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Viewing cable 06BRATISLAVA704, REACTION OF SLOVAKIA'S ETHNIC HUNGARIANS TO NEW GOVERNMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BRATISLAVA704 2006-08-21 06:04 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bratislava
VZCZCXRO5488
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHSL #0704/01 2330604
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210604Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0240
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRATISLAVA 000704 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM PREL KPAO LO
SUBJECT: REACTION OF SLOVAKIA'S ETHNIC HUNGARIANS TO NEW GOVERNMENT 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000704  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: New Slovak PM Robert Fico's decision to form a 
ruling coalition with the Slovak National Party (SNS) following the 
June 17 parliamentary elections elicited a strong negative reaction 
from the country's sizeable Hungarian minority. SNS leader Jan Slota 
is notorious for anti-minority remarks targeted mainly at ethnic 
Hungarians. Emboffs met with a number of prominent Slovak Hungarians 
from the political, cultural, and academic spheres to discuss their 
opinions about the new government. They expressed worries, lamenting 
that the SNS presence in the government has the potential to 
threaten minority rights and empower extremist nationalist groups 
throughout the country. The Hungarian community's main concern is 
that Hungarian-language education and the ability to use the 
language in public forums will be curtailed. US Embassy Bratislava 
will continue to take every opportunity to emphasize the importance 
of minority rights, tolerance, and ethnic diversity and speak out 
against hate crimes and any attempt to harm minority rights and 
cultural life.  In the meantime, the Slovak MFA is trying to tamp 
things down with its Hungarian counterparts.  END SUMMARY. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
2.  (U) According to the latest census (2001), ethnic Hungarians 
constitute almost 10 percent of Slovakia's population; they are the 
country's largest minority with a numerical strength of 520,000. The 
Hungarian Coalition Party (abbreviated SMK in Slovak and MKP in 
Hungarian) represents their interests on both the local and national 
levels. SMK was a member of the ruling coalition in 1998-2006 but is 
now part of the opposition along with its former coalition partners 
SDKU and KDH. The party ended up with 11.68 percent of the national 
vote in the June 17 elections, only slightly less than the 11.73 
percent that SNS received. SNS was the only party with which SMK 
categorically refused to enter a coalition agreement, as it 
considers SNS leader Jan Slota's nationalist agenda unacceptable. 
SNS was a member of the ruling coalition in the 1994-1998 government 
of Vladimir Meciar and has once again joined Meciar's HZDS (along 
with PM Robert Fico's Smer) in the government. SNS now has 20 seats 
in parliament (the same number as SMK) and controls the ministries 
of education, construction and regional development, and 
environment. 
 
3.  (SBU) Although the current tensions between Slovak nationalists 
and the country's Hungarian community are connected to SNS's recent 
return to power, they are rooted in conflicting views of the two 
nations' shared history. For hundreds of years, the area that now 
constitutes Slovakia was a part of the Hungarian (later 
Austro-Hungarian) empire; Slovaks point out that they faced 
discrimination as minorities in the country. The situation was 
reversed after World War I, when a large number of Hungarians ended 
up as minorities in the newly created Czechoslovakia. Arguments over 
past injustices and the fairness of the current border between the 
two countries still exist in both communities. Slovakia's ethnic 
Hungarians demonstrate a strong Hungarian identity and attachment to 
what they call the "mother country"; such sentiments raise questions 
about their loyalties to Slovakia. Some Slovaks fear that areas 
populated mainly by Hungarians wish to secede from the country and 
react strongly to suggestions of autonomy for these regions. 
Hungarians adamantly refute the claim of secessionist goals, arguing 
that they recognize that Slovakia is their home but wish that 
Slovaks would respect their cultural and linguistic differences. 
 
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR AMERICAN INTERESTS IN SLOVAKIA 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
4.  (SBU) The protection of minority rights is a vital component of 
democratic consolidation within multi-ethnic societies. Slovakia 
still struggles with the question of how to incorporate its minority 
groups into its political, economic, and cultural life. US Embassy 
Bratislava places a special emphasis on promoting diversity and 
tolerance in the country (FY 2008 Mission Performance Plan). The 
nationalist rhetoric and agenda of SNS pose a potential threat to 
minorities and undermine efforts to fully integrate them into 
society. Slovakia's new government has already garnered a negative 
reaction from the European community due to the inclusion of SNS in 
the ruling coalition; it is important that the country be forthright 
and strong in its protection of minority rights. Slota's rhetoric 
has the potential to cause divisions and instability within the 
government as the other coalition partners struggle to reign in the 
SNS leader and minimize the damage done by his remarks.  PM Fico has 
promised to keep Slota under control.  We will try to keep him to 
that promise. 
 
