VZCZCXRO2820
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1941/01 2270414
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 150414Z AUG 06 ZDK ZDK ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4153
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001941 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PHUM ASEC MOPS PGOV PREL US SU
SUBJECT:  Darfur: Increased Dangers, Reduced Humanitarian Access, 
Suggested Steps 
 
KHARTOUM 00001941  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  USAID/DCHA Khartoum recently produced a report on the changing 
security environment in Darfur and its impact on the delivery of 
humanitarian goods and services, particularly in the event of 
increased displacements.  Post hereby offers the report below, which 
it believes will be of interest to a broad audience. 
 
¶2.  The text of the document is as follows: 
 
(Begin text) 
 
Risk Assessment and Planning in Response to Wider Conflict and 
Increased Tensions in Darfur 
 
Summary 
 
In all three states of Darfur, humanitarian agencies have 
experienced decreased access, increased insecurity and an influx of 
new IDPs since the signing of the DPA.  According to the Khartoum 
Monitor, on August 8, the U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator Manuel da 
Silva stated that escalating violence in Darfur had killed more aid 
workers in the previous two weeks than in the last two years. 
According to da Silva, humanitarian access is at its lowest level 
since the Darfur operation began, and operational risks for aid 
workers are increasing daily.  In addition to deaths, there has been 
an increase in hijacking of NGO vehicles, attacks on cars, looting, 
and attempted ambushes.  These attacks include vehicles stolen 
during food distributions, and theft from NGO compounds. 
 
If this situation continues to worsen, international humanitarian 
organizations may be forced to further diminish their presence.  In 
order to prevent this from happening, there are a number of steps 
that can be taken immediately.  If the scenario of a worsening 
situation does unfold, there are steps that can be taken to minimize 
the humanitarian crisis. 
 
Current Situation 
 
Currently levels of violence are increasing in rural areas outside 
of the state capitals, which remain (relatively) safe. DCHA can 
still work with our local partners based in state capitals and they 
in general still have reasonable access to areas outside of the 
capitals.  There are windows of opportunities to explore areas 
(accessible by helicopter) outside of state capitals based on 
improvements in security.  These windows provide us the chance to 
develop relationships with more community based organizations 
outside of the capitals, but remain problematic because of the 
difficulty for regular/consistent implementation. 
 
Even with the opportunities to explore outlying areas, programming 
will still be significantly circumscribed by overall levels of 
violence.  This situation is unlikely to change in the near future. 
 
 
In West Darfur, there has been only a limited presence of 
international organizations, due to increased insecurity which 
resulted in December 2005 in a significant draw down of 
international staff in the state.  Since this time, NGOs are able to 
travel by helicopter to some locations, but are not able to 
regularly access rural areas. 
 
In South Darfur, although the security situation remains delicate, 
there has been greater access to vulnerable populations than in the 
other two states.  However, shifting allegiances between the Arab 
and non-Arabs may increase violence in the near-term, as parties try 
to obtain more land.  This could significantly decrease access to 
South Darfur.  As well, increased violence against groups so far not 
affected in the crisis may increase the needs and number of 
internally displaced. 
 
In North Darfur, insecurity has increased, and with it access has 
been restricted.  The U.N. has determined that the 
Melit-Kulkul-Tawila triangle is off limits for humanitarian 
activities. USAID staff has observed SLA/MM fighters entering camps 
in North Darfur recently.  Many INGOs have recently reported the 
presence of guns in camps at the household level.  This situation is 
creating a new dynamic in camps where humanitarians and IDPs are 
harassed and occasionally targeted for violence. 
 
Risks of Further Deterioration and Responses 
 
Greater displacement 
 
There are currently between 20,000 and 25,000 new IDPs in North 
Darfur.  If fighting continues, humanitarian workers in North Darfur 
may have to support between 40,000 and 50,000 IDPs.  Much of the 
area is insecure due to tribal tensions and fighting between SLA-MM, 
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), SLA-Abdel Wahid, National Resistance 
Front (NRF), and Chadian forces. Continued fighting between DPA 
signatories and non-signatory groups is anticipated to increase 
displacements in and around North Darfur. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001941  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Should additional displacements occur in North Darfur, newly 
displaced would likely go to either El Fasher or an existing camp 
housing extended family members or people of the same ethnic/tribal 
group.  Al Salaam and Zam Zam camps are currently open and would be 
able to register more IDPs.  The new fighting may result in the 
second, third, or fourth displacement of some IDPs, who may decide 
to go to the main town and settle there.  Other secure areas for 
IDPs may include Kutum town, Kassab, and Fata Borno camps.  USAID 
humanitarian programming would respond with the provision of 
essential life-saving sevices to displaced populations in camps or 
host communities. 
 
GOS Harassment of Local Populations 
 
Since the DPA was signed, there has been increased harassment of 
USAID local grantees, such as Bakhita Charitable Organization, Amel 
Center, SUDO, and SIHA.  This is often done under the guise of 
implementing the peace agreement.  This harassment includes arrest 
and detention of those who voice disagreement of the DPA or who 
provide legal defense for individuals who have been arrested for 
voicing their disagreement.  USAID/DCHA will develop better methods 
of communication with the Political Office about individual 
instances, so that if the Embassy chooses to intervene, it will do 
so with field knowledge. 
 
Decreased Safety of International Organizations 
 
Tension in camps is high, especially those camps where the Fur 
comprise a significant portion of the population. In the August 8 
press release, Da Silva stated that many NGO and U.N. staff now fear 
for their safety if they enter camps and are often reluctant to do 
so.  USAID and its partners are engaged in building the capacity of 
Sudanese staff and local organizations.  Should the security 
situation deteriorate to a point where expatriate staff is either 
evacuated or unable to travel to the field, some ongoing work could 
continue. There may be a limited number of cases where OTI would be 
able to use its small grants mechanism to fill some programmatic 
gaps left behind in IDP camps. 
 
