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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 DAMASCUS 004094 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ELA 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH 
TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON 
EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAGR ECIN ECON EIND EAID SENV SY EWWT
SUBJECT: SURVEY OF SYRIAN WATER SECTOR - 2006 
 
REF: A. 05 DAMASCUS 05788 
     ¶B. 02 AMMAN 08144 
     ¶C. 02 DAMASCUS 02280 
     ¶D. 04 BAGHDAD 00360 
     ¶E. AMMAN 04692 
     ¶F. AMMAN 05397 
     ¶G. BEIRUT 00831 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: After years of national water shortages, it 
has become clear that Syria faces a water crunch that, if not 
addressed comprehensively, will balloon into a crisis in the 
medium to long term.  Rapidly growing demand for water from 
various sectors of Syrian society in recent years combined 
with a plateauing national water supply have squeezed 
Syria,s water resources, leading to a chronic deficit that 
could be as high as 3 billion cubic meters, with demand 
outstripping supply by nearly 25%.  The SARG is clearly 
cognizant of the predicament, but has been characteristically 
slow and inefficient with implementing identified coping 
mechanisms.  In an effort to control water demand, the SARG 
has initiated steps to transition Syria,s agricultural 
sector to modern, more water-efficient, irrigation techniques 
and upgrade municipal water networks to reduce massive waste 
of potable water.  To boost Syria,s water supply, the SARG 
is building wastewater treatment plants.  At the same time, 
however, the population continues drilling wells and 
depleting the groundwater tables at a much faster rate. 
Given Syria,s haphazard, uncoordinated water sector 
management by a disorganized bureaucracy, it is doubtful the 
SARG has the tools to implement new water policies it may 
develop.  Given the trajectory of Syria,s economy and 
demographic trends, the country,s emerging water crisis 
carries the potential for severe economic volatility and even 
socio-political unrest.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU)    Demand: The rapid growth in demand for water in 
Syria for a variety of uses is clearly the primary driving 
force behind the recent water shortages and future concerns. 
Although the exact water demand growth rate is unknown, the 
general consensus among independent sources we consulted is 
that it has risen consistently over the past several decades 
and accelerated in recent years.  All sources agreed that the 
water demand growth rate certainly exceeds the 2.5% 
population growth rate, probably by quite a bit.  As in the 
past, agricultural use constitutes the vast majority of 
Syria,s water consumption, with estimates ranging from 75 to 
more than 90% of the total demand.  The fastest growing 
component of water demand, however, is human consumption, 
fueled by the combination of Syria,s high population growth 
rate and increasing rates of urbanization.  Industrial usage 
remains the smallest element of Syria,s water consumption, 
and a negligible factor to date in demand growth.  Most 
sources identified Syria,s grossly inefficient use of water 
as the main impediment to controlling its water demand. 
These major inefficiencies include still rampant utilization 
of old-fashioned irrigation techniques such as &flooding8, 
extremely leaky water distribution networks, and wasteful 
behaviors by the general Syrian population that expects 
cheap, abundant water.  In September 2005, Minister of 
Irrigation, Mahir al-Bunni, the SARG's top water official, 
announced the establishment of a General Commission for Water 
Resources, which ambitiously aims to save 5.4 million cubic 
meters per year by restructuring water sector management and 
rationalizing water use in Syria. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Agriculture: The SARG has strived to expand Syria,s 
agriculture for decades in an effort to improve the 
country,s chronically underperforming economy.  The Tenth 
Five-Year Plan, which went into effect in January 2006, seeks 
to boost agricultural production even further to diversify 
the economy in anticipation of vastly reduced oil production 
(ref A).  Data gathered by the International Center for 
Agricultural Research in the Dry Area (ICARDA), an 
independent international agricultural research institute 
headquartered in Syria (ref B), indicates that Syria more 
than doubled its land irrigated by groundwater (319,000 to 
817,000 hectares) and nearly doubled its land irrigated by 
surface water without a pump (144,000 to 314,000 hectares) 
 
