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O 161653Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5109
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0103
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002672 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2016 
TAGS: IS LE MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  PM SINIORA PLANS COUNTER-PUNCH (BUT, 
ALAS, NOT A KNOCK-OUT ONE) TO NASRALLAH 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman.  Reason: Section 1.4 (b). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C/NF)  In a 8/16 meeting with the Ambassador, PM Siniora 
stated that his number one goal at this point is to get the 
LAF into south Lebanon as quickly as possible.  This will be 
a significant achievement.  He discounted much of Hassan 
Nasrallah's recent "victory" rhetoric as simply that, and 
planned to address the Lebanese nation this evening to 
explain the peace, and exactly what the country stands to 
gain with implementation of UNSCR 1701.  Siniora acknowledged 
that he's walking a tightrope with Hizballah, but he 
projected confidence that his approach will succeed in the 
long run.  The Prime Minister once again asked the U.S. and 
the international community to give him tangible results to 
win the battle for Lebanese hearts and minds, and 
specifically, the rapid opening of the country's airport and 
seaports.  He said that he sought German help on ports and 
borders (but did not specify what exactly he requested or was 
offered).  He seeks international recognition that Shebaa 
will be addressed.  Finally, accepting our criticism that the 
GOL appeared to abdicate initial reconstruction to Hizballah, 
PM Siniora is placing Lebanon's reconstruction effort under 
the leadership of Ghassan Taher, a trusted (Shia) colleague 
of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Prime Minister Fouad Siniora met with the 
Ambassador and poloff at the Grand Serail on August 16. 
Senior advisors Mohammad Chatta and Rola Nouraddine also 
attended the meeting.  The Prime Minister was in better 
spirits than we have experienced lately.  He expressed 
confidence that things were going relatively well.  A number 
of Government Ministers, including Minister of Economy and 
Trade Sami Haddad and Minister of Finance Jihad Azour, were 
departing his office as we arrived. 
 
PRIMARY MISSION:  LAF DEPLOYMENT 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C/NF)  PM Siniora emphasized that most of his energy now 
is directed toward moving the LAF quickly into positions in 
the south, because this action, he believes will demonstrate 
to the people of Lebanon that a sea change has occurred.  He 
stated that if the Army could establish its authority in 
heretofore denied territory, Hizballah would have no option 
but to fall back.  In his analysis, Hizballah could not 
afford a clash with Lebanese troops. 
 
¶4.  (C/NF)  Referring to his almost constant communication 
with Speaker Nabih Berri, he stated that Hizballah had 
already committed itself to two necessary steps:  it would 
turn over all of its fixed bases to the  LAF, and it would 
have no "conspicuous, apparent presence" in south Lebanon 
once the army deployed.  Siniora also said he had extracted a 
promise that no area of south Lebanon would be "out of 
bounds" for the LAF.  (Note:  For several years, UNIFIL had 
not been permitted to enter nor overfly certain Hizballah 
"training areas" in the UNIFIL area of responsibility.  End 
note.) 
 
¶5.  (C/NF)  Speaking metaphorically, Siniora said, "If I 
don't go to the south, Nasrallah will believe I am leaving 
the south for him."  Siniora assured the Ambassador that his 
Government was asking more from Hizballah than what most 
observers believed.  He indicated that Lebanon's army will be 
taking the first steps toward deployment "within a very few 
days" and that full deployment would be completed within 
three weeks.  He said that he expected to secure cabinet 
approval later that evening for the LAF deployment, something 
Siniora described as a historic opportunity he did not wish 
to miss. 
 
CLARIFICATION REQUESTED 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C/NF)  PM Siniora complained about two issues:  the 
mixed message he says is being put out by the UN and the lack 
of attention being paid to Shebaa.  Siniora maintained that 
Geir Pedersen, Personal Representative of the UN SYG in 
Lebanon, had delivered a muddled message to Hizballah 
representatives that, according to Siniora, they "shouldn't 
worry" about disarmament until "the second phase."  If this 
 
BEIRUT 00002672  002 OF 003 
 
 
was accurate, and Siniora admitted it was second-hand 
information, the Prime Minister said it was making his 
difficult discussions with Nabih Berri that much tougher. 
 
¶7.  (C/NF)  Siniora also asked exactly when the international 
community was going to address Shebaa in a manner that would 
allow his Government to use the issue as a battering ram 
against Nasrallah.  He reiterated that if the international 
community, perhaps in the UN SYG's address scheduled for this 
Friday, would affirm that it viewed Shebaa as a legitimate 
issue, it would give Siniora and his pro-reform Ministers an 
instrument they need to crystallize the argument that it was 
the Government of Lebanon that achieved recognition of Shebaa 
through negotiations on the resolution 1701 -- and not 
Hizballah.  The Prime Minister strongly stated, "With this 
issue, I can finally take Hizballah's weapons." 
 
¶8.  (C/NF)  PM Siniora also addressed the deployment of 
"UNIFIL-plus," describing it as the essential element in 
empowering the LAF in its difficult mission.  Describing his 
concept of the impending operations in the south, PM Siniora 
said UNIFIL should not be overly "pro-active," but should 
supply those capabilities the Lebanese force still lacked, 
especially in the fields of intelligence, communications, and 
transport.  Once again, the Prime Minister voiced profound 
confidence in the commitment, ability, and loyalty of his 
army, but said they still required the added capabilities of 
a modern army.  He re-emphasized that the first elements to 
enter former Hizballah positions and collect arms would be 
the LAF, not the multi-national elements of UNIFIL plus. 
 
