VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1666/01 2121454
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311454Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6422
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001666 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINTSTAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:  CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
CONVENTION (CWC): U.S. CW DESTRUCTION 100% EXTENSION REQUEST 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 1530 
 
This is CWC-064-06. 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (U) Reactions to the U.S. 100% extension request, and the 
recently submitted draft decision, continue to be 
surprisingly muted.  However, comments over the past several 
weeks, and during EC-46, are beginning to shape a way forward 
for the U.S. strategy to gain approval for its extension 
request at EC-47 and CSP-11. 
 
-------------------------- 
U.S CW DESTRUCTION UPDATES 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) In general, the latest approach to the U.S. CW 
Destruction Update, delivered at the destruction informals, 
was well received.  (Based on feedback that details from 
previous briefings in April and May were more than adequate, 
and that the briefings focused too heavily on excuses and not 
on a clear path forward, del and DOD worked to develop a 
briefing that focused instead on a site-by-site update, to 
include specific, current challenges faced at each site.) 
Delegations appreciated the focused approach, and del was 
told by UK del members that the consistent transparency and 
approach would be instrumental in eventual approval of the 
extension request.  Del believes it will be effective to 
maintain a factual, forward-looking focus in future 
briefings. 
 
¶3. (SBU) However, to ensure a thorough understanding of 
site-specific challenges, and to set the stage for approval 
of the U.S. extension request by CSP 11, del recommends that 
to give the briefing greater political impact, Ambassador 
Javits, as appropriate, take a more active role in the 
briefing to emphasize the U.S. political commitment to 
completion of destruction as quickly as possible. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In addition, although it is readily apparent to 
those involved in the program, the idea that devotion of 
greater resources to the U.S. destruction program would not 
significantly alter the pace of destruction is evidently 
still quite difficult for some delegations to grasp.  It may 
be useful to provide more detail on some of the specific 
challenges faced at certain sites.  Del also appreciates the 
opportunity it has had to provide input in the development of 
recent briefings, and recommends this approach continue so 
that feedback from local delegations to the OPCW can be used 
to shape an effective briefing for EC-47. 
 
------------------- 
NATIONAL STATEMENTS 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Of the relatively few statements during the EC-46 
general debate, most references to CW destruction were 
variations on a &general concern/disappointment8 theme that 
major possessors were making such slow progress toward the 
complete elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles. 
Finland, speaking on behalf of the EU, also expressed strong 
support for visits to possessor states that would enable the 
EC to &assess progress8 and, more notably, to &highlight 
to national decision makers in these States Party the 
expectations of the international community.8  (Del comment: 
 The second element would seem to be formal evidence of 
continued UK and German efforts to muster support for the 
idea of visits to capitals, as opposed to destruction sites 
alone, in order to retain the &appropriate political 
element.8  End comment.) 
 
¶6. (U) The Mexican statement was also sharply critical of 
slow progress in possessor states, including a confusing 
statement implying that requests to extend destruction 
deadlines to 2012 were inconsistent with the Convention (when 
 
presumably the real concern was the indication in the U.S. 
detailed plan that destruction operations may extend beyond 
2012).  Mexico requested a more detailed rationale for the 
extension requests that have been submitted, and noted that 
detailed plans should include &actions necessary for 
complete fulfillment of obligations under the Convention8 
and &maintain consistency and adhere to commitments.8  (Del 
comment:  This seems to be a reference to the same line of 
reasoning encouraged/followed by the Russian delegation, 
which is to submit a plan that conforms to the Convention, 
regardless of whether or not it is achievable.  End comment.) 
 Finally, Mexico expressed support for the idea of visits to 
possessor states, and recommended that these visiting 
delegations be supplemented by independent experts with a 
technical background. 
 
