VZCZCXRO1364
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1943/01 2280415
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 160415Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4157
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001943 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG AND S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU
SUBJECT:  JURY STILL OUT ON IMPLICATIONS OF SLA-ABDEL WAHID OUSTER 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Several Fur activists in South Darfur, including 
an SLA commander, justify Abdel Wahid's ouster as Chairman on the 
basis of his lack of leadership and increasing distance from 
Darfurian popular opinion.  The SLA faction now led by Ahmed Abdul 
Shafi is organizing itself in Asmara and intends to return 
imminently to Darfur and hold a general conference.  Some Fur 
leaders conveyed cautious support for Shafi, but highlight that it 
is still too early to determine a majority Fur view on the SLA 
split.  UNMIS Civil Affairs in South Darfur contend that with Abdel 
Wahid in a weakened position, the moment is ripe for the 
international community to extend him an olive branch to sign the 
DPA.  The further division of the SLA may add to the complexity of 
the security, political, and humanitarian situation on the ground in 
Darfur.  End summary. 
 
------------------------ 
FED UP WITH ABDEL WAHID? 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) Active Response Corp (ARC) Officer and Embassy Poloff met 
August 8 with LTC Ahmed Fadul in Nyala, South Darfur, to discuss the 
recent ouster of Abdel Wahid as Chairman of his faction of the Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA).  Fadul, now aligned with Shafi, previously 
supported Abdel Wahid, and has worked with the African Union Mission 
in Sudan (AMIS) since July 2004. He remarked that the split with 
Abdel Wahid had been contemplated for at least a year, but because 
of timing and internal politics, the decision was delayed. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Fadul articulated several key reasons for Abdel Wahid's 
dismissal.  First, Abdel Wahid failed to lead the movement 
effectively,demonstrating little administrative or organizational 
capacity, which constrained his ability to negotiate with the 
Government of Sudan and international actors.  Second, the former 
SLA leader only provided limited support to his fighters, neglecting 
their logistical requirements and trying to command from abroad 
rather than from Darfur.  As a result, many within the movement 
perceived Abdel Wahid to be unconnected to his base, particularly to 
his commanders in the field.  Third, Fadul held that Abdel Wahid's 
increasingly "selfish" actions isolated him from the movement.  The 
former Chairman's unwillingness to consult field commanders and 
establish meaningful subsidiary positions within the faction 
provided additional impetus for his removal. (Note: septel provides 
translation of an August 1 letter from Shafi's group with a fuller 
explanation for the ouster.  End note.) 
 
----------------------------------- 
EARLY VIEWS OF SHAFI AND NEXT STEPS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Responding to ARC officer's queries on the views and 
anticipated next steps of the new faction, Fadul explained that 
Shafi's appointment is only temporary, pending an "SLA general 
conference" where members will be selected for key positions.  Shafi 
is currently in Asmara, organizing his supporters and refining their 
agenda.  Shafi's intent is to return to Darfur within the "next week 
or so," though logistical issues pose problems.  Fadul expects the 
general conference to occur soon after Shafi's return, possibly in 
the vicinity of Jebel Mara. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Fadul repeatedly stated that peace is a strategic goal of 
the new faction.  Explaining why Shafi's group, then, had not signed 
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), he noted their dissatisfaction 
with the provisions on compensation and Janjaweed disarmament, as 
well as the inadequate allocation of executive authorities for the 
position of Senior Assistant to the President.  Ninety percent of 
the agreement is acceptable, he remarked, but full support would not 
be possible until these outstanding issues are addressed.  The 
commander offered that the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation 
(DDDC) could serve as a useful tool for generating popular buy-in to 
the DPA, but that international community involvement would be 
necessary for the process to produce a meaningful outcome.  Fadul 
reiterated that SLA-Shafi remains committed to upholding its 
obligations under the 2004 Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement 
(HCFA), and that the new group wants to bridge the gap on unresolved 
provisions with the international community.  (Comment:  Based on 
Fadul's discourse and conversations ARC officer had with other 
SLA-Shafi commanders, it appears that many previous Abdel Wahid 
supporters felt that the former Chairman had lost too much 
credibility within the Fur population and the international 
community to remain an effective negotiator.  For this reason, among 
others, a re-branding of the SLA was needed.  End comment.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Fadul contended that Shafi's faction had no intention of 
joining the National Redemption Front (NRF).  He explained that the 
group's focus was on Darfur, and did not extend to the national 
agenda espoused by members of the NRF (i.e., those affiliated with 
JEM).  Fadul added that the Abdel Wahid's ouster was well known 
throughout the Fur community, though many had not yet formed 
 
