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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA1894, OAS EOM CHIEF FERNANDEZ AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA1894 2006-08-28 18:44 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0027
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #1894/01 2401844
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281844Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7395
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0757
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001894 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: OAS EOM CHIEF FERNANDEZ AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS 
ELECTION PREPARATIONS, NICARAGUA'S POLITICAL PANORAMA 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 1593     B. MANAGUA 1555 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).1. 
 
C) SUMMARY: Ambassador recently met with the OAS 
election observer mission (EOM) to assess preparations for 
Nicaragua's November 5 elections and discuss the country's 
volatile political climate.  EOM mission leader Gustavo 
Fernandez expects the Supreme Electoral Commission (CSE) will 
release its electoral regulations the week of August 28.  The 
OAS is confident the CSE will accredit both foreign and 
domestic observers.  It will press the CSE to allow domestic 
poll watchers access to municipal, departmental, and regional 
election centers, where electoral challenges (impugnaciones) 
will be decided, on Election Day.  Fernandez believes that a 
post-election political crisis is less likely now that both 
the Sandinista Front (FSLN) and the Liberal Constitutional 
Party (PLC) want to shelve the constitutional changes that 
would further erode presidential powers.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Ambassador, DCM, PAO, USAID deputy, USAID elections 
coordinator, and polcouns met on August 24 with members of 
the OAS election observer mission (EOM) to assess 
preparations for Nicaragua's November 5 elections and discuss 
the country's volatile political climate.  Points discussed 
follow. 
 
OAS WILL NOT BOW TO FSLN ATTACKS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3.  (C) EOM leader Gustavo Fernandez acknowledged that FSLN 
candidate Daniel Ortega is increasingly antagonistic towards 
the OAS.  While Ortega's personal and institutional attacks 
were uncalled for, Fernandez preferred not to respond in kind 
-- doing so would lower the OAS to Ortega's level, the media 
would distort the OAS response, and the public might perceive 
the OAS as another political player rather than a neutral 
observer.  We suggested the OAS consider issuing a communiquQ 
that clarifies the OAS mission here and reiterates its 
commitment to the Nicaraguan people. 
 
EXPLAINING LOW TURNOUT FOR CEDULA APPLICATIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4.  (SBU) Fernandez was not surprised by the low turnout of 
applicants for the national/voter ID card (cedula) during the 
two-week extension period ending August 21 (8,600 new 
applications were submitted), noting the time was nonetheless 
useful because Nicaraguans could rectify problems with lost 
cedulas (11,000 replacement requests were made).  According 
to Fernandez, who met with the Movimiento por Nicaragua (MpN) 
leaders on August 23, the MpN study on cedula issuance was 
flawed and partially misleading.  He argued that the MpN had 
inflated the numbers by combining 140,000 cedulas that have 
been languishing in CSE offices since 1997 (no longer valid 
in his view) with 185,000 more recently issued cedulas that 
have not been retrieved.  Additionally, some Nicaraguans are 
simply not interested in obtaining their cedulas or voting. 
 
5.  (U) Comment: According to a recent IPADE survey, 40% of 
the high school respondents had not applied for cedulas 
because they do not have birth certificates, which could 
partially explain the low turnout during the two-week cedula 
application period and previously.   In a press conference on 
August 24, the MpN countered CSE assertions that the grace 
period was largely a loss of resources, noting that ensuring 
that 20,000 additional Nicaraguans will be able to exercise 
their right to vote is worth the cost.  End Comment. 
 
DOMESTIC OBSERVER ACCESS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (C)  Responding to our concern over apparent delays in 
accreditation of domestic observers, lack of access to 
computation centers (thus far, ET has received 411 
accreditations out of 6,990 submitted), Fernandez replied 
that the CSE is proceeding in accrediting domestic observers, 
department by department.  He acknowledged that the CSE has 
been unwilling to date to allow domestic observers in the 
national vote computation center.  His team will investigate 
domestic access to regional and national computation centers 
and suggest international and domestic observers rotate 
through these sites to increase access. 
 
UPDATING PARTY POLL WATCHER MANUALS, TRAINING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
7.  (SBU) Fernandez shared that the CSE expects to release 
the final electoral regulations the week of August 28, and 
political parties and the OAS have provided input.  He added 
that two regulations are not yet finished and potentially 
raise concern: the vote challenge (impugnaciones) process, 
and the formula for National Assembly seat distribution among 
the competing parties.  The OAS is pressing for simple, clear 
regulations on both matters, e.g., the exclusion of a soiled 
tally sheet as grounds for nullifying the results of a voter 
table (JRV).  Fernandez voiced concern that IRI's party poll 
watcher (fiscales) training manuals are based on outdated 
materials (i.e., regulations, vote tabulation sheets, 
credentials, etc.).  The Ambassador noted that IRI has pulled 
the old manuals and will provide updated manuals when the new 
regulations are finalized. 
 
