VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #4622/01 2221417
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY TEXT ON SECTION 01 - VSD0999 - AD09798A - 555)
P 101417Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7827
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 6572
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 1065
RHMFIUU/COGARD MIO EUROPE ROTTERDAM NL

UNCLAS ANKARA 004622 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ROME FOR CBP ROBERT STIRITI 
DHS FOR CSI - TODD HORTON, LISA WAINWRIGHT, KRISTIN DUBELIER 
DEPT PASS TRANSPORTATION DEPT 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - TEXT ON SECTION 01 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EWWT PTER KTIA TU
SUBJECT: CSI: TURKEY RESPONDS TO ASSESSMENT WITH NEW PROPOSED 
DOCUMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
¶1. On July 31, Embassy received via diplomatic note Turkey's 
response to the draft Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
Declaration of Principles (DOP) and Basic Impelementation Procedures 
(BIP) that were provided to the GOT earlier this year. 
 
¶2. The revised Declaration of Principles (DOP) and Basic 
Implementation Procedures (BIP) were edited using the documents 
submitted by the CSI division as a model.  The major differences 
compared to the CSI division's drafts include the GOT's continued 
unwillingness to grant diplomatic immunity to CSI officers stationed 
in Izmir (BIP paragraph 5), the GOT's request that officers share 
with Turkish Customs the information contained in their reports to 
DHS (BIP paragraph 10), and a stipulation that official 
communication and correspondence be conducted in Turkish (BIP 
paragraph 14).  In addition, in the DOP, the GOT specifically 
requests that a corresponding U.S. port be designated for the 
purposes of potentially posting Turkish Customs officials. 
 
¶3. Comment:  While many of the previous issues surrounding CSI have 
been alleviated, questions related to immunity, language of 
operation, and the nature of the final signed agreement still 
remain.  The Foreign Trade Undersecretariat (FTU) -- which has taken 
the lead on implementing this program -- indicates that it views 
this as a negotiable document, from which they received the input 
and clearance of the other interested Turkish agency, and is open to 
further discussion.  We stand ready to facilitate negotiations 
between DHS and Turkish government officials.  End comment. 
 
¶4. Begin text of Turkish Diplomatic Note 2006/DHGY/316837 regarding 
CSI in Izmir: 
 
(Standard greeting) and with reference to the Latter's Note No: 638, 
dated 18 April 2006, has the honour to enclose herewith a draft 
"Agreement for the Implementation of the Container Security 
Initiative at the Designated Ports of Both Countries." 
The Ministry kindly requests the Embassy to transmit the enclosed 
document to the relevant U.S. authorities and looks forward to 
receiving the Embassy's reply. 
 
(Standard closure). 
 
¶5.  Begin text of Turkey's proposed DOP: 
DRAFT 
(AGREEMENT/PROTOCOL/AGREED MINUTES) BETWEEN THE CUSTOMS 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES 
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE (CSI) AT THE DESIGNATED PORTS OF BOTH 
COUNTRIES 
 
(note: The concrete headline will be mutually determined by the 
Parties) 
 
The Customs Administration of the Republic of Turkey and the United 
States Customs and Border Protection (hereinafter referred as the 
"Parties"); 
 
Considering the principles and terms set forth in the "Agreement 
Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government 
of the United States of America Regarding Mutual Assistance Between 
Their Customs Administrations" signed on 28 March 1996, 
 
Recognizing the long-standing close and productive relations between 
the Parties, 
 
Being convinced that this cooperation can be further improved by 
intensifying the exchange of information and best practices between 
the two customs authorities, 
 
Recognizing the high volume of trade between Turkey's seaports and 
the seaports of the United States of America, 
 
Bearing in mind the World Customs Organization resolution on 
Security and Facilitation of the International Trade Supply Chain 
adopted in June 2002, 
 
Being convinced that there is a need to deter, prevent, and 
interdict any terrorist attempt to disrupt global trade or to make 
use of commercial shipping to further their own schemes, 
 
Supporting the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which is 
designed to safeguard global maritime trade by enhancing 
co-operation at seaports worldwide to identify and examine high-risk 
 
 
containers and ensure their in-transit integrity, 
 
Have agreed on the following provisions; 
 
Article 1 
 
For the purpose of this Agreement; 
 
"CSI Officers" shall mean the US Government officers who will be 
stationed at Turkey's designated seaports for the purpose of CSI 
implementation. 
 
"CSI Contact Points" shall mean the Turkish Customs Officer(s) who 
are notified to the US Customs and Border Protection as contact 
point(s) for the purpose of the CSI implementation. 
 
"High risk containers" shall mean the containers which are carrying 
commodities that pose a risk for terrorism, and destined for the US 
Ports. 
 
"CSI examination" shall mean non intrusive inspection of the US 
destined containers 
 
"Anomaly" shall mean any condition, characteristic or feature of the 
commodity that indicates a risk for terrorism. 
 
