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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 003909 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/12/06 
 
 
INDEX: 
(1) Editorial: Enemy strike argument requires calm and thorough 
discussion 
 
(2) Gov't begins studying strike on enemy country; Ruling parties 
out of step 
 
(3) North Korea's missile launches boosts Abe's political identity; 
Is Koizumi urging Abe to heighten his awareness? 
 
(4) Interview with Internal Affairs and Communications Minister 
Takenaka on Koizumi reforms over five years: Prime minister 
demonstrates leadership in policymaking, but concerned about change 
in nature of policy panel 
 
(5) Elimination of factional influence: Abe secretly asked Yuji 
Yamamoto, chairman of Parliamentary League to Support Second Chance, 
in March to support challenge for LDP presidential race 
 
ARTICLES: 
(1) Editorial: Enemy strike argument requires calm and thorough 
discussion 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
July 12, 2006 
 
"In order to defend the people within the context of the 
Constitution, there is every reason for Japan to have a limited 
capability to (strike an enemy country) as an independent country." 
 
These words came from Defense Agency Director-General Fukushiro 
Nukaga in a press conference following the launch of ballistic 
missiles by North Korea. 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe also said, "We need to study that 
option at all times." Liberal Democratic Party Secretary General 
Tsutomu Takebe also echoed Nukaga's view. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
In contrast, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi called for caution, 
while acknowledging the need for discussion. The New Komeito is 
dismissive of the argument, saying, "Striking an enemy base will 
turn into an all-out war." 
 
The Hatoyama cabinet presented the enemy strike argument for the 
first time in 1956 as the government's view. Logic behind the 
argument is that striking an enemy base in response to an attack on 
Japan with a guided missile or other weapon constitutes an act of 
self-defense as long as there is no other means for defense. It is a 
classic yet new argument. 
 
Japan basically takes an exclusively defense-oriented policy, which 
means to: (1) take defensive action only after being attacked by 
another country; and (2) maintain a defense capability at a minimum 
level. 
 
For this reason, Japan has refrained from possessing 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range strategic bombers, 
and attack aircraft carriers. Japan's defense strategy in time of a 
national emergency is to let the Self-Defense Forces take defensive 
action and leave the offensive action to the US military. 
 
Japan has provided US Forces Japan with bases in accordance with the 
bilateral security treaty. Role sharing between Japan and the United 
 
TOKYO 00003909  002 OF 008 
 
 
States is specified in the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation. Japan has also improved the law to extend logistical 
support to US forces in action in areas surrounding Japan. 
 
In order for Japan to introduce offensive weapons based on the enemy 
strike argument, the nation's strictly defense-oriented policy must 
be turned around. It would also be necessary to review the 
realignment of US forces in Japan, to which the defense chief also 
agreed. The nature of the Japan-US alliance would also change. An 
independent defense argument may arise in the end. 
 
If that is the case, Japan in strengthening its defense capability, 
would have to give up its status as a "peaceful nation." Other Asian 
countries may regard Japan as a threat. Japan's peace diplomacy 
based on the bitter WWII lesson may also fall apart. 
 
North Korea has reportedly deployed 200 Rodong missiles, which have 
Japan in their range. That country has also declared it possesses 
nuclear weapons. The abduction issue, too, remains unsettled. 
Needless to say, North Korea remains a major threat to Japan. 
 
North Korea launched ballistic missiles in defiance of repeated 
warnings. The Japanese people are frustrated and irritated with a 
lack of effective means to cope with the intimidating missile 
launches. Some may have questions about the rigid defense-oriented 
argument. There is need to discuss how to deal with the new 
intimidating situation. 
 
Nukaga's statement sounds farfetched, however. His comment includes 
crucial aspects, such as how to sort out the relationship with the 
US-Japan Security Treaty. A conclusion must not be reached so 
easily. 
 
Rational and thorough discussion is necessary in view of the new 
situation and the country's defense capability. 
 