NOT TO WORRY OVER VOTER IDS FOR POSSIBLE RUNOFF 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  (SBU) Regarding our concern that Nicaraguan voters will 
be unable to vote in the event of a runoff (December 21 if it 
occurs) if the CSE retains their supplemental voting 
documents, or documentos supletorios, on November 5, 
Fernandez replied that the CSE has agreed to extend the 
validity of these documents to January 10, 2007.  It will not 
take the documents from voters on November 5 as they have in 
past elections. 
 
OAS REPORTING PLANS 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
9.  (SBU) Fernandez noted the OAS preliminary report on 
Nicaragua's election preparations will be released in 
Washington on October 5.  He added that its recent report on 
the cedula issuance process was well received by many OAS 
member states, including Ecuador, Chile, and Brazil. 
 
GON AND CSE ON BOARD WITH VISIT OF "NOTABLES" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
10.  (C) According to Fernandez, both the GON and CSE will 
invite three former presidents -- Lagos, Hurtado, and 
Paniagua -- to visit Nicaragua before and during the 
elections.  The former presidents will be used to tackle 
sensitive political issues, such as the constitutional 
reforms and Ley Marco. 
 
POST-ELECTION PRIORITY: A NEW VOTER ROLL 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
11.  (SBU) Fernandez reiterated the need for the CSE to 
create a new voter roll (padron) starting immediately after 
the election and to periodically scrub the list thereafter. 
 
ORTEGA'S EFFORTS TO MANIPULATE ELECTORAL LAW IN HIS FAVOR 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
12.  (C) The Ambassador related information from senior GON 
officials and PLC affiliates that the FSLN will attempt to 
manipulate the interpretation of the Electoral Law to his 
advantage, specifically the stipulation that a candidate will 
win on the first round if he/she receives at least 40% of the 
vote, or at least 35% with a five-percent advantage to the 
closest competitor.  The FSLN is starting to argue that once 
a candidate gets more than 35% of the vote, he/she does not 
need a five-percent margin of victory.  While the OAS 
technical chief Gajardo had heard of this interpretation, 
Fernandez was unaware of it.  Both dismissed its validity, 
but the OAS will pursue the matter. 
 
WHAT DO TO ABOUT OBANDO 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
13.  (C) While Fernandez concurred with the Ambassador that 
Cardinal Obando's opening the CSE's launching of the official 
election campaign period on August 18 was inappropriate, he 
offered no suggestions how to remedy the situation. 
(Comment:  We have engaged the Papal Nuncio on Obando's 
inappropriate political role in the past and will revisit the 
matter with him.  Obando still enjoys robust popular support 
and his "blessing" of Ortega's campaign may encourage some 
previously anti-Ortega voters to reconsider their position.) 
 
FRAMEWORK LAW/POST ELECTION GOVERNABILITY LESS OF AN ISSUE? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
14.  (C) Fernandez opined that the Ley Marco has become "an 
orphan law," with neither the FSLN nor the PLC supporting it, 
while the emerging ALN and MRS parties remain ambivalent.  He 
expects it will be abrogated, noting that the visiting 
presidents will take advantage of the candidates' desire to 
consolidate their democratic credentials to broach a broader 
issue: the need to depoliticize governmental institutions - 
courts, CSE, etc.  (Comment: Although legal interpretations 
vary, the abrogation of the constitutional changes might 
require votes by both the 2006 and the 2007 members of the 
National Assembly.  Ortega appears to be hedging his options. 
 If the current Assembly repeals the constitutional changes 
and Ortega wins the November election, then he will press for 
a second vote in January to abrogate the changes.  If, 
however, he loses the election, Ortega is likely to instruct 
his legislators to block the second vote so that he can 
continue to limit the Executive from the Assembly.) 
 
LIBERAL DIVIDE, MRS SUPPORT ARE HOT-BUTTON POLITICAL ITEMS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
15.  (C) Fernandez shared our view that the direction the 
division of liberal votes among Rizo and Montealegre will 
take is the most significant political process to monitor. 
He was impressed with MRS candidate Mundo Jarquin, noting 
that MRS numbers have not slipped since Herty Lewites' 
passing.  Fernandez also opined that the MRS may be pulling 
more votes from the independent voters than the Sandinistas. 
The Ambassador concurred with Fernandez that Nicaragua's 
socio-political culture is evolving, noting that this 
election could be the "caudillos' last hurrah."  They also 
agreed that the current electricity and water shortages could 
sway voters to vote for one of the emerging parties as the 
traditional corrupt and inefficient parties have failed in 
delivering services to the people.  (Comment: MRS contacts 
assert the MRS is indeed whittling FSLN votes, arguing that 
many FSLN supporters are reluctant to share their views in 
polls out of fear that the FSLN will "threaten" them.) 
TRIVELLI