Article 2 
 
The Parties shall intensify bilateral customs cooperation, including 
in particular on the implementation of the CSI in accordance with 
the basic implementation procedures provided in Annex A that shall 
constitute an integral part of this Agreement, at designated ports 
of both countries, within the framework of the "Agreement Between 
the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the 
United States of America Regarding Mutual Assistance Between Their 
Customs Administrations" of 28 March 1996. 
 
Article 3 
 
The parties shall intensify bilateral customs cooperation by working 
closely together to ensure that screening and sealing of high-risk 
containers is carried out swiftly through the use of inspection 
equipment that will allow a non-intrusive screening during the 
examination of the containers, where appropriate facilitate trade 
flow and strive to ensure the screening and examination of the 
containers that pose a risk for terrorism. 
 
Article 4 
 
US Customs Officers, who will work in accordance with the basic 
implementation procedures provided at Annex A, shall be stationed on 
a pilot basis at Turkey's designated seaports with significant 
volume of commercial traffic to the United States of America. 
 
Turkish Customs Officers shall be stationed at US seaports on a 
pilot basis, upon the request of the Customs Administration of the 
Republic of Turkey with the same aim and under the same conditions 
established in this Agreement and its Annex. 
 
In this respect, the Parties agreed to start the CSI at the Izmir 
Port in the Republic of Turkey and at the xxxxxx Port, USA. 
 
Addition of new ports within the CSI is to be mutually agreed by the 
relevant Parties through diplomatic channels. 
 
The Parties are not to reimburse any charges or fees due to the 
enforcement examination or a targeted shipment that poses risk for 
terrorism at the designated ports within the framework of the CSI. 
 
Article 5 
 
The Parties shall consult closely on the implementation of this 
Agreement, to ensure continuous effectiveness and the reciprocal 
benefit of the bilateral customs cooperation. 
 
Article 6 
 
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date the Parties have 
notified each other in writing through diplomatic channels that the 
necessary internal procedures have been completed. 
 
The Agreement shall remain in force until three months from the date 
on which either Party notifies in writing through diplomatic 
channels to the other party its intention to terminate the 
Agreement. 
 
 
 
Done in xxxxxx this xxxx day of xxxxxx in two original copies in 
Turkish and English languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
End text of DOP. 
 
¶6. Begin text of Turkey's proposed Basic Implementation Procedures 
(BIP). 
 
ANNEX A 
 
Basic Implementation Procedures for CSI Cooperation Between Customs 
Administration of the Republic of Turkey and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) 
 
(For Pilot Implementation) 
 
INTRODUCTION:  THE CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE 
 
Container Security Initiative (CSI) is an anti-terrorism initiative 
that targets and pre-screens containers, which may pose a risk for 
terrorism at designated ports of lading. The implementation of CSI 
shall include, inter alia, the following: 
 
-  Using information to target containers that pose a risk for 
terrorism. 
 
-  Using non-intrusive detection technology to quickly pre-screen 
those containers that pose a risk at the port departure before they 
arrive at US ports. 
 
-  Deploying CSI team works in the host country to target high risk 
containers in cooperation with the host government which will 
conduct inspections when deemed appropriate while the US CSI team 
observes. 
 
-   Thus, increasing security, CSI facilitates flow of legitimate 
trade by allowing pre-screened containers to enter the US without 
delay. 
 
This basic implementation procedures document, prepared in line with 
the Articles 1 and 3 of the Agreement to which it is annexed, aims 
to arrange the principles of cooperation between the Turkish Customs 
Administration and the US Government Officers stationed at 
designated seaport(s). 
 
The same procedures shall apply for the Turkish Customs Officers 
stationed at designated US seaport(s), in case the Turkish Customs 
requires deploying a Turkish CSI team. 
 
SECTION ONE:  GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
 
¶1. CBP officers should adhere to the national laws and regulations 
of the Republic of Turkey as well as rules, and common practices 
applied at seaports of Turkey where CSI is implemented. 
 
¶2. With a view to the review of the CSI implementation and the 
further development of Turkish Customs and CBP cooperation, and 
regular meetings between relevant customs authorities are to be held 
every three months. 
 
¶3. The issues not mentioned in this document, additional or modified 
implementation procedures, divergences about the interpretation of 
this document or any disputes regarding the CSI implementation shall 
be evaluated and tackled by the Turkish Customs. 
 
¶4. CSI officers will only perform relevant activities within the 
areas defined in the Agreement.  CSI officers are not to directly 
contact, exchange information or carry out activities with any party 
of the host country other than the CSI contact point(s). 
 
¶5. CSI officers shall not have diplomatic status. They shall be 
subject to Turkish laws and regulations and shall not enjoy any 
privilege or immunity. As such, the US CSI Officers shall be 
promptly issued with the necessary working permission by the Turkish 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security. 
 
¶6. All inspections and customs procedures of high-risk containers 
are to be conducted solely by Turkish Customs officers. In the case 
of an anomaly is identified during an inspection, the Turkish 
Customs is to investigate and address related issues in accordance 
with the laws and regulations of the Republic of Turkey. CBP 
Officers will be permitted to observe when physical inspection is 
conducted. 
 