HUNGARIANS FEAR SNS INFLUENCE ON GOVERNMENT POLICY 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
5.  (SBU) Embassy contacts contend that the vast majority of 
Slovakia's ethnic Hungarians are dissatisfied and disappointed with 
the ruling coalition, mainly due to the presence of SNS. Although it 
is difficult to judge the new government from the few weeks that it 
has been in power, they argue that the signs pointing to its future 
ambitions are discouraging. The very names of Meciar and especially 
of Slota carry with them very negative associations, as the general 
point of view within the Hungarian community is that the latter did 
all he could to destroy Hungarian-language education and Hungarian 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000704  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
cultural life during the 1990s. Since the election in June, Slota 
has made several statements to foreign press that have enraged 
Hungarians in both Slovakia and Hungary. PM Fico's government states 
that it supports and values minority rights; Hungarians admit that 
Dusan Caplovic, the Deputy PM for European Affairs, Human Rights and 
Minorities seems very reasonable and trustworthy. Nonetheless, they 
question the extent to which the government's actions will mirror 
the stated commitment to minority issues. 
 
6.  (SBU) The single most important issue for many ethnic Hungarians 
is the availability of and support for Hungarian-language education 
(preschool through university). Embassy contacts argue that SNS 
asked for and received the Ministry of Education because the party 
opposes the very idea of education in minority languages. Prominent 
Hungarians from the academic sphere point to the difficulties that 
Hungarian-language schools faced in the 1990s under the Meciar 
government, which included an SNS-controlled Ministry of Education. 
Although the current government program does not propose any 
concrete changes to minority education, the wording it uses to 
discuss the topic demonstrates the influence of SNS. The program 
highlights the need to emphasize national values and patriotism in 
education and adds that instruction in minority languages cannot 
come at the expense of instruction in Slovak. Hungarian educators 
fear a move toward increasing the number of hours taught in Slovak 
in Hungarian-language schools, an obligation to teach an overly 
nationalist version of Slovak history, and a possible decrease in 
funding to minority education. The leadership of the Selye Janos 
University in Komarno (the country's only Hungarian-language 
institution of higher learning) is especially worried about the 
university's future, as many members of parliament opposed its 
establishment two years ago (Jan Mikolaj, the current Minister of 
Education, voted against it). Decreases in funding and 
politically-motivated decisions against the accreditation of its 
programs and degrees would seriously harm the university's prospects 
for survival. 
 
7.  (SBU) Ethnic Hungarians are also concerned about SNS control of 
the Ministry of Construction and Regional Development. Some of the 
most underdeveloped areas of the country are those that are 
inhabited mainly by Hungarians, and Hungarian politicians fear that 
there will be no efforts to develop them. The ministry controls much 
of the funding that Slovakia receives from the European Union, and 
Hungarians predict an inequitable distribution of these and other 
resources, directed away from regions with large Hungarian 
populations. The mayors of cities and villages in such regions fear 
an ethnically-motivated decrease in monetary support for 
infrastructure and community and cultural projects. They predict 
that the grant proposals they submit to the government might be 
rejected not because of poor quality but rather because they would 
mainly benefit Hungarians. 
 
8.  (SBU) In a more abstract sense, Hungarians also worry about a 
general change in societal attitude and an increase in ethnic 
tensions. The inclusion of SNS in the ruling coalition seemingly 
validates extremist opinions and thus empowers and emboldens people 
and groups with nationalist agendas. They are disappointed that a 
sizeable number of Slovaks support Slota and SNS; they fear this is 
a sign that the Hungarian community is far from gaining full 
acceptance in the country. Although there is no reason to predict 
any sort of violent confrontation, it is probable that people who 
hold anti-Hungarian views will express them more freely and openly 
than before (Embassy contacts point out recent increases in 
anti-Hungarian graffiti and verbal exchanges at sporting events). 
 
SMK PREPARES TO DEFEND HUNGARIAN INTERESTS 
------------------------------------------ 
9.  (SBU) SMK members expressed satisfaction with the party's 
election results, which they claim reflect that ethnic Slovaks also 
voted for it (although this is impossible to prove). Nonetheless, 
the party received around 40,000 less votes than it did in 2002. As 
a prominent researcher specializing in minority issues pointed out, 
these votes are always SMK's to lose, as Slovakia's Hungarians 
either vote for the party or stay home on election day. This 
suggests a level of dissatisfaction with the party's performance in 
the last government. Several embassy contacts suggested that they 
hope the loss of votes and the status as an opposition party will 
force SMK to rethink its programs and strategies and perhaps allow 
some new voices and ideas to shape its future. The president of an 
important Hungarian cultural organization told Emboffs that he 
expects more open and honest dialogue between the party, the 
government, and the people. SMK politicians argue that they will 
have very little room for action as an opposition party; instead, 
they will focus on monitoring the ruling coalition (especially in 
terms of possible measures and statements against minorities) and 
alert the international community if they feel something is amiss. 
They highlight the need to cooperate closely with SDKU and KDH to 
form a strong and united opposition. On the other hand, minority 
issues will dominate the SMK agenda to the detriment of the party, 
suggest some Embassy contacts. Over the past eight years, SMK 
successfully established itself as a party representing the 
interests of all of Slovakia as an actor in the national government. 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000704  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Now, however, SMK shows signs of reverting back to being an ethnic 
party with an almost exclusive focus on responding to anti-minority 
statements. It is up to party leader Bela Bugar to preserve a truly 
national, not regional or ethnic, focus for the SMK. 
 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE MEDIA 
--------------------------- 
10.  (SBU) As Slovakia's main Hungarian-language daily (circulation 
24,482; readership around 120,000), Uj Szo has devoted a great deal 
of coverage to minority issues and to the SNS agenda. Slota's 
statements have been the subject of numerous front-page articles and 
editorials over the past few weeks. Predictably, Uj Szo's slant 
favors Hungarians and SMK; the daily has been quite critical of the 
new government in general and of Slota in particular. Uj Szo's 
tendency to dwell on any remark or action that could be construed as 
anti-Hungarian is occasionally a bit sensationalistic; it certainly 
contributes to the sense of worry in the Hungarian community. 
 
