VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0842/01 2341225
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221225Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2341
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0073
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0049
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0622

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000842 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2016 
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV MARR FI SY LE
SUBJECT: FINLAND TO STRONGLY URGE SYRIA TO RESPECT LEBANON 
ARMS EMBARGO 
 
REF: STATE 136196 
 
Classified By: PolChief Gregory Thome, Reasons 1.5 (b and d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: DCM and PolChief met with MFA Political 
Director Vierros-Villeneuve Aug. 22 to express US 
disappointment regarding the Aug. 23 visit of Syrian FM Walid 
Al-Moallem to Helsinki; to remind the GOF of the need to 
isolate Syria diplomatically; and to urge that the Finns use 
the meeting to insist that Syria honor the arms embargo in 
Lebanon.  Vierros-Villeneuve assured us that the Finnish EU 
Presidency intends to use the meeting to deliver a very tough 
message demanding that Syria honor the embargo and to press 
Damascus to "re-think its behavior" in Lebanon.  Referring to 
our talking points (reftel), she said that "this US message 
is very much our message."  She emphasized that the meeting 
in no way represents an upgrading or improving of EU-Syrian 
relations; is not to be considered a formal bilateral; and 
will take place in Finland because the GOF wants "to control 
the process, rather that letting it be controlled by 
Damascus."  By way of background, at the August 1 GAERC the 
EU Foreign Ministers decided that Spain, Germany and the 
Finnish Presidency would make contact with the GOS to demand 
it play a constructive -- rather than "unhelpful" -- role in 
Lebanon.  The Finns have consulted with the Israelis and 
sought their input for this meeting.  They welcomed our 
input, and promised us a detailed read-out.  End Summary. 
 
"US Message is Our Message" 
--------------------------- 
¶2. (C) DCM opened the meeting by expressing disappointment 
over the fact that Finland had agreed to host such a high 
level meeting with the Syrians.  She reminded 
Vierros-Villeneuve that the US believes the international 
community needs to show unity in isolating the GOS in 
response to its unhelpful role in Lebanon and elsewhere in 
the region.  However, since the meeting was to go forward, 
the DCM urged the GOF to use the opportunity to demand that 
Syria, as a UN member, respect the arms embargo on Lebanon 
and honor the other provisions of UNSC Resolution 1701. 
Allowing the Lebanese Government to assert sovereignty and to 
regain control over its territory is key to an enduring peace 
in the region, DCM concluded, and the Syrian Government must 
be put on notice that the international community expects it 
to allow that process to go forward. 
 
¶3. (C) Vierros-Villeneuve responded by thanking the US for 
its interest and by assuring us that the GOF had every 
intention of using the meeting to deliver tough messages to 
the Syrians -- both on the arms embargo and on the generally 
troubling role it has played in Lebanon and the region.  In 
that regard, the GOF intends to tell Al-Moallem that Syria 
needs to "re-think its behavior" and "behave in a more 
constructive way."  Referring to the US talking points, she 
said specifically that "this US message is very much our 
message."  FM Tuomioja has even consulted with Israeli FM 
Livni to solicit her input for the meeting, 
Vierros-Villeneuve said. 
 
Not a Formal Invitation 
----------------------- 
¶4. (C) Vierros-Villeneuve went on to stress that Al-Moallem's 
visit to Helsinki did not represent a formal bilateral 
meeting, nor did it represent a formal EU Presidency 
invitation.  The ministers will reach no joint conclusions, 
there will be no joint press conference following the 
meeting, and the Finns do not intend to facilitate press 
availability for Al-Moallem.  Rather, discussions will occur 
entirely behind closed doors, with Tuomioja issuing his own 
press statement afterward.  The GOF will then provide a 
detailed report to the other EU member states. 
(Vierros-Villeneuve promised to give us a detailed read-out 
as well.)  She added that Tuomioja will make clear to the 
Syrian that this does not represent "an upgrading" or a step 
toward improving the EU-Syria relationship;  on the contrary, 
the EU remains very concerned about Syria's actions. 
 
¶5. (C) By way of background, Vierros-Villeneuve explained 
that the Member States' foreign ministers had agreed at the 
extraordinary Aug. 1 GAERC meetings that the EU needed to 
deliver a tough, direct message to Syria regarding the 
unhelpful role it was playing in the region.  It was decided 
that Spain, Germany, and the Finnish EU Presidency -- along 
with High Rep Javier Solana -- would initiate the contact. 
Unhelpful public comments from Syria kept the German FM from 
visiting Damascus earlier, Vierros-Villeneuve explained, and 
Solana has not yet acted, partly out of deference to France, 
which apparently is adamantly opposed to direct contacts with 
Syria.  Now, however, all member states were in agreement 
 
that the Presidency needed to deliver a message to Syria as 
part of its effort to support 1701.  Regarding the venue, 
Vierros-Villeneuve added, EU leaders quickly ruled out 
Brussels, to avoid the appearance of an EU-Syria high level 
meeting; for his part FM Tuomioja insisted that the meeting 
not take place in Syria, so that the Finns could "control the 
process, rather that letting it be controlled by Damascus." 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶6. (C) Most EU member states, including Finland, do not share 
the US view that diplomatic isolation is the best means of 
dealing with Syria.  That said, Vierros-Villeneuve clearly 
understood our concerns, and was adamant that the US and the 
EU are on the same page in terms of message -- if not 
tactics.  We are relatively confident that the Finns do 
intend to try to turn this potential negative into a positive 
by talking tough to the Syrian; however, given recent 
performances, we are less sanguine that FM Tuomioja will 
manage the media coverage as skillfully as Vierros-Villeneuve 
assured us he would.  We will follow up with a read-out after 
the Aug. 23 meeting. 
WARE