¶7. For day-to-day work, CSI officers are to communicate with the 
 
 
relevant designated departments of Turkish Customs.  All CSI 
officers' requests for non intrusive inspection are to be specified 
in a written format and relayed to the appropriate Turkish Customs 
office in a timely manner, at least 24 hours before shipping, 
stating why the inspection is requested. 
 
¶8. CSI officers' all non intrusive inspection requests made via the 
appropriate written format are to be responded to by Turkish Customs 
within a reasonable time frame. 
 
¶9. Turkish Customs Administration and CSI officers are to consult on 
all targeting results of high-risk containers selected for non 
intrusive inspection. Turkish Customs officers reserve the right to 
determine whether and how an inspection is to occur. 
 
¶10. CSI officers shall provide information to the Turkish Customs, 
concerning the monitoring reports to be submitted to the US CBP. 
 
¶11. If CBP officers need to enter Turkish Customs controlled 
areas/premises, they may do so only with permission from Turkish 
Customs and shall be accompanied by a CSI contact point. The CSI 
officers are prohibited from taking photographs or films within 
Turkish Customs controlled areas and shall not take out any 
document. 
 
¶12. CSI is to operate within the normal office hours of the Turkish 
Customs. 
 
¶13. Turkish Customs is to identify personnel as points of contact 
for CBP officers during weekends and holidays, and overtimes other 
than normal office hours. 
 
¶14. Language of communication and correspondence between the CSI 
officers and the CSI contact points will be Turkish. 
 
¶15. In case of seizure of commodities within the CSI project, the 
CSI officers will not be provided with samples of the captured 
commodities. 
 
SECTION TWO:  INSPECTION 
 
¶1. After CSI officers select a container(s) for non intrusive 
inspection through risk analysis, they are to submit a completed 
written referral to the CSI contact points in a timely manner. 
 
¶2. When making requests for non-intrusive inspection (NII), CBP is 
to provide all necessary identifiers of the targeted shipment to the 
appropriate Turkish Customs Office, stating why the inspection is 
requested. 
 
¶3. If an inspection is to be conducted, Turkish Customs officers are 
to complete a written response, stating the time and place of the 
inspection. 
 
¶4. If an inspection is not to be conducted, Turkish Customs officers 
are to complete a written response, stating why the request for 
inspection is not accepted. 
 
¶5. Once a container is selected for inspection, Turkish Customs 
should try to arrange for a non-intrusive inspection (NII).  If the 
NII is inconclusive or an anomaly is detected, or a radiological 
isotope is identified, Turkish Customs may arrange for a physical 
inspection. Turkish Customs officers are to perform all inspections. 
Capacity and workload of Turkish Customs and infrastructure of the 
designated Turkish seaport will be taken into consideration by the 
CSI officers when requesting non-intrusive inspection. 
 
¶6. CSI officers will be allowed solely to observe all inspections of 
containers based on high-risk referrals originating from the CSI 
team. 
 
¶7. All containers that have had a CSI examination are to have the 
CSI security bolt seal and tamper-evident tape applied by Turkish 
Customs officers to distinguish the CSI examined goods from other 
goods. 
 
¶8. Containers examined at designated seaports of Turkey will not be 
re-examined once they arrive in United States unless a specific 
justification that indicates a risk for containers has occurred 
after the CSI examination. In case of re-examination of containers 
which were examined in Turkey, the US CBP will notify the Turkish 
customs about the reasons for such examination. 
 
¶9. CSI officers request for CSI examination of cargo already laden 
on a departing vessel, will be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 
 
¶10. During the pilot phase of CSI program, a total of 5 CSI officers 
will be assigned to the CSI port located at Izmir. The number of CSI 
officers may vary depending on the volume of trade, subject to 
mutual agreement of the Parties. 
 
¶11. Establishment and operation of any communication and data 
exchange equipment require prior approval of Turkish Authorities. 
Thus, installation of communication and networking equipment on port 
premises will be coordinated with the appropriate Turkish 
Authorities. 
 
¶12. The Turkish Government shall not bear any functional or personal 
costs of the CSI officers. 
 
SECTION THREE:  GENERAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
CBP Officers operating in the Republic of Turkey as part of the CSI 
may: 
 
¶1. Request information related to and subsequent of the examination 
of only maritime shipments destined to the United States. 
 
¶2. Request Turkish Customs to perform inspections of selected 
containers; 
 
¶3. Observe the non intrusive and physical inspections when 
accompanied by Turkish Customs Officers. 
 
¶4. Request physical inspection by Turkish Customs if NII screening 
is inconclusive or an anomaly is detected, or a radiological isotope 
is identified. 
 
CBP Officers operating in the Republic of Turkey as part of the CSI 
are not to: 
 
¶1. Carry or possess any weapons or firearms; 
 
¶2. Wear CBP uniforms at any time; or 
 
¶3. Engage in activities not in conformity with Turkish laws and 
regulations. 
 
¶4. Perform any task outside the scope of this Implementation Plan 
without mutual consent from the CSI partners. 
 
¶5. Delay or hinder any shipment that does not pose any risk for 
terrorism. 
 
End text of BIP. 
Wilson