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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 003922 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/13/06 
Part-2 
INDEX: 
(6) Editorial: No jumping the gun 
 
 
(7) Enemy strike argument linked to LDP presidential race 
 
(8) Interview with Internal Affairs and Communications Minister 
Takenaka on five years of Koizumi reforms: Door opened for economic 
recovery 
 
(9)  Lost civilian control -- pullout of GSDF troops from Iraq: 
Uniformed officers learned a lot from troop dispatch to Iraq 
 
ARTICLES: 
(6) Editorial: No jumping the gun 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
July 12, 2006 
 
Key cabinet ministers have been sounding as if they want Japan to go 
strike and destroy North Korea's missile-launching sites before they 
fire missiles. Even more, they are starting to say Japan should also 
acquire the capability of striking first in order to do so. 
 
"I wouldn't say we must do nothing until we suffer damage." This 
remark came from Foreign Minister Aso when he appeared on a July 9 
TV program. "From now on, we will need to deepen our discussions 
over whether we should acquire that capability," Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Abe said in a July 10 press conference. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Amid the international community's diplomatic efforts to resolve the 
nuclear problem, North Korea fired seven missiles in the name of 
"training." This is an extremely irresponsible act of provocation. 
 
Someday, North Korea may fire real warheaded missiles at Japan. Its 
recent firing of missiles made people harbor such an intangible 
feeling. It is difficult to shoot down all missiles, so it might be 
unavoidable to carry out a preemptive strike in order for Japan to 
save the lives of its people. They probably wanted to raise such a 
problem. 
 
Seemingly, their arguments appear plausible. However, we should 
think it over in a cool-headed manner. 
 
There is no knowing where a yet-to-be-fired missile is targeted to 
hit. Striking first, though in self-defense, is tantamount to waging 
war. The question is how to find out North Korea's aim, but it would 
be extremely difficult to do so. 
 
The Rodong, a missile of the intermediate-range type, has Japan 
within its range. Rodong missiles are reportedly deployed in 
mountain tunnels or elsewhere to be moved out and fired. Tremendous 
intelligence capabilities are needed to locate their whereabouts. 
 
If Japan may strike first, North Korea may further try to forestall 
Japan's move and attack Japan. There is also such a risk. 
 
In the event of an armed attack on Japan, the Self-Defense Forces 
will defend Japan's homeland, and US forces will pound enemy bases. 
This has been the basis of Japan's national security or its 
defense-only doctrine. 
 
The government has taken the position that Japan may strike first in 
a very limited number of cases. In point of fact, however, the SDF, 
 
TOKYO 00003922  002 OF 007 
 
 
with its role and hardware being restricted, has not been enabled to 
strike enemy bases. 
 
Conforming to the ideal of its peace constitution, Japan will never 
ever commit aggression against foreign countries, nor will it become 
a military threat. This is our national will, which has endorsed 
Japan's defense-only principle. 
 
Some may argue that we need to retouch Japan defense-only posture 
now that we are in the age of ballistic missiles. However, striking 
North Korea's missile site first will undermine Japan's security 
policy. 
 
We must not jump the gun as a consequence of becoming oversensitive 
to North Korea's provoking tactics. 
 
Altering Japan's defense-only doctrine would inevitably stir up not 
only North Korea but also China, South Korea, and other neighbors. 
 
What is most fearful to North Korea is the United States' mighty 
military power. What is most reliable for Japan and its national 
security is probably the United States' deterrence capabilities. 
Premised on this, Japan should seek to settle the problem on the 
diplomatic front as its strategy. 
 
(7) Enemy strike argument linked to LDP presidential race 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 24) (Abridged) 
July 12, 2006 
 
Following the test firing of ballistic missiles by North Korea, an 
argument calling for enabling Japan to "launch a (preemptive) strike 
on an enemy country" has resurfaced in the Liberal Democratic Party 
and Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan). The argument may overturn 
the foundation of the nation's exclusively defense-oriented policy. 
Behind brave comments seems to be a tug-of-war with North Korea, as 
well as such other factors as the LDP presidential election in 
September. 
 