(2) Gov't begins studying strike on enemy country; Ruling parties 
out of step 
 
SANKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
July 11, 2006 
 
In the wake of North Korea's recent firing of missiles, the 
government has entered into a full-fledged study of striking an 
enemy country to pound its missile sites before they fire missiles. 
The study is based on the government's unified view adopted in the 
days of Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama's cabinet. The government's 
position in the unified view is that it is not the spirit of the 
Constitution of Japan to wait for self-destruction while doing 
nothing if and when there is a country that is obviously intent to 
aggress against Japan. Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro 
Nukaga has declared that the government would discuss the matter. In 
point of fact, however, it is impossible for the Self-Defense Forces 
to strike an enemy country as long as the SDF's equipment remains at 
the present level. In the meantime, the ruling parties are getting 
out of step over the advisability of striking enemy bases. 
 
"It's all right to study this matter while theoretically 
anticipating various cases," Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi told 
reporters on the evening of July 10 when he was asked about Nukaga's 
remarks that touched on the possibility of striking an enemy 
country. At the same time, however, Koizumi also suggested the need 
for the government to remain cautious in its study of the option, 
 
TOKYO 00003909  003 OF 008 
 
 
saying: "It's quite difficult to find out whether they will attack 
Japan. It's different from a preemptive strike." 
 
In 1956, when the Hatoyama cabinet was in office, the government 
deemed it possible to strike an enemy country. 
 
After that, however, the government tabooed the notion of striking 
an enemy land. And even now, 50 years later, the government still 
has no clear-cut guidelines to deem it possible to strike an enemy 
land. 
 
In January 2003, Defense Agency Director General Shigeru Ishiba 
stated before the Diet that Japan might be allowed to strike an 
enemy country if and when that country has "a clear intention to 
aggress against Japan" and in case that country has "set a missile 
on a launch pad or is preparing to fuel a missile." However, Japan 
cannot strike any missile site in North Korea as long as North Korea 
prepares to test-fire a missile with a hidden intention to attack 
Japan. 
 
Then, is the SDF capable of striking North Korea's bases? 
 
"It's possible under legal theory," Defense Agency Administrative 
Deputy Director General Takemasa Moriya said in a press conference 
on July 10. "But," Moriya went on, "Japan expects the United States 
to strike enemy bases." In 1997, Japan and the United States revised 
their guidelines for bilateral defense cooperation. The new version 
of the defense guidelines stipulates that "US forces will consider, 
as necessary, the use of forces providing additional strike power" 
in case Japan comes under a missile attack. 
 
In the press conference, Moriya cited some reasons for that: 1) 
Japan does not have any missiles that can reach North Korea; 2) 
Japan does not have any attack aircraft that can fly to and back 
from an enemy base; and 3) Japan does not have any aircraft that can 
dodge enemy radar. 
 
However, there are arguments even within the Defense Agency over 
whether the SDF is really incapable of striking an enemy land. 
 
In April last year, Defense Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono 
revealed that the Defense Agency in 1994 simulated Air Self-Defense 
Force fighter jets' strike on a missile base in North Korea. 
According to Ono, the ASDF answered that its fighters would be able 
to strike a North Korean missile site if they try. 
 
In that simulation, however, the Defense Agency anticipated that 
ASDF attack fighters would have to land at a US military base in 
South Korea if they run out of fuel and that their pilots may have 
to be ejected over the Sea of Japan. "It wouldn't be a realistic 
mission," one senior official of the Defense Agency said. 
 
Meanwhile, the Defense Agency has now decided to introduce tanker 
aircraft needed for fighter jets to make longer flights. Last year, 
the agency planned technology research for long-range guided 
missiles that can strike an enemy land. However, the New Komeito 
party, a coalition partner of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, 
raised an objection to this planned technology research. Eventually, 
it was not incorporated in the agency's midterm defense buildup 
program. The agency still cannot expect to go ahead with its 
feasibility study of long-range guided missile technology. 
 
