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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 003952 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/14/06 
Part-2 
INDEX: 
(8) Feelings of abductee families on sanctions against North Korea 
 
 
(9) Commentary: North Korea's missiles and Japan's shields8 
 
(10) Interview with Minshuto President Ichiro Ozawa on regime 
change 
 
-- There will be no Daily Summary on July 17 - a Japanese holiday. 
 
ARTICLES: 
(8) Feelings of abductee families on sanctions against North Korea 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
July 13, 2006 
 
On the afternoon of July 12 while Okinawa was hit with the high 
winds of typhoon No. 4, the parents - Shigeru and Sakie Yokota - of 
Megumi Yokota, who was abducted to North Korea, spoke at the gym of 
Ishigaki Daini Junior High School in Ishigaki City, on Ishigaki 
Island. 
 
Sakie underlined before more than 700 students and their parents: 
 
"It means that if North Korea fires a missile, not only will a 
country be threatened, but the beautiful waters around this island 
and the beautiful earth will be devastated. I hope you will think 
about various North Korean problems such as human rights through the 
abduction issue and take action to resolve them." 
 
The Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea, 
to which Mr. and Mrs. Yokota belong, and another group supporting 
abductees have called on the Japanese government to invoke economic 
sanctions against North Korea. 
 
On July 5 when the North launched its missiles, the association 
released a statement saying that economic sanctions would be the 
best way to shake the Kim Jong Il regime. They praised the Japanese 
government's quick decision to impose sanctions, including a ban on 
entry of North Korean ferry Man Gyong Bong into Japanese ports. 
 
The statement also held that the government should have mentioned 
that Pyongyang's unfaithful response so far to the abduction issue 
was one of the reasons why Japan imposed sanctions. 
 
In consideration of such a statement, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo 
Abe called Shigeru on July 6 and told him that the government had 
decided to impose sanctions, taking into the North's stance toward 
the abduction issue. He also told a press conference the same day: 
 
"The government has imposed sanctions on the North as that country 
fired missiles, but we also took into account the fact that 
Pyongyang has not responded in a sincere manner to the abduction 
issue." 
 
At a press conference the same day, Shigeru stated: 
 
"If North Korea thinks Japan imposed sanctions on it due to its 
missile launches alone, this would adversely affect the abduction 
issue. North Korea would become stubborn and discontinue dialogue." 
 
 
Teruaki Masumoto, chief secretariat of the association, stated in a 
 
TOKYO 00003952  002 OF 008 
 
 
gathering held in the city of Fujisawa, Kanagawa Prefecture: 
 
"We are most concerned about the possibility that the abduction 
issue will be eclipsed by the missile issue. We don't want the 
government to think that things are okay so long as the North 
doesn't fire missiles." 
 
A draft resolution that Japan, the United States, and other 
countries submitted to the United Nations Security Council did not 
stipulate the abduction issue as a reason for sanctions against 
North Korea. A vote on the draft resolution has been put off in 
order to carefully watch China's efforts to persuade Pyongyang. 
 
Mr. and Mrs. Yokota said in Ishigaki, Japan's southernmost city, "We 
would like the government to hold firm to its position." 
 
(9) Commentary: North Korea's missiles and Japan's shields 
 
YOMIURI (Page 13) (Full) 
July 13, 2006 
 
Hidemichi Katsumata 
 
Faced with the threat of North Korean missiles, some government 
officials are maintaining that Japan should acquire the capability 
of striking enemy bases. This enemy base strike advocacy would have 
to be discussed from the perspective of constitutionality and 
international law. However, the general public has a growing sense 
of crisis about Japan's national security. What should politics 
prioritize now to secure the nation? 
 
