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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1966, UNDSS Security Briefing, North Darfur Aug 17

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1966 2006-08-17 16:07 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3441
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1966 2291607
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171607Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4205
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001966 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG 
DEPT PASS TO AID/W FOR AFR ALSO FOR OFDA 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PGOV MOPS PREL SU
SUBJECT:  UNDSS Security Briefing, North Darfur Aug 17 
 
1.  Summary:  At UNDSS Security briefing on August 17, NMIS and the 
humanitarian community expressed extreme apprehension about the 
implications of the AU's directive to expel JEM and SLA-Abdel Wahid 
representatives from the CFC process and AMIS compound.  Concerns 
were expressed that AMIS access to areas controlled by JEM and/or 
Abdel Wahid will become even more constrained.  NGOs are concerned 
that the action will further undermine an already unstable security 
environment and negatively impact humanitarian access to displaced 
populations and conflict-affected areas.   End Summary. 
 
2.  UNMIS Regional Head of Office Niels Scott provided the August 17 
UNDSS security briefing.  He cited only three recent significant 
security events: 
 
- August 15:  A GoS military truck careened into a number of 
bystanders near the market in El Fasher, resulting in 7 killed and 
roughly 18 injured.  Cause of the accident is still unclear, though 
it is thought that the driver unintentionally lost control of the 
vehicle.  (Note:  We have not observed any hostile civilian reaction 
directed toward the local government or GoS military forces as a 
result of the accident.  End note.) 
 
- August 15:  A two-vehicle ICRC convoy was stopped roughly 20 
kilometers south of Tawila by unidentified armed men in military 
dress.  The men took one vehicle and allowed the ICRC staff to 
proceed with its other vehicle.  No indication of the identity of 
the bandits, though ICRC is investigating. 
 
- August 16:  A four-vehicle ICRC convoy in the vicinity of Jebel 
Mara was halted by armed men, who took two vehicles, some 
communications equipment and one ICRC driver.  Remaining ICRC 
personnel were released.  An investigation is on-going. 
 
3.  As a result of the car-jackings, ICRC has temporarily suspended 
its activities in the Tabit area of southern North Darfur.  Niels 
postulated that the recent spate of car-jackings could be attributed 
to either: a) opportunistic banditry, or b) systematic efforts by 
rebel groups to build up their vehicle inventories in anticipation 
of renewed fighting. 
 
4.  Significant discussion during the briefing focused on the AU's 
directive to expel JEM and SLA-Abdel Wahid representatives from the 
CFC process and AMIS compound.  UNMIS and the humanitarian community 
expressed extreme apprehension about the implications of the action, 
which suggests that AMIS access to areas controlled by JEM and/or 
Abdel Wahid will become even more constrained.  NGOs are visibly 
concerned that the AU's directive will further undermine an already 
unstable security environment and negatively impact their own 
humanitarian access to displaced populations and conflict-affected 
areas. 
 
5.  One protection officer from UNMIS, which has been involved in 
mediating the return of AMIS elements to Abu Shouk and El Salaam IDP 
camps, indicated that the AU directive could cause the collapse of 
this mediation and will only reinforce the perception of AMIS 
partiality. 
 
HUME