GOVERNMENTS OF HUNGARY AND SLOVAKIA REACT 
----------------------------------------- 
11.  (SBU) The Hungarian government has paid close attention to 
Slovak politics in light of the composition of the new ruling 
coalition. Hungarian FM Kinga Goncz called for the Slovak government 
to distance itself from Slota's anti-minority remarks and agenda 
during her July meeting with new Slovak FM Jan Kubis. A diplomat at 
the Hungarian embassy in Bratislava explained that the Hungarian 
government feels some responsibility toward Slovakia's Hungarian 
community and thus will continue to speak out against negative 
statements and actions directed at them. Privately, Hungarian 
diplomats are worried and rather pessimistic but are unwilling to 
discuss the subject publicly for fear of misunderstanding and harm 
to bilateral relations. Hungarian diplomats note that it is an 
"immense gesture" on the part of the Hungarian government to 
emphasize good bilateral relations and to defend Slovakia in the 
international arena. Nonetheless, the Hungarian MFA is worried that 
PM Fico does not take their concerns seriously; he blithely 
dismissed a letter MFA Goncz wrote to the Slovak government in 
response to Slota's recent anti-Hungarian comments. In MFA Goncz's 
opinion, PM Fico has not adequately distanced himself or his 
government from Slota's positions. 
 
12.  (SBU) The Slovak MFA is also trying to ease interethnic 
tensions. Slovak FM Kubis' decision to go to Budapest for his first 
official visit abroad sent a strong signal that the country values 
good relations with Hungary, even though his visit elicited 
criticism from some members of the Slovak government (and Slovak 
President Ivan Gasparovic).  MFA officers said the GOS is trying to 
avoid escalating Slovak-Hungarian tensions by responding seriously 
to provocations, such as removing a recent video clip that 
circulated on the Internet and depicted Slovak youths burning a 
Hungarian flag.  It is also avoiding overreacting to rival Hungarian 
provocations, such as the throwing of paint on the Slovak Embassy in 
Budapest.  The MFA notes the GOS is attempting to control the 
nationalist elements within the ruling coalition; indeed, Slota has 
not made as many anti-minority remarks as he probably has had the 
opportunity to do. PM Fico made a point of attending the recent 
Hungarian National Day reception. Embassy contacts in the Hungarian 
community said they support and appreciate such efforts but add that 
they would like to see PM Fico condemn nationalism in general and 
Slota in particular much more strongly in the future. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
13.  (SBU) COMMENT: Slovakia's ethnic Hungarian community is 
decidedly pessimistic about the new government and the extent of SNS 
influence within it. Although some of them compare the new 
government to the one that was in power under Meciar's leadership, 
it is highly unlikely that the next four years will bear much 
resemblance to the 1990s. Slovakia is now a member of NATO, the 
OSCE, and the European Union; these institutions constrain possible 
actions against minorities. There are also a number of new legal 
frameworks in domestic legislation to protect minority rights. 
Nonetheless, ethnic Hungarians worry that the government will find 
ways to curtail minority life through more clandestine measures, 
such as decreases in funding for education, cultural activities, and 
municipalities with Hungarian populations. It is difficult to 
predict what constitutes the breaking point for Slovakia's Hungarian 
community, but above all Hungarians value their ability to use the 
Hungarian language in education, government offices, and public 
life. They will protest when this is threatened either through 
measures aimed at limiting Hungarian-language use or drastic 
decreases in monetary support for Hungarian-language institutions. 
 
14.  (SBU) In light of the current tensions, US Embassy Bratislava 
is using every opportunity available to promote the importance of 
tolerance, ethnic diversity, and respect for minority rights. The 
Ambassador has stressed these ideas in all his calls to new 
government officials and will continue to do so both in public and 
in private. We will publicly condemn hate speech and hate crimes 
while applauding efforts at minority integration. We recognize the 
concerns specific to the Hungarian community and will monitor the 
 
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government's statements and actions, particularly in the areas of 
education, culture, and regional development. The ultimate goal is 
to ease tensions and promote understanding between all Slovak 
citizens, including ethnic minorities. 
 
VALLEE