Defense Agency Director-General Fukushiro Nukaga, Foreign Minister 
Taro Aso, and LDP Secretary General Tsutomu Takebe all called for 
allowing Japan to launch a "preemptive strike," that is, to strike 
an enemy before being attacked. In reality, a preemptive strike 
requires: (1) a confirmed enemy base; (2) insufficient air defense 
of an enemy country; and (3) sufficient striking power. Is a 
preemptive strike a real possibility for Japan? 
 
Military analyst Motoaki Kamiura thought such was not technically 
possible. He argued: 
 
"Taepodong is the only missile that requires building a frame for 
fueling. Rodong and other types of missiles are hidden, being 
mounted on trailers. The radar systems in spy satellites and 
reconnaissance planes Japan and the United States can deploy are 
unable to catch their images to determine a target base. 
 
Furthermore, South Korea and US Forces South Korea cannot launch a 
preemptive strike, according to Kamiura. 
 
"North Korea has deployed a large amount of chemical and biological 
 
TOKYO 00003922  003 OF 007 
 
 
weapons along the demilitarized zone. That country produces 4,500 
tons of chemical weapons and 1 ton of biological weapons annually. 
Japan's preemptive strike would result in the explosion of those 
weapons on the Korean Peninsula." 
 
What caused the enemy strike argument to surface? Masaru Sato, an 
indicted Foreign Ministry official on leave, noted: 
 
"It's part of the intelligence war. The intelligence war involves 
four factors: external, counterespionage, propaganda, and 
conspiracy. Japan makes good use of the last two." 
 
According to Sato, the Koizumi diplomacy has "unintentionally" 
achieved a successful outcome since the issuance of the Pyongyang 
Declaration in September 2002. The declaration is designed to allow 
Japan to provide economic assistance to North Korea in return for a 
total settlement of the abduction issue and a freeze on the nuclear 
and missile development programs. In the past, the North's 
intimidation strategy worked, eliciting concessions from Japan. 
Today, Japan is on the offensive, repelling all intimidations from 
the North. 
 
Sato added: 
 
"North Korea today resembles Japan during the Battle of Okinawa in 
the closing days of WWII. With no hope in sight, the North is a step 
short of giving in to despair. The enemy strike argument is designed 
to further pressure the North. Pyongyang will take it seriously. The 
problem is that Japan is not using the theory as part of its 
strategy in the intelligence war. In other words, Japan may end up 
losing its freedom of action because of this argument." 
 
What does it specifically mean? Former Upper House lawmaker Sadao 
Hirano explained: 
 
"The enemy strike argument has the risk of lawmakers uttering 
hawkish words in the hope of gaining immediate popularity instead of 
discussing how to defend the nation based on a rational perception 
of the current situation. And that might fuel emotional arguments in 
the country. The current situation is reminiscent of prewar days." 
 
The enemy strike theory reportedly has its roots in the unified 
government view released by the Hatoyama cabinet in 1956. Hirano 
warned: 
 
"The Hatoyama administration spread the hawkish policy widely in the 
postwar period. Between the period back then and today, there are 
marked differences in terms of the situation in East Asia and the 
performance of weaponry. It is not improper to shed the same light 
on the two distinctive periods. The series of hard-line views are 
connected with moves supporting Abe, a hardliner toward the North, 
for the LDP presidential race." 
 
Childish politics resulting in war underway 
 
Political commentator Minoru Morita warned: 
 
"If Japan declared a preemptive strike policy, other countries would 
do the same. Lawmakers must not play with fire that would endanger 
the people's lives just for the LDP presidency." 
 
TOKYO 00003922  004 OF 007 
 
 
 
Morita also said that the lawmakers' true mission is to maintain 
peace and that anyone suggesting the enemy strike theory would have 
been beaten up even by hawks a decade ago. 
 
"Simply put, such a move today will result in a war. Self-styled 
hawks are keeping silent for fear of emotional public criticism. 
Childish politics making light of the people's lives has begun." 
 
(8) Interview with Internal Affairs and Communications Minister 
Takenaka on five years of Koizumi reforms: Door opened for economic 
recovery 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 4) (Full) 
July 11, 2006 
 
The government's Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy finalized on 
July 7 its annual economic and fiscal policy guidelines (honebuto 
hoshin) for 2006, the last package for the Koizumi administration. 
The Nihon Keizai Shimbun asked Heizo Takenaka, who has engaged in 
economic policymaking since the inauguration of the Koizumi 
administration, for his views about the reform efforts made by Prime 
Minister Koizumi over the past five years. 
 
