VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #1731/01 2212239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 092239Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7193
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0748
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 3758
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001731 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM SOCI NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA ELECTIONS: FSLN CONFIDENT OF FIRST ROUND 
VICTORY 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 1565 
     ¶B. 05 MANAGUA 2806 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: With FSLN internal polls supposedly 
demonstrating an 8-10 point lead over the nearest challenger, 
FSLN Foreign Affairs officer Samuel Santos is confident that 
perennial FSLN presidential candidate Daniel Ortega can win 
in the first round of elections.  The FSLN's confidence was 
further demonstrated by the party's recent proposal to repeal 
the constitutional reforms earlier enacted (and then 
postponed) by the PLC-FSLN pact that would significantly 
weaken the presidency.  Santos claims that an Ortega 
administration desires a positive relationship with the USG 
and will not interfere with the market economy or withdraw 
from CAFTA.  He does not believe that the production and 
distribution of cedulas (national/voter ID cards) is a major 
problem, although he does not deny charges of inappropriate 
partisan behavior on the part of Nicaragua's Supreme 
Electoral Council.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) FSLN Foreign Affairs officer Samuel Santos told 
Ambassador, DCM and poloff on August 7 that he is confident 
that FSLN presidential candidate Daniel Ortega can win in the 
first round of elections on November 5.  Santos claimed that 
FSLN internal polls show an 8-10 point lead for Ortega over 
the next strongest candidate.  While he would not reveal the 
runner up, he commented that the FSLN is more concerned about 
competition from the PLC than the FSLN as "Montealegre does 
not have real support in the interior" of Nicaragua.  The 
FSLN plans to recruit enough fiscales (party poll watchers) 
to cover all of the voting tables in Nicaragua (some 11,000) 
"to avoid the problems that Lopez Obrador had in Mexico 
"because his party was absent at 30 percent of the voting 
centers," Santos explained. 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador queried Santos regarding the FSLN's sudden 
enthusiasm for a National Assembly vote to repeal 
constitutional reforms (currently suspended by the Ley Marco) 
that were earlier enacted by the PLC-FSLN pact to strip 
powers from the executive branch (Ref B).  He responded that 
the FSLN is fighting an "image war" with the PLC (which has 
proposed a referendum on the reforms), and that many people 
in the party "believe in the power of the presidency." 
(Comment: Rather than sincere concerns regarding the 
existential nature of Nicaraguan government, the FSLN's 
sudden about-face concerning the constitutional reforms is 
more likely a reflection of their confidence that Ortega can 
win in the first round of voting.  End Comment.) 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador challenged Santos' claim that the FSLN 
would like to enjoy positive relations with the USG by 
mentioning Ortega's July 19 speech in which he promised to 
discard CAFTA for ALBA (the Venezuelan alternative), plan a 
"mixed economy," funnel remittances through a government 
agency, cancel agricultural debts, and offer subsidies to a 
wide range of producers.  Santos stated that the FSLN 
government plan is not yet "fully realized" and that Ortega 
made several promises "in the heat of the moment."  He 
claimed that a "mixed economy" only refers to more government 
oversight (presumably benign) in a "few key industries" and 
that it would be "stupid" for the FSLN to reject CAFTA. 
 
¶5. (C) Santos later discussed the Supreme Electoral Council 
(CSE) and the problems with the cedula (national/voter ID) 
production and distribution process (Ref A).  After stating 
that he personally did not think that the civil registry 
should be part of the CSE, he downplayed the cedula problems, 
claiming that the vast majority of Nicaraguans have the 
document and recounting an anecdote in which CSE personnel 
visited Managua high schools, including his daughter's, to 
help students apply for their cedulas.  Santos admitted that 
the CSE is often overly defensive regarding criticism and 
emphasized the need for a "positive environment."  He 
refused, however, to refute the Ambassador's and DCM's 
charges that the CSE -- a theoretically independent body -- 
has behaved in a partisan manner by facilitating cedula 
applications for FSLN members. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment: Both ALN and FSLN representatives have 
recently expressed assurances in private that their candidate 
will win in the first round, although neither Ortega nor 
Eduardo Montealegre has polled above 35 percent of the vote 
 
(in reputable, publicly released polls), the lowest threshold 
to enable a first-round victory (with a 5 percent lead over 
the next candidate).  Some non-FSLN contacts insist that 
Ortega has reached a voter ceiling of about 32 percent, a 
calculation supported by the consistently large number of 
citizens who claim to pollsters that they would never vote 
for him.  Nevertheless, the FSLN is clearly the best-financed 
party and its operatives are working diligently to push 
Ortega over the 35-percent threshold. 
TRIVELLI