Opposition parties are cautious about Nukaga's remarks. In addition, 
 
TOKYO 00003909  004 OF 008 
 
 
there are also cautious arguments from within the ruling coalition. 
 
LDP Secretary General Tsutomu Takebe gave high marks to Nukaga's 
remarks. "We know they will fire missiles," Takebe said. He added: 
"Even so, do we do nothing? That's unacceptable. We should make 
positive efforts if we need to legislate measures." 
 
However, New Komeito President Takenori Kanzaki voiced a negative 
view on July 10. "Theoretically, there are various ideas," Kanzaki 
said. "But," he also said, "that would mean a full-scale war (in the 
case of striking a North Korean missile base)." He added, "So the 
government should remain cautious in its study." Another New Komeito 
executive said, "Japan may have to acquire that capability in time, 
but it's dangerous to go for it." This executive also said, "So we 
will apply the brakes." 
 
(3) North Korea's missile launches boosts Abe's political identity; 
Is Koizumi urging Abe to heighten his awareness? 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
July 12, 2006 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, who is regarded as the most 
likely candidate to succeed Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, has 
rapidly boosted his political identity in the government by his 
diplomatic handling of the fallout from North Korea's ballistic 
missile launches. He is now serving as acting prime minister since 
Koizumi left yesterday for a seven-day trip to the Middle East and 
Russia. With the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential 
election coming up in September, the Prime Minister's office has 
already taken an aspect of being under Abe's control. 
 
The government has unusually taken a tough stance toward the North's 
missile launches. Many point out the presence of Abe, known for his 
hard-line stance toward North Korea, as the reason for Tokyo's 
strong stand toward Pyongyang. 
 
Japan has submitted to the UN Security Council a resolution calling 
for sanctions on North Korea. Abe said that China's proposal for 
issuing a nonbinding chairman's statement "is meaningless." He has 
continued seeking an adoption of the resolution. 
 
Abe has been engaged with negotiations with US National Security 
Advisor Stephen Hadley and US Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer 
since June. He promised to support the US resolution even though 
Washington was concerned about whether Japan would go along with it. 
Abe's thorough preparations have brought about Japan's tough stance, 
supported by close cooperation with the United States. 
 
Abe also played an important role in imposing Japan's independent 
sanctions against Pyongyang, including a ban on North Korean 
freighter Man Gyong Bong 92's entry into Japanese ports. 
 
In a meeting on July 4 a day before the North test-fired missiles, a 
government official proposed prohibiting the North Korean freighter 
from entering Japanese ports only when a missile flied over Japan, 
but Abe turned down the proposal, saying, "North Korea has already 
had an yellow card due to its abductions of Japanese nationals." The 
meeting held at the Prime Minister's office decided to ban Man Gyong 
Bong 92 from entering Japanese ports even when a missile dropped 
into the Sea of Japan. 
 
There are no signs that Prime Minister Koizumi has given Abe any 
 
TOKYO 00003909  005 OF 008 
 
 
specific instructions, even though Abe reports to him. Koizumi 
appears to have entrusted the handling of the issue to Abe. 
 
It seems that Koizumi is trying to impress audiences at home and 
abroad that Abe would be able to head the Prime Minister's office by 
letting Abe handle the missile issue and serve as his proxy during 
his overseas trip. Koizumi is believed to think of Abe as his 
successor. He is probably urging Abe to boost his consciousness. 
 
Abe underscored that he was prepared for the role, saying, "As 
acting prime minister, I will handle matters responsibly." 
 
(4) Interview with Internal Affairs and Communications Minister 
Takenaka on Koizumi reforms over five years: Prime minister 
demonstrates leadership in policymaking, but concerned about change 
in nature of policy panel 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 4) (Full) 
July 11, 2006 
 
-- Has the situation in recent discussions at the Council on 
Economic and Fiscal Policy changed? 
 
