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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 003838 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06 
Part-1 
INDEX: 
(1)  Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with 
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia 
 
 
(2)  Challenge of North Korea's missile firing-What's ahead in 
strategy toward DPRK: How to defend Japan; US military uncertain on 
whether to conduct counterattack operations 
 
(3)  Chinese military attaches made frequent contacts with Defense 
Agency officials; Military info leaks suspected 
 
(4)  Government made thorough preparations for Japan's response to 
Taepodong launch; Secret team launched 20 days before missile 
launches 
 
(5)  In speech in Sasebo, Economic Minister-Counselor urges US, 
Japan to energize business activities to strengthen bilateral ties 
 
ARTICLES: 
(1)  Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with 
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 1) (Abridged) 
Evening, July 10, 2006 
 
The Japanese government aims to put to a vote at the United Nations 
Security Council a resolution for imposing sanctions on North Korea 
as jointly proposed by Japan, the United States, and other 
countries. It intends to put the resolution to a vote on July 10 and 
will not budge on this schedule. In fact, Foreign Minister Taro Aso 
stressed to reporters: "It's better not to delay taking a vote." 
This remark seemed to reflect his judgment that it would be 
impossible for North Korea to soften its stance even if it is given 
more time. At a liaison meeting of the government and the ruling 
parties, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stated: "The international 
community needs to work together to work on (China and Russia)." 
 
This morning, the Japanese and US governments agreed to work in 
close cooperation with other countries, such as Britain and France, 
to try to get the resolution adopted at the UNSC. They also 
confirmed to do everything they can to persuade China and Russia, 
which are both reluctant to adopt the resolution. 
 
This policy line was confirmed by Foreign Minister Aso during his 
earlier conversation on the phone with Secretary of State Rice and 
during his meeting today at the ministry with Assistant Secretary of 
State Hill for East Asia and the Pacific, who is now making a tour 
of the concerned Asian nations, such as China and South Korea. Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe also talked on the phone to US 
Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs Hadley. 
 
Aso pointed out during the meeting with Hill: "It's important to 
adopt the resolution as quickly as possible." Hill emphasized the 
need to set in motion the six-party talks as swiftly as possible. 
 
(2)  Challenge of North Korea's missile firing-What's ahead in 
strategy toward DPRK: How to defend Japan; US military uncertain on 
whether to conduct counterattack operations 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 1) (Full) 
July 8, 2006 
 
Shigeru Handa, city desk 
 
TOKYO 00003838  002 OF 007 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06 
Part-1 
INDEX: 
(1)  Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with 
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia 
 
 
When North Korea fired seven ballistic missiles on July 5, a 
resolution that was certain to clear the municipal assembly of 
Okinawa City in Okinawa Prefecture was scrapped. It was a resolution 
against the planned deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability 3 
(PAC-3) surface-to-air intercept missiles to the US Air Force's 
Kadena base on the island prefecture. 
 
"Isn't it strange to discuss the matter under a state of tension?" A 
conservative member of the city's municipal assembly raised this 
question to make his case. This assemblyman's assertion gained 
ground. 
 
The ballistic missiles shocked Okinawa. Is Japan fully ready to 
defend itself? 
 
In December 2003, the government made a cabinet decision to 
introduce a missile defense (MD) system. This MD system counters 
intruding ballistic missiles in two stages. An Aegis-equipped 
destroyer of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) on stage 
launches sea-based Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) intercept missiles to 
shoot down a ballistic missile in midcourse phase. In case the SM-3 
misses the missile, the ground-based PAC-3 interceptor shoots it 
down in the terminal phase. PAC-3 deployment starts in March next 
year and SM-3 deployment in March 2008. 
 
However, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) will deploy the PAC-3 to 
only three of its six air defense missile groups. The PAC-3's shield 
is highly effective only in Tokyo, Gifu, Fukuoka, and their 
environs. This was noted in the Diet. There are people inside and 
outside the shield of PAC-3 intercept missiles. This problem has yet 
to be resolved. 
 
US Forces Japan (USFJ) plans to deploy the PAC-3 to the Kadena Air 
Base. This PAC-3 deployment to Kadena is intended to shield US 
military personnel on that base. 
 
The PAC-3 cannot be expected to intercept all intruding missiles 
even if its shield network covers the Japanese archipelago like a 
porcupine, according to Defense Agency Administrative Deputy 
Director General Takemasa Moriya. Given its cost effectiveness, 
there is a limit to depending on MD within the limited slot of 
defense spending. 
 
