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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002665 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, INR, AND PM; 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2016 
TAGS: MOPS PTER PREL LE SY IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: DEFENSE MINISTER AWAITS CABINET DECISION 
ON DEPLOYMENT 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 2553 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 2583 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador.  Reason 1.4(d). 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  During a downbeat 8/15 meeting with the Ambassador 
and poloff, Lebanese Defense Minister Elias Murr said he 
awaits a Cabinet decision on moving forward with LAF 
deployment to the South, but that his personal opinion is 
that the LAF cannot coexist for long in the South with an 
armed Hizballah.  He argued that the LAF needs to be 
strengthened significantly and as soon as possible in order 
to counter the belief, as voiced by a churlish and 
patronizing Hassan Nasrallah in his 8/14 speech, that the LAF 
isn't capable of defending Lebanon on its own.  Murr said 
that the relatively weak Israeli military performance, 
particularly in the conflict's final days, had bolstered 
Hizballah, which was why the group is now reluctant to give 
up their arms even south of the Litani.  Describing the 
atmosphere in the Cabinet (Note.  As of this time, the 
Cabinet session meant originally for 8/13 has still not taken 
place due to differences over disarmament.  End Note), Murr 
worried that the Sunni leadership -- PM Siniora in particular 
-- are simply too weak-kneed to challenge the Shi'a on the 
disarmament issue now, and this unwillingness to stare down 
Hizballah would leave the materially unprepared LAF stranded 
in a dangerously-combustible situation in the South.  End 
Summary. 
 
"THE WORST ARMY IN THE WORLD" 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Sitting in his study surrounded by a stunning 
collection of Greek Orthodox icons, Murr informed the 
Ambassador that senior LAF and IDF officers met on 8/14 at 
UNIFIL headquarters in the southern city of Naqoura to 
coordinate the deployment/withdrawal, noting that the 
Israelis behaved "sweetly" and asked if the LAF "could come 
tomorrow."  Murr was amazed that the Israelis had already 
pulled most of their troops out of the South, even though the 
LAF and UNIFIL-plus might still be several days away from 
deploying.  Murr complained that the vacuum left by the 
Israeli "defection on the ground" is being rapidly reclaimed 
by Hizballah.  In addition, what he saw as the relatively 
poor Israeli military performance, especially over the last 
two days of conflict when dozens of Israeli soldiers were 
killed, had left Hizballah in a triumphant and uncompromising 
mood.  "The IDF put us in a difficult situation," complained 
Murr, adding in a typical flourish, "They are the worst army 
in the world." 
 
¶3.  (C)  Murr said that Hizballah now believes that since it 
apparently fought the mighty IDF to a standstill on the 
ground, that it is therefore in a position to dictate to the 
Lebanese what terms it would and would not accept.  Whereas 
it appeared only a week ago that Hizballah had seemingly 
agreed to the LAF deployment and the group's disarmament 
south of the Litani, by Sunday 8/13 Hizballah was no longer 
in such a generous mood, forcing the postponement of the 
Cabinet session.  Nasrallah's speech on the evening of Monday 
8/14 only further strengthened this feeling that Hizballah, 
as the putative "victor" in the conflict, no longer needs to 
make concessions.  "Nasrallah thinks of himself as stronger 
than Abdel Nasser and bigger than Asad," Murr exclaimed, 
"Hizballah carries the banner of having beaten Israel. 
Nasrallah will be very aggressive now." 
 
"NO KNEES" 
---------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Murr admitted that the prospect of deploying the LAF 
into a zone still crawling with armed Hizballahis is not 
ideal and that, if he had his preference, he would not send 
the army to become "a filet" between Hizballah and Israel. 
Murr said that if the decision were to come down to him, he 
would rather resign than deploy into that kind of situation. 
However, he believes the Cabinet will ultimately give the 
final go-ahead for deployment, which he will abide by, though 
 
BEIRUT 00002665  002 OF 003 
 
 
he thinks the question of Hizballah's weapons in the South 
will unfortunately remain unresolved.  Murr said that he had 
pressed the disarmament issue during the Cabinet session on 
Saturday August 12, but that others in the Cabinet had not 
wanted to pursue the matter at that time.  "My recommendation 
blew up the government in the last meeting."  He said that 
Hizballah Minister for Energy and Water Mohammad Fneich had 
replied to a question about arms, "You want our arms that are 
protecting Lebanon from Israel?  Come take them by force." 
(Comment.  As he claims, Murr may indeed have pushed the 
issue during the last Cabinet session.  An editorial by 
Ibrahim Amin, considered a Nasrallah mouthpiece, in the 
August 14 edition of Al-Akhbar newspaper noted that the 
"Minister of Defense said that he was prepared to deploy the 
Army to the South, but there should be no armed presence 
except the army."  End Comment.) 
 