Many difficulties in store for acquiring strike capability 
 
With the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War in mind, one may think 
about the advisability of enabling the Self-Defense Forces to strike 
North Korea's missile sites, and we may come across the scenes of 
dropping bombs and missiles from airplanes or launching cruise 
missiles from naval ships. In carrying out such airborne and 
seaborne operations, the SDF will need aerial refueling aircraft to 
lengthen its aircraft's cruising distance. In addition, the SDF will 
need precision bombs for pinpoint target hitting with the aid of a 
global positioning system, as well as Tomahawk cruise missiles. 
 
In March next year, Japan will introduce its first air tanker. The 
SDF plans to deploy a total of four tanker planes. Among the Air 
Self-Defense Force's fighter jets, F-15 and F-2 fighters can be 
refueled in flight, and their cruising radius will be markedly 
expanded with airborne refueling. The ASDF is now equipping 250-kg 
antisurface bombs for F-2 fighters with precision-guided systems. 
All ASDF F-2 fighters will be payloaded with precision-guided bombs 
in two years. 
 
The ASDF has introduced these hardware systems for the defense of 
Japan's outlying islands and other missions. They can be used to 
strike enemy bases. If that is the case, one may wonder if the SDF 
is ready to strike enemy bases. The matter, however, is not so 
simple. 
 
In the first place, a cruising fighter jet needs to approach a 
target base in an enemy country. To do so, the fighter jet has to 
 
TOKYO 00003952  003 OF 008 
 
 
sense radarwaves from the enemy country's ground-based radar. Then, 
the fighter has to jam the radarwaves and destroy an air defense 
system, or many of the ASDF's fighters on a mission would be downed 
by enemy antiaircraft missiles. None of the ASDF's currently 
deployed aircraft and weaponry is capable of doing so. 
 
"If we're ordered to strike a base over there, that would be the 
same as the one-time kamikaze suicide attack," one ASDF officer 
said. 
 
Then, is it all right if there are Tomahawk missiles? The answer is 
no. In the Gulf war, US forces launched many Tomahawk missiles to 
destroy Iraq's Scud missiles, which range 300-500 kilometers. 
However, they could not hit those targets because the Scud is a 
mobile missile of the trailer-launched type. British commandoes 
entered Iraq, where they discovered launchers and guided Tomahawks 
to destroy those launchers. 
 
The Rodong, a North Korean missile with a range of 1,300 kilometers 
targeted to hit Japan, is also a missile of the mobile type like the 
Scud. Moreover, many of North Korea's military facilities are 
impregnable underground fortresses that are hard to destroy. 
 
From the start, Japan is not fully capable of gathering intelligence 
with the aid of satellites needed to strike an enemy base. Japan 
therefore cannot locate key military facilities. If Japan is going 
to acquire such functions and capabilities, it will have to spend 
huge money and time. Moreover, Japan depends on US forces for most 
of its hardware systems, technologies, and intelligence. 
 
North Korea targets its ballistic missiles at Japan, so it is 
understandable that government officials are wondering if Japan can 
do nothing until it comes under attack. It would be necessary to 
discuss the advisability of striking enemy bases. However, Japan has 
many more things to do first to defend itself. 
 
Japan-US bilateral defense planning needed to cope with imminent 
threat 
 
Surprisingly, Japan currently has nothing like bilateral defense 
planning with the United States in order for US Forces Japan (USFJ) 
and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to act in concert with each other 
to defend Japan against ballistic missile attacks. 
 
It became evident from this February's SDF-USFJ joint command post 
exercise (CPX) at the Defense Agency. The CPX was based on a 
computer-aided simulation of scenarios that began with US forces 
picking up North Korea's fueling of ballistic missiles. The scene 
later developed into an emergency on the Korean Peninsula. Japan 
declared a neighboring contingency. However, a number of ballistic 
missiles came flying to Japan backing up US forces. 
 
