VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #2993/01 2422245
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 302245Z AUG 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1875
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5599
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6803

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 002993 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - DAVID FIRESTEIN 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
 
¶1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their 
coverage August 30 on former DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh's campaign 
to oust President Chen Shui-bian, President Chen's planned overseas 
trip in early September, the 2006 National Defense Report released 
by the Ministry of National Defense on Tuesday, and U.S.-Taiwan arms 
procurements.  The pro-unification "United Daily News" ran a 
front-page banner headline that said "United States Refuses to Allow 
Air Force One to Land in Guam."  The pro-independence "Liberty 
Times," Taiwan's biggest daily, however, ran a news story on page 
four with the headline "United States Agrees to Let Bian Transit 
Guam." 
 
Regarding U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, several papers covered a 
"Defense News" article, which said that the U.S. National Security 
Council and the Department of State have both suggested turning down 
Taiwan's request to purchase 66 F-16 C/D fighter planes.  These 
papers also reported on inside pages that during a meeting between 
Defense Minister Lee Jye and Legislative Yuan President Wang 
Jin-pyng Tuesday, Lee showed Wang a cable from TECRO in Washington, 
which mentioned that the United States has been very displeased with 
the Legislative Yuan for stalling the U.S. arms procurement bill. 
 
 
¶2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, a "China Times" 
editorial said whether Chen Yunlin, the director of China's Taiwan 
Affairs Office, is able to visit Taiwan in October will serve as a 
touchstone to test whether Premier Su Tseng-chang really meant what 
he said about cross-Strait opening.  An editorial in the 
limited-circulation, pro-independence, English-language "Taipei 
Times," on the other hand, criticized Beijing's carrot-and-stick 
approach toward Taiwan.  The article said "The lack of coordination 
between the agencies responsible for carrying out Taiwan policy has 
resulted in a situation where each acts as it sees fit, sometimes 
even working directly against each other."  End summary. 
 
A) "Chen Yunlin's Trip to Taiwan Is Touchstone for Cross-Strait 
Opening" 
 
The pro-status quo "China Times" [circulation: 400,000] 
editorialized (8/30): 
 
"A glimpse of hope is finally seen in China's Taiwan Affairs Office 
Director Chen Yunlin's visit to Taiwan to co-host the 'Cross-Strait 
Agricultural Forum.'  The spokesman for China's Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) recently announced: 
'ARATS is willing to coordinate with the KMT's National Policy 
Foundation to negotiate with an agency specified by Taiwan using an 
appropriate name over issues concerning the immigration, security, 
and convenience of the mainland [Chinese] personnel [coming to 
Taiwan].'  Judged from a certain perspective, this statement is a 
clear message of a 'goodwill gesture' shown [by Beijing].  After 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait have ceased negotiating for so many 
years, this time is clearly the most evident change in attitude on 
the part of the mainland authorities. ... 
 
"What the ruling party should contemplate now is whether it wants 
both sides across the Taiwan Strait to resume talks.  If Premier Su 
Tseng-chang means what he said with regard to the cross-Strait 
 
SIPDIS 
opening policy, Chen's visit to Taiwan will clearly be a touchstone. 
 The best way to make Chen's trip possible is to bypass the familiar 
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), and have the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the Council of Agriculture go ahead to discuss the 
contents and schedule of the forum based on 'how agriculture on both 
sides can mutually benefit and complement each other.'  But if the 
cross-Strait opening spoken of by Su is simply a smokescreen, all he 
needs to do is to ask the SEF to get ready, and act as if 
'government officials will come forward to talk,' then he can direct 
this matter to a highly sensitive area, where it will even attract 
the attention of the pro-independence factions of the DPP and the 
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU).  With a severe lambasting [from the 
DPP and TSU], the whole issue will surely blow up. ...  In other 
words, whether Chen will be able to come to Taiwan is a touchstone 
to test Premier Su's cross-Strait opening policy.  We hope it will 
become a starting point where both sides of the Taiwan Strait can 
resume talks, and not another postponement again.  Given the many 
political upheavals going on in Taiwan, there is not much left that 
can make the people feel that the island is changing, and this might 
as well be an opportunity for Su to break the deadlock." 
 
B) "The Stick Is Mightier Than the Carrot" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (8/30): 
 
"Chinese President Hu Jintao has used a more pragmatic 
carrot-and-stick approach in that country's Taiwan policy by 
tightening its already tough approach on certain issues while 
softening its stance on others. ...  China is mixing up both 
approaches so that threats, coercion, promises of benefits and 
enticements will eventually compel Taiwan to accept the 'one China' 
principle.  A lack of overall coordination, however, means that 
frequent and sudden policy changes undermine this goal.  There are 
reports that China - hot on the heels of securing diplomatic 
recognition from Chad on the eve of Premier Su Tseng-chang's visit 
to that African nation - may try to establish relations with Palau 
prior to President Chen Shui-bian's visit to the Pacific island 
nation in a few weeks.  Superficially, this would embarrass Chen and 
provide support to those campaigning to unseat him.  For China's 
foreign ministry, this may seem a sensible strategy.  The result, 
however, could be the opposite of what it might expect. ... 
 
"... And if China really does win over Palau on the eve of Chen's 
visit, it will be playing into Chen's hands.  It would allow him to 
redirect the focus of the media from the domestic situation to 
foreign affairs, while China's suppression might serve to 
consolidate pan-green-camp support.  The China factor may also 
dampen support for the anti-Chen campaign and strengthen anti-China 
sentiment, a situation that Chen would welcome after so many months 
of political and personal difficulties. ...  Chinese foreign affairs 
officials may think spending huge amounts of money to buy over 
Taiwan's allies may be a good policy, but cutthroat diplomatic 
competition is certain to erase the TAO's achievements.  The lack of 
coordination between the agencies responsible for carrying out 
Taiwan policy has resulted in a situation where each acts as it sees 
fit, sometimes even working directly against each other.  If this 
continues for much longer, Chen will find a way out of his 
predicament thanks to his enemies - something he has grown used to 
over the decades." 
 
YOUNG