"If North Korea fires many ballistic missiles at Japan, that will 
constitute a defense emergency," one SDF staff officer said. "But," 
he continued, "the SDF is not capable of fighting overseas." The SDF 
officer added, "In this case, we can only expect US forces to strike 
North Korea." The officer indicated that his expectations were on 
the Japan-US alliance. 
 
Japan and the United States are to cooperate with each other to 
defend Japan under their security treaty. However, the 1997 
guidelines for defense cooperation between Japan and the United 
States state: "US forces will consider, as necessary, the use of 
forces providing additional strike power." With the wording 
"consider," the guidelines indicates that the United States will not 
automatically invoke its strike power. 
 
 
TOKYO 00003838  003 OF 007 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06 
Part-1 
INDEX: 
(1)  Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with 
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia 
 
The question then is how far the United States will go to defend 
Japan. In 1993, when there was a crisis over North Korea's suspected 
development of nuclear weapons, US forces studied the option of 
striking North Korea. The US military reportedly estimated 
casualties in a full-scale war at 52,000 for US forces, 490,000 for 
South Korean forces, and 1,000,000 including civilians. 
 
China and North Korea have concluded a treaty on friendship, 
cooperation, and mutual assistance, under which the two countries 
are obligated to cooperate with each other in the military area. 
This bilateral pact cannot be ignored. "US forces may only build up 
MD deployment in Japan," one in the Defense Agency surmises. 
 
If the MD system and the Japan-US alliance are insufficient, does 
Japan have any other ways to secure its people? 
 
"It would be effective to conclude a multilateral treaty that 
freezes missile firing in Northeast Asia," said Tetsuo Maeda, a 
journalist on military affairs. "In that case," Maeda added, 
"China's ballistic missiles, of course, and the US military's cruise 
missiles will be subject to the freeze." Maeda went on, "South 
Korea, which is now hurrying to develop short-range ballistic 
missiles, must join in, or it will be meaningless." He noted that no 
security policy can work out without high-level diplomacy. 
 
(3)  Chinese military attaches made frequent contacts with Defense 
Agency officials; Military info leaks suspected 
 
SANKEI (Top play) (Full) 
July 8, 2006 
 
Two military attaches to the Chinese embassy in Japan were 
repeatedly in touch with senior Defense Agency officials, sources 
revealed yesterday. Police authorities have confirmed on the spot 
that each of the two Chinese embassy attaches had met Defense Agency 
officials and others about 20 times. Police investigated the agency 
in secret to find if they had leaked military information, including 
classified information about the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). However, 
police investigations were discontinued because both Chinese 
attaches were returned home. Meanwhile, it became known in December 
last year that a Japanese diplomat at the Japanese consulate general 
in Shanghai had been urged by Chinese intelligence authorities and 
committed suicide in China. China is now suspected of having 
conducted espionage activities in Japan, as well. 
 
According to informed sources, a military attache to the Chinese 
embassy in Japan repeatedly met a former mid-level Defense Agency 
official at restaurants in Tokyo and other places around 1997. 
 
Police investigators watched and tailed them. As a result, they 
confirmed on the spot that the two had made about 20 secret contacts 
in one year. However, the attache suddenly returned to China. In 
2002, another attache repeatedly met a senior official of a Defense 
Agency research institution at restaurants and other places. The 
police confirmed that they had made more than 10 contacts in nearly 
one year. However, this Chinese attache also returned home shortly 
thereafter. 
 
Their contacts were periodic. Police authorities therefore kept tabs 
 
TOKYO 00003838  004 OF 007 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06 
Part-1 
INDEX: 
(1)  Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with 
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia 
 
on them for a long time, suspecting that those Defense Agency 
officials might have leaked defense secrets to their Chinese 
counterparts. However, the police had to discontinue investigations 
because both of the two Chinese attaches returned home. The police 
could not discover if intelligence had been leaked. 
 
The Defense Agency classifies confidential information into three 
categories-top secret, strictly secret, and secret. SDF personnel 
and other employees leaking secret or higher classified information 
will be charged with a violation of the SDF Law. 
 
In September 2000, a senior official of the Defense Agency was 
arrested by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) for a 
violation of the law. This official was alleged to have handed over 
a secret document to an attache from the Russian embassy in Japan. 
 