"I think the Finance Ministry's intentions have been strongly 
reflected in recent debates, and I have complained about it. Under 
such a situation, the panel would find it difficult to play the role 
of an engine. 
 
In pursuing the task of reforming both expenditures and revenues, 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has demonstrated leadership as a 
powerful engine under the prime minister and centered on the Policy 
Research Council chairman. The prime minister has exerted 
leadership, but he takes a different style on each occasion." 
 
-- Some say they are satisfied at the party serving as an engine to 
promote the reform drive. 
 
-- I think that is a high-level political judgment. In carrying out 
reforms at the initiative of politicians, it would be ideal for the 
party to take the lead. In order to make the panel serve as an 
engine, the prime minister's strong leadership and cohesiveness in 
managing it are essential. It might be correct to think that this 
was possible under the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi. It has 
been proved that the policy council can be used as a tool, if 
desired. The next leader supposedly will be required to skillfully 
make use of the party, the government, and the council for different 
tasks." 
 
-- Some critics denounce the top-down management in the council as 
dictatorial. 
 
"As a result of Prime Minister Koizumi's reform efforts, reactionary 
forces have gained considerable influence. Roughly classified, there 
are three types of forces. First, the reinvigoration of the 
bureaucracy can be listed. Over the past five years, dissatisfaction 
built up in the heart of bureaucrats. There are many things that 
Prime Minister Koizumi and the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy 
have done over the opposition of government officials, such as 
postal privatization, the disposal of nonperforming loans, economic 
and fiscal management, and regulatory reform. 
 
Secondly, there are moves against globalization and market-oriented 
economic reform efforts. The Japanese economy has finally recovered 
 
TOKYO 00003909  006 OF 008 
 
 
enough to compete on an international scale over the past five 
years. If the reform drive is slowed down now, Japan will become 
less competitive in the world market. The government must deal 
severely with such illegal activities as the Livedoor and Murakami 
Fund scandals. That is why I feel regret when I hear some saying 
that regulatory reform is wrong. 
 
Resistance to a change of generation can be cited as the third 
force. In China, those who were born in the 1960s and graduated from 
college in the 1980s, securing key posts, have taken the lead in 
promoting reforms. Such a trend has yet to occur in Japan." 
 
-- Somewhat fed up with the ongoing reforms, the public now harbor a 
grievance and a sense of anxiety, don't they? 
 
"It is true that many people cannot control their uneasiness and 
hide their pent-up feelings. To my regret, although the economy has 
emerged from its worst state, the effect of the improvement has yet 
to reach all the population. The government is now being put to the 
test as to whether it will uphold the reform initiative on both 
political and economic fronts. 
 
-- The challenge of reforming spending and revenues will be left to 
the next administration as its homework. 
 
"The key point is whether priority is given to economic policy or 
fiscal policy. If priority is given to fiscal policy, when the 
economic situation becomes serious, the government will increase 
public works projects. When faced a fiscal deficit, it will hike 
taxes. But I have insisted in the Koizumi cabinet that priority 
should be given to economic policy. I take the view that the 
government, when faced with an economic recession, should promote 
the disposal of nonperforming loans and regulatory reform as 
measures to buoy up the economy, without relying on public works. 
 
Unless tax hikes are minimized, the people will not be convinced, 
and the economy will not improve, either. Four years ago, when the 
nation's financial deficit reached its peak, the primary balance 
shortfall totaled 28 trillion yen. This figure has dropped to below 
14 trillion now. This result is owing to the economic policy 
measures the government has so far taken, even without raising the 
consumption tax rate. In its debates since early this year, the 
policy panel has apparently had a bias toward increasing taxes. 
 