KHARTOUM 00001943  002 OF 003 
 
 
opinions on the development.  He held that there were no "hard 
feelings" toward Abdel Wahid, who would remain part of the movement 
and could even regain the Chairmanship should the commanders so 
decide at the general conference.  (Comment: A general conference 
convened by Shafi, filled with his supporters, and following an 
agenda established by the new Chairman, would not likely lead to a 
favorable outcome for Abdel Wahid.  End comment.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Fadul, who speaks fluent English, was optimistic that 
differences between his new SLA-Shafi faction and the international 
community could be bridged.  Like most other Darfurians, he strongly 
supports the rapid deployment to the region of UN peacekeepers, who 
he believes would create the necessary security conditions to 
facilitate returns of internally displaced persons (IDPs).  Fadul 
appeared realistic regarding the unlikely prospect of re-opening the 
DPA, but held firm that Shafi's group would not sign unless their 
concerns with the accord were addressed. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
SELECT FUR LEADERS ON ABDEL WAHID OUSTER 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) ARC Officer and Poloff spoke with other prominent Fur 
political activists in Nyala, including Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Abdulla 
Abaker, Mahdi Bosh, and Dr. Mohamed Eisa Alaj, all of whom had 
previously met with the CDA in late June.  (Biographical Note:  Dr. 
Mohamed Ahmed is a physician currently working at the teaching 
hospital in Nyala.  He is Chairman of the Fur Committee in Nyala and 
a key player in its efforts to organize politically.  He has strong 
ties to both Abdel Wahid and Shafi.  Originally from the Jebel Mara, 
he has one brother working as a lawyer in Saudi Arabia.  Mahdi Bosh 
is the Executive Officer of the GNU-sponsored Commission for the 
Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children and a former 
prosecutor general in Darfur.  Dr. Mohamed Eisa Alaj is a pharmacist 
-- who owns at least one pharmacy in Nyala -- with strong ties to 
Abdel Wahid.  He has one brother in New Jersey.  All three 
individuals speak English.  End note.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) The prevailing sentiment of the Fur leaders was one of 
frustration with Abdel Wahid's leadership and his inability to 
advance Fur interests more effectively.  They noted the glaring 
absence of a "political plan" for the SLA and expressed confidence 
that Shafi would be able to provide greater direction and 
organization for the movement.  The activists highlighted oft-cited 
"shortcomings" in the DPA, to include the insufficiency of 
international oversight and lack of credible mechanisms to ensure 
GNU compliance.  Dr. Mohamed Ahmed, in particular, provided a cogent 
six-point discourse on means to improve the DPA.  He argued that: 
 
-- An acceptable UN official should be appointed to impartially 
mediate between Darfurians and the GNU. 
 
-- The GNU must quickly make public its disarmament plan of the 
Janjaweed, whose dismantlement must be overseen and verified by the 
international community and the rebel movements. (Note:  ARC officer 
informed Dr. Mohamed Ahmed that a plan had been delivered to AMIS, 
which was reviewing it.  Additionally, the DPA provides for rebel 
involvement in the verification of Janjaweed disarmament.  End 
note.) 
 
-- Adequate compensation must be paid expeditiously to Darfurians. 
(Note:  ARC Officer stressed that the initial GNU $30 million 
contribution was only a down payment and would very likely be 
increased as payments were disbursed.  End note.) 
 
-- Darfurians deserve greater political representation at both the 
state and national levels.  Ahmed held that only thirty percent of 
the legislative and executive positions in Darfur should be filled 
by non-Darfurians, rather than visa-versa. 
 