DAMASCUS 00004094  002 OF 008 
 
 
from the late 1980s to 2002.  In 2002, Syria had over 1.3 
million irrigated hectares and the SARG,s 2005-06 plan 
envisions 1.5 million irrigated hectares by the end of 2006. 
Most of Syria,s irrigated land is in the northeast of the 
country and serviced by the Euphrates River.  According to 
statements by al-Bunni published in September 2005, Syrian 
agriculture consumes approximately 12 billion cubic meters of 
water per year, with 4.5 billion coming from dams (i.e. 
rivers) and the other 7.5 billion from groundwater sources. 
Given the SARG,s stated desire to expand agricultural 
production and land under irrigation, most experts we 
consulted expect this consumption figure to grow 
considerably. 
 
¶4. (SBU)    How much the agricultural sector expands over the 
medium-term depends on the implementation of the SARG,s 
initiative to transition to more water-efficient irrigation 
methods.  Several sources noted the SARG,s longstanding 
official effort to shift agricultural production toward more 
water-efficient crops to contain water consumption.  As 
proof, they cited the decrease in land used for 
water-&heavy8 crops such as cotton and corn.  In September 
2005, al-Bunni announced the creation of a 53 billion Syrian 
Pound (approximately USD 1 billion) fund to finance a 
ten-year transition to modern irrigation techniques among 
small farmers and peasants, who comprise the vast majority of 
Syrian agricultural producers.  In addition to supporting 
farmers, acquisition of advanced irrigation infrastructure 
such as drip irrigation and sprinkler systems, the government 
would provide them with technical assistance to install, 
operate and maintain the new irrigation systems.  An 
experienced Syrian water expert ventured that the SARG hopes 
ultimately to conserve 30% of the water currently consumed 
for agricultural purposes (mostly from the Euphrates out 
east), and redirect the savings to residential use in the 
country,s major metropolitan areas in the west. 
 
¶5. (SBU)    Expert opinions are mixed, however, on how 
successful the SARG,s initiative can be in the timeframe set 
out.  Despite the absence of solid data, an ICARDA observer 
believed that a large portion of farmers have already adopted 
modern irrigation techniques, with more poised to do so if 
additional funding and technical assistance became available. 
 He attributed much of Syria,s massive growth in 
agricultural production-per-unit over the past 25 years (e.g. 
a tripling of per-unit-production of wheat) to increasing 
water-efficiency, particularly the use of &supplemental 
irrigation8 (ref C).  Skeptics, however, discount the 
SARG,s transition plan for several reasons.  First, being 
&old-fashioned8 creatures of habit and suspicious of the 
government, farmers will oppose the new irrigation technology 
on psychological grounds.  Critics also doubted that the SARG 
would follow through with the technical assistance critical 
to getting the new irrigation systems up and running 
effectively.  In addition, despite the availability of loans, 
the costs required to purchase and maintain the news systems 
are prohibitive for the vast majority of Syria,s subsistence 
farmers.  (Comment: It seems likely that the farmers noted by 
ICARDA, who had already adopted water-efficient irrigation 
techniques, are the ones most capable of change, thus leaving 
the most challenging segment of the farmer population still 
to be converted to modern irrigation. End comment.)  Third, 
low fuel and labor costs (for pumping ground water) and no 
penalties for excessive water use discourage farmers from 
changing their current irrigation practices.  Finally, the 
fragmented, small-scale nature of Syrian agriculture ) 
namely the millions of Syrian farmers who farm tiny swaths of 
land who will have to be convinced to change -- will prevent 
a quick transition to modern irrigation techniques and 
greater water efficiency. 
 