THWARTING NASRALLAH'S ATTEMPTED COUP D'ETAT 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C/NF)  PM Siniora made clear his awareness that Hassan 
Nasrallah was attempting to achieve in the post-conflict 
phase what Hizballah could not achieve in the war, namely a 
virtual coup d'etat of the Government by assuming 
governmental responsibilities and authorities.  Siniora was 
convening a session of his Council of Ministers that evening 
and said he would also address the nation in a televised 
speech.  He intended to clearly explain what Lebanon achieved 
and what it suffered.  Siniora said he planned to compare the 
costs suffered by both Lebanon and Israel -- and to make the 
point that if this is what "victory" looks like, who needs it. 
 
¶10.  (C/NF)  From his remarks, it was clear that PM Siniora 
considers Hassan Nasrallah's claims of victory to be absurd, 
and almost obscene considering the loss of innocent life. 
Siniora said that the people of Lebanon may still be in shock 
at the violence of the conflict, but they are intelligent 
enough to understand the high price Nasrallah forced them to 
pay. 
 
¶11.  (C/NF)  The Prime Minister emphasized that his goal 
tonight was to describe his vision of an "inclusive" state, 
where an empowered government fulfilled its responsibilities 
to all its citizens in all the country's regions. 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 
-------------- 
 
¶12.  (C/NF)  Faced with the enormity of the imminent 
reconstruction of the country, PM Siniora acknowledged that 
his office has too few resources to manage every aspect of 
what appears will be a multi-billion effort.  With regard to 
the significant sums of aid being pledged, especially by Arab 
states, PM Siniora indicated he would allow the donating 
states to execute various projects, as long as they adhered 
to the Government's overall plan. 
 
¶13.  (C/NF)  He confided that in the next few days, he would 
appoint Ghassan Taher, a well-respected project manager who 
had previously worked closely with former Prime Minister 
Rafiq Hariri, in addition to possessing government experience 
in the airline sector.  In Siniora's view, Ghassan Taher, a 
Shia from south Lebanon, would be accepted by both government 
ministers and Lebanon's sectarian communities.  He also 
stated that Taher would be assisted in his work by the 
Minister of Finance and Minister of Economy and Trade. 
(Note:  Our FSN staff describes Taher in glowing terms.  End 
note.) 
 
¶14.  (C/NF)  Siniora said he doesn't want all the promised 
 
BEIRUT 00002672  003 OF 003 
 
 
aid to be forced through the "cube" of government, indicating 
that market forces and the international aid community may 
provide better efficiencies and be more agile. 
 
BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT -- A SYMBOL 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C/NF)  The Prime Minister ended the meeting with a 
renewed appeal to expedite the re-opening of Beirut 
International Airport, as well as the country's seaports.  He 
argued that not only were these avenues of commerce 
critically important for economic recovery and the 
reconstruction effort, but also served as a symbol of 
national sovereignty. 
 
¶16.  (C/NF)  He insisted that U.S. concerns about Hizballah's 
long-standing control of the airport were being addressed as 
he spoke.  He asked the Ambassador to discuss the particulars 
with Minister of Interior Ahmed Fatfat, but that the 
principal improvement involved replacement of 
Hizballah-influenced elements of the LAF stationed at the 
airport with more independent (and Sunni dominated) ISF 
personnel. 
 
¶17.  (C/NF)  In a brief meeting with Minister Fatfat 
afterwards, the Interior Minister confirmed that ISF General 
Yassir Mahmoud (Druze -- someone Walid Jumblatt told us 
separately could be trusted) had been selected by ISF 
Commander General Rifi to serve as the "president of a 
committee" that will supervise the security of the Beirut 
airport.  That committee took up position today.  Fatfat also 
indicated that Cabinet approval was not needed because the 
applicable Ministries of Finance, Public Works, and Defense, 
had already authorized the appointment.  Minister Fatfat said 
these changes were being implemented immediately, with 120 of 
an eventual 400 new ISF personnel already stationed at the 
facility. 
 
¶18.  (C/NF)  The PM expressed deep impatience with the 
Ambassador's suggestion that the airport be opened to 
passenger traffic in stages, with a possible interim step 
being an air bridge to Amman as security procedures were put 
in place.  The blockade on the airport, Siniora insisted, 
must be lifted entirely, in order to empower the government 
and restore a symbol of Lebanon's sovereignty.  The 
Ambassador asked Siniora about requesting UNIFIL or 
international assistance to help ensure proper security. 
Siniora said that he had already talked with the German 
Foreign Minister about this, and the Germans were positively 
inclined to help.  (The PM interrupted the meeting to ask an 
aide to place a call to the Germans.)  But Siniora, with a 
line of people waiting to see him, did not go into details on 
exactly what the Germans might provide.  Walking the 
Ambassador to the door, he complained that Israel still does 
not understand that its measures hurt the GOL much more than 
they hurt Hizballah.  Hizballah can still sneak people across 
the Syrian border, whereas the March 14 politicians have to 
beg for spots on French or American helicopters, reinforcing 
the impression of collusion and impotence. 
FELTMAN