However, no orders were issued to the SDF for defense operations 
even in that case. The Ground Self-Defense Force was only ordered to 
dispatch troops on a disaster relief mission to a disaster-stricken 
area where a missile landed. "Even in the case of training, we're 
not allowed to issue defense operation orders if there are no 
grounds," a senior official of the Defense Agency said. "At this 
point," the official added, "we don't know the government's course 
of action about how many missiles we must see landing in Japan to 
 
TOKYO 00003952  004 OF 008 
 
 
issue defense operation orders and when a neighboring contingency is 
changed to an emergency in Japan." 
 
"Japan cannot use the right of self-defense in the event of a 
neighboring contingency since it is under normal circumstances." 
This explanation came from the government when it revised the SDF 
Law to stipulate missile intercept procedures. The government was 
equivocal in responding to ballistic missiles. As a result, the CPX 
ended up with no scenario of SDF mobilization for defense 
operations. In contrast, the United States, based on a final report 
on USFJ realignment, is shielding Japan at a high pitch with missile 
defense (MD) systems. 
 
Last month, USFJ installed a high-performance missile-tracking radar 
system at the ASDF's Shariki basein Aomori Prefecture. In late 
August, the US Navy will deploy the USS Shiloh to its Yokosuka base 
in Kanagawa Prefecture as the first MD ship loaded with Standard 
Missile 3 (SM-3) missiles capable of intercepting North Korea's 
Rodong missiles. Furthermore, the US military is also planning to 
deploy the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3), an intercept 
missile of the ground-based type, to the US Air Force's Kadena base 
in Okinawa Prefecture, where 24 PAC-3 launchers will arrive this 
month at the earliest and will be operational within the year. 
 
Of course, the Shiloh alone cannot cover even a half of Japan's 
defense zone, and the PAC-3 is no more than localized shielding. The 
Maritime Self-Defense Force will take at least several years to rig 
its four Aegis-equipped destroyers with SM-3 missiles. It is not 
until then that Japan can acquire the capability of defending itself 
against ballistic missiles. 
 
Then, what can Japan do now? In 1997, the Japanese and US 
governments revised their guidelines for bilateral defense 
cooperation. The new version of the defense guidelines stipulated 
that "US forces will consider, as necessary, the use of forces 
providing additional strike power" in case Japan comes under a 
ballistic missile attack. "The wording 'consider' means that they 
will respond to such a situation according to what and how far Japan 
will do," one SDF officer says. Under the present circumstances, 
however, the US military may use its MD systems in Japan at its own 
discretion. 
 
"If there is an imminent threat near at hand, the government must 
think of how to deal with it to secure the people." This is an 
excerpt from the words of former US Secretary of State Powell in 
Foreign Afafirs magazine two years ago. What the government should 
tackle now in the first place is to expedite bilateral defense 
planning between Japan and the United States in order to provide 
against a ballistic missile attack. Japan and the United States 
should define their respective roles in terms of what USFJ and SDF 
will do and how far. This will also lead to deterring North Korea. 
The government must not mistake the order of precedence. 
 
(10) Interview with Minshuto President Ichiro Ozawa on regime 
change 
 
ASAHI (Page 15) (Excerpts) 
July 14, 2006 
 
Asahi senior writer Hiroshi Hoshi: Japan and China should be able to 
 
TOKYO 00003952  005 OF 008 
 
 
discuss matters frankly is your theory. In view of that theory, was 
your visit to China fruitful? 
 
Ichiro Ozawa: It was good that I was able to share the basic view 
with President Hu Jintao that Japan and China have to make efforts 
to eliminate bilateral obstacles and develop cooperative relations. 
It will be useful when we take the reins of government. 
 
Asahi senior writer Atsushi Yamada: Besides China, I'm afraid that 
Japan's relations with the United States are not so good. 
 
Ozawa: You can say that again. When Mr. Koizumi did an imitation of 
Elvis Presley, President Bush raised his eyebrows. Mr. Koizumi was 
terrible. 
 
Yamada: Mr. Ozawa, if you were prime minister, how would you handle 
Japan-US relations? 
 