¶6. (SBU)    Human Consumption: Though the SARG,s efforts to 
expand the utilization of more water-efficient irrigation 
systems may slow the growth in agricultural consumption of 
water if the government becomes more serious about 
implementation, residential (i.e. human) use of water is 
booming with no end in sight.  Residential water use - 
consisting of drinking, cleaning, and septic/sewage disposal 
 
DAMASCUS 00004094  003 OF 008 
 
 
) comprises a small but rapidly growing segment of total 
consumption, according to a University of Aleppo water 
expert.  More than 90% of the Syrian population has access to 
potable water.  Syria consumes potable water at the 
relatively high rate of 200 liters per capita per day.  The 
potable water crunch is, not surprisingly, most acute in 
Syria,s cities.  The Damascus metropolitan area (including 
the surrounding &suburbs8) faces an especially desperate 
situation.  According to the DG of Damascus Suburbs Water 
Establishment Dr. Abdel Nasr Sa,alluddin, the Damascus area 
currently suffers an annual water deficit of 400 million 
cubic meters.  High population growth and rates of 
urbanization are further taxing the already-dilapidated 
municipal water networks and limited local water supply. 
There is no consensus on the best ways to restrict 
residential water consumption.  One means to control 
residential water usage includes more stringent water 
rationing, which seems all but inevitable in the future.  The 
main barrier, however, appears psychological: Syrians view 
water as a cheap public good to be used as much as they 
desire rather than as a commodity of limited quantity ) 
because water is so heavily subsidized.  One cubic meter of 
water costs six Syrian Pounds on average, but sells for 3.5 
Syrian Pounds.  Furthermore, vast quantities of water are 
stolen for free from the network.  For political reasons, the 
SARG is hesitant to reduce subsidization or pursue 
cost-recovery. 
 
¶7. (SBU)    Industry: Industrial use of water makes up a 
relatively small portion and diminishing percentage of 
Syria,s total water consumption.  One local expert called 
the water needs of Syrian industry &neither high nor 
significant8, a sentiment shared by all sources consulted. 
Another source explained that the SARG does not monitor 
industrial consumption of water, but he estimated industrial 
water use in Syria as somewhat less than residential use.  He 
added that industrial demands on the water supply remain 
relatively constant.  Industrial zones, however, contribute 
significantly to pollution of both groundwater sources and 
rivers basins.  Water pollution, in turn, causes major health 
problems among the local population, requires more water 
treatment plants for which the SARG lacks the funding and 
even causes friction in Syria,s relations with neighboring 
countries.  A resident Turkish diplomat complained that 
Syria,s pollution of the Orontes River by refineries and 
factories around Homs was destroying agriculture in his 
country,s Iskanderia province. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Supply: Enhancing and enlarging Syria,s water 
supply remains a top SARG priority, one the government is 
presently pursuing with a heightened sense of urgency.  The 
SARG has been &pushing all possible levers for some time8 
to maximize output from Syria,s water sources, according to 
one ICARDA expert.  Syria draws water from a broad array of 
surface, ground and rain water sources, but does not yet 
desalinize seawater.  The SARG is also boosting its capacity 
to treat and recycle wastewater (exclusively for agricultural 
use).  With the quantity of rain exogenously determined and 
low to begin with, river sources generally limited by 
political factors, and treated wastewater not yet a major 
contributor of supply, Syria has used groundwater to fill its 
annual deficit.  This dynamic has caused severe, even 
dangerous, depletion of the country,s aquifers. 
 
¶9. (SBU)    Surface Water: Syria has 16 main rivers and 
tributaries, including six major international rivers 
(Euphrates, Tigris, Orontes, Yarmouk, Al-Kabir and Afrin). 
Surface water comprises about a third of Syria,s total water 
supply.  Although several Syrian rivers and springs in the 
country,s more arid regions have dried up considerably in 
recent years, exacerbating the water crunch especially in 
Damascus, Syria could boost its total surface water supply by 
pumping water from the Tigris River. 
 
¶10. (SBU)   According to all sources, Syria presently 
extracts only a negligible amount of water from the Tigris. 
In the 1980s, the SARG had plans to irrigate 150,000 hectares 
with water from the Tigris, but never implemented the 
 
DAMASCUS 00004094  004 OF 008 
 
 
program.  Syria,s increasingly desperate water situation and 
plans to boost agricultural production have led to renewed 
talk of pumping water form the Tigris, but the SARG has not 
taken any concrete action or even indicated an intent in this 
direction.  Most observers concurred that Syria has not yet 
tapped the Tigris because it lacks the equipment to do so, 
and the funds for the requisite technology. 
 
