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DE RUEHBUL #3538/01 2191415
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1819
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2730
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2874
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6207
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1560

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 003538 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT), SCA/A, S/CRS, 
SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
REL NATO/AU/NZ/ISAF 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/TARIN KOWT - GOVERNOR MONIB: FOCUSED ON 
RESULTS, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND IMPROVING SECURITY 
 
KABUL 00003538  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Since he took office on March 18, 
Uruzgan Governor Abdul Hakim Monib has been 
confronted by a number of challenges to his 
authority, most coming from former Uruzgan Governor 
Jan Mohammed Khan and his supporters, but also from 
a deteriorating security situation that has 
undermined his position.  Since his return from 
Kabul on July 13, however, Monib seems to have found 
a new political confidence that has allowed him to 
move forward on a host of pressing security and 
governance issues that are beginning to solidify his 
position as governor and broaden his support base. 
By reaching out to previously marginalized tribes, 
educated locals, and disaffected Durrani tribesmen, 
including the Populzai, Monib is assembling a 
support base that should strengthen his position. 
By focusing on improving governance through removing 
incompetent officials and insisting on results from 
the provincial government, the governor is beginning 
to sway many locals to his side who simply want 
honest and effective administration.  With time, 
Governor Monib's plans to create a viable, 
inclusive, and effective government that reaches all 
of Uruzgan should create a bulwark of stability 
against any future Taliban pressure.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Monib, Jan Mohammed Khan, and other Power Brokers 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Though former Uruzgan Governor Jan Mohammed 
Khan had often complained about his weariness at 
being governor, a position he had held since January 
21, 2002, his March 2006 removal came as somewhat of 
a shock to him.  Over time, his initially welcoming 
and supportive behavior towards Governor Monib 
turned into overt opposition, as he began using his 
contacts in Kabul to interfere in the central 
government's budget and resource allocation for 
Uruzgan.  He also appears to have orchestrated 
attacks by "Taliban" on Afghan National Army units 
in Uruzgan and then volunteered his security forces 
to defend the province.  He has also actively spread 
rumors that it was only a matter of time before he 
was returned to power.  Khan was quick to say that 
Governor Monib could not guarantee security in the 
province, as evidenced by the increase in Taliban 
activity shortly after taking office in March 2006, 
and that only he, Jan Mohammed Khan, could guarantee 
security in the area.  Since much of the provincial 
administration and all district appointments had 
been made by Jan Mohammed Khan, Governor Monib was 
confronted not only by Khan's personal opposition 
but also by a local administration inclined against 
him. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Other local political figures have 
challenged Monib's legitimacy as well.  Provincial 
Council President, and former President of the 
Provincial Shura, Mullah Hamdullah has openly 
challenged Monib's political legitimacy since Monib 
took office, for example he has attempted to sign 
government documents that required the governor's 
signature and to speak on behalf of the governor 
when he was not entitled to do so.  Though these 
efforts were eventually beaten back, Monib's efforts 
to build up his authority are an ongoing project. 
Former Provincial Police Chief Rozi Khan was also an 
 
KABUL 00003538  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
initial supporter of Governor Monib but his 
subsequent replacement by Monib loyalist General 
Qasim soured him on the governor, and several 
reports now implicate his brothers - and possibly 
Rozi Khan himself - in anti-coalition and anti-GOA 
activities.  Subsequent Taliban activity in Rozi 
Khan's Barakzai tribal area indicates either his 
complicit support of the Taliban or his passivity at 
confronting them - either of which could have the 
effect of undermining Monib's position in the 
province. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Some residents of Uruzgan are wary of Monib 
due to his coming from the Ghilzai branch of the 
Pashtuns (most Uruzgan locals are Durranis).  The 
governor's tribal background is particularly 
relevant because the great bulk of Taliban fighters 
in Uruzgan come from Ghilzai tribes.  Monib's 
Ghilzai roots and background as a member of the 
Taliban regime suggest to some that he remains a 
Taliban sympathizer.  Some say the increase in 
fighting in Uruzgan following his appointment is a 
sign of Monib's support for the insurgents, and 
others circulate tales of his alleged collaboration 
with Taliban leaders and fighters.  (PRT Comment: 
After months of close scrutiny, we have seen nothing 
to suggest that Monib is a Taliban sympathizer.  End 
comment.)   In addition, some locals feel that Monib 
is too young and inexperienced for his position. 
 
