VZCZCXRO6193
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2312/01 2331327
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211327Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2165
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002312 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/RSA 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: AUGUST 10 AU DITF BRIEFING HIGHLIGHTS 
GOS ATTACKS AND UNCERTAINTY ABOUT AMIS FUTURE 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 2130 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  At an August 10 briefing AU 
officials reported that the situation in Darfur was 
"relatively calm" despite serious incidents in northern 
Darfur (Sector 6), including several alleged attacks by 
GOS aircraft on an IDP camp and a village, and a 
suspension of AMIS activities near Kutum due to 
unspecified joint military operations between the GOS 
and SLM/A Minni Minawi's forces.  AU officials, who 
underscore the need for sustained political engagement 
with non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA), report that the GOS is deliberately conducting 
military attacks against non-signatories.  With regard 
to other post-DPA activities, the AU continues to await 
for Sudan to submit a revised plan to disarm the 
Janjaweed; and, Japan has pledged USD 8.6 million for 
the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.  In the 
absence of any new PSC decision on the mandate of AMIS, 
AU military planners say the mission is now logistics- 
driven and warn that some troop contributing countries 
may consider withdrawaling.  NATO will begin airlifting 
rotating troops on September 1, and is proceeding with 
planning as if no changes to AMIS will occur until 
later.  The deployment of partner experts to AMIS 
Forward Joint Mission Headquarters has proceeded, 
despite delays since June in the AU's appointment of a 
Joint Chief of Staff to oversee them.  (Note:  No DITF 
briefing was held August 17, but partners and AU 
officials met that day with troop contributing 
countries who all agreed that September rotations 
should go forward as planned.  End Note.)  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) Poloffs attended an August 10 briefing by the 
African Union Commission's Darfur Integrated Task Force 
(AU DITF) to the AU Partners Liaison Group (chaired by 
the EC, and comprised of Canada, the US, UK, UN, and 
NATO). 
 
---------------------------------- 
SECURITY: CALM EXCEPT NORTH DARFUR 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) DITF Military Component chief Colonel Mayell 
Mbaye reported that while rapes, harassment, and 
hijacking of civilian vehicles continued, the general 
security situation was "relatively calm," except for 
significant incidents in Sector 6 (northern Darfur): 
-- August 1: GOS forces reportedly used helicopters to 
attack an IDP camp, which, if true, would be a 
violation of the May 5 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), 
Mbaye said. 
-- August 5: At the request of GOS and SLA Minni 
forces, AMIS sector headquarters had agreed to restrict 
AMIS operations in the Kutum area, due to an ongoing 
joint GOS-SLA Minni operation.  Mbaye reported that the 
GOS had deployed two battalions of reinforcements to 
protect Minni forces from anticipated attacks by Wahid. 
-- August 7:  SLA Wahid forces armed with artillery and 
anti-aircraft weapons mounted on LandCruisers, along 
with National Redemption Front (NRF) fighters, attacked 
SLA Minni forces at Saiyah; in response, GOS aircraft 
had bombarded the village, Mbaye said.  Neither side 
was giving AMIS information on what had occurred. 
-- MILOB sites throughout Sector 6 were now on high 
alert, Mbaye said, in response to a gathering of SLA 
Wahid fighters who were suspected of seeking to attack 
them. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Pressed for additional details, Mbaye said, 
"the situation does not allow AMIS to go to the sites." 
Canadian and EU poloffs noted that these constituted 
serious incidents and a deterioration of the security 
situation.  Mbaye replied that Sector 6 was only one of 
eight in AMIS's area of operations (AOR); the remainder 
of the AOR remained "relatively calm," he said. 
 
-------------------------------- 
CONCERN ABOUT GOS-MINNI JOINT OP 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Referring to the reported joint GOS-SLA Minni 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002312  002 OF 004 
 