¶11. (SBU)   Originating in Turkey, the Euphrates is by far 
the largest river in Syria with 680 km located within Syrian 
territory and an average rate of flow over the past two years 
of 745 cubic meters per second (m3/s).  (Note: By contrast, 
the average rates for all Syria,s other rivers did not top 
ten m3/s in 2004. End Note.)  The Euphrates constitutes 
Syria,s primary source for irrigation water and 
hydroelectricity generation.  In a 1987 Protocol signed 
between Turkey and Syria, Turkey guaranteed to provide Syria 
a minimum average monthly flow from the Euphrates of 500 
m3/s.  A 1990 treaty between Syria and Iraq codified that 
Syria would keep 42% of the total flow of the Euphrates 
received from Turkey and pass 58% on to Iraq, irrespective of 
variations in flow.  In recent years, however, Turkey has 
released more than the 500 m3/s guaranteed by the protocol, 
according to both SARG and GOT sources.  In 2004 and 2005, 
the average flows of the Euphrates in Syria were 757 m3/s and 
732 m3/s, respectively.  But this excess will not persist 
forever, as an official Turkish source asserted that dams 
upstream associated with the GOT,s GAP (Southeastern 
Anatolia) project would basically eliminate major 
fluctuations in the Euphrates flow such that Syria would 
receive a regularized flow of 500-600 m3/s every month 
regardless of the season.  He also indicated that Turkey 
would continue providing the 500 m3/s minimum flow to Syria 
indefinitely absent a comprehensive agreement, but warned 
that the GOT had no obligation to continue releasing these 
higher flows, adding that Syria could not count on more than 
the guaranteed 500 m3/s flow in the future. 
 
¶12. (SBU)   In response to severe water shortages in Damascus 
resulting from years of drought and exploding demand, Syrian 
water authorities turned to the Barada River to bolster 
supply.  About six years ago, the Damascus municipality began 
pumping water from the Barada and built a pipeline that can 
transport one m3/s of the river,s average 2.7 m3/s flow to 
the city to supplement other sources.  This project, however, 
represents a short-term &band-aid8 solution to the 
capital,s deteriorating water situation.  Both the al-Awaj 
and the Barada Rivers that supply Damascus are quickly drying 
up, such that the main source of potable water for Damascus 
is now the Al-Fija spring.  A local Syrian water expert 
stressed that the Barada, Fija, and groundwater &cocktail8 
would not keep up with Damascus, chronic water deficits in 
the medium to long-term. 
 
¶13.   (SBU) Groundwater: Groundwater sources account for 
nearly two-thirds of Syria,s total water supply and provide 
the vast majority of its potable water, although no exact 
figures are available.  Thus, stemming the rapid depletion of 
groundwater tables throughout the country is a chief concern 
of the SARG.  In the Aleppo area, groundwater tables have 
dropped one to three m/yr., descending from 60 to 105 meters 
below the surface in the past 20 years, strictly due to 
irrigation.  Heightening the concern is the fact that in 
Syria,s arid regions, where groundwater plays an even more 
critical role in the local economy and daily life, the tables 
are not replenished by rain or irrigation seepage.  According 
to ICARDA,s experts, the sustainability of groundwater ) 
more than any other factor - will determine the long-term 
viability of Syria,s agricultural sector.  Inefficient 
irrigation systems, highly subsidized diesel fuel (for water 
pumps), cheap labor and lack of metering have resulted in 
over-pumping of groundwater sources and widespread drilling 
of ever-deeper wells.  Indeed, well-drilling among Syrians, 
for both agricultural and residential purposes, has reached 
epic proportions.  Water shortages in the main springs 
serving Damascus and suburbs (due in part to consistent 
droughts) have forced the utilization of groundwater on a 
massive scale.  The Damascus Directorate of Water Resources 
 
DAMASCUS 00004094  005 OF 008 
 
 
reported in July 2006 that over 50,000 wells exist in the 
Damascus greater metropolitan area, of which only 12,000 are 
legal.  (Note: Syrian law requires that &legal8 wells have 
permits and meters, so that the government can monitor water 
consumption from them.  Syrians frequently circumvent the 
SARG,s monitoring efforts. End note.) 
 