 
Broadening the Base: Tribal Inclusion and Reaching 
Out 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Since his return from Kabul on July 13th, 
Governor Monib has worked aggressively and 
decisively to broaden his support base, improve 
governance, and enhance provincial security - 
efforts that are beginning to bear tangible results. 
He has been actively reaching out to previously 
marginalized tribes and making allies among the 
majority Durrani Pashtun by delivering on his 
promises and practicing good governance.  On July 
20th, Governor Monib convened a series of meetings 
with village elders from Mirabad, Drushan, and Sar 
Marghab (areas in Chora and Tarin Kowt districts 
with security problems) to discuss the security 
situation in their areas and their development 
needs.  What is notable about this meeting is that 
these elders had never met former Governor Jan 
Mohammed Khan when he was in power.  Khan regularly 
victimized the villagers, who mostly come from 
Ghilzai tribes.  Khan's oppression of Uruzgan's 
Ghilzai minority had the predictable effect of 
alienating them from the GOA and making them 
sympathetic to the Taliban, which justified Khan 
used to rationalize his further persecution of them. 
By contrast, the elders felt comfortable talking 
with Governor Monib not only because he is an 
outsider to the tribal conflicts in the area but 
also because he is a fellow Ghilzai.  Governor Monib 
has also been reaching out to tribesmen in the 
remote district of Caher Cineh, which is largely 
populated by the Noorzai subtribe of the Ghilzai. 
Governor Monib hopes to bring the Noorzai tribal 
leader Arif Noorzai, who is also a member of 
 
KABUL 00003538  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
Parliament, to the area later this month to help 
select a District Chief and to bring the Noorzai 
closer to the GOA.  Since 2002, all the District 
Chiefs and most of the Police Chiefs of Caher Cineh 
had been appointed by Jan Mohammed Khan from his own 
Populzai tribe. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The governor is also making a point of 
visiting each district for up to five days at a time 
to consult with village elders and to get a sense of 
the community's needs and on how their district and 
village leaders are doing, and the PRT has worked 
closely to support him with logistics and 
transportation for these visits.  He also uses these 
meetings to gain a better understanding of the local 
political and tribal situation and uses this 
information in his decision of who he would like as 
a District or Police Chief in the area.  This type 
of local consultation was utterly lacking during Jan 
Mohammed Khan's administration, as he imposed his 
policies and appointees on an unwilling population. 
Additionally, Governor Monib is planning to hold 
elections for the position of Mayor of Tarin Kowt 
and will likely expand this idea to other major 
villages.  (Note: the constitutional implications of 
this are unclear, and could be disputed by Monib's 
opponents.  End note.) 
 
Good Governance: Promoting Accountability, Providing 
Structure 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Another legacy of former Governor Jan 
Mohammed Khan's administration is the lack of local 
government structure and the absence of 
accountability and results from public officials. 
Governor Monib has made it his express intention to 
provide this badly needed structure and has 
systematically removed incompetent or corrupt 
officials while retaining and promoting educated, 
competent, and honest civil servants.  In April, 
Governor Monib fired the illiterate and corrupt 
Director of Agriculture and promoted the only 
trained employee of the directorate to director.  On 
July 20, he arrested the Director of Health, Dr. 
Khan Agha, for selling government-purchased medical 
supplies in Tarin Kowt and is actively recruiting a 
new director and getting local doctors, many of whom 
had been alienated by Dr. Agha, to join the Health 
Directorate.  He has also replaced the Director of 
Education with a more competent administrator and is 
in the process of finding suitable replacements for 
the Directors of Communications and Public Works, 
both of whom are incompetent (and are Jan Mohammad 
cronies).  On July 25, Governor Monib replaced the 
corrupt and incompetent Mayor of Tarin Kowt, Mullah 
Obaidullah, with the Director of Irrigation Engineer 
Kabir.  Mullah Obaidullah, a member of the Populzai 
tribe and long-time friend of Jan Mohammed Khan, was 
appointed by the former governor in August 2004 and 
his replacement is yet another sign of a shift 
towards a more honest and effective administration 
at the local level. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The governor also convenes regular weekly 
meeting of his directors, security officials, and 
development officials and expects participants to 
 
KABUL 00003538  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
have reports ready for discussion.  Each meeting has 
an agenda, which is followed, and the proceedings 
are well run.  The governor is adamant that 
participants bring paper and pen to take notes and 
aggressively questions his officials about how many 
employees they have (often a source of corruption 
with payrolls being padded), the nature of their 
work, the resources they have at their disposal, and 
their plans for the future.  Monib has also been 
reclaiming the stolen public property that many 
officials took with them after they were removed. 
The governor even tasks the PRT to deliver on its 
promises and gives the commander deadlines for 
information, resources, and assistance.  The 
administrative coherence Monib is giving to local 
administration and his insistence that people do 
their jobs is a fresh departure from the 
administrative wreckage Jan Mohammed Khan left 
behind. 
 