 
operation in Kutum, UK poloff questioned whether GOS 
and SLA Minni forces had in fact informed AMIS that DPA 
violations would occur, and whether AMIS had decided to 
overlook them.  DITF POLAD Dr. Solomon Gomes responded 
that according to an August 8 AMIS situation report, 
Minni forces had attacked a village and were awaiting 
reinforcements from Nyala; the GOS then bombed the 
village, he said. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Gomes recalled that at the August 3 DPA Joint 
Commission meeting in Addis Ababa, GOS rep General 
Adabi had underscored the necessity of punishing non- 
signatories to the DPA.  The GOS was "deliberately 
trying to sabotage this process" by attacking non- 
signatories, Gomes added. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In contrast, Gomes said, in a report to AU 
Peace and Security Commissioner Ambassador Said 
Djinnit, AMIS Darfur mediator Ambassador Sam Ibok had 
noted the urgent need to make contact with non- 
signatories.  Ibok argued for sustained engagement with 
non-signatories to encourage support for the DPA, Gomes 
added, and had recently met with six factions, 
including G-19 and the newly established "G-14" faction 
led by Abdulrahim Mousa.  Factions were now becoming 
their own armed groups, Gomes said.  Commenting on 
Abulwahid's recent ejection from the SLA, announced by 
25 SLA leaders, Gomes noted that Abulwahid still had 
support in IDP camps. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Gomes said that while Minni Minawi had been 
appointed special assistant to the GNU president, Amb. 
Ibok had underscored that AMIS had provided 
transportation for Minni to attend a meeting only on an 
exceptional basis, as the UN had not been available. 
Gomes observed that continued GOS use of white 
helicopters created confusion, as GOS military 
helicopters were mistaken for AMIS aircraft.  AU DITF 
Administration Control and Management Center Chief 
Commodore Binega Mesfin noted that the DPA called for 
AMIS to provide non-military logistical support to DPA 
signatories.  Canadian embassy special advisor 
objected, noting that such parties were not in 
compliance with the DPA. 
 
----------------------------- 
DPA IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Individuals named to bolster the DPA 
Implementation Team (DPAIT) had been identified, but 
their appointment was awaiting approval by Commissioner 
Djinnit, Gomes said.  He added that the USG had helped 
provide two offices for the DPAIT, anticipating the 
need to provide office space for rebel movements. 
 
¶10. (SBU) As for the GOS plan to disarm the janjaweed, 
Col. Mbaye said the AU was still waiting for the GOS to 
submit its revised plan.  Responding to the observation 
that the GOS had established a commission for 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in 
June, Mbaye explained that the DPA's call for a 
specific GOS plan to disarm the janjaweed was separate 
from a global plan for disarmament that was to include 
JEM and other parties.  UN representative Major General 
Henry Anyidoho noted that the disarmament of the 
janjaweed was supposed to precede the assembly of 
movements in specific areas. 
 
¶11. (U) Commodore Mesfin announced that Japan had 
pledged USD 8.6 million to support the Darfur-Darfur 
Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC), whose budget totaled 
USD 60.5 million.  The Japanese pledge would be used 
for the DDDC secretariat, he said.  EC representative 
observed that the EU may be able to provide additional 
funds; UK poloff underscored the need for a single AU 
point of contact for funding issues, as Khartoum and 
Addis Ababa did not always coordinate fully.  Mesfin 
said a summary of pledges made at the July 18 AMIS 
pledging conference would be distributed shortly 
(forwarded to AF/SPG). 
 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002312  003 OF 004 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
AU AND TCCS UNCLEAR ON AMIS FUTURE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Partners recommended resuming meetings of the 
Technical Committee chaired by Commodore Mesfin and 
tasked with implementing joint assessment 
recommendations to improve AMIS; partners noted the 
committee had not met since April.  In response, Mesfin 
recommended merging the committee's work with 
implementation of recommendations made by the more 
recent June 2006 joint UN-AU technical assessment 
mission.  Dr. Gomes noted that the implementation 
roadmap, listing concrete steps to strengthen AMIS, was 
awaiting overdue input from AMIS officials in Khartoum. 
 
¶13. (SBU) "This mission now is logistics-driven," 
Mesfin said, but it was "unclear what direction we are 
taking."  It was uncertain whether AMIS would continue 
or withdraw after its current mandate ended September 
30, he said; the current focus was now on 
implementation of the DPA.  AU DITF was preparing an 
"exit strategy" on logistics which he expected to be 
available by the end of the following week, he said. 
Mesfin questioned the viability, for example, of 
constructing new police stations were AMIS to 
terminate, as AMIS was not now fulfilling police 
functions under its current concept of operations 
(CONOPS). Partner representatives noted that Norway 
would coordinate donors interesting in funding police 
stations. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Dr. Gomes said he had hoped the AU Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) would meet to discuss the CONOPS 
for strengthening AMIS by two battalions, but none had 
been scheduled.  "For me, it's business as usual" until 
the PSC decided otherwise, he said.  Gomes observed 
that GNU Vice President Salva Kiir accepted transition 
to a UN operation, while President Bashir had not. 
 
