VZCZCXYZ0034
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #2122 2141424
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021424Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1887

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 002122 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ET KPKO PREL AU SU
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: DARFUR - SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION ON UN PEACEKEEPING 
 
REF: STATE 123408 
 
 ¶1.  DCM delivered reftel demarche to Ambassador Sahlework 
Zewde, Director of African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, on July 31.  Responding that an October 1 date for 
the transition of AMIS to the UN would not be easy, 
Ambassador Sahlework raised the concerns of Sudan's 
non-acceptance of rehatting; the difficulty of implementing 
the DPA, particularly with regard to the non-signatories who 
have Eritrean support; and the fact that funds raised from 
the pledging conference are sufficient to take AMIS through 
December 2006.  DCM emphasized that given the deteriorating 
security situation on the ground, an early transition to an 
UNMIS force with a strong mandate is required. 
 
¶2.  Ambassador Huddleston also delivered the demarche during 
an August 1 meeting with African Union Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) representatives PSC Director Geofrey Mugumya, 
Head of the African Standby Force Maj General Ishaya Isah 
Hassan, Technical Advisor Dr. Aim Kamubudzi, and Conflict 
Management Director El-Ghassim Wane. Ambassador Huddleston 
emphasized that the worsening humanitarian situation in 
Darfur at this point, and commended the AU on their work in 
Sudan and urged full AU support for turning over AMIS to the 
UN by October 1st. What is needed now, she said, is a 
stronger, more sustainable UN force. 
 
¶3.  Wane replied that the June 27 PSC meeting in Banjul 
endorsed a UN transition on October 1, and that from the AA 
perspective, the sooner the transition happens the better. 
He admitted that the AU is frustrated by the Government of 
Sudan,s reluctance to allow an UNMIS mission in Darfur as 
well as the UN stated timeframe of a January 1, 2007, 
transition.  Wane said that if AMIS is expected to continue 
until December 31, the AU will need more financial support 
from the international community.  The PSC will most likely 
convene in early September to discuss 1) a timeline outlining 
when the current funding will deplete (Wane speculated that 
because of the donor pledging conference AMIS could possibly 
fund troops until mid-October); and 2) the willingness of the 
GOS to accept UNMIS in Darfur.  Wane outlined possible risks 
if the AMIS were to leave Sudan without a solid UNMIS in 
place: current initiatives could unravel; massive numbers of 
IDPs could be on the run; and UNMIS may have to begin a peace 
keeping operation from scratch. 
 
¶5.  Speaking candidly, Wane said that his personal worry was 
that the transition will take longer than predicted because 
of the GOS reluctance and the current UN and international 
community preoccupation with the situation in Lebanon.  He 
said that Sudan does not want an expanded role for the UN out 
of fear that it will be "a puppet" for the U.S. and Israel. 
Wane added that he personally believes the AU did not engage 
the GOS enough on its resistance to the AMIS transition to 
UNMIS.  He reflected that if the AU can secure funding for 
six months and mobilize technical support from the UN and 
NATO, this would buy time to engage politically with Sudan. 
 
¶6.  Ambassador Huddleston responded that AMIS must continue 
until the transfer to UNMIS because no one wants to see the 
situation worsen.  To that end, she stated, the reason the 
U.S. is pushing for an October 1 transition is to put 
pressure on the UN and the GOS to create a smooth and fast UN 
transition.  She pointed out and Wane argeed that rehatting 
AMIS would allow the UN to meet the time table of October. 
HUDDLESTON