Improving Security: Professionalizing the Police 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶9. (SBU) With the removal of Provincial Police Chief 
Rozi Khan in May, the rudimentary force that was 
called the Afghan National Police (ANP) completely 
disappeared in the province.  Smaller police units 
in the districts, which were largely beholden to 
their respective commanders and nominally under the 
control of Rozi Khan, melted away at a time when 
district Police Chiefs were being replaced and the 
threat from the Taliban increased in late spring. 
Due in part to the security vacuum this created, the 
Taliban were able to significantly step up their 
attacks in the province.  To counter this threat and 
to begin the process of creating a professional 
police force for Uruzgan, Governor Monib has 
undertaken a process of recruiting competent Police 
Chiefs and police, training them at the Kandahar 
Training Center, outfitting them with the right 
equipment, and constructing checkpoints in key 
villages and along the Tarin Kowt - Kandahar Road. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Using one hundred standby police given to 
him by the central government as a stabilizing force 
in Tarin Kowt, Governor Monib set out to bolster the 
Police Chiefs of Chora.  In southern Chora district, 
in a region called Chenartu, he provided the Police 
Chief, Akhtar Mohammed, with 10,000 rounds of AK-47 
ammunition, 600,000 Afghanis (approximately USD 
12,000) to recruit new police and increase the pay 
of existing police, and foodstuffs to feed the 
additional men.  In northern Chora, the governor 
arrested District Chief Obaidullah for cooperating 
with the Taliban and installed a new Police Chief, 
Mohammed Gul, who is well thought of locally, and 
provided him with ammunition and money as well.  He 
has also done the same thing for the Police Chief of 
Deh Rawud, Haji Abdul Ghani.  Governor Monib told 
the PRT he has received money from Kabul to recruit 
two hundred additional police from the local 
community, which he intends to use, and that he 
plans to send these men to Kandahar to receive 
training. (Note: the MoI has not yet worked out a 
procedure for training auxiliary police like these. 
End note.)  As a stopgap measure, though, he plans 
to use another two hundred additional police that he 
 
KABUL 00003538  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
expects receive soon to maintain security while the 
local security forces are trained.  Monib is also 
planning to construct three checkpoints in the 
problem villages of Mirabad, Drushan, and Sar 
Marghab and provide the police there with radios, 
heavy weapons, and vehicles.  He is also hoping to 
construct eight checkpoints along the Tarin Kowt- 
Kandahar Road. 
 
Jan Mohammed Khan: A Diminished but Enduring Power 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶11. (SBU) While some village elders will continue to 
meet in Kabul to try and convince President Karzai 
that Monib must be replaced by Jan Mohammed Khan, 
the former governor seems to have already become 
resigned to the fact that he will not be returning 
anytime soon.  Jan Mohammed Khan has moved his 
entire family to Kandahar and left a son to watch 
his compound.  Meanwhile his local militia leader 
(former Tarin Kowt District Police Chief Haji Ali 
Ahmed) has also evacuated his family after being 
removed from his position.  With the replacement of 
his last political ally in Tarin Kowt, Tarin Kowt 
Mayor Mullah Obaidullah on July 25, the former 
governor has few friends left in official government 
positions.  While Afghan Highway Police Commander 
Matiollah might be a source of instability for 
Governor Monib, their on-again off-again 
relationship seems to have stabilized with Matiollah 
supporting Monib (thanks largely to President's 
Karzai's intervention).  Additionally, Governor 
Monib has split the Populzai community through his 
active political and material support of Chenartu 
District Chief Maleem Faez Mohammed and Aktar 
Mohammed, both of whom are Populzai tribesmen and 
former bodyguards to President Karzai.  This too 
should weaken Jan Mohammed's support base in 
Uruzgan, and mitigate against any attempted 
comeback. 
 
NEUMANN