Ozawa: Giving priority to the Japan-US alliance that may follow a 
suicidal course is one option, but a master-servant relationship is 
out of the question. Japan must be an equal partner. As long as 
Japan takes a cosmetic approach, it will never be able to earn the 
trust of the United States. 
 
Hoshi: Prime Minister Koizumi has been in power for over five years. 
What's the secret? 
 
Ozawa: His popularity comes from the public's dissatisfaction with 
the current situation and uncertainty about the future. 
 
Yamada: He is tactful, isn't he? 
 
Ozawa: He is really good at deceiving people. Japanese people are 
too conservative and timid to change the system. Mr. Koizumi has 
fulfilled people's desire to sustain the LDP administration with his 
performance. 
 
Yamada: There seems to be some similarities between your book 
Blueprint for a New Japan and Mr. Koizumi's policies. 
 
Ozawa: Oh, no. Mr. Koizumi doesn't think of anything. He is only 
interested in how to raise his popularity to remain in power. 
 
Yamada: In truth, bureaucrats might have been leading the Koizumi 
administration. 
 
Ozawa: Of all past prime ministers, Mr. Koizumi relies most heavily 
on bureaucrats. Bureaucrats' power is growing. 
 
Yamada: Can you give us some examples? 
 
Ozawa: Take a look at highway and postal reforms. The administration 
totally gave in to bureaucrats. The government ended up with 
building highways in the countryside, as planned. Nothing will 
change in postal administration. 
 
Yamada: Minshuto fought an uphill battle over postal reform, didn't 
it? 
 
Ozawa: We've been saying all along that the postal savings and 
 
TOKYO 00003952  006 OF 008 
 
 
insurance businesses must be downsized before being privatized and 
that the mail delivery business must not be privatized. 
 
Hoshi: If the Japanese people are really conservative and hope only 
for gradual reforms, a regime change would be difficult, wouldn't 
it? 
 
Ozawa: The Japanese public takes things slowly. They are filled with 
dissatisfaction with the current situation and anxiety for the 
future. People feel uneasy because the Japanese safeguards have 
collapsed and Koizumi's LDP has failed to present substitutes. 
 
Hoshi: Blueprint for a New Japan begins with a story that there are 
no fences at the Grand Canyon. You used to insist on deregulation. 
Are you saying that the country now needs safeguards? 
 
Ozawa: There is no question that deregulation is necessary, but we 
must consider safeguards at the same time. This applies to social 
security and employment, as well. Both the government and private 
sectors should introduce the merit system actively. But the vast 
majority of the country's salaried workers are hoping for stable 
lives. For such people, our society has devised the lifelong 
employment and seniority systems as safeguards. I think that they 
must be protected and that they are compatible with free 
competition. 
 
Hoshi: Blueprint mentions a 10 PERCENT  consumption tax rate. 
 
Ozawa: The consumption tax must be hiked as necessary. But before 
that, wasteful spending must be eliminated and the administration 
must be reformed fundamentally. A consumption tax hike should come 
after, for instance, transferring tax collection authority from the 
central to local governments. 
 
Yamada: The government adopted the Basic Policies for Economic and 
Fiscal Management and Structural Reform, which do not mention any 
consumption tax hike. Won't the consumption tax become an issue in 
next year's Upper House election? 
 
Ozawa: It probably wont' be an issue. The government and the LDP 
turned the subject away from the attention of the general public so 
as not to make it an issue. Pension and employment would become 
issues, however. 
 
Hoshi: Tell us about your strategy for wresting power from the 
ruling coalition. 
 
Ozawa: In next year's Upper House election, the opposition camp will 
win a majority. If Minshuto can garner over 50 seats, endlessly 
close to 60, the opposition camp would be able to force the ruling 
coalition into a minority. 
 
Hoshi: You have been searching for ways to join hands with postal 
rebels, such as the People's New Party. Some Minshuto members think 
there is no need to reach out to LDP-like individuals. 
 
