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Viewing cable 06HELSINKI847, FINLAND RESPONSE TO UPDATED BRIEFING ON KOSOVO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HELSINKI847 2006-08-23 15:01 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0847 2351501
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231501Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2349
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 0018
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000847 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2016 
TAGS: PREL UN UNMIK PGOV YI EU FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND RESPONSE TO UPDATED BRIEFING ON KOSOVO 
STATUS NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: STATE 135734 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (U) PolChief delivered subject demarche to Finnish MFA 
Balkans Director Juha Ottman Aug. 23.  Because of former 
Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari's status as special 
envoy, the Finns tend to be very well briefed on Kosovo 
developments; nonetheless Ottman welcomed the US initiative 
to 
share our perspectives on the current status of 
negotiations. 
 
2. (C) Ottman offered the following points: 
 
 -- Finland, as EU President, "shares entirely" the US 
views that anything but independence for Kosovo (with 
significant EU and NATO participation) is unrealistic and 
ultimately not sustainable; that delaying a final status 
decision beyond January or at the very latest February 2007 
carries risks; that partition is unacceptable; and that 
both sides need to do more to find realistic solutions and 
to compromise. 
 
 -- Finland agrees that EU and NATO perspectives for Serbia 
are important.  However, the GOF shares Ahtisaari's strong 
conviction that "no talk of compensation" to Belgrade for 
the "loss" of Kosovo is acceptable.  Current Serb 
leadership -- including Kostunica -- even appears 
uninterested in the EU perspective, Ottman said, and the 
international community should not be drawn into the 
"Serbian game" of talking about compensation. 
 
 -- The GOF understands that Ahtisaari intends to present 
his recommendations for compromises on issues that still 
separate Serb and Kosovar negotiators to the Contact Group 
(CG) for comment on Aug. 31, and would then meet again with 
the CG Sept. 11.  Ottman was unclear how long Ahtisaari 
would then wait to present the recommendations to the 
parties -- although he noted wryly that mid-September is 
likely, especially given that "once the Russians have the 
recommendations, the Serbs will have them very shortly 
thereafter." 
WARE