live on USD1/day, and 
unemployment/under-employment is also about 50 percent. 
Tourism is now the top export sector, followed by flowers, 
tea and coffee.  Africa is Kenya's largest export market, 
followed by the EU.  Kenya is the regional center for 
industry and services, with Mombasa handling imports and 
exports for the whole region.  Accelerating growth to achieve 
Kenya's potential will require continued de-regulation of 
business, improved delivery of government services, 
rebuilding decrepit infrastructure (especially roads), 
reforming the telecommunications sector to expand services 
and cut prices, the sale of failed parastatals, and improved 
economic governance generally (see below). 
 
¶10. (U) The Privatization Act, passed in 2005, should enable 
privatizations to occur more easily and rapidly, but 
implementation of the Act has yet to begin.  Kenya continues 
to benefit from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 
but exports and jobs are dropping in the face of Asian 
competition, and they will likely disappear completely unless 
Congress renews the waiver allowing Kenya and others to use 
third country fabric to provide more time to develop local 
cotton and fabric production that meets the buyers' rigorous 
standards.  Although rains in much of the country ended the 
drought and avoided rationing of hydro-electric power, 
drought conditions persist in the arid regions, and 
significant portions of the population will continue to 
require emergency food assistance in the coming year. 
 
¶11. (U) Corruption is the greatest challenge facing the 
Kenyan economy.  In the first year after taking office, the 
new government took some bold action, including passing 
important anti-corruption legislation and removing nearly 
half of the country's judges following allegations of 
corruption.  However, the momentum of those early actions has 
been largely squandered and there have been virtually no 
prosecutions of senior officials from either the former or 
the current regime for corruption, despite ample evidence of 
wrongdoing in both cases and mass public outcry, in 
particular following the publication of reports in early 2006 
detailing the extent of the rot.  However, we are encouraged 
that Kenya's press, civil society, Parliament, and general 
public have shown that they will not suffer quietly while the 
country's coffers are emptied.  The revelations of corruption 
scandals by an opposition MP and the press, commonly referred 
to by the name of the fictitious financial corporation 
involved - i.e., Anglo-Leasing - are noteworthy because they 
demonstrate a more open climate for public criticism in 
Kenya. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Confronting corruption in the government is a high 
priority for the U.S. Mission in Kenya, as our initiatives on 
all fronts are frustrated by malfeasance and mismanagement. 
As part of our support for Kenyan anti-corruption efforts, 
the Mission helped create the Department of Public 
Prosecutions' (DPP) specialized anti-corruption unit and has 
supported training and other capacity building activities. 
Although the Government's rhetoric has improved, corruption 
remains pervasive at all levels.  Failure by the Executive to 
take serious action on a number of recent cases involving 
breach of security and corruption allegations have seen an 
increase in the number of committees taking up investigations 
into corruption scandals.  Parliament has also questioned the 
effectiveness of the anti-corruption institutions.  The 
growing assertiveness of Parliament and the fact that MPs are 
taking their watchdog role more seriously have alarmed the 
Executive, which is now accusing Parliament of overstepping 
its mandate.  The Mission supports a legislative 
strengthening program designed to empower key committees and 
promote quality legislation. 
 
HIV/AIDS and the President's Emergency Plan 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (U) The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
achieved impressive advances in 2005, and those successes 
continue in 2006.  Kenya has the second largest 
single-country PEPFAR program in the world.  Five Mission 
elements have coordinated their activities to implement 
USD208 million worth of activities in the areas of 
prevention, treatment and care in 2006.  Thanks in part to 
efforts with our Kenyan partners, the HIV prevalence rate 
among 15-19 year old women declined from 7 percent to 6.7 
percent.  PEPFAR's impressive results include an increase in 
the number of U.S.-supported anti-retroviral (ART) treatment 
sites from three to nearly 200 in just over two years.  In 
2005, PEPFAR funding, coupled with this increased access and 
focus on improving the quality of treatment with a strong 
emphasis on treating children, has made possible ART for 
34,913 Kenyans, an increase from our starting point of 389 
individuals.  By the end of 2006, we will be directly 
supporting 75,000 of the anticipated 100,000 Kenyans on ART - 
a 100 percent year-to-year increase.  The Mission is now 
actively planning for a USD321 million program for 2007. 
 
Islam in Kenya 
-------------- 
 
¶14. (U) The Muslim population in Kenya is estimated to be 
about 15 percent, although Kenyan Muslims often claim a much 
higher proportion.  Concentrated in the Coast and 
Northeastern Provinces, most Kenyan Muslims practice a 
moderate, often Sufi-influenced Islam.  A handful of Kenyan 
Muslims have been radicalized, but foreign influence aimed at 
such radicalization has not achieved any widespread 
acceptance.  Offering as evidence the lack of a university on 
the coast, Muslim Kenyans feel severely marginalized, both in 
terms of government and society.  The Public Affairs Office 
(PAO) has a multi-pronged approach to engaging the Muslim 
community, including a dedicated Muslim Outreach FSN staff 
member.  PAO supports the general Muslim population through a 
variety of community-based programs and assists Muslim 
students through scholarships and education programs both in 
Nairobi and at the coast. Additionally, a DOD MIST Team is 
engaged in Muslim outreach on the coast through a successful 
drug awareness program. 
 
Somalia 
------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) The U.S. Mission in Kenya is the focal point for 
implementing U.S. policy in Somalia.  The United States has 
three goals in Somalia: counter-terrorism (including regional 
stability); governance and democracy; and humanitarian 
assistance.  U.S. policy toward Somalia is designed to 
support the re-establishment of a functioning central 
government and address the international community's concerns 
regarding terrorism.  Without sustained stability in Somalia, 
our anti-terrorism activities throughout the Horn of Africa 
will be continuously undermined.  Establishment of democratic 
institutions will be critical to ensuring long-term peace and 
eventual economic development.  Stability will also enable us 
to engage more broadly and effectively with communities 
inside Somalia. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Kenya took the lead, through the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), in the Somali National 
Reconciliation Conference that took place over 23 months in 
Kenya.  Since the conclusion of the conference, Kenya has 
continued to support the strengthening of the Somali 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) institutions which 
emerged from the conference and were established in 2004. 
However, the effectiveness and very future of the TFG are in 
jeopardy, particularly given the dissolution of the TFG 
cabinet in early August of this year.  By contrast, the 
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) has taken control of Mogadishu and 
is extending its influence throughout south-central Somalia. 
The ICU is credited by many for having brought a measure of 
security and stability to Mogadishu that has been unknown for 
the past 15 years.  Due to their success in providing 
security and rudimentary services befitting a government 
body, the ICU is enjoying fairly broad-based local support. 
Some members of the ICU are moderates, but they have been 
marginalized by extremists who appear firmly in control of 
the ICU's militia.  The perceived threat posed to the TFG by 
the growing influence of the ICU prompted Ethiopian forces to 
intervene to defend the TFG in July.  Somali pirates 
operating off the coast of Somalia have attacked cargo and 
cruise ships alike, prompting U.S. military attention to the 
threat posed to international shipping. 
HOOVER