DPA Implementation in a Deteriorating Scenario 
 
Some Darfurian leaders still believe the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and 
Consultation (DDDC) is the best way to encourage Darfurian 
populations to lay down their weapons.  While it is not possible to 
reopen discussion of the contents of the DPA, as a framework 
document the Darfur Peace Agreement could allow civil society to 
express its concerns through the DDDC.  In principle, the DDDC would 
ease tensions and channel activity away from violence.  USAID is 
prepared to support the African Union to start the process by 
seconding at least one staff person, who had similar experience with 
the Loya Jirga process in Afghanistan. 
 
Role of Land in Further Conflict 
 
Increasing tension and conflicting interests between Fur and Zaghawa 
could certainly lead to open conflict between the groups, with 
outside influence and support.  Zaghawa would likely continue their 
alliance with the Sudanese government (and possibly with the 
northern Abbala Arab groups), and the Fur have reason to align with 
the Massalit and have shown a budding alliance with the southern 
Baggara Arab groups.  Abbala Arabs are commonly without their own 
land and migrate through areas with the consent of others while 
Baggara Arabs have their own Dars (homelands).  In Jebel Marra, 
Abdel Wahid al Nur is believed to have signed an agreement with 
local Arab militia commanders to cooperate against outsiders who may 
attack the region.  The possibility of this cooperation is further 
supported by the fact that they are the traditional landholders and 
want to defend the dar/hakura system. 
 
While the campaign against the non-Arab landholders (primarily Fur, 
but also others) has been successful in many areas and people are 
displaced into camps, Jebel Marra remains the biggest prize and is 
still in the hands of the Fur and allied with the former SLA-Abdel 
Wahid.  It is possible to speculate that the heavily armed and 
powerful (yet poor in terms of land ownership) alliance of Zaghawa 
and Abbala Arabs would align themselves for a large land grab.  The 
Sudanese government, now including SL/M-Minni Minawai, could 
actively support this campaign using the DPA as cover --i.e., 
treating non-signatories as "terrorists."  UN agencies and NGOs are 
reporting such attacks.  Experience shows that the Chadian 
government may very well arm or otherwise support the Fur in a 
campaign to keep the Sudanese government busy fighting on their own 
soil in an effort to prevent further Sudanese military engagement 
against Chad. 
 
Possible suggested ideas for immediate action to support: 
 
Sensitization programs in the camps regarding the consequences of 
the existence and storage of weapons at the household level. 
 
Internally displaced persons (IDP) service provider capacity by 
 
KHARTOUM 00001941  003 OF 003 
 
 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) established and 
developed in the rural areas (perhaps in coordination in key village 
locations, eg. (Wada'a, Dar Salaam, Muzbat, Tawillah, Mellit). 
 
Provision of essential services to existing and newly displaced 
populations.  Such services would include shelter provision, food 
assistance, water and sanitation interventions, and health service 
provision. 
 
Establishment of funding for Quick Impact Projects that would allow 
for supporting innovative ideas like those above and others 
developed by DFO partners. 
 
Should violence come to state capitals and force international NGOs 
to retreat, DCHA's work would be dramatically curtailed.  In all 
likelihood, protection activities in places like IDP camps will be 
dramatically reduced due to access problems.  If just DCHA is forced 
to withdraw to Khartoum, programming will probably continue, albeit 
in a more difficult operating environment. 
 
If violence increases to the point where even local organizations 
have difficulty accessing areas outside of state capitals or even in 
state capitals, then we will have to rethink our strategies 
entirely. 
 
DCHA Response: 
 
In Darfur, humanitarian assistance was initially focused on 
displacement camps located near urban areas, sometimes to the 
detriment of vulnerable communities and IDPs in more remote 
locations.   DCHA will continue to provide shelter, food, water and 
sanitation, health, and other essential life saving services in 
areas of displacement.  Efforts will be made to provide more 
assistance to conflict-affected rural areas to stabilize communities 
and to lay the foundation for large-scale IDP returns. 
 
Humanitarian agencies are doing what they can, where they are 
located.  Health and water are the most needed services, but IDPs 
add that food assistance is needed.  Partners have sufficient 
flexibility within existing programs to extend a response both 
within a sector and within a state if the implementing agency has 
the capacity to meet the additional need/caseload. 
 
Protection issues loom large, with both IDPs and host populations 
suffering violations at the hands of militias, formal armed groups 
(SLA/M), and the SAF.  DCHA programming will continue to attempt to 
address protection issues through coordinated activities and 
mainstreamed NGO interventions. 
 
Protection and VAW programming will likely remain focused on large 
camps where DCHA can leverage its assistance for greatest possible 
impact and where there is more consistent over-land access. 
 
More "political" work such as supporting nascent peace processes is 
limited primarily to regional capitals, but may be expanded if local 
partners have good networks in areas outside of the capitals.  More 
experimental programming in more rural population centers will be 
difficult, particularly as our understanding of the actors in the 
region remains limited and access to rural areas unreliable. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
The Darfur security situation may deteriorate until opposition 
forces complete their realignment (three SLAs, NRF, G19, and JEM). 
Chadian government and Sudanese government support to individual 
groups in each country may determine whether violence increases or 
decreases.  A vital and credible force is needed to secure Darfur. 
The Government of National Unity (GNU) must seriously start 
supporting humanitarian operations.  Fighters must be kept outside 
IDP camps. 
 
(End text) 
 
HUME