(5) Elimination of factional influence: Abe secretly asked Yuji 
Yamamoto, chairman of Parliamentary League to Support Second Chance, 
in March to support challenge for LDP presidential race 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
July 11, 2006 
 
Yuji Yamamoto, director general of the Accounting Bureau of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo 
Abe were sitting face to face at a Japanese restaurant near the Diet 
building in mid-March. At the time, Abe still did not clarify his 
intention to run in the LDP presidential race. Soon after the meal 
and drinks were served, Abe calmly spoke to Yamamoto: "I plan to run 
in the presidential election. Would you mind pulling together some 
young party members? 
 
Yamamoto, surprised at Abe's straightforward remark, automatically 
questioned: "Are you really going to run? You won't give up in the 
middle, will you?" 
 
TOKYO 00003909  007 OF 008 
 
 
 
"I am resolved to run in the race," Abe replied as if a further 
confirmation was needed. This was the primary reason for the setting 
up of a "Parliamentary League to Support a Second Chance," comprised 
of junior and mid-level lawmakers who support Abe. 
 
Yamamoto, now serving in his sixth-term in the Diet, belongs to the 
faction led by former Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura. In the 2003 
LDP presidential election, he backed Komura. The faction has only 16 
members, but Komura secured 54 votes in the end. It was difficult 
then for Yamamoto to get endorsement of 20 lawmakers, the number 
needed to run in the LDP presidential race. Yamamoto went through 
much trouble. 
 
Yamamoto later began to think that it would be good for the party 
and its lawmakers to select a president based on personal decisions, 
eliminating factional influence, Abe then approached him. A lawmaker 
close to Abe said, "Mr. Abe had his eyes on Yamamoto's efforts in 
the previous presidential election, and for that reason, he seems to 
have recruited him." 
 
The government's Council for Promotion of Second Chance is a perfect 
tool to organize support by keeping a distance from the presidential 
race. Yamamoto sought Komura's approval, saying, "Mr. Abe is from 
Yamaguchi Prefecture where you come from." He then started moving 
into action in early May. Yoshihide Suga, senior vice minister of 
internal affairs and communications, acted as liaison between Abe 
and Yamamoto. They were able to collect the endorsement of 20 
lawmakers (two later withdrew) in just one week. 
 
Those who played the leading role were Yamamoto, Suga, a Koga-Niwa 
faction member, who is now serving in his fourth term in the Diet, 
Hiroshi Kajiyama, a third-termer with no factional allegiance, and 
Isshu Sugawara, who belongs to no faction and is serving in his 
second term in the Diet. The selection of members impressed other 
because there was no factional influence, and the members 
represented generational change. A total of 94 junior and mid-level 
lawmakers (including lawmakers with no factional allegiance) from 
seven factions attended the first meeting of the parliamentary 
league on June 2 when Yamamoto assumed its chairmanship. The number 
of participants indicated how high the expectations of junior to 
mid-level lawmakers are of Abe. 
 
However, existing factions and veteran lawmakers reacted strongly to 
that new development. The second meeting, planned for mid-June, was 
delayed to sometime after the end of the regular Diet session. 
 
On June 16, Yamamoto called on former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori at 
his office since Mori had expressed displeasure with the 
parliamentary league, concerned that the group's moves might provoke 
a standoff with his favorite Yasuo Fukuda. 
 
Yamamoto said to Mori, "If Mr. Fukuda decides not to run, I would 
like you to support Mr. Abe." Mori responded, however, "We don't 
know whether Mr. Fukuda will run or not." Many in the party already 
saw the parliamentary league as working toward the formation of a 
government led by Abe. 
 
Abe stated that he would announce his candidacy in mid-August or 
later. Yamamoto and other members plan to set out on a stumping tour 
of regional areas late this month. They plan to hold meetings with 
local government official as an opening move to secure rank-and-file 
member votes. 
 
TOKYO 00003909  008 OF 008 
 
 
 
When and where the league will hold its second meeting is crucial 
for Abe in his drive to assume the prime minister's post. 
 
SCHIEFFER