¶14. (SBU)   Rainwater: Rain does not make up a significant 
portion of Syria,s total water supply.  Syria,s Coastal 
basin, north of Lebanon, receives in excess of 350 mm of 
rainfall per year, giving this region a modest annual water 
surplus and keeping it fertile for agriculture.  Syria 
harvests some rainwater, but not a significant amount, from 
this basin.  More arid climates elsewhere in the country 
produce evaporation rates that prevent any usable 
accumulation of rainwater. 
 
¶15. (SBU)   Treated wastewater: Syria is increasingly turning 
to wastewater to bolster its water supply, but financing new 
water treatment facilities is a major inhibitor.  Syria has 
long used treated wastewater, produced by residential and 
industrial activities, exclusively for irrigation.  (Note: 
Syria currently does not treat wastewater in order to make it 
potable or acceptable for residential usage. End note.)  The 
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported that in 
1993 Syria treated 60% of its wastewater, and all independent 
sources concur that since then the SARG has expanded these 
efforts modestly in an attempt to ameliorate the country,s 
persistent water shortages and boost its agricultural 
production.  The Ministry of Housing expects to complete 
construction on two sewage treatment plants by the end of 
2006 and four more in 2007, but this would not make much of a 
dent in Damascus, current 400 million m3 water deficit. 
Based on the current round of treatment plant-construction 
and the SARG,s fiscal position, Syria,s future efforts to 
expand Syria,s supply of treated wastewater will depend on 
the availability of foreign financing. 
 
¶16. (SBU)   Desalinization: At present, Syria has no 
desalinization plants due to the high expense of such 
technology and the current availability of cheaper sources of 
potable water.  Independent experts, however, agree that, 
given rising residential water demand, Syria will almost 
inevitably have to build desalinization facilities in another 
decade or so as the potable water supply from other sources 
peaks. 
 
¶17. (SBU)   Infrastructure: Water networks: Of poor quality 
to begin with, Syria,s generally dilapidated municipal water 
networks waste 40-60% of the water that passes through them 
and pollutes much of the rest of the water that does not leak 
out, according to SARG officials and Syrian academics.  The 
SARG has initiated an effort to repair this antiquated 
infrastructure.  The government,s revamping of the networks 
began about five years ago in Damascus where the Japanese 
funded the complete replacement of the Damascus city water 
pipes over a lengthy period.  In the past year, the effort 
has broadened to other municipalities, where the upgrading 
process has slowed.  European financing ) including a  90 
million loan from European Investment Bank and a 26.7 million 
loan from the German Construction Bank ) will fund the 
SARG,s program to broaden the Damascus potable water network 
further into the suburbs, starting in 2007. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Dams: Syria,s 159 dams, mostly regulatory in 
nature, have storage capacity exceeding 15.8 cubic 
kilometers.  Syria has nine dams currently under construction 
or not yet in operation.  Many of Syria,s dams are 
approaching the end of their lifecycles and require extensive 
(and expensive) repairs, according to a Syrian source. 
Syria,s many outdated, Eastern Bloc-designed and constructed 
dams raise a host of safety concerns as well.  The 2002 
breach of the Zeyzoun Dam (Syria,s fourth largest in terms 
of storage capacity), which caused significant economic and 
humanitarian damage (ref D), provided a wake-up call to the 
SARG.  Since the Zeyzoun disaster, the SARG has quietly begun 
reinforcing its major dams, particularly those on the 
Euphrates due to lingering fears of a possible collapse of 
 