------------------------------ 
TCCS CONSIDERING THEIR FURTURE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶15. (SBU) Gomes expressed concern that several troop 
contributing countries (TCCs) were considering 
withdrawal rather than rotation; he criticized a push 
to get TCCs to accept that the UN would be present but 
that AU would be out.  He expected the AU would 
organize a meeting with both TCCs and partners prior to 
the next PSC meeting.  Mesfin said AU DITF had been 
instructed to prepare operational and logistical 
contingency plans, in order to brief TCCs and partners, 
prior to submission to the PSC.  Mesfin acknowledged 
that the United States sought to terminate AMIS in 
October, whereas the UN insisted on transition in 
January. 
 
¶16. (SBU) AMIS needed to continue with its plan to 
rotate current troops in October, Col. Mbaye said, as a 
June 28 UN report underscored that transition would not 
occur until January.  Even if transition were to occur 
in October, he said, rotation should proceed, as some 
troops had been deployed to Darfur for as long as seven 
months.  DITF Chief of Staff Major General Henry 
Anyidoho noted that the failure to rotate troops who 
had served for "unduly long" periods had hurt ECOMOG's 
efficiency.  Anyidoho said that the UN did have a 
CONOPS for its mission, as a result of the joint 
technical assessment mission conducted in June; the 
only issue remaining was to obtain Sudan's consent, he 
said.  He observed, however, that the GOS was now 
blocking equipment meant for the already established UN 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) addressing the North-South 
conflict, fearing that it would be used by the UN in 
Darfur; even the entry of AMIS communications equipment 
continued to be blocked by the GOS telecommunications 
agency, he said. 
 
¶17. (SBU) NATO Senior Military Liaison Officer 
discussed the proposed rotation schedule for AMIS 
forces, noting that the first movement was due to occur 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002312  004 OF 004 
 
 
September 1.  As the first rotations were to be 
conducted via commercial charter (vs. milair), 
rescheduling them would be expensive, he said.  As the 
first six movements were all to be conducted by NATO, 
it would seek the AU's approval for them within the 
next few day, he said.  Col. Mbaye noted that a Joint 
Forward Movement Cell would be established within the 
following week. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Note:  On August 17 partners and AU officials 
(Peace and Security Director Mugumya, Gomez, and Force 
Commander Ikhere) met with TCC representatives who 
agreed to move forward with scheduled retotations.  End 
Note. 
 
----------------------------- 
UPDATE ON COMMAND AND CONTROL 
----------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Col. Mbaye reported that the appointment of 
one of two Zambian candidates to serve as Joint Chief 
of Staff for AMIS Forward Joint Mission Headquarters 
(FJMHQ), originally proposed in June, still awaited 
Commissioner Djinnit's approval.  Partners expressed 
their shared concern at the delay, especially as six 
partner experts from the USG, EU, and UN, requested by 
the AU to serve as advisors to the FJMHQ, had all been 
deployed.  Mbaye said the AU Commission had sent a June 
27 memo to the AMIS Force Commander reminding him of 
the decision to establish a FJMHQ under the AMIS Deputy 
Head of Mission; Gomes announced that another reminder 
would be sent to the Force Commander. 
 
---------------------- 
PAE CONTRACTUAL ISSUES 
---------------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) Poloff raised USG concern about several 
issues relating to contractor PAE; in response, Mesfin 
and Gomes stated: 
-- an Antonov aircraft leased by a PAE subcontractor 
had not been grounded arbitrarily by an AMIS sergeant; 
rather, Sudanese civil aviation authorities had 
grounded the aircraft for safety reasons, as the PAE 
subcontractor was substituting car batteries for 
aircraft batteries.  PAE had since replaced the 
aircraft, Mesfin said, and an investigation of the 
incident was underway. 
-- AU DITF had finally responded with a counterproposal 
to PAE's June proposal that the catering subcontractor 
Amzar be paid a higher rate to compensate for the US 
dollar's depreciation against the Sudanese dinar; 
Mesfin said the counterproposal would not raise the 
budget for AMIS. 
-- of USD 8 million owed by the AU to PAE for invoices 
through April, AU DITF did not accept USD 3.9 million 
in equipment costs, and requested that PAE provide 
itemized unit costs for the amount. 
 
¶21. (SBU) COMMENT:  Both African Union and EU Military 
Representative officials have previously discussed a de 
facto military alliance between Government of Sudan 
forces and those of SLM/A Minni Minawi; the AU's August 
10 acknowledgement that AMIS suspended activities near 
Kutum due to a joint request by GOS/SLM Minni forces 
was viewed by some concern by allied partners, notably 
the UK and Canada.  Reports of continued aerial 
bombings should also generate concern as violations of 
the DPA, but in the absence of a functioning Joint 
Commission, there is no mechanism to hold parties 
accountable.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
WILGUS