-- What has been brought in through the Koizumi reforms? 
 
The Japanese economy had been in an abnormal state during the dozen 
years or so after the bursting of the bubble economy. As economic 
pump-priming measures, the government stepped up investments in 
public works projects, resulting in piling up the nation's current 
account deficit. The economy, though, did not improve, and 
uncertainty loomed large over the nation's banking system due to 
huge nonperforming loans. Entrusted with economic management under 
such a situation, the Koizumi administration pushed for structural 
reforms. The reforms over the past five years contributed to stop a 
further deterioration of the economy and to open the door for the 
economy to improve. 
 
There are two types of reform: reactive and proactive. Reactive 
reform is defensive, as represented by measures taken to deal with 
the issue of bad loans. In this case, there is no other remedy but 
to write off the loan claims. 
 
During the so-called lost decade in Japan, major changes occurred in 
the world. With the advance of globalization, the population in the 
market economies in the world increased from 3 billion to 6 billion. 
In addition, frontier areas, like the digital revolution, have 
appeared. To cope with such changes, promoting proactive reform has 
also become necessary, and such reform was exactly what Prime 
Minister Koizumi pursued, based on the principle that tasks that can 
be done by the private sector should be done by the private sector, 
and the economy should be improved based on market vitality. As its 
symbolic challenge, there is the privatization of postal services. 
 
The Koizumi cabinet opened the door of proactive reform. The next 
administration will have to continue to carry out this type of 
reform in order to prevent the Japanese economy from deteriorating 
again. 
 
-- Making use of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, which 
 
TOKYO 00003922  005 OF 007 
 
 
was set up just before the Koizumi administration was launched, you 
changed the conventional policymaking method, didn't you? 
 
A number of councils have been set up in government offices, and 
policy debates have been conducted in earnest. Despite such efforts, 
Japanese policies during the decade since the bubble economy burst 
did not score good results. In deliberations at such councils, with 
no strong political leadership demonstrated and under bureaucrats' 
lead, breakthrough policies cannot be worked out. 
 
In this sense, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy is quite 
different from other deliberation councils. Chaired by the prime 
minister, the panel discusses various matters and works out policies 
while seeking the prime minister's judgment. The prime minister's 
leadership has been displayed through the council in an 
unprecedented way. In part thanks to this, reforms made headway. Our 
council served as en engine of reform. 
 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry took charge of 
economic policies, while the finance minister was responsible for 
fiscal policies. Economic and fiscal affairs are closed linked to 
each other. The policy panel took the view of managing economic and 
fiscal policies under a single body for the first time. As a result, 
it has become possible to bring about moderate economic recovery 
while moderately restoring fiscal soundness. 
 
Most key terms, like honebuto hoshin, were coined in meetings of the 
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy. Even so, if a certain 
government agency has strong influence over the council, it could 
become a "super council." We therefore must be careful about this. 
 
-- The panel made compromises in coordination with the ruling 
parties on the financial revitalization program, postal 
privatization, and other reform plans, didn't it? 
 
Policies in a democratic society must be adopted through the 
democratic process. There naturally are conflicting views. It is 
impossible to achieve a perfect score, so points must be gradually 
deducted. Even the prime minister cannot carry out policies just as 
he hopes. 
 
Cynically speaking, this trend is, in a sense, to prove that 
democracy is properly functioning. Some might think that the policy 
panel made concessions on the issues of financial revitalization and 
postal privatization, but we engaged in a tactful game and achieved 
results based on such tactics as setting a high goal and aiming to 
achieve something more attainable and giving up on negotiations if 
this minimum goal is out of reach. We are amazed at how skilled 
government officials are on tactics. Government officials who can 
act without being diffident toward their ministries or agencies 
helped me. Unless common principles on policymaking are shared among 
experts, it will be impossible to deepen policy debate. 
 
(9)  Lost civilian control -- pullout of GSDF troops from Iraq: 
Uniformed officers learned a lot from troop dispatch to Iraq 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 1) (Full) 
July 12, 2006 
 
By Shigeru Handa 
 
TOKYO 00003922  006 OF 007 
 
 
 
Colonel Masahisa Sato, the leader of an assistance unit who is known 
for his imposing mustache, temporarily returned home secretly on 
April 20, 2004, three months after Japanese troops were deployed to 
Iraq. The purpose was to look for ways to get funds for troop 
activities in Iraq. 
 
