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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002625

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2016
TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER SY LE IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GHATTAS KHOURY SUPPORTS GRADUAL SOLUTION
TO HIZBALLAH ARMS

Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d
).

SUMMARY
--------

¶1. (C) During an August 14 lunch with Ambassador Feltman
and poloff, former Hariri MP and Jumblatt-ally Ghattas Khoury
said that now -- meaning today -- is not the time to corner
Hizballah on full disarmament, although that moment is
quickly approaching. Voicing concern about the increasingly
thretening tone being used against March 14 movement
politicians, and claiming that Syria hopes to sow civil war
in Lebanon, Khoury nevertheless does not believe that the
current Cabinet impasse will lead to a violent confrontation.
Khoury said that Nabih Berri is the key player in getting
Hizballah to agree to disarm south of the Litani and in
securing replacement of President Emile Lahoud. Khoury's
meeting was a prelude to the Ambassador's dinner meeting
later on August 14 with Walid Jumblatt (to be reported
septel), whom Khoury admitted has a much less gradualist view
of Hizballah disarmament. End Summary.

DEALING WITH HIZBALLAH
----------------------

¶2. (C) Khoury is a Maronite from Jumblatt's Shouf region
who used to hold the one Maronite MP seat for Beirut, on
Rafiq Hariri's parliamentary list. Now a close ally to Saad
Hariri, Khoury does not feel that the Cabinet should confront
Hizballah now about full disarmament, as PM Siniora privately
argues, but rather should concentrate on an initial phase of
disarmament south of the Litani river. According to Khoury,
this would put a safe distance between Hizballah and its
nemesis, Israel, thereby causing the group's militancy to
wither. "Get them away from the border, and they become
obsolete. There is no harm in stalling for a year."

¶3. (C) Ultimately, according to Khoury, Hizballah must be
convinced that a strong Lebanese state is the best salvation
for Lebanon. The GOL has an excellent opportunity to
demonstrate its effectiveness through championing the
reconstruction effort in the South, though Khoury 粑tressed
that any support should not be channelled through Berri or
Hizballah. He suggested that the effort be "Arab-led."

¶4. (C) Khoury commented that, "legally we're very covered"
on the issue of disarmament, based on the Taif Accords and
UNSCRs 1559, 1680, and 1701. All call in one way or another
for Hizballah disarmament. He did not think it would be a
big problem to get Hizballah to agree at least to disarmament
south of the Litani. He admitted that Jumblatt is much more
hard-line on the issue of full Hizballah disarmament,
concerned that Hizballah weapons north of the Litani could be
used against his nearby Shouf stronghold of Mukhtara. "Walid
says, either we have a deal now on full disarmament, or there
is no deal."

STORM CLOUDS?
-------------

¶5. (C) Khoury worried about the foreboding tone in recent
days in the Hizballah-affiliated press, accusing March 14
Cabinet ministers of treachery and of conspiring with Israel
to weaken "the resistance." He believed that Syria, largely
ignored during the negotiations over UNSCR 1701, would try to
foment civil war in Lebanon. Khoury did not think it likely
that Hizballah would choose to turn its weapons on other
Lebanese. "It would lose a lot. It then becomes a militia.
But, it'd be a big militia."

¶6. (C) Khoury held that Syria's ultimate goal in stirring
up trouble in Lebanon is to divert attention away from the
investigation into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri,
including a special tribunal of international character that
would try suspects. Khoury added though that Syrian
influence in Lebanon has diminished to the extent that "the
Iranians" -- like FM Mottaki -- "now come for themselves to
Lebanon," whereas Syrian FM Mouallem's visit last week was
viewed as mostly ineffectual. (Note: Khoury said there is a
joke currently making the Beirut circuit -- and there are
lots of them -- playing on the physical resemblance between
Mouallem and Ariel Sharon. End Note.)

BEIRUT 00002625 002 OF 002

AGAIN, IT ALL COMES BACK TO BERRI
---------------------------------

¶7. (C) As we have heard in many of our meetings, Khoury
said that Nabih Berri is the key in getting Hizballah
agreement to disarm south of the Litani and in assuring the
ouster of President Lahoud. Khoury, who like many Maronite
politicians entertains his own presidential ambitions, asked
the Ambassador to urge Berri to come up with a "list of five
names" of people whom Berri could support for the Presidency.
The Patriarch and the March 14 movement would then review
the list and choose their favorite. He also urged the
Ambassador to "convince Walid to talk to Nabih" about
Hizballah disarmament and the Presidency, and that Walid
could assure Nabih that "his role (as Speaker) would be
protected."
FELTMAN