In March last year, another incident involving the Chinese embassy 
was brought to light. In this case, the MPD raided the Defense 
Agency, suspecting that a senior official of the agency stole a 
document with submarine data from his office. The stolen file is 
alleged to have gone to China through a trader who used to visit the 
Chinese embassy. 
 
In March this year, a Tokyo-based consultant firm's president was 
arrested for a violation of the Immigrant Control and Refugee 
Recognition Law. The president's pocket notebook seized by the MPD 
had a description indicating that the president was ordered by a 
Chinese embassy counselor to campaign for the unification of China 
and Taiwan. The MPD therefore made an unusual request to the 
counselor in April to report as a witness. This incident brought to 
light a part of Chinese spying. 
 
However, this is the first time that police investigators have 
uncovered questionable contacts between Chinese embassy staff 
members and Defense Agency officials. 
 
(4)  Government made thorough preparations for Japan's response to 
Taepodong launch; Secret team launched 20 days before missile 
launches 
 
North Korea launched a barrage of missiles on July 5. How did the 
Japanese prepare itself against such launches? The government led by 
the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) carried out 
thorough preparations for over a month in close cooperation with the 
United States. The government's ability to gather Intelligence and 
manage a crisis has improved markedly since North Korea launched a 
Taepodong-1 missile in 1998. But some challenges still remain 
unresolved. 
 
The government began considering measures against North Korean 
missiles in late May. 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe ordered Assistant Deputy Cabinet 
Secretary Hiroyasu Ando, a former Foreign Ministry official, to 
 
SIPDIS 
secretly study measures against missile launches. Aware of growing 
 
SIPDIS 
signals around the Taepodong base in North Korea, the Self-Defense 
Forces also kept a vigil. 
 
Finally on June 15, it became clear that North Korea mounted a 
 
TOKYO 00003838  005 OF 007 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06 
Part-1 
INDEX: 
(1)  Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with 
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia 
 
Taepodong-2 on the launch pad. 
 
That evening, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Masahiro Futahashi, 
assistant deputy chief cabinet secretaries Ando and Kyoji 
Yanagisawa, and Cabinet Intelligence Director Hideshi Mitani 
assembled at Abe's office on the fifth floor of Kantei. They formed 
the government's secret team to deal with missile launches. The team 
also served as the government's control tower to make arrangements 
for sanctions against North Korea and Japan's response. 
 
To be prepared against missile launches, the members also decided to 
remain in Tokyo on weekends in principle so that the relevant 
cabinet ministers, such as the chief cabinet secretary, the foreign 
minister, the defense chief, and the land, infrastructure, and 
transport minister, could assemble swiftly. In mid-June, the team 
generally outlined a nine-item sanctions plan, including a ban on 
port calls by the North Korean ferry Man Gyong Bong. 
 
In a tense atmosphere on the morning of July 4, the Kantei, based on 
the intelligence that the North would fire more than one missile in 
the early hours of July 5, began mapping out specific sanction 
measures to protest launches of Rodong and Scud missiles in addition 
to a Taepodong-2. 
 
The project team was split in views on the evening of July 4 over 
Japan's responses to such cases as a Taepodong-2 not flying over the 
Japanese archipelago and the North firing Rodong missiles alone. 
Many expressed cautious views about prohibiting Man Gyong Bong's 
port calls in reaction to such events. But Abe's words determined 
Japan's course of action: "North Korea has received two yellow cards 
due to the abduction and nuclear issues. It doesn't matter whether a 
Taepodong does not reach Japan or the North fires Rodongs, Japan 
will give that country a red card the next time around." 
 
In the end, the Taepodong-2 did not reach Japan, but the government 
in just a few hours after its launch formally decided to impose 
sanctions on the North, including banning the Man Gyong Bon from 
entering Japanese ports. 
 
Close cooperation with the United States 
 
Japan the United States worked closely to prepare themselves against 
North Korean missiles. 
 
On the morning of June 15, Abe discussed Japan's response with US 
Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer over breakfast at his official 
residence. 
 
"Are you sure that Japan will take a strong attitude, including 
economic sanctions?" Schieffer asked. In response, Abe said firmly, 
"Yes, I'm positive." Through the Abe-Schieffer breakfast meeting, 
Tokyo and Washington also generally nailed down the scenario of 
Japan seeking sanctions against North Korea at a UN Security Council 
meeting with the assistance of the United States. 
 
