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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002615 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2026 
TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER EAID LE SY IS
SUBJECT: STRENGTHENING A SHAKY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES -- 
AND A TEETERING GOL 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  This message contains a non-exhaustive list of 
initiatives that we suggest the USG support, in the first 
days of the fragile cessation of hostilities forged by U.S. 
leadership in UNSCR 1701.  We seek to strengthen the GOL and 
move Lebanon toward a permanent cease-fire.  After the U.S. 
success in getting UNSCR 1701 adopted unanimously, we see 
other steps as essential to translate the diplomatic progress 
into lasting improvements on the ground. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Despite the silencing of the guns, few of our 
Lebanese contacts are optimistic about the cessation of 
hostilities that entered into force today, 8/14.  Most people 
cite two parallel dangers:  first, Israel is expected to 
define the prohibition on "offensive military operations" 
more narrowly than the average Lebanese would see as 
reasonable.  We have told our contacts that Israel will 
continue its surveillance activities and use all means to 
disrupt suspected resupply of weapons and strategic goods to 
Hizballah.  Second, Hizballah, while likely to suspend (at 
least initially) rocket attacks into Israel, may lick its 
wounds momentarily before resuming attacks against Israeli 
positions inside Lebanon.  Hizballah can easily -- 
intentionally -- provoke Israeli force protection operations 
that will be seen by the Lebanese as excessive. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Thus, despite the cessation of hostilities, 
Israeli-Hizballah fighting could easily spin out of control, 
with both sides perhaps crossing the informal red lines the 
next time around (e.g., Hizballah fires rockets into Tel 
Aviv, Israel destroys Lebanon's power plants or hits GOL 
institutions, etc.).  Even lower-level fighting would make 
many countries reluctant to step forward with troop 
contributions for the beefed up UNIFIL force that, upon 
deployment, triggers the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. 
And that, we would guess, is exactly what Hizballah and its 
Iranian and Syrian backers desire:  no additional UNIFIL 
troops, no LAF deployment to the south, no IDF withdrawal, 
and no Hizballah disarmament. 
 
¶4.  (C)  At the same time, the Lebanese cabinet is 
approaching a moment of truth.  With a cabinet meeting on 
exactly how to implement UNSCR 1701 postponed, ministers will 
soon -- upon LAF deployment with UNIFIL -- have to say once 
and for all whether they will stand up to Hizballah and 
insist on disarmament, first in the south and eventually 
everywhere.  As we will explore in other messages, the 
cabinet's 8/12 unanimous acceptance of UNSCR 1701, while good 
news, is less solid than it appears.  Yet the continued IDF 
presence in south Lebanon makes it difficult for the 
non-Hizballah members of the cabinet to unify behind 
immediate disarmament of Hizballah, lest they be accused of 
collusion with an Israeli occupation.  We do not 
underestimate the ability of Lebanon's political class to 
muddle through by relying on the ambiguity of various 
interpretations.  But the cabinet might easily collapse over 
UNSCR 1701, with far-reaching, and mostly negative, political 
and security implications for Lebanon. 
 
¶5.  (C)  We believe that we can reinforce the cessation of 
hostilities and build public support for the requisite 
Hizballah disarmament if we can show some changes on the 
ground now.  In many ways, for most Lebanese, today feels 
like yesterday, despite the cessation of hostilities:  people 
remain distracted by the need to find gasoline, milk, and 
other essentials; people worry about the destabilizing impact 
of the IDPs who have no homes to reclaim; businesses cannot 
import essential supplies or export products; travel in and 
out of Lebanon remains difficult and open only to those who 
have no fear of transiting Syria -- to name only a few of the 
hardships of daily life here.  Israel may hope that these 
deprivations move more people away from Hizballah, but, with 
the cabinet now behind UNSCR 1701, people should start to 
feel some relief as an incentive to go further. 
 
¶6.  (C)  To build momentum for the more permanent cease-fire, 
we suggest that the USG support some initiatives now, to 
demonstrate that there are initial benefits to subscribing to 
the cessation of hostilities -- and that normal life can 
gradually be restored as implementation of UNSCR 1701 moves 
forward.  The sticks for non-compliance remain clear: 
ongoing Israeli military presence in south Lebanon, defensive 
Israeli measures that will strike Lebanese as offensive, and 
the ongoing Israeli air and sea blockade.  With those sticks 
obvious to all, we believe that the international community, 
 
BEIRUT 00002615  002 OF 003 
 
 
under USG leadership, should offer some carrots now.  Our 
ideas, most of which deal with access and safety, follow: 
 
--  Immediate opening of an air shuttle for passenger travel 
between Beirut and (probably) Amman.  We have discussed this 
idea before, and now we hope it can be implemented.  Given 
that the Israelis have, we understand, expressed confidence 
in Jordan's security procedures, we suggest that Lebanon's 
national carrier, Middle East Airlines, be permitted to begin 
operating passenger shuttles multiple times a day between 
Beirut and Amman (assuming the Jordanians would be amenable). 
 If we could inform the Lebanese even today that runway 
repairs and munition-clearing could commence now, this 
shuttle could start operating on one of the runways within 
days.  We can also broker Israel's acceptance of Lebanon 
starting longer-term runway repair and replacement of 
destroyed fuel tankers now.  We can at the same time make it 
clear that more general aviation traffic depends on the GOL 
having effective plans to prevent arms, money, and alien 
smuggling via the airport. 
 