In past overseas activities, Self-Defense Forces (SDF) troops had to 
engage themselves in repair works. But in Iraq, the number of SDF 
troops to be dispatched to Iraq was limited to no more than 600 
personnel; consequently, a facilities unit was decided to be 
composed of some 50 troops. Although this figure was insufficient to 
do the repair work, if Iraqis were hired to make up for the shortage 
of staff, it would become a relief measure for the unemployed locals 
and contribute to bringing peace to the region. The troops to be 
dispatched to Iraq calculated that doing so could lead to securing 
their safety. 
 
On April 7, the GSDF camp in Iraq was attacked by rockets for the 
first time. This attack might have stemmed from local discontent 
with insufficient job availability. This incident eventually led 
Colonel Sato, a responsible officer for public relations, to return 
home temporarily. 
 
Why can't the SDF have ample funding for their activities? The 
reason is because laws and rules related to the SDF do not assume 
overseas SDF activities. In order to hire Iraqis, the SDF disbursed 
the employment cost from the remuneration fund, which is used to pay 
guest speakers invited to the Japanese camp. 
 
After Sato returned to Iraq, this employment cost was paid from the 
equipment procurement budget used to purchase goods, instead of the 
remuneration fund. The disbursement expanded 10 times from 10 
million yen per month to 100 million yen. 
 
The "uniformed officer's lobby activity," according to a senior GSDF 
officer, on the government achieved a tangible result. 
 
In addition, the GSDF had an eye on official development assistance 
(ODA), which is under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MOFA) 
control, as a possible source to fund the cost of GSDF activities. 
Particularly, it targeted the grass roots grant fund cooperation 
under the ODA. 
 
The upper limit of money paid out from the grass roots grant 
cooperation is set at 100 million yen, which is a relatively small 
amount. But the merit is there no need to go through clumsy 
proceedings, namely, if nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) apply 
for financial support for their plans or projects, Japanese 
diplomatic missions abroad can make the decision on whether to 
finance their plans or projects. In order to use this fund, a 
diplomatic establishment is necessary in Samawah. In response to the 
GSDF's strong call to establish such a diplomatic establishment, 
MOFA established an office in the GSDF camp in Samawah and installed 
five MOFA officials there on a regular basis. 
 
Uniformed officers thus made one effort after the other to set the 
stage for SDF personnel to be stationed abroad safely. But the 
payment of the employment cost for Iraqis from the defense budget is 
suspected of stretching the definition of the defense budget. As for 
 
TOKYO 00003922  007 OF 007 
 
 
ODA, it is neither intended to finance SDF activities nor be 
insurance for the protection of the SDF. 
 
Is the SDF dispatch to a battlefield intended to loosen the laws and 
the systems that are supposed to be observed tightly? 
 
The troop dispatch to Iraq has brought some changes to the SDF. For 
example, a military-civilian cooperation office in charge of 
overseas activities is expected to be established in the GSDF's new 
readiness group that will be formed in the GSDF's Asaka base in 
Tokyo in March 2007. That office will be staffed by senior officers 
who were stationed in Iraq. 
 
Major General Koichiro Bansho, who was dispatched to Iraq along with 
Colonel Sato and who served as chief of the reconstruction 
assistance unit, in looking back on the past years of the deployment 
of SDF troops to Iraq, said: "The SDF has moved in the right 
direction over the past 50 years since its foundation." The morale 
of diligent and well-trained troops did not weaken despite being in 
a "burning hell" where the temperature could rise above 50 degrees 
centigrade and where there were repeated rocket attacks. 
 
What the SDF lacked in the past may be the experience in actual 
combat. Helped by weak civilian control, SDF troops were able to 
grope for the best way to do their operations abroad and learn a lot 
from the experience. 
 
"If Japan needs to send personnel to dangerous areas, politicians 
tend to send SDF personnel to them," a senior GSDF officer remarked. 
This, too, has become a valuable lesson ahead of the next troop 
dispatch. 
 
SCHIEFFER