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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1898, SPLA Chief of Staff Disappointed

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1898 2006-08-10 11:18 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #1898/01 2221118
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101118Z AUG 06 ZDK UR SVC 1955
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4092
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001898 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS US SU
SUBJECT:  SPLA Chief of Staff Disappointed 
 
REF: Khartoum 00902 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The SPLA Chief of Staff, Oyai Deng, is 
disappointed with the assistance he has received from the USG 
program to transform his military from a guerilla movement to a 
professional military.  Tired of waiting for the U.S., the SPLA is 
now proceeding with transformation plans on its own.  In particular, 
Deng cited unfulfilled promises from Dyncorps, the U.S. contractor, 
to build two training bases, renovate or build a temporary command 
and control center, provide military trucks, furnish communication 
equipment, and construct prefabricated housing for SPLA officers. 
The SPLA is now using existing resources and hiring a private 
British firm to meet its needs.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Deng Expresses Appreciation and Frustration 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) In a meeting with Acting Consul General Juba on August 7, 
 
 
 
Deng described a series of miscommunications and unfulfilled 
commitments that has diminished his confidence in both Dyncorps, the 
USG implementing contractor, and overall U.S. support for the SPLA. 
He began by explaining his deep appreciation for everything the U.S. 
had done for the SPLA/M and the South, and said if nothing else were 
ever done it would be more than enough.  That said, Deng explained 
that military transformation had stalled because he had been relying 
on the United States to follow through with commitments it made to 
help transition the SPLA into a professional fighting force. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
SPLA Command and Control Center, Housing Needs Unmet 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3. (SBU) In particular, Deng discussed several projects over the 
past year that were meant to be completed in the short term but have 
not yet begun.  One of these projects was the establishment of a 
temporary command and control center in Juba, which Dyncorps 
promised to complete.  The SPLA initially offered an existing 
building to be renovated, but were told it was not appropriate and 
that a new building would be built.  The land for this new building 
was identified long ago, but Deng pointed out that they were still 
working out of the old, dilapidated building and had no indication 
when the new offices would be built. 
 
4. (SBU) Deng also said the SPLA had turned down several offers over 
the past year to build prefab temporary housing for its officers 
because Dyncorp had agreed to build the SPLA a camp.  The officers 
are currently housed in a commercial tent camp at the cost of USD100 
per tent per night.  Unable to wait for Dyncorps any longer, the 
SPLA has purchased 200 tents for a camp to be built near the 
airport.  Hearing that they already purchased the tents, Dyncorps 
then offered to build the camp infrastructure, including concrete 
tent pads.  It is now almost two months later, and Dyncorps has only 
fenced the site and drilled two boreholes. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
SPLA Training Centers - Perhaps the Brits Instead 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5. (SBU) Another important project was the building of two training 
centers for SPLA troops, which he said Dyncorps agreed to do nearly 
a year ago.  After much discussion, it was agreed that the first 
center would be built in Malau, outside of Rumbek.  Although it has 
been many months, Deng said that virtually nothing has been done at 
that site (reftel).  The SPLA has therefore started training its men 
with existing resources in several largely undeveloped sites around 
Southern Sudan.  The SPLA has also engaged a private British 
security firm (NFI) to help support its training mission. 
 
---------------------- 
Keep on Trucking...Not 
---------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) In addition to construction projects, Deng said that the 
USG had agreed to provide communication equipment and trucks to the 
SPLA, neither of which have arrived.  He says that he has not heard 
anything on the status of the communications gear, and has heard 
conflicting stories on the status of the trucks.  Initially, he said 
the SPLA requested heavy, all-terrain Russian military trucks.  The 
SPLA had used similar trucks, provided by Ethiopia, to great success 
during the war.  Deng understood why the USG was unable to purchase 
the Russian trucks, and then asked for MAN military trucks instead. 
Deng explained that he has been told both that the trucks were on 
their way and that the trucks were too expensive and could not be 
bought.  Dyncorps reportedly has offered DAF trucks as an 
alternative, but Deng said they are unacceptable because of the lack 
of roads and harsh conditions in Southern Sudan.  Deng also refused 
Isuzu trucks on similar grounds, but said he could use Toyota trucks 
if the larger trucks were outside the budget.  Deng is still waiting 
for any type of truck to arrive.  (Note: The SPLA has purchased 
several of the Russian trucks on its own.  End note.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HUME