DAMASCUS 00004094  006 OF 008 
 
 
Turkey,s mammoth Ataturk Dam.  By contrast, the SARG has so 
far neglected to renovate the drainage systems of the 
Euphrates dams because of the prohibitive cost.  The 
dysfunctional drainage system puts 10,000 hectares of 
irrigated land out of production each year through 
over-salinization. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Pipelines: To meet the long-term water needs of 
Damascus and its suburbs, the SARG has been exploring two 
massive projects to transport water from well-endowed sources 
to the ailing city: 1) the Euphrates-Damascus pipeline, and 
2) the Coast-Damascus pipeline.  Both projects present major 
technical hurdles and financial burdens because they would 
require widespread use of expensive counter-gravity pumps. 
The price tag for each pipeline would exceed $1.5 billion -- 
probably by a lot, given the SARG,s history of cost 
underestimation.  The SARG has recently shown more interest 
in the Coast-Damascus pipeline, as it presents three 
advantages.  First, coastal basin water is less polluted than 
the oversalinated Euphrates water, especially important 
because most of the water would go toward human consumption. 
Second, the SARG could avoid international politics with the 
Coast-Damascus pipeline, but would have to engage with its 
downstream neighbor, Iraq, in order to pursue the Euphrates 
pipeline option.  Finally, if the SARG eventually developed a 
desalinization capability on Syria,s Mediterranean coast, as 
most experts anticipate, it could link the desalinized water 
supply to the Coastal pipeline.  The Coast-Damascus pipeline 
project was undergoing a feasibility study, as the SARG hoped 
to operationalize the pipeline by 2020, but has been delayed 
indefinitely due to funding problems. 
 
¶20. (SBU)   Water Sector Management and Governance: "Too many 
cooks in the kitchen": Syrian water sector management is 
plagued by overlapping agency portfolios, fragmented and 
vague water laws, unqualified staff, minimal coordination 
among government departments, and inadequate centralized 
planning and oversight.  Officially, the SARG,s water sector 
governance institutions consists of: the Ministry of 
Irrigation (ostensibly the lead water sector agency); the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Directorate of Irrigation and Water 
Uses; the Ministry of Housing and Public Services, 
Directorate of Water Supply and Waste Water; the State 
Planning Commission,s Irrigation and Agriculture Sector; the 
State Environmental Affairs Commission,s Water Environment 
Safety Sector; the Ministry of Local Government; and a host 
of municipal water directorates.  In July 2006, the DG of the 
Damascus Directorate of Water Resources complained publicly 
about the SARG,s lack of coordinated management of the water 
sector, blaming the failure on the existence of too many 
water authorities who did not cooperate.  Recognizing its 
dysfunction, the SARG proposed a plan in September 2005 to 
establish a General Commission for Water Resources that would 
restructure the Irrigation Ministry to create a central 
authority for managing water resources and local authorities 
for utilizing water.  Exacerbating the difficulties of 
managing Syria,s water resources, the SARG possesses no 
systematic data management, storage or collection networks 
with which to monitor the country,s water situation.  In 
fact, demonstrating its weak governing capabilities and 
fundamental information deficiencies, the SARG has so far 
utterly failed even to implement its 2000 plan to enhance 
monitoring of water resources by installing meters on all 
groundwater pumps around the country. 
 
¶21. (SBU) International Relations: Syria shares surface water 
resources with all of its neighbors, except Israel.  (Note: 
The issue of water rights in the Sea of Galilee represents 
one the main sticking points in Syrian-Israeli negotiations 
over the future of the Golan. End Note.)  Syria relies on its 
riparian neighbors, particularly Turkey which controls the 
headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, for a 
substantial portion of its water supply.  Given the regional 
scaricity of water and Syria,s own modest resources, water 
has been a politicized and generally contentious issue 
between Syria and its neighbors for years. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Tripartite Negotiations on the Tigris-Euphrates 
 
DAMASCUS 00004094  007 OF 008 
 
 
Basin: Management of this basin continues to top the SARG,s 
international water agenda because of the Syrian economy,s 
reliance on irrigation water from the Euphrates.  Despite a 
warming of Turkish-Syrian and Turkish-Iraqi relations the 
past few years, negotiations to reach a comprehensive 
agreement on the future of the Tigris-Euphrates Basin by the 
three riparian states show no significant signs of resuming. 
A locally-based Turkish diplomat cites Syria and Iraq,s 
unrealistic demands, lack of information-sharing and 
inefficient water infrastructure as obstacles to progress. 
He stated that the GOT viewed the SARG,s recent public 
praise of Turkey for releasing more than 500 m3/s from the 
Euphrates and private acknowledgement of Syria,s benefit of 
Turkey,s regulation of the Euphrates as good signs of 
Syria,s desire to reengage on the future of the basin.  The 
Turkish diplomat identified the Iraqis as the main stumbling 
block to resuming negotiations, observing that &this issue 
is not Iraq,s top priority right now.8 
 
