VZCZCXRO9476
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHBW #1277/01 2260922
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140922Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9141
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001277 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SR
SUBJECT: Serbian Parties Begin to Prepare for Elections 
 
 
BELGRADE 00001277  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Responding to perceptions that the international 
community will decide Kosovo independence in the near 
future, parties across the spectrum have begun to prepare 
for a tense political period and probable early elections 
in the aftermath.  Across the board, democratic parties 
remain unprepared and divided, although some are undergoing 
attempts to rectify their problems.  The nationalist 
parties remain strong with a dedicated following, but have 
failed to attract additional supporters to their xenophobic 
ideology.  They are hoping that even a modest backlash to 
Kosovo independence could secure for them a majority in the 
national assembly.  Most parties anticipate an IC decision 
for Kosovo independence in late winter with elections to 
follow in spring.  End Summary. 
 
The DSS: We're Angry and We Aren't Going to Take It Anymore 
----------------------- ----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Milos Aligrudic, the PM Kostunica's DSS Caucus 
Chair, avoided speculating to poloff about the future 
longevity of the governing coalition, but admitted the 
party is preparing for elections in the near future.  Many 
in his party and the governing coalition anticipate a 
difficult future Kosovo status solution to be handed down 
in early 2007 with elections to follow.  This would allow 
the GOS to save some face since, according to Serbian law, 
elections at anytime next year are not considered "early." 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In speaking of future political partners, 
Aligrudic told poloff that the DSS was equidistant from the 
Democratic Party (DS) and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). 
He was noncommittal on cooperation with the DS, while 
suggesting that collaboration with the SRS could be 
possible under the right circumstances.  Nonetheless, Prime 
Minister Kostunica recently told Ruzica Djindjic, wife of 
the late premier, that he would prefer to form a coalition 
with the DS instead of the SRS, both of whom offered him 
the premiership in the next government. (Some months ago, 
Kostunica told the Ambassador that he would never form a 
government with the Radicals, arguing that it "would go 
against everything" he has stood for in his political 
life.) 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Aligrudic complained that the DSS' development 
was arrested during the Milosevic period and as a result 
its bureaucracy is overly centralized, with a 
disproportionate authority over party operations resting 
with Premier Kostunica.  Conversely, local leaders have too 
much control over day-to-day activities on the ground, 
reflecting the DSS' lack of a central political strategy. 
Experts have complimented the DSS's recent efforts to 
overhaul its creaking, chaotic party structure, but 
acknowledge that this process will last an extended period 
and that the party will suffocate under the weight of its 
bureaucracy in the meantime. 
 
The DS: We'll Get to It...After the Vacation 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) President Tadic's party has been reeling from a 
series of local election defeats since his 2004 
presidential victory, which include losses in Nis, Novi 
Sad, and Kragujevac (Serbia's second, third, and fourth 
most populous cities).  The loss of its central Serbia 
stronghold, Uzice, on July 16 and the recent split in its 
critical Belgrade chapter are yet more setbacks that 
threaten the party's ability to act.  Party insiders are 
frustrated with the influence of several of Tadic's close 
childhood friends from the public relations sector who 
serve as spin-doctors/advisors, but have little standing in 
the party.  Outside experts have lamented the DS' lack of 
message, its poor internal communication, weak local 
leadership, an aloof presidency, and--most of all--a 
seeming unwillingness to address these recognized problems. 
Pessimists within the party's leadership have grown 
concerned about increasingly unfavorable polls and some 
have even privately voiced their belief that the Radicals 
are unbeatable and that the next election is already lost. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In a meeting with poloff, Dusan Petrovic, first 
deputy president of the party, faithfully defended the DS, 
highlighting its solid support (19 percent) and noting that 
the party was addressing its dficiencies, a response we 
have heard many times efore.  He gave vague assurances 
that the party ould begn to create a platform sometime 
after th summer vacation, focused on economic issues, but 
heavily playing on the public's fear o an SRS victory.  He 
added that President Tadic will be able to draw throngs to 
the polls, once he gets around to hitting the stump, and 
 
BELGRADE 00001277  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
that they are relying on the West to spend lavishly on a 
GOTV campaign. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Additionally, Slobodan Homen, a member of the DS 
Main Board, told poloff in mid-July that the Democrats 
would begin a more aggressive approach to coalition 
building due to fear that an election could occur earlier 
than expected.  Smaller parties have complained for years 
that the DS offers of partnership translated as requests of 
servitude, providing the DS with needed support in return 
for nothing.  Last week Tadic visited Minister Draskovic to 
discuss a pre-election coalition between the DS and SPO, 
and an insider close to Tadic has told us the president is 
preparing a substantial offer to the G-17 Plus that could 
include accepting Finance Minister Dinkic as premier. 
[Comment: The DS remains the key to Serbia's short-term 
democratic and economic transition, which makes its 
lackadaisical approach to preparation all the more 
frustrating.  An honest self-appraisal, hard work, and 
Western assistance as part of an aggressive GOTV campaign 
will be needed to halt its hemorrhaging of supporters.  End 
Comment]. 
 
The SPO: For King and President? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Vlajko Senic, General Secretary of FM Draskovic's 
shrinking SPO, told poloff that the party is facing a 
significant challenge and likely will only reenter 
parliament through a pre-election coalition.  The party has 
a three part plan for early elections, which it believes 
will occur after an international community pronouncement 
of Kosovo independence early next year.  First, Draskovic 
will spend less time concentrating on his Foreign Minister 
duties and begin campaigning throughout the country.  Senic 
noted that Draskovic's aloofness from the SPO had 
undermined its support since 2003.  Second, the party would 
highlight its support for restoration of the monarchy, in 
hopes of attracting support from the 14 percent of Serbs 
that advocate for a return of the king (Senic noted quietly 
that this is a political ploy and not a key political 
goal). 
 