¶7. (U) Interestingly, despite UK and German warnings that the 
U.S. could expect the NAM and other, non-WEOG States Party to 
insist upon visits (to include visits in capitals), no 
reference was made to the UK proposal by either Malaysia 
(speaking on behalf of the NAM and China) or Sudan (speaking 
for the Africa Group).  Both statements included the standard 
lines expressing serious concern over the pace of CW 
destruction and urging possessor states to adhere to 
Convention deadlines, but made no mention of site visits. 
Sudan also referred to clear indications that, even after the 
5-year extension period, major possessors may be unable to 
complete destruction, thus (perhaps inadvertently) publicly 
placing the U.S. and Russia in the same category, a 
distinction the Russians have worked assiduously to avoid. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
RECENT REACTIONS TO U.S. DRAFT DECISION 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Although the U.S. decision was deferred to the next EC 
session without discussion, there were two notable 
exceptions.  South African Ambassador Mkhize, in her role as 
EC Chair, met with Ambassador Javits and del reps to express 
the &general concern8 of the Council regarding U.S. CW 
destruction, which she later defined as a disbelief that a 
country as wealthy and powerful as the U.S. could not somehow 
exercise the political will to meet the April 29, 2012 
deadline set by the Convention.  When del reps noted a lack 
of concern, or even questions, at almost any level (capitals, 
Ambassadorial, or working level), Mkhize explained that, at 
least locally, perhaps delegations were reluctant to approach 
a highly respected figure like Ambassador Javits with 
difficult political questions.  Del reps were unable to 
elicit specific concerns from Mkhize, who admitted it was 
difficult to address undefined issues, and promised she would 
herself consider ways to elicit more specific feedback. 
 
¶9. (U) Also of note was the last-minute Iranian (successful) 
attempt to draw public attention to the &differences8 
between the U.S. and Russian draft decisions.  As reported in 
REFTEL, Iran refused to approve report language on the two 
draft decisions, initially citing references to previous 
Conference decisions as problematic, but quickly moving on to 
highlight the U.S. potential inability to meet 2012, and the 
fact that Russia has made no such statements.  Iran used 
later sidebar discussions to press U.S. reps on their 
anticipated reaction if consensus was not reached on their 
draft decision. 
 
¶10. (U) Ambassador Javits explained that, in the absence of a 
CSP decision, the issue would be &in limbo,8 with the U.S. 
proceeding under its &in principle8 extension from the 2003 
CSP decision and that the obligation to destroy all CW stocks 
by April 29, 2012 would remain in effect.  Javits further 
offered that the U.S. would be &in the hands of the member 
states,8 and would continue to do everything in its power to 
destroy its CW stocks as quickly as possible.  Despite 
murmurings of dissatisfaction with the U.S. extension 
request, it is unlikely that most delegations would actually 
block a draft decision.  Iran, however, is showing an early, 
but expected, inclination to use &potential U.S. 
non-compliance8 to its political advantage. 
 
 
--------- 
WAY AHEAD 
--------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) As the UK,s proposal for &terms of reference8 
for visits to U.S. and Russian CW destruction sites have now 
been in circulation for several weeks, del recommends 
distributing U.S. proposed site visit parameters in the 
several weeks following EC-46.  Distribution now, as opposed 
to closer to EC-47, would have the advantage of making the 
U.S. bottom line clearly known early in the process.  It has 
also been obvious since April that delegations are unlikely 
to provide feedback in the absence of documents that can be 
used as a basis for discussion.  Despite the danger that 
early presentation of text lends itself to protracted 
negotiations, public availability of the informal proposal 
along with the draft decision text could be instrumental in 
eliciting constructive feedback in the run-up to EC-47. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Delegation has been informed by German Ambassador 
to the OPCW Alexander Petri (also the EC Vice Chair for the 
CW Cluster) that he is under considerable pressure to hold 
some sort of discussion/consultations on &CW Destruction.8 
When pressed, Petri has provided little information on the 
source of these requests, and it is not unlikely that he is 
creating some of this &pressure8 himself, given the strong 
views he has already expressed on the U.S. extension request. 
 However, it has become increasingly obvious that the purpose 
of convening such a group would actually be to talk about the 
U.S. and Russian draft decisions.  While del has pointed out 
to Petri that its decision language is already fairly 
accommodating in several areas, and that the general concern 
is pressuring the Russians to improve their text, an informal 
session of this nature could (if carefully managed) serve the 
purpose of drawing out delegations, positions on the 
decisions, something sometimes more difficult to accomplish 
in bilateral discussions. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In the run-up to EC-47, it will be critical to 
ascertain where States Party stand on the U.S. extension 
request, and to determine which SPs specifically are inclined 
to actually block the draft decision.  Del will use the next 
several months to approach all member states of the Executive 
Council, preferably one-on-one, to seek opinions, provide 
clarification, and foster an atmosphere of cooperation, 
understanding and responsiveness to political and technical 
concerns.  Del will continue to push back on attempts to 
formally define site visit parameters, and remind WEOG 
colleagues that a common goal of increased transparency in 
the U.S. and Russia is best achieved by focusing on principle 
as opposed to details.  Del will also work quietly with the 
Russian del to encourage acceptance of site visits, if only 
as a political gesture, and to consider supporting the U.S. 
proposal for specific parameters. 
 
SANDERS SENDS. 
BLAKEMAN