--  Immediate lifting of the sea blockade for fuel tankers 
and automatic clearances for shipments of grain and 
humanitarian deliveries (perhaps from recognized sources) to 
Lebanon, with the UN required to inform the Israelis.  The 
Israelis would retain the ability to stop suspicious 
freighters at the sea embargo line for inspection.  As with 
the airport, this partial opening of sea lanes would provide 
some relief to Lebanon while maintaining a strong incentive 
-- the potential full reopening -- for the GOL to improve its 
security procedures at the port. 
 
--  Large-scale Mine Action activities:  On the first day of 
the cease-fire, Lebanon already suffered casualties when 
IDPs, returning home, encountered unexploded ordnance.  With 
the long-standing U.S. leadership in Mine Action activities 
in Lebanon (and given that we are held largely responsible 
for Israeli weaponry, whether of U.S. origin or not), we 
could play an important role in providing safety for people 
returning to the south that would have a major impact on 
public opinion here.  The UAE has also announced a resumption 
of its mine-clearing program.  We recommend a vast increase 
in USG funding for Mine Action activities, to be announced 
immediately and used as quickly as possible. 
 
--  Immediate deployment of a planning unit to UNIFIL. 
UNIFIL is going to play the key role in coordinating the 
IDF's withdrawal and the LAF deployment, yet UNIFIL in its 
current incarnation does not have sufficient planning 
capacity.  If the French are expected to play a key role in 
the beef-up UNIFIL authorized in UNSCR 1701, perhaps we could 
encourage the French could send a planning unit to Naqoura 
now.  If the French are not available, someone else should 
provide competent military planners.  UNIFIL and LAF 
deployment needs to be done right, and that requires 
planning.  The initial planning meeting held today by UNIFIL 
Commander Pellegrini was encouraging (with the Lebanese and 
Israeli generals eventually sitting in the same room, 
although talking through Pellegrini), but UNIFIL needs more 
planning power. 
 
--  Providing transitional housing materials for IDPs -- 
which could in many cases be done through local purchases, 
thus helping Lebanon's economy overall.  It is already clear 
from spontaneous traffic jams today that IDPs who are from 
the south want to go back home.  (The UN counted 1200 cars an 
hour heading south out of Beirut, each averaging five people, 
on the main road alone.)  Many of them are going to discover 
that their houses have been damaged, some severely, by the 
fighting.  Purchases (or shipments, for items not in stock in 
Lebanon) of building materials such as, wood, corrugated 
steel and plastic sheeting would enable residents to move 
back home, by permitting them to make at least part of their 
houses habitable.  As part of this, we should accelerate the 
delivery of basic cooking utensils and cooking gas as well. 
 
--  Focus on reopening hospitals and medical clinics in the 
south.  This will entail working with NGOs and others to 
ensure that staff can return safely to hospitals, that fuel 
supplies are sufficient for generators, and that medical and 
other supplies are delivered. 
 
--  Transfer of UN security responsibilities from the UNICEF 
representative to either the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (our 
first choice) or the UNSYG's Personal Representative to 
Lebanon.  While this is an internal UN organizational matter 
 
BEIRUT 00002615  003 OF 003 
 
 
that would not be noticed by the Lebanese, it is in fact critical to the ability of the Humanitarian Coordinator to 
work effectively.  Currently, the UN's Designated Security 
Officer (DSO) for Lebanon is housed with UNDP and temporarily 
placed with UNICEF.  This means that the HC cannot prioritize 
relief staffing needs.  Given our lack of confidence based on 
prior experiences in both UNDP's and UNICEF's local 
representation, we suggest that the USG quietly suggest to UN 
headquarters that the DSO be housed either with the HC or in 
the office of Geir Pedersen.  (While Geir Pedersen is 
bureaucratically senior to HC David Shearer, there is no 
formal link between their critical operations.  But, 
according to both, Pedersen and Shearer work well together, 
having done so for years in the West Bank during the second 
Palestinian Intifada.) 
 
--  Shipment to Lebanon of military-style trestle and Bailey 
bridges, to restore key traffic linkages.  Until Lebanon 
begins to take seriously its responsibilities under UNSCR 
1701 to control arms smuggling, the Israelis will be 
reluctant to allow the restoration of all transportation 
linkages.  But, in coordination with the Israelis, we and 
others could provide some emergency, military-type steel 
spans as temporary replacements in some areas quickly. 
 
--  Work on a private-sector initiative that could bring U.S. 
business representatives -- with as many Lebanese-Americans 
as would be willing to participate -- to Lebanon in 
September, to look at how U.S. business consortia might be 
willing to participate in Lebanon's reconstruction, both by 
adopting certain projects to finance and by finding economic 
opportunities to create local jobs.  While this initiative 
would be (for security reasons) kept at arm's length from the 
USG, initiatives sponsored by the American business community 
will have far-reaching impact by providing hope to the 
Lebanese people that Lebanon's international connections, 
like its infrastructure, can be repaired. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Over the longer term, we need to be prepared for 
reconstruction and job creation in the areas of the country 
hardest hit by the fighting -- which means in the areas of 
the country where Hizballah's infrastructure and support was 
strongest, such as the south.  To beat out the Iranian 
funding that will surely flow in, we will need to be 
generous, flexible, and quick.  Our strategy should be to 
strengthen the GOL and its institutions, in order to counter 
the "state-within-a-state" charitable institutions Hizballah 
had used (with Iranian financing) to garner support.  We will 
send ideas septel on the longer term, but in general we 
believe we should focus on some infrastructure work, some 
housing guarantee financial programs, and much related job 
creation.  One complication we will face:  how to use our 
assistance to reduce support for, and reliance on, Hizballah, 
while ensuring that we stick to USG rules about not helping 
those associated with terrorist organizations. 
FELTMAN