9.(SBU) Political analysts have opined that this unique 
approach could bear fruit for the SPO because even the low 
support for the royals is significantly better than the 
SPO's current polling results.  Third, it will seek an 
alliance with President Tadic and the DS to ensure that it 
crosses the five percent parliamentary threshold. 
[Comment: Danica Draskovic, wife of the SPO president and 
influential party leader, allegedly half-jokingly 
threatened President Tadic that, if the DS did not make a 
good offer to the SPO, then the party would side with the 
DS-nemesis Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).  End Comment]. 
 
The G-17+: Dazed and Confused 
----------------------------- 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Deputy Premier Dulic-Markovic (strictly protect) 
told poloff that she does not anticipate that the coalition 
will survive its mandate (while making clear her disdain 
for Kostunica's policies).  She would not confirm to poloff 
(though she had done so to the Ambassador previously) that 
Finance Minister and G-17 Plus leader, Mladjan Dinkic, 
would fulfill his promise to withdraw the party's support 
for the GOS on October 1 if EU negotiations were still 
frozen.  [Comment: Observers have suggested that Dinkic 
will renege on his promise if he cannot cut a pre-election 
deal with the DS and if he retains the potential to siphon 
off significant funds from the GOS.  End Comment]. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Dulic-Markovic acknowledged that the G-17 Plus 
was in trouble and would not likely enter parliament 
without help.  Although the party has belatedly begun 
internal reforms, analysts point out that the G-17 Plus 
lacks a credible message since it failed to live up to its 
reform-oriented, anti-corruption platform, which prompted 
its base to abandon it (support for the party plummeted 
from about 10 percent in 2003 to 2.9 percent in June).  To 
this end, Dulic-Markovic said the G-17 Plus is looking to 
form an alliance with the DS, but complained bitterly that 
the Democrats had offered them nothing.  Many pundits also 
anticipate that Dinkic will attempt to redirect funds from 
upcoming privatizations into G-17 Plus coffers, which could 
dramatically increase the party's war chest and ability to 
utilize the media to campaign. 
 
The LDP: Momentum Versus Polling 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) LDP President Cedomir "Ceda" Jovanovic presented 
 
BELGRADE 00001277  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
to poloff the steps to prepare his party for elections that 
he foresees in spring.  The party has established offices 
in 112 of Serbia's 145 municipalities and registered 23,000 
members (although it remains well below its goal of 
250,000) since its inception in November 2005. 
Additionally, it has scored a series of moderate successes 
in local elections, including its first mayoral victory in 
June.  The LDP still faces an uphill challenge, though.  It 
is only polling at two percent nationally and the 
anticipated merger with its ally, the Civic Alliance of 
Serbia (GSS), has stalled due to GSS demands for guaranteed 
positions in the LDP hierarchy and election list. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Milka Puzigaca, a respected political analyst, 
said she is confident that the LDP will cross the 
threshold.  She noted that the party has a lot of momentum, 
its supporters are the most loyal and active, and its 
Western, reform-oriented image and message could appeal to 
the mass of disaffected voters who are looking for someone 
with vision.  Additionally, according to this one analyst, 
Jovanovic (though hardly an uncontroversial figure) could 
receive a boost from smaller parties joining his election 
coalition, although he admits he is battling large egos who 
each want to be the big man in the party. 
 
The SRS and SPS: Power to the People 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The SRS and SPS are both expecting elections in 
spring, following an announcement of Kosovo's final status 
at the end of the year.  According to a reliable Embassy 
contact, Milorad Vucelic, the leader of the 
ultranationalist wing in the SPS, indicated that this was 
the general opnion of the governing coalition.  Aleksander 
Vucic, the SRS General Secretary, said that the Radical 
expect the same.  Vuclic added, however, that,the only 
thing that could trigger elections thisyear would be for 
the international community toannounce final status before 
expected.  Regardless, this is the moment both parties have 
been awaiting: an unpopular GOS forced to deal with the 
loss of Kosovo, which they hope will give them a temporary 
boost in the polls that will propel them to power. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) As a result of this perceived timeline, neither 
the SRS nor SPS has begun to prepare actively for 
elections.  The SPS is focused on the struggle for 
leadership--and the party's future ideological direction-- 
which will reach its climax at the party's congress in 
December.  Analysts suggest that an election this year 
could be a disaster for the SPS, which will be woefully 
unprepared.  The SRS has begun to develop a strategy, but 
it is in its nascent stages and the party has done little 
else to prepare.  Vucic and acting party leader, Tomislav 
Nikolic, plan on implementing an extensive door-to-door 
campaign that utilizes the party's sizeable grassroots 
network.  They plan to use this strategy because they know 
that their party cannot match the tycoon-fueled war chests 
of the ruling parties, which monopolize the media. 
Ironically, both hope to follow the example of the 
opposition's electoral victory over Milosevic, despite his 
likewise large monetary advantage and unscrupulous 
manipulation of state structures and media, as a guide for 
their strategy. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU) All parties assume elections will be in the 
spring because of their perceptions of the Kosovo 
timetable.  We have noted recently, however, a growing fear 
that a pronouncement on Kosovo may come much earlier, 
prompting the parties to worry about their lack of 
preparation.  Even the DS, which has been pushing for early 
elections since January, has not done the necessary work to 
win. Observers have noted that an announcement of early 
elections by the GOS will begin a two month period (until 
the actual elections are held) during which there will be 
no parliament and a caretaker government unwilling or 
unable to take any decision on important issues, e.g. 
Kosovo.  We have begun our planning of the crucial GOTV 
campaign (septel), and will be working intensely in the 
months ahead to focus all of the democratic parties on 
Serbia's future after Kosovo. 
POLT