Ozawa: Such a view raises questions about their political sense. In 
order to win a majority, we must turn LDP supporters into Minshuto 
supporters. Such a view explains why they have always been an 
opposition party. There is no need to reject sympathetic people who 
 
TOKYO 00003952  007 OF 008 
 
 
will for Minshuto. We are talking about a battle for power here. 
 
Hoshi: To Mr. Ozawa, politics is about power and struggles. But many 
Minshuto members regard politics as something like study sessions. I 
believe you find their view disagreeable. 
 
Ozawa: Without power, we cannot realize our standpoints. I think 
those people have come to realize gradually that power is at stake 
in elections in any democracy. 
 
Yamada: What are your slogans for the Upper House election next 
year? 
 
Ozawa: I have many slogans, but we're going to pick a couple of them 
that are easy to understand for the general public. 
 
Yamada: You haven't determined them yet? 
 
Ozawa: We'll come up with basic policies before year's end. What 
we're going to push forward is a matter of election technique or 
strategy. 
 
Hoshi: Suppose the opposition camp won a majority in the Upper House 
election, what would you do after that? 
 
Ozawa: Mr. Koizumi said last year, 'The outcome of the general 
election reflects public wishes.' By the same toke, we will say, 
'Public wishes have given the opposition camp a majority.' From 
there, we will follow a path to the helm of government. 
 
Hoshi: In order to remain in power, the LDP could approach some 
Minshuto members after the Upper House election at the risk of 
another political realignment. 
 
Ozawa: We will take the initiative as soon as the ruling coalition 
fails to win a majority, and the LDP won't be able to reach out to 
us. I have learned bitter lessons during the LDP-Liberal Party 
coalition days, so I have no intention of discussing any fishy deal 
with the LDP. 
 
Hoshi: Given the recent North Korea situation, there is a tendency 
to fuel nationalism ahead of the LDP presidential election in 
September. 
 
Ozawa: Anxiety and discontent might prompt the general public to 
ride that trend, and that worries me. 
 
Hoshi: To Mr. Ozawa, taking power and become prime minister are 
separate matters, aren't they? 
 
Ozawa: To me, a change in administrations is important for two 
reasons. One is for enrooting parliamentary democracy in Japan, and 
the other is for realizing true reform. So it doesn't matter who 
becomes prime minister. 
 
Hoshi: You don't have to be prime minister? 
 
Ozawa: No, I don't have to be prime minister. But the person who 
becomes prime minister must be reform-minded. 
 
 
TOKYO 00003952  008 OF 008 
 
 
Yamada: You are selfless. I thought all lawmakers want to become 
prime minister. 
 
Ozawa: I my mind, I already served as prime minister. (During the 
LDP days), I could have had that position if I had wanted to. People 
say it would be easier for me to implement reforms myself. That 
could be true, but it would be a lot easier if someone else could 
reinvent the country on my behalf. 
 
Hoshi: You were often absent from Lower House plenary sessions. The 
LDP says such a person cannot serve as prime minister. 
 
Ozawa: Many times, Prime Minister Koizumi and cabinet ministers 
didn't attend sessions, either. For over 15 years until I became 
chief cabinet secretary, which forced me to abstain from attending 
sessions, I had not skipped even a single plenary session. I have 
acted on the basis of my priorities. But I have always attended 
important plenary sessions. 
 
Yamada: The candidate Minshuto backed in collaboration with the 
ruling coalition was defeated in the recent Shiga gubernatorial 
race. That makes us wonder if Minshuto is in good shape. 
 
Ozawa: The race gave us a bitter lesson, and that was good; we 
needed that. Lawmakers are to blame for that, but labor unions are 
not totally blameless. 
 
Yamada: Minshuto went along with the labor unions. 
 
Ozawa: We had to go along with them, and that was the problem. Now 
that we have learned a lesson, we will avoid that option in the 
future. 
 
SCHIEFFER