In a press conference at 9 a.m. July 5, five hours and a half after 
the North fired the first missile, Foreign Minister Taro Aso 
announced that Japan had called for an emergency UN Security Council 
meeting. 
 
TOKYO 00003838  006 OF 007 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06 
Part-1 
INDEX: 
(1)  Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with 
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia 
 
 
Abe said to his aides on July 7: "Japan's resolute stance prompted 
the United States, Britain, and France to support the UN Security 
Council sanctions resolution." 
 
System to notify local governments needs improvements 
 
A senior Cabinet Secretariat official noted: "Unlike North Korea's 
missile launch in 1998, we were all in all able to take the 
necessary steps this time." Abe held his first press conference 
about three hours after the North fired the first missile to give an 
outline of the missile launches. 
 
The government's information was patchy when the North launched a 
Taepodong-1 missile on August 31, 1998. The Defense Agency did not 
formally announce until 11 p.m., half a day after the launch, that 
the missile warhead had landed in the Pacific Ocean. The delay was 
ascribable to poor coordination between the Foreign Ministry and the 
Defense Agency for press announcements. 
 
The teamwork between Japan and the United States then was also poor. 
The US military was slow to inform the Self-Defense Forces of the 
missile launch. 
 
The July 5 launches, though, exposed the poor communication level 
between the central and local governments. 
 
The prefectural governments received fax messages on the missile 
launches from the Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry Fire 
and Disaster Management Agency at 6:30 a.m., three hours after the 
North fired the first missile. Hokkaido Governor Harumi Takahashi 
said disapprovingly in a press conference on July 5, "We need such 
information in a more timely manner. The fax message came after NHK 
news reports, and that's a problem." 
 
In the wake of the missile launches, the Fukui prefectural 
government went into an initial emergency mode for the first time to 
defend its people. Frustrated with a lack of information from the 
central government, Fukui Governor Issei Nishikawa reportedly 
directly called the Fire and Disaster Management Agency to gather 
information. 
 
The government was also slow to issue warnings to the ships 
navigating in the Sea of Japan and aircraft. 
 
A government source said, "The government directly explained things 
to the public on the situation in the press conference shortly after 
six o'clock." But local governments are urging the central 
government to find out what needs to be done to provide more 
information to the public in a timely manner and take necessary 
steps accordingly. 
 
(5)  In speech in Sasebo, Economic Minister-Counselor urges US, 
Japan to energize business activities to strengthen bilateral ties 
 
YOMIURI (Full) 
June 29, 2006 
 
Economic Minister-Counselor James Zumwalt at the US Embassy to Japan 
 
TOKYO 00003838  007 OF 007 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/10/06 
Part-1 
INDEX: 
(1)  Japan will not budge on taking vote on July 10, agreement with 
US to do all the two can do to persuade China, Russia 
 
delivered a speech titled "The Future of Japan-US Economic 
Relations" at the Shinwa Bank in Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture, 
yesterday. In the speech, Zumwalt stated: "There is no other 
economic issue between the US and Japan than the beef issue now. It 
is necessary to promote business activities between the two 
countries, as part of efforts to strengthen bilateral relations." 
 
The economic minister-counselor gave the speech before about 40 
local economists and others under the sponsorship of the 
Japan-America Society of Sasebo and other organizations. In 
reference to US-Japan relations, Zumwalt emphatically said: "The 
combined shares of outlays by the US and Japan for military affairs 
and research and development are 55 PERCENT  and 50 PERCENT , 
respectively." He added: "Japan is a partner with which the US finds 
it easier to cooperate based on common values." 
 
On the beef issue, Zumwalt stated: "I hope Japan will introduce 
international criteria, instead of its own ones." Turning to Japan's 
official development assistance (ODA), he remarked: "Japan's ODA has 
decreased by 30 PERCENT  over the past six years. It is important 
for Japan to disburse ODA funds commensurate with its economic 
strength." 
 
Regarding economic development in Sasebo, which houses US military 
bases, Zumwalt said: "It should be possible to bring in investments 
directly from the US." 
 
Zumwalt assumed his current post in April 2004. He will return to 
the US in August to become the director of the Office of Japanese 
Affairs in the East Asian Affairs Bureau at the State Department. 
 
SCHIEFFER