¶23. (SBU)   Turkey: Having ceased accusing Turkey of both 
polluting the Euphrates and using water as a political 
weapon, Syria has recently used its official press to praise 
Turkey,s management of the Euphrates headwaters. 
Nevertheless, Syria publicly opposes Turkey,s plans to build 
the Ilisu Dam on the Tigris.  Syria,s greatest concern 
vis--vis water relations with Turkey will remain the flow it 
receives from the Euphrates. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Even though negotiations on the Tigris-Euphrates 
basin remain stalled, Syria and Turkey seem poised to 
increase cooperation on the Orontes River.  The local Turkish 
diplomat mentioned two promising joint projects still in 
their infancy.  The first is an &Early Warning System8 for 
floods managed by a Syrian-Turkish technical committee.  The 
diplomat explained that the GOT was ready to begin forming 
and planning the technical committee, but was waiting on the 
SARG to produce its delegation of technical experts to 
compose half the Joint Committee, which he expected to start 
meeting in September 2006.  The second is a dam on the 
Syrian-Turkish border.  The Turkish diplomat remarked that 
fairly intense GOT-SARG discussions on such a project had 
occurred, but noted that Turkey was again waiting on Syria to 
move forward. 
 
¶25. (SBU)   Iraq: Other than voicing joint opposition to 
Turkish dam-building on the Tigris River, Syria and Iraq have 
taken no noticeable steps to engage on water issues.  It does 
not appear that Iraq,s Water Minister, whom Syria had 
invited to Damascus for talks in 2004 (ref E), ever accepted. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Jordan: Water resources remain a source of friction 
in Syrian-Jordanian relations, in spite of the completion and 
inauguration of the &Unity8 Dam on the border in 2006. 
Jordanian officials continue to complain about Syria,s 
pollution of the Yarmouk River, illegal dam-building and 
capture of water that should flow into Jordan (ref F).  On 
the other hand, the SARG normally publicizes its annual 
release of three to seven million cubic meters of water to 
Jordan as being a response to an official plea from the GOJ. 
This year, in an apparent gesture of goodwill, the SARG 
quietly released the annual allotment of water to Jordon 
without the attendant negative press.  At a June 2006 meeting 
of the Jordanian-Syrian Higher Committee, a joint technical 
committee co-chaired by both countries, PMs, the GOJ and the 
SARG signed a cooperation agreement on water-sharing (ref G). 
 The details of this agreement have not become public. 
 
¶27. (SBU)   Lebanon: According to Syrian and international 
water experts, Lebanon is a natural net water exporter whose 
overabundant supply has historically languished because of 
inefficient infrastructure and incompetent resource 
management (ref H).  Under their current agreement, Lebanon 
draws 80 million m3/year of water from the Orontes River, 
with the remainder flowing to Syria.  It is not unreasonable 
to imagine Lebanon, under the right circumstances, becoming 
an important water source for Syria in the long run. 
 
¶28. (SBU)   Comment: With groundwater tables severely 
 
DAMASCUS 00004094  008 OF 008 
 
 
depleted and surface water supplies from abroad essentially 
fixed, efforts to make up Syria,s water shortfalls by 
boosting supply via water treatment facilities, 
desalinization plants and intranational pipelines appear to 
hold the most promise.  Yet these artificial solutions are 
extremely, perhaps prohibitively, expensive.  Faced with 
seriously declining oil production, the SARG is looking to 
Syria,s agricultural sector to compensate, but ongoing water 
shortages jeopardize the sustainability of Syria,s 
agricultural expansion.  A prolonged period of 
under-satisfied urban residential demand for water 
constitutes another potential source of social turmoil. 
Finally, if the technological solutions to Syria,s 
persistent water deficits prove infeasible, the SARG may 
aggressively pursue additional water supply from surface 
sources that it shares with its neighbors. 
CORBIN