¶5.  (C)  Murr hopes that the disarmament issue causes the 
next Cabinet session, whenever it is finally held, to 
"explode."  Unfortunately, he said, the only people prepared 
to go face-to-face against Hizballah in the Cabinet are 
himself and non-Sunni March 14 members Joe Sarkis, Pierre 
Gemayel, Nayla Moawad, and Marwan Hamadeh.  Otherwise, he 
lamented, "the Sunna have no knees and no experience" to go 
against Hizballah.  "Saad (Hariri) should have been tougher 
from the beginning," Murr complained, while PM Siniora had 
asked Murr to be "firm but smooth" about the disarmament 
issue, and to "not cause him any problems."  (Note.  During 
the meeting Murr took a call from PM Siniora, who asked Murr 
to call back once the Ambassador had left.  Inviting the 
Ambassador to stay, Murr called Siniora back after five 
minutes. The Prime Minister wanted to know what the 
Ambassador had said regarding the deployment.  End Note). 
While the Sunni March 14 members want Hizballah to disarm, 
said Murr, they are unwilling to rock the boat for fear of 
exacerbating Sunni-Shi'ite tensions, and will let the 
Christians and Druze take the lead.  Unleashing an arsenal of 
expletives, the Defense Minister complained that, "This is 
the problem with the Sunna, they want to f**k with the d**k 
of others." 
 
STRENGTHEN THE ARMY 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Acknowledging that the deployment of the army will 
likely go ahead, but that disarmament of Hizballah in the 
South will likely be put on hold for the time being, Murr 
said that the best option is to strengthen the LAF and the 
UNIFIL-plus force as much and as soon as possible. 
Otherwise, Hizballah can continue to claim, as Hassan 
Nasrallah did during his televised August 14 speech, that the 
army is not sufficiently equipped and is therefore incapable 
of defending Lebanon.  Murr wants to snatch away this trump 
card from Hizballah and its Iranian and Syrian backers. 
Hizballah, he said, had used "super-equipment," such as 
Korean anti-tank missiles modified in Iran to pierce the 
Merkava tank armor, in order to defeat the Israelis.  The LAF 
also needs to be "super-equipped" in order -- and clearly 
here he was referring to both Hizballah and Israel -- "to 
resist, to defend, and to destroy if necessary."  Murr asked 
if the LAF could be supported and rapidly equipped, so that 
in "three months" the Lebanese can come to the negotiating 
table and tell Hizballah thank you, but its arms are no 
longer needed in defense of the country.  Murr basically 
explained that he saw the LAF gradually gaining the upper 
hand over Hizballah in the south by a combination of new 
equipment to the LAF, beefed-up UNIFIL presence, and 
enforcement of weapons shipments to Hizballah. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Regarding the monitoring of the border between 
Lebanon and Syria, Murr said that it wouldn't be a problem to 
move 7500 LAF troops there and to erect towers and radar 
equipment, and added that "UNIFIL will help."  When the 
Ambassador asked how Murr planned to get Cabinet support for 
this plan, Murr waved his hand dismissively and claimed the 
"enforcement of the border doesn't need Cabinet approval." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  While his comments on border monitoring without 
 
BEIRUT 00002665  003 OF 003 
 
 
Cabinet approval are clearly unrealistic, Murr seems to 
finally be getting a grasp on the complexities involved in 
LAF deployment to the South (Note. See reftels for his 
earlier, rosier predictions. End Note).  Of the options 
facing the Lebanese government -- don't deploy the LAF at 
all, deploy but with an armed Hizballah presence in the 
South, or deploy as Hizballah disarms in the South -- the 
last is obviously the preferred choice.  Murr prefers this 
option as well, but is willing to go with the second option 
if so directed by the rest of the Cabinet.  His argument is 
that Lebanon should not lose the historic opportunity to get 
the army to the south, and that reequipping the LAF (and 
adding in the beefed-up UNIFIL) will tip the balance of power 
in the south to the LAF's favor. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Murr's comments on Sunni reticence to challenge 
Hizballah highlight a real concern in the current political 
bartering in Lebanon.  Unless Siniora and others from March 
14 are willing to stand as one -- Maronite, Sunni, and Druze 
-- and compel Hizballah to disarm in the South now, 
disregarding all of Hizballah's and Syria's attempts to paint 
them as "traitors" in league with the "Zionist entity," then 
it looks as though the GOL will have to settle for the second 
option -- with the LAF, UNIFIL-plus, and Hizballah all armed 
and in the same bed, and a jumpy Israel just across the Blue 
Line.  We have noted that the Maronite March 14 members 
remain outspoken on the issue of disarmament, despite 
implicit death threats against them in the Hizballah-allied 
media, while on the Druze side Walid Joumblatt will likely 
add to these calls during a press conference scheduled for 
August 17.  The one weak point remains the Sunnis -- as well 
as Nabih Berri who, though he hates Hizballah, is unlikely to 
openly confront the group -- and we will work on stiffening 
the backbones of PM Siniora, Saad Hariri and other Sunni 
March 14 members to join in the fray, if not publicly then at 
least in the Cabinet, to press Hizballah to disarm at least 
in the South now.  As we will report septel, the Ambassador 
met with Siniora on 8/16 -- a day after the conversation with 
Murr -- and Siniora is moving to retake the initiative in a 
step-by-step approach to UNSCR 1701 implementation. 
FELTMAN