-- The DDDC, to be viewed as a legitimate process, must be organized 
under the auspices of the UN.  Ahmed proposed that the first stage 
of the DDDC should be a discussion among "educated" Darfurians 
inside and outside of Sudan to better define the nature of the 
relationship between Darfur's states and the central government. 
Later stages of the dialogue could then address issues of regional 
reconsolidation, intertribal reconciliation, and resolution of land 
disputes. 
 
-- The Senior Assistant to the President position currently filled 
by Minni Minawi provided insufficient executive authorities.  Ahmed 
argued that the Special Advisor has no power to directly influence - 
politically or fiscally - the Walis of Darfur and, furthermore, is 
excluded from key decision-making processes on security and military 
matters. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Dr. Mohamed Ahmed remarked that he is leading an effort to 
create a Fur "working group" in South Darfur to promote political 
 
KHARTOUM 00001943  003 OF 003 
 
 
and humanitarian objectives.  The group consists of four committees 
and thirteen sub-groups, but he did not provide detail on the 
mission or tasks of the various components.  The doctor noted that 
more than 23 tribes are represented in the working group, which 
includes IDP, student, and women constituencies.  (Comment:  When 
pressed to provide greater detail about the working group or its 
plan to become more public, Ahmed was evasive.  This may be due to 
its inchoate form or sensitivities about organizing such a group 
given the intolerant political environment created by the GNU.  End 
comment.) 
 
---------------------- 
UNMIS VIEW ON SLA RIFT 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) In a separate conversation, Ali Hassan, Head of UNMIS 
Civil Affairs in South Darfur, echoed Fadul's assertion that the 
Fur, including those in the IDP camps, were well aware of the recent 
SLA rift.  Based on his interaction with Fur IDP representatives, 
there was no clear majority opinion in terms of which rebel leader 
to favor.  He outlined the UN position that in order for the DPA to 
truly work, those outside the accord would have to be brought on 
board.  Notwithstanding Abdel Wahid's removal, the former Chairman 
continues to hold sway and serve as a symbol for many Fur, which 
suggests that efforts by the GNU, Minawi, and international 
community must continue to gain Abdel Wahid's support for the DPA. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Hassan opined that recent developments have had a mixed 
effect on Abdel Wahid's position.  On the one hand, he has been 
strengthened by the obvious lack of DPA implementation and the 
on-going violence in Darfur.  On the other hand, Abdel Wahid has 
been obviously weakened by his ouster as Chairman, the creation of 
new rebel factions, and the ascendancy of Minawi to Senior Assistant 
to the President.  The change of circumstances for Abdel Wahid 
suggests that the international community may now have more leverage 
to pressure him into signing the DPA.  Hassan posited that the UN 
and other key stakeholders should make a public pronouncement 
denouncing Shafi's faction, as it only complicates the situation on 
the ground and undermines Fur solidarity (and, in return, could 
prompt Abdel Wahid to give support to the DPA).  ARC officer 
responded that it may be more prudent to determine where Shafi stood 
on the DPA before making definitive statements, especially given 
Abdel Wahid's recent silence and diminished stature. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) While the Fur leaders and UNMIS officials with whom ARC 
Officer and Poloff spoke generally believed that Abdel Wahid's 
marginalization was a positive development for the SLA, there 
remained some ambiguity on the extent of field commander support for 
Shafi.  Fadul remarked that the July 27 letter revealing the SLA 
split listed a number of supporters who, in fact, had not endorsed 
the ouster.  He added that the August 1 declaration was the 
definitive list of SLA military and political officials who endorse 
Shafi's chairmanship.  Still, UNMIS Ali Hassan and UNDSS in North 
Darfur, who have been in touch with various Abdel Wahid military 
leaders, intimate that some influential commanders remain loyal to 
Abdel Wahid.  With his leadership challenged and significant support 
lined up behind Shafi, Abdel Wahid appears weakened, which may 
present an opportunity for the international community to be in a 
stronger position to encourage his support for the DPA.  The further 
division of the SLA may very well add to the complexity of the 
security, political and humanitarian situation on the ground in 
Darfur.  End comment. 
 
 
HUME